Legislative Oversight and Budgeting

A World Perspective

Rick Stapenhurst, Riccardo Pelizzo, David Olson, Lisa von Trapp

• Publisher: World Bank Publications
• Year: 2008
• eBook ISBN: 9780821376126
• Edition: 0
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In most countries, parliament has the constitutional mandate to both oversee and hold government to account. In light of the increased focus on good governance, academics and legislative strengthening practitioners are re-examining parliament's oversight function with a view to increasing public financial accountability, curbing corruption, and contributing to poverty reduction. This volume brings together research from many different perspectives and many different legislative settings worldwide. As the country case studies in section III demonstrate, the accountability mechanisms or oversight tools available to the legislature vary based on constitutionally defined powers of the legislature, institutional arrangements between the branches of government, divisions of authority between national, regional, and local governments, the degree of legitimacy conferred on the legislature, and the resources available to it. The budget process provides critical opportunities. Section II of this volume is devoted to examining budget oversight from the formulation and approval of the budget, to implementation and the ex post examination of the public accounts. Special attention is also paid to mechanisms to assist parliaments such as Public Accounts Committees and independent parliamentary budget offices. This title will be of interest to parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, legislative strengthening practitioners, and students of legislative development.

Table of contents

• Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction
• I. OVERVIEW
• II. OVERSIGHT AND THE BUDGET PROCESS
• III. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
• Index
• Box 3.1 Brazilian Congress and the Budget Process
• Box 3.2 Ghana’s Parliament and Introducing Value Added Tax
• Box 3.3 The Polish Parliament’s Budget Research Office
• Box 3.4 Enhancing Financial Transparency by Broadening Access to Information
• Box 3.5 Analyzing the Political Context
• Box 13.1 Objectives and Tasks for Scrutiny Committees
• Box 21.1 The Role of the House of Regional Representatives (DPD) in the Budget Process
• Box 21.2 Budget for Sale: The Role of Budget Brokers
• Figure 3.1 Heart of Executive-Legislative Relations: The Budget Process
• Figure 3.2 Fiduciary Obligation
• Figure 4.1 Model of a Controlled Process
• Figure 5.1 Index of Legislative Budget Institutions
• Figure 18.1 Governance of the Budget
• Figure 18.2 Budget Institutions and Fiscal Discipline in Latin America, 2000
• Figure 18.3 Reform Path of Budget Institutions in Latin America, 1990–2005
• Figure 18.4 Index of Legislative Budgeting in Latin America, 2003
• Figure 21.1 Responsibilities in the Public Expenditure Management Cycle
• Table 1.1 The Tools of Legislative Oversight
• Table 1.2 Use of Oversight Tools, by Number of Respondents
• Table 1.3 Number of Legislative Oversight Tools Used by Surveyed Countries
• Table 1.4 Tools of Legislative Oversight, by Form of Government
• Table 1.5a Number of Legislative Oversight Tools, by Form of Government and Country
• Table 1.5b Number of Oversight Tools, by Form of Government
• Table 1.6 Number of Oversight Tools, by Income Level
• Table 1.7 Use of Committee Hearings, by Income Level
• Table 1.8 Use of Hearings in Plenary Sittings, by Income Level
• Table 1.9 Use of Questions, by Income Level
• Table 1.10 Use of Question Time, by Income Level
• Table 1.11 Use of Interpellation, by Income Level
• Table 1.12 Use of Committees of Inquiry, by Income Level
• Table 1.13 Presence of Ombudsman as Oversight Tool, by Income Level
• Table 1.14 Number of Oversight Tools, by Level of Democracy
• Annex Table 1 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Formally Democratic
• Annex Table 2 Number of Oversight Tools and the Probability That a Country Is Liberal Democratic
• Table 2.1 Correlation Analysis of Level of Democracy and Oversight Tools
• Table 2.2 Logistic Regression, with Formal Democratic Status as a Dependent Variable
• Table 2.3 Logistic Regression, with Liberal Democracy as a Dependent Variable
• Table 2.4 Oversight Tools, Income Level, and Democracy
• Table 2.5 Oversight Tools, Income Level, and Democracy in Africa
• Table 2.6a Number of Oversight Acts in Italy’s Legislature—Chamber of Deputies, 1976 to 2001
• Table 2.6b Number of Oversight Acts from the 7th to the 13th Italian Senate
• Table 2.7a The Upward Trend in Oversight Acts—Chamber of Deputies
• Table 2.7b The Upward Trend in Oversight Acts—Senate
• Table 2.8a Interpellations Directed to the Ministry of Budget from the Chamber
• Table 2.8b Interpellations Directed to the Ministry of Budget from the Senate
• Table 2.9a Interpellations Addressed to the Foreign Affairs Ministry from the Chamber of Deputies
• Table 2.9b Interpellations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from the Senate
• Table 2.10 Effectiveness of Oversight Tools in the 14th Legislature
• Table 2.11 Logit Models, with Oversight Tools and Democracy
• Table 3.1 Legislatures’ Powers to Amend the Budget
• Table 5.1 Spearman Correlations between Indices
• Table 5.2 Comparison of Budget-Amending and Non-Budget-Amending Legislatures
• Annex Table 1 Data for the Index and Amendment Dummy
• Annex Table 2 Construction of Composite Variables
• Table 6.1 When Does the Executive Release a Prebudget Statement to the Public?
• Table 6.2 Does the Prebudget Statement Describe the Government’s Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework?
• Table 6.3 Does the Prebudget Statement Describe the Government’s Policies and Priorities That Will Guide the Development of Detailed Estimates for the Upcoming Budget?
• Table 6.4 Are Any Arrangements in Place for the Legislature to Establish Aggregate Expenditure Ceilings before Beginning Debate on Individual Expenditure Items?
• Table 6.5 In Practice, Does the Legislature Generally Approve the Budget as Presented by the Executive?
• Table 6.6 Is There a Specialized Budget Research Organization Attached to the Legislature That Conducts Analyses of the Budget (Organization May Be Part of the Audit Offi ce)?
• Table 6.7 What Best Describes the Committee Structure for Dealing with the Budget?
• Table 6.8 Does a Legislative Committee (Or Committees) Hold Public Hearings on the Macroeconomic and Fiscal Framework Presented in the Budget in Which Testimony from the Executive Branch and the Public Is Heard?
• Table 6.9 Does the Executive Present More Details or Provide a Better Explanation of any Budget Proposal, if Members of the Legislature (Including from Minority Parties) Request Such Information?
• Table 7.1 If the Budget Is Not Approved by the Legislature before the Start of the Fiscal Year, Which of the Following Describes the Consequences?
• Table 7.2 Provisions for Spending in the Event No Budget Is Enacted before the Fiscal Year, by System of Government
• Table 8.1 Results Achieved by the PAC: How Frequently Has the PAC Achieved the Following Result?
• Table 8.2 Success and Composition of the PAC: How Important Is This Factor?
• Table 8.3 Success and Powers of PACs: How Important Are These Factors?
• Table 8.4 Answers to the Question: Are Practices and Procedures Important for the Success of a PAC?
• Table 8.5 The Least Important Practices and Dynamics for the Success of the PAC
• Table 9.1 Distribution of CBO Staff
• Table 9.2 Staffing by Core Function
• Table 10.1 Characteristics of Budget Offices Reviewed
• Table 12.1 Federal Budget Laws, 1992–2002
• Table 14.1 Government and Opposition Average Party Cohesion, 1991–98
• Table 14.2 Estimated Veto Frequency, 1991–98
• Table 18.1 Legislative Capabilities Index in Latin America (2005)
• Table 18.2 Legal Framework of Budgetary Systems in Latin America, 2005
• Table 18.3 Executive-Legislative Budget Relations in Latin America
• Table 19.1 Italian Budget Laws for 1982 to 2001
• Table 19.2 Regression Analyses
• Table 20.1 Deputies’ Perception of Importance of Individual Activities of the Parliament, 1993 to 2003
• Table 20.2 Voting on the State Budgets in the 1st Electoral Term
• Table 20.3 Voting on the State Budgets on the 2nd Electoral Term
• Table 20.4 Voting on the State Budgets in the 3rd Electoral Term
• Table 20.5 Voting on the State Budgets in the 4th Electoral Term
• Table 20.6 Committees according to Their Prestige in the Chamber of Deputies of the Czech Republic
• Table 20.7 Activity of the Budget Committee over Five Terms, 1990–2004
• Table 20.8 Fulfillment of the State Budget between 1991 and 2003
• Annex Table 20.1 The Composition of the Government and Its Support in the Parliament
• Annex Table 20.2 Names of Political Parties in English and Czech and Their Czech Abbreviations
• Table 21.1 Top 10 Political Parties in the 1999 and 2004 General Elections
• Annex DPR Sectoral Commissions and Their Government Working Counterparts