Smart Power

Toward a Prudent Foreign Policy for America

Ted Galen Carpenter

• Publisher: Cato Institute
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN: 9781933995168
• eBook ISBN: 9781933995946
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The United States confronts a host of foreign policy problems in the 21st century, yet the Republic's security strategy is increasingly muddled and counterproductive. The litany of misplaced priorities and policy failures grows ever larger. Disagreements over Iraq policy as well as other matters have soured Washington's relations with its long-time European allies. NATO, the centerpiece of Washington's transatlantic policy for nearly six decades, is foundering in Afghanistan and displays a growing lack of cohesion and relevance. Tensions between the United States and Russia are on the rise as authoritarianism has reemerged in that country and Moscow resists Washington's assertive policies, especially the ongoing expansion of NATO into traditional Russian spheres of influence and the repeated displays of contempt for Russian interests in the Balkans and other regions.

American policymakers grapple with the prospect of new and volatile nuclear powers, most notably North Korea and Iran. It remains to be seen whether Washington's strategy of using multilateral negotiations involving North Korea's neighbors to induce Pyongyang to end its quest for nuclear weapons will succeed. The more hardline strategy of imposing economic sanctions and considering the use of military force is clearly not working with regard to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Other problems, such as the Taiwan issue, are just clouds on the horizon at present, but they have the potential to cause serious trouble in the coming years. The Taiwan problem highlights the danger inherent in Washington's habit of making ill-advised security commitments to small, vulnerable client states that are not crucial to America's own security and well being. In the case of Taiwan, such an obligation could lead to armed confrontation between the United States and China.

Ted Galen Carpenter examines these and other foreign policy challenges that America confronts in the 21st century and diagnoses what is wrong with Washington's current approach. Throughout these essays, he outlines an alternative strategy that would protect America's security while avoiding unnecessary and unrewarding military adventures.

PART 1

Trying to Thwart
the Drive to War
against Iraq

Introduction

Those foreign policy experts who tried to stem the surge toward war with Iraq in 2002 and early 2003 faced a daunting challenge. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had understandably alarmed the American people and made them unusually receptive to arguments in favor of preemptive military action to neutralize any possible security threat. Bush administration officials skillfully (some critics might say cynically) exploited the public’s fears to make the case for attacking Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein’s regime from power. Although most officials did not explicitly seek to link Iraq to the 9-11 attacks, since there was no credible evidence of Baghdad’s complicity, they rarely passed up the opportunity to make that linkage through innuendo. The message they conveyed to the American people over and over again was that if the United States did not oust Saddam, the danger of another 9-11—this time perhaps involving nuclear weapons—would reach intolerable levels. National security adviser Condoleezza Rice epitomized that strategy when she stated that America could not afford to wait for a smoking gun to emerge in the form of a mushroom cloud.

Once the Iraq mission turned sour, administration policymakers and their political allies tended to argue that the case for war against Iraq had never been based entirely on the issue of weapons of mass destruction. That is technically true. Proponents of war did occasionally cite other reasons for invading and occupying the country, including the prospect that post–Saddam Iraq would become a secular, pro-Western democratic model that would transform the entire Middle East. But fears about weapons of mass destruction were always the dominant component of the case for war. Those who now argue otherwise engage in flagrant historical revisionism.

In making the case against going to war, I emphasized two themes. First, I argued that even if Saddam should someday obtain nuclear weapons, the United States would be able to deter Iraq in the same way that it had deterred other bad actors (most notably the Soviet Union and Maoist China) in the past. War, therefore, was unnecessary, and it threatened to disrupt an already delicate balance of power in the Persian Gulf region. Second, I warned that contrary to the rosy projections of the Bush administration and its neoconservative allies, the mission in Iraq would not be short and easy. By overthrowing Saddam, the United States would become responsible for the future of a fragile, fractious country. The deep divisions among Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds created the specters of secessionism and civil war, not the likelihood of a united, democratic polity. I warned that Washington was embarking on a dubious nation-building mission of indefinite duration with little prospect of success.

Those of us who made such arguments were drowned out by the pro-war chorus. The administration had powerful political allies who dominated the newspaper op-ed pages and the media airwaves. Prowar pundits repeatedly exacerbated the public’s fears about new terrorist attacks and smeared anti-war forces as being soft on terrorism. It was hardly surprising that Fox News, the Wall Street Journal, and other conservative outlets amplified the administration’s calls for war. What was surprising was the pro-war stance—or at least supine behavior—of many supposedly liberal outlets. Critics of the war found it extraordinarily difficult to get exposure for their arguments. It is emblematic of the problem that none of the articles against going to war contained in this chapter appeared in the agenda-setting newspapers. Yet that outcome was not for lack of trying. Most of the articles were first offered to one or more of those outlets. Other anti-war experts reported similar problems getting their critiques accepted by prominent publications. The unsettling reality is that the case against war did not receive a fair hearing, and that was a troubling failure of the media to serve as vigilant watchdogs regarding government policies. In the run-up to war with Iraq, the media too often were lap dogs rather than watchdogs.

That was tragic, because the predictions of war proponents were so wildly inaccurate. The Iraq mission did not turn out to be, as neoconservative pundit and former Reagan administration official Kenneth Adelman stated confidently, a ‘‘cakewalk.’’ Instead, it became a bloody, frustrating, multisided conflict that continues to plague us to this day. In retrospect, the predictions made by those of us who sought to prevent the Iraq war proved to be much closer to the mark than the rosy scenarios our opponents embraced.

Overthrow Saddam? Be Careful What
You Wish For

Advocates of making the ouster of Saddam Hussein the next stage in America’s war against terrorism are becoming increasingly vocal. The United States has the military power to achieve that goal. Yet no matter how emotionally satisfying removing a thug like Saddam may seem, Americans would be wise to consider whether that step is worth the price. The inevitable U.S. military victory would not be the end of America’s troubles in Iraq. Indeed, it would mark the start of a new round of headaches. Ousting Saddam would make Washington responsible for Iraq’s political future and entangle the United States in an endless nationbuilding mission beset by intractable problems.

True, some optimists argue that the Iraqi opposition in exile—especially the largest umbrella group, the Iraqi National Congress—can not only defeat Saddam but can set up a stable successor government with only modest assistance from Washington. But as Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni, former commander of U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, notes, the INC is a motley assortment of groups running the gamut from Marxist revolutionaries to Islamic fundamentalists. That hardly seems the basis for a stable, democratic system.

The reality is that American troops would be needed to install a new government. They also would have to stay on to protect it from authoritarian elements and create democratic institutions strong enough to survive the eventual departure of U.S. occupation forces. Otherwise, another military dictator—a ‘‘new Saddam’’—would likely emerge. Installing and preserving a democratic Iraqi government would entail a nation-building mission of indefinite duration that would dwarf the ongoing efforts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

The unpromising prospects for a stable democratic system in Iraq should be sufficient to dissuade those who want the U.S. military to march to Baghdad. But there are other, equally daunting problems.

Most notably there is the issue posed by two persistent regional secession movements: the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south. Washington would have to decide whether to commit itself to preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq or to give its blessing to the secessionists. Either option has a serious downside.

Holding Iraq together might take some doing. Attempting to force the Kurds and Shiites to remain under Baghdad’s jurisdiction would probably provoke ferocious resistance. Washington would then face the task of explaining to the American people why U.S. troops were dying in military campaigns to suppress the aspirations of populations that merely want to throw off the shackles of Iraq’s Sunni Muslim elite.

Yet endorsing the creation of independent Kurdish and Shiite states also has drawbacks. U.S. officials would be presiding over the dismemberment of Iraq—an action that the Sunnis (and others throughout the Islamic world) would certainly resent. Dismemberment would also eliminate the only significant regional military counterweight to Iran.

Furthermore, the establishment of an independent Kurdistan would create a thorny problem for Washington’s ally, Turkey. A Kurdish republic would be an irresistible political magnet for Turkey’s Kurdish population—more than half of all Kurds living in the region. Ankara has waged a bloody war for more than 17 years to suppress a Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey. Turkish forces have repeatedly entered northern Iraq since the Gulf War, taking advantage of the fact that Saddam’s regime does not exercise effective control of the area. Turkey would find its difficulties multiplied if rebel forces could find sanctuary in a neighboring Kurdish state.

If credible evidence emerges that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks, the United States would have no alternative but to remove Saddam from power despite the potential risks and problems. But absent such a justification, a decision to oust Saddam and become responsible for Iraq’s political future is ill advised.

United Press International, January 15, 2002

Missing the Point: Bush’s Speech
to the UN

In his speech to the UN General Assembly, President Bush challenged the world body to enforce the various resolutions that it had passed since 1991 requiring Iraq to unconditionally accept the dismantling of its chemical and biological weapons and nuclear research facilities. If the UN proves unwilling or unable to enforce those resolutions, Bush indicated that the United States would take action on its own.

Bush’s speech was a classic case of missing the point. The pertinent issue is whether Saddam Hussein poses a serious threat to the security of the United States. If he does, this country is justified in taking whatever steps are necessary to terminate that threat. Whether the UN approves of Washington’s course is irrelevant. Although it might be desirable to have the UN’s endorsement, America’s security cannot be held hostage to the vagaries of multilateral diplomacy.

But does Iraq pose a serious, credible threat to America? If President Bush were a prosecutor in a criminal case, the evidence that he has presented thus far would not be sufficient to secure an indictment, much less a conviction. The administration’s case essentially argues that: 1) Saddam Hussein is intent on acquiring nuclear weapons; 2) he is on the verge of success in that effort; and 3) if he does develop nuclear weapons, he will use them against the United States or its allies.

The administration may be right on the first point, but its other two allegations are dubious. Recent reports from two prominent think tanks concluded that Iraq is years away from being able to build even a crude nuclear weapon, much less deploy a usable arsenal. Moreover, even if Iraq is able someday to deploy a small arsenal, the administration has yet to explain why the United States would be unable to deter an attack.

That professed loss of faith in deterrence seems disingenuous. The United States successfully deterred the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin and his successors. We were able to do so for decades, even though the USSR ultimately acquired thousands of nuclear weapons. The United States also deterred China when that country developed a nuclear weapons capability beginning in the mid-1960s.

Given that historical record, why does Washington conclude that Saddam Hussein would be undeterrable? The president and his advisers cannot believe that Saddam is more brutal than the totalitarian dictators the United States deterred in the past. Stalin and Mao were genocidal monsters who make Saddam look like a rank amateur. Moreover, brutality is not the same as irrationality. Stalin and Mao butchered millions of their own people—70 million combined—but they also understood that they would be signing their own death warrants if they ever attacked the United States.

Saddam likewise understands that the consequence of attacking the United States would be political and personal annihilation. Notably, he refrained from using chemical weapons against U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf war. Furthermore, a man who sleeps in a different location each night to maximize his chances of survival does not seem the suicidal type.

Even the argument that Saddam might pass along a nuclear weapon to al Qaeda or another terrorist group is not credible. Saddam knows that if terrorists detonated such a weapon against an American target, he would be at the top of a short list of suspects. Terrorists are far more likely to get a weapon of mass destruction on the black market from the Russian mafia than they are to get it from Iraq.

The administration’s most plausible argument is that Baghdad might threaten its neighbors with nuclear weapons. But even that scenario is fairly remote—and it is not directly relevant to America’s security. An attack on Israel is highly unlikely because Israel has an arsenal of 200 to 300 nuclear bombs and warheads. Iraq’s other neighbors are somewhat more vulnerable. But collectively they have far more military power than does Baghdad and that should act as a credible deterrent.

Taking the United States into war is a very serious matter, and it is a path that should be taken only if there is no reasonable alternative. That is especially true in the current case. An attack on Iraq would be a highrisk venture with significant potential to destabilize the entire Middle East–Persian Gulf region. The one scenario in which Saddam might use chemical or biological weapons in his possession is if the United States invades his country to overthrow his regime and kill him. At that point, he would have nothing to lose, and the logic of deterrence would no longer apply.

Even if we manage to avoid that nightmare and the war goes quickly and easily, victory simply means that the United States would undertake another long and futile nation-building mission. Almost all experts agree that U.S. troops would have to stay in Iraq for years to stabilize the situation. That presence would be seen as flagrant U.S. imperialism throughout the Islamic world. And the United States would become even more of a lightning rod for Muslim anger than it is already.

The burden of proof is rightly on those who contend that we must adopt such a perilous course. President Bush did not meet that burden of proof in his speech to the United Nations. Indeed, he and his advisers have failed to make a compelling case in any setting.

Orange County Register, September 15, 2002

‘‘False Historical Analogies on Iraq’’

Supporters of the military action against Iraq have recently launched a barrage of accusations that their opponents are advocates of ‘‘appeasement.’’

Comparisons are made repeatedly to the 1930s and the failure of the Western powers to stand up to Adolf Hitler. Opponents of war with Iraq are likened to the hapless British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.

One outraged warhawk even implied such proponents of caution as former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft and Anthony Zinni, a retired general, were worse than Chamberlain.

Such arguments confirm that a little historical knowledge can be a dangerous thing. Participants in debates on current foreign policy issues typically know just enough history to make simplistic and misleading historical analogies to bolster their case.

Knee-jerk opponents of military action anywhere believe that every possible arena for the application of U.S. power threatens to become ‘‘another Vietnam.’’ Hawks believe that a refusal to use U.S. military power, even in the most obscure and insignificant locales, threatens to repeat the disaster of appeasement in the 1930s.

Both sides should renounce their overused analogies, and violators should be subject to sanctions. Some misuses of history, though, are worse than others.

Excessively invoking the Vietnam analogy should be considered a Class A misdemeanor. But promiscuously invoking the 1930s analogy ought to be a felony.

Even comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler is a bit of a stretch. Saddam is a garden-variety Third World thug; Hitler was a genocidal monster of historic proportions. It trivializes Hitler’s crimes to equate the two dictators.

Moreover, Saddam was Washington’s de facto ally during the 1980s when he attacked Iran. Apparently, U.S. officials at this time in the Reagan administration did not consider him the ‘‘new Hitler.’’

More importantly, Iraq is not Nazi Germany. The European crisis of the 1930s involved one of the world’s great powers—one with the secondlargest economy and large, well-trained, well-equipped military force—embarking on a frightening and highly destabilizing expansionist binge.

Iraq, on the other had, has a population of 25 million (only a little larger than the Netherlands), an economy less than one-tenth the size of Denmark’s, and a military force that has been degraded by more than a decade of sanctions.

Nazi Germany posed a global threat. Iraq poses—at worst—a threat only to its immediate neighbors.

Even if one believes the ‘‘nightmare scenario’’ that Iraq is on the verge of acquiring a nuclear-weapons capability (and there are ample reasons to doubt that scenario), the Iraqi threat still pales in comparison with that posed by Nazi Germany.

At most, Baghdad could develop only a small number of nuclear weapons. It would hardly be enough to credibly threaten the United States, given America’s vast nuclear arsenal.

The United States was able to deter far more capable nuclear powers, including the Soviet Union under Josef Stalin and his successors and China under Mao Zedong. We should certainly be able to deter Iraq.

Indeed, Iraq wouldn’t even be the leading nuclear power in its region. Pakistan has a significant arsenal and Israel—with an est...

Table of contents

• Acknowledgments
• Introduction.. America’s Strategic Incoherence
• PART 1 Trying to Thwart the Drive to War against Iraq
• PART 2 Assessing the Iraq Debacle
• PART 3 America’s Other War: Afghanistan
• PART 4 The War on Terror
• PART 5 Attempting to Head Off War against Iran
• PART 6 Prospects for Peace and Democracy in the Middle East
• PART 7 New Approaches for the Troubled Korean Peninsula
• PART 8 The Dangerous Taiwan Issue
• PART 9 A Delicate Relationship with China
• PART 10 NATO, the Balkans, and Relations with Russia
• PART 11 The Disastrous War on Drugs
• PART 12 The Connection between Foreign Policy and Domestic Liberty