The Russian Invasion of Ukraine, February–December 2022

Destroying the Myth of Russian Invincibility

John S Harrel, John S. Harrel

• Publisher: Pen & Sword Military
• Year: 2025
• eBook ISBN: 9781399031783
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 21st Century History
• Index: History

"For the Military Enthusiast- an intriguing view of the war through the eyes of a contemporary Western Military Officer." — ARGunners.com On 24 February 2022, Russian forces invaded Ukraine, intending to overthrow the Zelensky government and bring the former Soviet republic back into the Russian sphere of control. Vladimir Putin clearly expected a quick victory and many in the West also predicted that Kiev would fall in a few days. But they hadn't counted on the skilled, courageous and determined resistance of the Ukrainian armed forces, nor the degree to which Russian military might had been overestimated. The initial Russian dash for Kiev was thrown back and their advances in the east and south also slowed by a combination of fierce resistance and their own unpreparedness, inadequate logistical planning and incompetent command. While the Russians ground their way forward in the east and south of the country, devastating towns and cities, they paid a heavy price in casualties and equipment losses. A carefully planned Ukrainian counteroffensive in the summer forced the invaders into a series of humiliating retreats. As winter approached, the Russians still held considerable territory but the initiative and strategic momentum had clearly swung to the defenders. The illusion of Russian invincibility was shattered forever. US Major General (retired) John S Harrel, a graduate of the US Army War College, trained with the Ukrainian army in the 1990s and in 2006, and commanded Ukrainian troops as part of the NATO force in Kosovo in 2005. His military expertise and detailed knowledge of the combatants informs this clear narrative and analysis of the course of the first 10 months of the war. He gives the reasons for the failure of the Russian invasion and, conversely, explains how the Ukrainian defense exceeded expectations, while acknowledging that strategic mistakes were made on both sides.

Table of contents

• Cover
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Map Symbols
• List of Maps
• List of Charts
• List of Photographs
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: ‘Welcome to Hell’
• Chapter 1 A Short History of Ukraine
• Chapter 2 Partnership for Peace
• Chapter 3 Ukraine: Terrain and Weather
• Chapter 4 Twenty-first Century Warfare
• Chapter 5 Road To War
• Chapter 6 Putin Tests NATO and EU Resolve
• Chapter 7 The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF)
• Chapter 8 Russian Armed Forces
• Chapter 9 The Effect of Russian Corruption and Deceptive Reporting, and Ukrainian Corruption
• Chapter 10 Comparison of Ukrainian and Russian Armed Forces’ Combat Capabilities on the Eve of the Invasion
• Chapter 11 Putin Invades and Stumbles
• Chapter 12 Defending Kyiv’s Eastern Flank
• Chapter 13 Battle for Kyiv March 2022
• Chapter 14 Battle for the Donbas 24 February–1 April 2022
• Chapter 15 The Naval Battle for the Black Sea Coast
• Chapter 16 Ground Conquest of the Black Sea Coast
• Chapter 17 The Battling Bastards of Mariupol
• Chapter 18 Russian Reorganization After Decisive Defeat
• Chapter 19 Battle for the Donbas, Summer 2022
• Chapter 20 Twenty-first Century Lend Lease and the Arsenals of Democracy
• Chapter 21 The Ukrainian Strategic Counteroffensive Shaping Operation
• Chapter 22 Ukrainian Counteroffensive: Strategic Deception and Shaping Operation, Donbas and Kharkiv Sectors
• Chapter 23 Russian Mobilization
• Chapter 24 Liberation of Kherson
• Chapter 25 Battle of Donbas and the Fight for Bakhmut, August–December 2022
• Chapter 26 Threat of Nuclear War: The Potential Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
• Chapter 27 Twenty-first Century Holodomor: Putin’s Terror Campaign
• Chapter 28 Rush to Join NATO
• Chapter 29 Lessons Learned and the 2023 Offensives
• Notes and References
• Plates