Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers

Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917–1945

David E. Johnson

• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780801434587
• eBook ISBN: 9780801467103
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The U.S. Army entered World War II unprepared. In addition, lacking Germany's blitzkrieg approach of coordinated armor and air power, the army was organized to fight two wars: one on the ground and one in the air. Previous commentators have blamed Congressional funding and public apathy for the army's unprepared state. David E. Johnson believes instead that the principal causes were internal: army culture and bureaucracy, and their combined impact on the development of weapons and doctrine.Johnson examines the U.S. Army's innovations for both armor and aviation between the world wars, arguing that the tank became a captive of the conservative infantry and cavalry branches, while the airplane's development was channeled by air power insurgents bent on creating an independent air force. He maintains that as a consequence, the tank's potential was hindered by the traditional arms, while air power advocates focused mainly on proving the decisiveness of strategic bombing, neglecting the mission of tactical support for ground troops. Minimal interaction between ground and air officers resulted in insufficient cooperation between armored forces and air forces.Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers makes a major contribution to a new understanding of both the creation of the modern U.S. Army and the Army's performance in World War II. The book also provides important insights for future military innovation.

PART I

SOLDIERS AND MACHINES: 1917–1920

In some ways it was like the debate of a group of savages as to how to extract a screw from a piece of wood. Accustomed only to nails, they had made one effort to pull out the screw by main force, and now that it had failed they were devising methods of applying more force still, of obtaining more efficient pincers, of using levers and fulcrums so that more men could bring their strength to bear. They could hardly be blamed for not guessing that by rotating the screw it would come out after the exertion of far less effort; it would be a notion so different from anything they had ever encountered that they would laugh at the man who suggested it.

—C. S. Forester, The General

[1]

America, the Army, and the Great War

On April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson stood before a special session of the U.S. Congress and asked for a declaration of war against the German Empire. Almost overnight, public opinion shifted from cautious, albeit increasingly pro-Allied, neutrality to overwhelming enthusiasm for intervention to stamp out the evils of “Prussianism.” Americans’ idealism was shared by their president, whose words before Congress echoed their sentiments: “The world must be made safe for democracy.”1 Wilson, who was convinced that only the United States could ensure a just peace, framed the war as a crusade, one worthy of American intervention:

We shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts—for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free.2

Wilson’s speech was enthusiastically received by Congress; its members voted for war by a margin of 82 to 6 in the Senate and 373 to 50 in the House. On April 6 the United States went to war with Germany. This event, perhaps more than any other in American history, marked a turning point in American foreign policy. For better or worse, the United States had entered into an association with the Allied powers, a major departure from its tradition of avoiding involvement in European affairs. This radical shift also had immense implications for the U.S. Army.

The Army on the eve of World War I was a reflection of the tasks long assigned to it by the civil government. Until late in the nineteenth century, its principal missions were to repress Native American opposition against continental expansion and to guard national coasts and borders. The excursions during the Mexican-American, Civil, and Spanish-American wars were anomalies; the Army quickly reverted to its traditional role as a frontier constabulary after each conflict. When it reached the West Coast the United States briefly tried to establish an overseas empire; after its victory over Spain, the Army merely shifted its garrisons from the western frontier to colonial outposts in the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Nevertheless, as the United States entered the twentieth century as a major economic and industrial power, some saw the need for change in its army.

Elihu Root, secretary of war from 1899 to 1904, was foremost among the individuals trying to drag the Army into the twentieth century. Root had analyzed the findings of a commission examining the conduct of the Spanish-American War and realized that many of the Army’s problems in planning and supply were attributable to institutional weaknesses. His attempts at reform hinged on replacing the Army’s tenured position of commanding general with a limited-term chief of staff, replacing the cumbersome branch-oriented bureaus of the War Department with a functional general staff, and revitalizing the Army educational system by establishing a war college.3 Although Root was able to push through the establishment of a war college and a chief of staff office, his plans for a general staff met stiff resistance. American political leaders were wary of any kind of central war planning group, which many saw as similar to the Prussian autocratic state. Thus, when America entered World War I, only twenty General Staff officers were assigned to Washington, and the bureaus were still firmly entrenched.4

The small planning staff was constrained by more than numbers. President Wilson, committed to American neutrality, was enraged when he learned in 1916 that the War Department was developing contingency plans for a war with Germany and ordered a halt to such activity. Furthermore, the planners on the General Staff were busy trying to support the latest American foray into Mexico under the command of Gen. John J. Pershing. Lack of planning, however, was only one of the challenges the Army faced when confronted with the actuality of entering into a modern war in Europe. Other serious problems, particularly in personnel and industrial mobilization, soon became apparent.

On the eve of its entry into World War I, the U.S. Army was unprepared for a twentieth-century war. The most obvious deficiency was its size. On April 1, 1917, only 213,557 Regular Army and National Guard soldiers were active in federal service. The inadequacy of this force was made clear by the French offensive on the Aisne, which began with 800,000 men. By May 15, when the slaughter finally stopped, the French had suffered nearly 130,000 casualties and the Germans 163,000—losses equal to twice the size of the active-duty U.S. Army.5 Moreover, the French Army almost disintegrated in the aftermath of the offensive; elements of fifty-five divisions mutinied, weakening the Allied position.6 When the French mission arrived in Washington late in April, Marshal Joseph Joffre concisely stated what the Allies needed from the United States: “We want men, men, men.”7

The challenge for the U.S. Army, however, was much more complex than recruiting enough soldiers. Gone were the days when the small Regular Army could be rapidly expanded with haphazardly trained volunteers for a temporary emergency against a minor power such as Spain or Mexico. The Great War demanded a mass army trained and equipped to fight a powerful opponent that was on the verge of defeating the Allies. The War Department had attempted to improve personnel mobilization through the provisions of the 1903 Dick Act and the more comprehensive National Defense Act of 1916. The latter, however, allowed for only 175,000 regular servicemen and 457,000 National Guardsmen—figures woefully inadequate in the context of the war in Europe.

Conscription was the answer to twentieth-century personnel mobilization problems. After passage of the Selective Service Act of May 18, 1917, American ranks began to swell almost immediately, and by the end of the conflict the Army numbered 3,685,458 officers and enlisted men. But forging these men into a viable army proved a difficult task. Although token American forces arrived in France in the summer of 1917, it was late May 1918 before the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in France were able to execute even limited offensive operations.8

The war on the western front was one not only of mass armies but also of mass firepower and increasing technological complexity. Supplies of artillery, machine guns, airplanes, poison gas, tanks, and—above all—munitions were necessary for modern warfare. Design and quantity production of this matériel required specialized research and industrial bases, and the United States had neither when it entered the war. Its army had traditionally relied on the War Department’s limited technical services for its modest and unsophisticated munitions needs. The frontier constabulary had little demand for large numbers of machine guns and heavy artillery, much less poison gas.

The officers’ attitude toward technological research and development also influenced the Army’s state of preparedness. Most lacked confidence that civilian scientists would observe basic security measures and questioned even the military practicality of their efforts. Additionally, the powerful bureaus controlled military research and development and jealously guarded their prerogatives. Before the war they had focused on developing and testing proven designs—largely offered by independent inventors—rather than systematic research and development. The results of their efforts were disappointing. By early 1917 the Army still lacked a standardized machine gun and a field artillery piece equivalent to the French 75, which had been introduced in France in 1897.

The Army’s lack of matériel preparedness also stemmed from the types of officers assigned to the technical services, a post many regarded as detrimental to their careers. Most positions in the technical services were filled through four-year details of officers from combat arms, such as the infantry. This policy tended to keep the most ambitious officers—those eager to make a mark in their own branches—out of the specialized technical services.9 Nevertheless, the Army, although admittedly conservative, was not far behind the national trend in industrial research. Industrial research was in its infancy, and the government had done little to support or acknowledge it. Still, among government agencies, the Army was particularly backward.10

Finally, the bureaus also dominated the manufacture and procurement of military weapons and equipment, with little reference to private industry. The model 1903 Springfield rifle is a good example of the problems the Army encountered because of its almost exclusive reliance on government arsenals. By 1917 the Army had received 600,000 Springfields from federal manufacturers. When it became clear that this stockage and the limited production capacity of the government arsenals were inadequate to equip the rapidly swelling ranks of a national army, the Army had to turn to civilian industry for help. But American arms manufacturers were not tooled for producing Springfields, and modification of their assembly lines promised long delays. Fortunately, two American companies, Remington and Winchester, were producing Enfields for the British. As a stopgap measure, the government contracted with them to produce Enfields modified to fire American ammunition.

Similar difficulties were encountered with almost every aspect of military munitions and matériel procurement. The production facilities for the massive quantities of ordnance and equipment needed to supply the U.S. Army in 1917 could not be improvised, particularly for more sophisticated weapons such as tanks and airplanes. In the end, the Allies had to make up the difference.11 By this point in the war, however, British and French war industries were running at full capacity and could compensate for American matériel shortfalls.

By early 1918 it was painfully apparent that the semiautonomous bureaus were capable of neither staying abreast of the demands of mobilization nor supporting General Pershing’s growing AEF. In February 1918 Secretary of War Newton D. Baker finally addressed the need for centralized control of the War Department by reorganizing the General Staff and installing a new chief of staff. From this point forward the General Staff grew enormously in size and power, numbering 1,072 people before the end of the war. The new chief of staff, General Peyton C. March, had been Pershing’s chief of artillery in France before returning to the United States at Baker’s request. March was vigorous and efficient, if somewhat tactless, and rapidly gained control of the bureaus. By August 1918, using the temporary wartime authority of the May 20, 1918, Overman Act, he had structured a General Staff of four divisions: Operations; Military Intelligence; Purchase, Storage, and Traffic; and War Plans. He had also created the Air Service, Tank Corps, and Chemical Warfare Service.

March made the new arrangement work by ruthless—many said high-handed—tactics. He made some powerful enemies, particularly in Congress, and ultimately came into conflict with Pershing over the relationship between the War Department and General Headquarters in France. With Baker’s support he tried to rein in the AEF.12 Nevertheless, despite this controversy, March’s leadership and management of the War Department provided Pershing with the tools to fight the war.

Given the prevailing conditions when the United States entered the war, the accomplishments of the War Department in support of the AEF were impressive: more than two million soldiers were mobilized, trained, and deployed overseas and nearly six million tons of supplies were procured and shipped to France.13 These American forces were decisive in the Allied victory over Germany. Although not nearly as sophisticated in the ways of modern war as the Europeans, the Americans made up for their lack of experience and training with their enthusiasm, a quality long since bled out of the other war-weary armies.

The turning point in the war came in July 1918, when the Allies contained General Erich Ludendorff’s offensive in the Second Battle of the Marne. The German attack, after some initial success, faltered under the weight of 800,000 casualties. The Allies held the initiative for the remainder of the war. But the German Army had lost more than momentum: the horrendous losses sapped morale and destroyed discipline in both the Army and the German civilian population.14 It was in this regard that the American forces probably played their greatest role in the Allied victory:

It was the Americans—not the handful of divisions in the line, but the huge and growing reserve of well-fed, unwearied, and unshaken men they supplied. Whereas in August the average field strength of a German battalion had sunk to 660–665 men, and the only fresh reserves...

Table of contents

• Tables
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• PART I. SOLDIERS AND MACHINES: 1917–1920
• PART II. INERTIA AND INSURGENCY: 1921–1930
• PART III. ALTERNATIVES AND AUTONOMY: 1931–1942
• PART IV. DYING FOR CHANGE: 1942–1945
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Primary Sources