The Art of Coercion

Credible Threats and the Assurance Dilemma

Reid B. C. Pauly

• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Year: 2025
• eBook ISBN: 9781501782695
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Art of Coercion presents a fresh explanation for the success—and failure—of coercive demands in international politics.

Strong states are surprisingly bad at coercion. History shows they prevail only a third of the time. Reid B. C. Pauly argues that coercion often fails because targets fear punishment even if they comply. In this "damned if you do, damned if you don't" scenario, targets have little reason to obey.

Pauly illustrates this logic in nuclear counterproliferation efforts with South Africa, Iraq, Libya, and Iran. He shows that coercers face an "assurance dilemma": When threats are more credible, assurances not to punish are less so. But without credible assurances, targets may defy threats, bracing for seemingly inevitable punishment. For coercion to work, as such, coercers must not only make targets believe that they will be punished if they do not comply, but also that they will not be if they do.

Packed with insights for any foreign policy challenge involving coercive strategies, The Art of Coercion crucially corrects assumptions that tougher threats alone achieve results.

Table of contents

• Acknowledgments
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction: When Do Threats Work?
• 1. The Assurance Dilemma: Credible and Conditional Threats
• 2. “I at Least Want to Be Guilty”: Coercing South Africa into a Corner
• 3. “Sanctions with Inspectors”: Convincing Iraq to Come Clean
• 4. “They Will Laugh at Us”: Coaxing Libya to Confess
• 5. “We Knew That They Knew We Knew”: Compelling Iran to Concede
• Conclusion: The True Sources of Coercive Leverage
• Notes
• References
• Index