
- 226 pages
- English
- PDF
- Available on iOS & Android
The Strategy of Social Choice
About this book
Advanced Textbooks in Economics, Volume 18: The Strategy of Social Choice focuses on the social, economics, and political implications of social choice. The publication first surveys introduction, social choice functions and correspondences, and monotonicity and the arrow theorem. Discussions focus on efficiency, anonymity and neutrality, classifying voting methods, normative versus positive approach to voting, voting and the non-strategic theory of social choice, and development of the strategic theory of voting. The text then ponders on strategy-proofness and monotonicity and sophisticated voting. Topics include sophisticated implementation, voting by binary choices, strategy-proof social choice functions and game forms, Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, and restricted domains. The manuscript examines cooperative voting and voting by veto, including the minority principle, proportional veto core, voting by integer veto, effectivity functions, maximal and stable effectivity functions, and implementation by Nash equilibrium. The text is a dependable source of data for researchers interested in the process of social choice.
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Table of contents
- Front Cover
- The Strategy of Social Choice
- Copyright Page
- Table of Contents
- INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
- Dedication
- PREFACE
- CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
- CHAPTER 2. SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND CORRESPONDENCES
- CHAPTER 3. MONOTONICITY AND THE ARROW THEOREM
- CHAPTER 4. STRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND MONOTONICITY
- CHAPTER 5. SOPHISTICATED VOTING
- CHAPTER 6. VOTING BY VETO
- CHAPTER 7. COOPERATIVE VOTING
- INDEX