Railroads and American Political Development

Infrastructure, Federalism, and State Building

Zachary Callen

• Publisher: University Press of Kansas
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780700623006, 9780700623006
• eBook ISBN: 9780700623013
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

America’s founders envisioned a federal government of limited and enumerated powers. What they could not envision, of course, was the vast and complex infrastructure that the growing nation would demand—a demand that became ever clearer as the power and importance of railroads emerged. The requirements of a nationwide rail network, it also became clear, far exceeded the resources of state and local government and private industry. The consequences, as seen in this book, amounted to state building from the ground up. In Railroads and American Political Development Zachary Callen tells the story of the federal government’s role in developing a national rail system—and the rail system’s role in expanding the power of the federal government. The book reveals how state building, so often attributed to an aggressive national government, can also result from local governments making demands on the national state—a dynamic that can still be seen at work every time the US Congress takes up a transportation bill.

Though many states invested in their local railroads, and many quite successfully, others were less willing or less capable—so rail development necessarily became a federal concern. Railroads and American Political Development shows how this led to the Land Grant Act of 1850, a crucial piece of legislation in the building of both the nation’s infrastructure and the American state. Chronicling how this previously local issue migrated to the federal state, and how federal action then altered American rail planning, the book offers a new perspective on the exact nature of federalism. In the case of rail development, we see how state governments factor into the American state building process, and how, in turn, the separation of powers at the federal level shaped that process. The result is a fresh view of the development of the American rail system, as well as a clearer picture of the pressures and political logic that have altered and expanded the reach of American federalism.

1. The Problem of Federalism and State Building

Railroads first appeared in the United States in 1827, and they were not quite the grand engineering marvels that we might imagine today. The very first American railroad constructed was the Granite Railroad in Quincy, Massachusetts. The Granite Railroad was three miles long, and its sole purpose was to move building stones from the quarry to the shipyard. In the late 1820s and early 1830s, a number of rail lines similar to the Granite Railroad emerged, particularly in the coal-rich regions of Pennsylvania. These early railroads, while modest, served an important role in filling gaps in the existing turnpike and water infrastructure of the early nineteenth-century United States (Larson 2001; Stover 1997). However, from these quiet beginnings, there would emerge a massive infrastructure network that would radically alter American economic, social, and political development.

In fact, the value of railroads to the American infrastructure network was almost immediately obvious. By the late 1820s, there was an explosion of railroads being built. Rail projects quickly emerged in Maryland, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina (Larson 2001). And, contrary to popular expectations, the American rail story was never really about private industrialists building the nation’s infrastructure (Sellers 1991; White 2003, 2011). From the very beginning, rail development was a mixture of public and private resources, often with public funds providing a critical piece of any given project. Of course, the public funds involved were often not from the federal government. During the early days of rail development, a number of legal battles over whether federal action on railroads was permissible combined with sectional rivalries to prevent Washington, DC, from taking an active hand in railroads. Instead, as a consequence of American federalism restricting federal authority over a range of policy issues, rail development was a local affair. States, counties, and cities stepped into the gap created by federal inaction and contributed land, granted money, directly invested in private rail companies, and offered tax breaks to the very first rail projects.

Given the importance of local funds to jump-starting many early railroads, it is not surprising that one of the first American railroads to propose actually carrying freight and passengers over a meaningful distance also benefited from active local governments. At the end of the 1820s, the state of Pennsylvania undertook a massive infrastructure project to more effectively connect the two distant ends of the state. The Pennsylvania Mainline was a hybrid project comprising both rail and canal sections. While never especially successful financially, the Mainline nonetheless opened up Philadelphia to western markets and also displayed the possibility inherent in rail technology. Further, the Pennsylvania legislature’s support of the Mainline was the first in a trend. Many states invested in their local railroads, and many quite successfully. For instance, Maryland’s legislature invested in the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and that railroad was eventually so successful it could barely keep up with demand (Goodrich 1960; MacGill 1917; Riegel 1926; Stover 1997). At first glance, then, it appears that state governments were able to support railroads without any federal support. This suggests that local state actions could coalesce into a larger entity without any kind of central support or coordination, thereby constructing a state from decentralized and local piecemeal contributions rather than a single federal action.

Unfortunately, the story is not quite that simple. There were two barriers that emerged that prevented states from being able to successfully supplant the federal government in rail development. First, it turns out that not all states were swayed by the demands of local industrialists or competition with the rail projects of their neighbors. Thus, many states simply did not offer support of any kind to rail development. Some states, such as Ohio, had built new canal systems just a few years prior and simply were not well situated to spend funds on another major infrastructure project (Larson 2001; Scheiber 1969). Other states, like Iowa, had state constitutional limits for public spending on infrastructure (Larson 1984). Even some states that engaged in rail promotion did so as minimally as possible: Alabama supported only one rail project (Cline 1997). Thus, the first impediment to a rail system built primarily through local efforts was a lack of action on the part of many state legislatures. Without this kind of public support, many early rail lines struggled to gain traction and grow.

But the second problem with relying on local actors to supply the American rail system was that many states were simply not very good at rail development. For instance, many states, acting on the competitive spirit that exists between rival states, were reluctant to connect local railroads with the rail systems emerging beyond their own borders. Just as problematic were states that simply could not launch rail programs at all. For instance, by the 1830s, Illinois’s legislature was ready to engage in rail development. As a western state rich in resources, it is not surprising that Illinois’s citizens and political leaders would view a railroad as a sound investment. But the rail project itself quickly grew out of control, with more and more miles of track being added. This ambition, combined with an economic recession, ultimately doomed the Illinois rail project (Corliss 1950; Stover 1975). What the Illinois case underscores is that while federalism placed responsibility for internal improvements with the states, federalism did not always give states the power necessary to complete those tasks (Rodden and Rose-Ackerman 1997). The combination of indifference to railroads, poor regional coordination, and failed rail projects reveals that while there was a possibility for states to use their funds and legal powers to build a rail system without federal assistance, the reality was much more grim and difficult.

Of course, the American rail story hardly ends with the failure of the state governments to support the nascent American rail system. After all, by 1869, the Transcontinental Railroad would directly connect the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, both symbolically and literally linking the nation together in the wake of the Civil War. The federal policies that supported infrastructure projects such as the Transcontinental Railroad appeared because, in light of local difficulties with rail development, railroad development became a federal concern. This federal intervention began in Illinois, as a consequence of Stephen Douglas’s work in the Senate. Illinois’s political elite, perhaps smarting from the failure to build a railroad on their own, turned to the federal government for aid. In effect, Illinois’s state legislature took its policy mishaps and, taking advantage of the vertical nature of American federalism, shifted the problem from the local level to the federal level. While it took several attempts to secure federal aid, and a fair amount of compromise due to the separation of powers between the three federal branches, the Land Grant Act of 1850 turned federal lands over to Illinois, Mississippi, and Alabama for the purpose of supporting regional rail development (Corliss 1950; Stover 1975). The Land Grant Act of 1850 was a crucial piece of American legislation, in terms of both American infrastructure development and the process of American state building. First, the Land Grant Act of 1850 opened up new resources for rail development, resources that allowed for the nation’s rail network to finally fully emerge. As a result of greater federal control over internal improvements, the spatial development of the nation was altered to further centralize political power. In addition, the Land Grant Act of 1850 also highlights how American federalism impacts the process of state building. The early American state is often noted for its small size and lack of administrative might, which raises questions about how the modern, more robust American state emerged (Skowronek 1982). The Land Grant Act of 1850 suggests that political centralization can occur through federalism placing responsibility for major initiatives at the local level and then later the federal state being prompted to act due to an inability of state governments to meet those policy demands. Hence, the Land Grant Act of 1850 presents a critical puzzle for American state building, namely, the Land Grant Act of 1850 raises the question of why states were unable to build a national rail network, as well as how that previously local issue migrated to the federal state and how federal action then altered American rail planning. Put another way, the question is, how did federalism, in shaping both the local and the federal responses, impact American railroads and state building more generally?

In picking up this puzzle, my aim is to emphasize the importance of federalism in state building. Most theories of American state building emphasize the growth of federal power, overlooking both the role of local actors and the three branches of the federal government in accomplishing that feat. However, increasingly there is an understanding that much of the debate over federal power has actually, all along, been a conflict over the exact nature of federalism itself. In that way, federalism is both the object of political conflict and a determining factor in those conflicts (Robertson 2012). Expanding on these themes, I particularly aim to emphasize how state governments factor into the American state-building process. I am interested in considering how states use their powers and resources to contribute to state capacity building through providing resources and services at the local level, which cohere into a larger good that improves national administration, defense, economic growth, and other public goods. While states possessed the legal and administrative power to provide some needed goods, my analysis suggests that local limitations prevent states from truly building national capacity through these decentralized, localized state-building efforts and eventually lead state issues to migrate to the federal level. Second, through discussing federalism, I also aim to shed particular light on how the separation of powers at the federal level shaped the state-building process. While my primary focus is on the vertical interaction between state and federal governments, I also consider the role of separation of powers in securing greater federal authority in order to address how federalism shapes state building as comprehensively as possible. My analysis considers how state issues are first transformed as a result of congressional coalitions and then only realized when executive support is forthcoming. Taken as a whole, this analysis underscores not only that federalism initiated and directed American state-building enterprises but also that institutional change itself can often be the result of internal tensions within an institution. Thus, I challenge ideas that institutions merely always re-create themselves or only change due to external pressures, by underscoring how American federalism has undergone considerable centralization due in part to its own political logics (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

the history of american infrastructure

Why the Land Grant Act of 1850 is such a crucial moment for American federalism as well as American infrastructure becomes more evident when a cursory history of American infrastructure policies is considered. To be clear, the Land Grant Act of 1850 was not the first time the federal state had taken an interest in the nation’s internal improvements. There were a handful of cases of federal action on transportation infrastructure in the antebellum United States. For instance, the Cumberland Road was a federally funded project that connected the Atlantic coast with the expanding frontier, eventually reaching Illinois. Additionally, federal assistance aided in the clearing of harbors and rivers, and military engineers provided key technical support to early canal projects (Hill 1957; Maass 1951). Finally, federally funded post roads were a central piece of American infrastructure, facilitating communication between distant points and building a sense of nationhood in the early, highly diffused United States (John 1995). However, even these early successes were plagued by conflict among states. For instance, the Cumberland Road’s initial approval was delayed by debates over whether the road would begin in Baltimore, Philadelphia, or Richmond (Larson 2001). Though these federal actions served a critical role in enhancing the American transportation system, they also only minimally met the nation’s growing infrastructure demands. Further, they were hardly the norm. For the most part, the federal government was not involved in developing early roads or canals, and the contributions made by the federal government were generally modest.

More common than actual federal action on infrastructure was a series of ongoing conversations, equally fruitless and frustrating, surrounding possible federal policies on internal improvement. Early American political leaders were neither ill informed nor naive: the need for grander action on a national transportation system, beyond these early limited efforts by Washington, DC, was widely recognized in the antebellum United States. Despite having a very real understanding of the problem the nation faced in terms of transportation infrastructure, repeated attempts to generate a broad, federal program around infrastructure failed. One of the earliest efforts at federal transportation building was the Gallatin Plan. Published in 1808, the Gallatin Plan was drafted by the secretary of treasury Albert Gallatin and became the essential blueprint for nineteenth-century American infrastructure. Working under President Thomas Jefferson, Gallatin argued that the federal government should identify and aid local infrastructure projects that were of federal concern, such as vital turnpikes or particularly valuable water routes. However, Congress disagreed over the federal government’s role in internal improvements, still wary of both the constitutionality of such actions as well as the potentially unequal benefits that would accrue for states and regions that received federal aid. Over the next few decades, numerous attempts would be made to realize Gallatin’s vision but they were all ultimately undone by American federalism’s inherent barriers (Larson 2001).

Similarly, the Bonus Bill of 1817 underscores the role of constitutional limitations in undermining attempts to expand the federal government’s role in American transportation infrastructure. The Bonus Bill was introduced by Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, as a response to the War of 1812. After the nation nearly lost the war to the British, Calhoun suggested an internal improvements policy that would increase the nation’s struggling defenses by allowing for faster troop movements. At the same time, facing an increasingly volatile domestic polity wracked by local interests and partisanship, Calhoun sought to promote a plan that could benefit the country as a whole. Through such a plan, Calhoun hoped to log roll his infrastructure plan through Congress. As an additional incentive, Calhoun believed that linking the country together via internal improvements would also increase national unity. Ultimately, the Bonus Bill was in actuality Calhoun’s attempt to revitalize the moribund Gallatin Plan.

Significantly, the Bonus Bill plan itself did not designate any specific routes for roads or canals. Calhoun knew that any such discussions would quickly break down into sectional interests, stalling the plan in endless legislative debate. Instead, Calhoun’s bill would merely have authorized and established a fund to support future internal improvements. Specifically, Calhoun’s suggestion was to fund the infrastructure account through money owed to the United States government from the new federal bank as well as any future dividends the federal government would accrue from that bank. In just addressing the funding, and not the planning, Calhoun attempted to sidestep both sectional rivalry as well as debates over the constitutionality of his plan. Calhoun’s political ingenuity is admirable: once the money was allocated, constitutional and sectional rivalries would have been almost beside the point in constructing a national transportation network. In practice, the Bonus Bill aimed to spread the benefits of a national transportation infrastructure to as many states as possible, as a means to quiet interregional conflict. Further, state control over any proposed project would ensure that states could develop their own internal network according to local specifications and interests. As a result of its clever political design, the Bonus Bill was able to successfully pass the House. However, the Bonus Bill was defeated when James Mad...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 The Problem of Federalism and State Building
• 2 Rail Promotion, Diffusion, and State Inaction
• 3 Railroads and Interstate Connectivity
• 4 International Comparison and American Rail Quality
• 5 Local Limits, Vertical Federalism, and Congressional Intervention
• 6 Executive Power, the Courts, and National Rail Aid
• 7 The Impact of Federal Rail Grants on American Railroads
• 8 Federalism’s Role in State Building
• Notes
• References
• Index