Common Pool Resources

Strategic Behavior, Inefficiencies, and Incomplete Information

Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Felix Muñoz-Garcia

• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781108831031
• eBook ISBN: 9781108913003
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Environmental Economics
• Index: Economics

Common Pool Resources include, for instance, fishing grounds, irrigation systems, forests and the atmosphere. Now more than ever, how we responsibly share and use those goods is a vital issue. This textbook introduces students of economics, business and policy studies to the key issues in the field. It uses a game-theory approach to help readers understand the mathematical representation of how to find equilibrium behavior in CPRs, how to identify the socially optimal appropriation, and how to measure the inefficiencies that arise. Algebra and calculus steps are clearly explained, so students can more easily reproduce the analysis and apply it in their own research. Finally, the book also summarizes experimental studies that tested theoretical results in controlled environments, introducing readers to a literature that has expanded over the last decades, and provides references for further reading.

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-title
• Title page
• Copyright information
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Matrices
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Common Pool Resources in a Static Setting
• 3 Common Pool Resources in a Dynamic Setting
• 4 Entry Deterrence in the Commons
• 5 Repeated Interaction in the Commons
• 6 Commons under Incomplete Information
• 7 Signaling in the Commons
• Appendix A Game Theory Tools
• Appendix B Solutions to Selected End-of-Chapter Exercises
• Bibliography
• Index