Averroes on Plato's "Republic"

Averroes, Ralph Lerner

• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9780801471643
• Topic: Philosophie
• Subtopic: Philosophie des Mittelalters & der Renaissance

"In one fashion or another, the question with which this introduction begins is a question for every serious reader of Plato's Republic: Of what use is this philosophy to me? Averroes clearly finds that the Republic speaks to his own time and to his own situation.... Perhaps the greatest use he makes of the Republic is to understand better the shari'a itself.... It is fair to say that in deciding to paraphrase the Republic, Averroes is asserting that his world—the world defined and governed by the Koran—can profit from Plato's instruction."—from Ralph Lerner's IntroductionAn indispensable primary source in medieval political philosophy is presented here in a fully annotated translation of the celebrated discussion of the Republic by the twelfth-century Andalusian Muslim philosopher, Abu'l-Walid Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd, also know by his his Latinized name, Averroes. This work played a major role in both the transmission and the adaptation of the Platonic tradition in the West. In a closely argued critical introduction, Ralph Lerner addresses several of the most important problems raised by the work.

THE TEXT

(21.) Averroes’ [Epitome] of Plato’s Republic [and] Its Scientific Arguments, Which Is the Second Part of Political Science

[The First Treatise]

The intention of this treatise is ^┌to abstract^┐ such scientific arguments attributable to Plato as are contained in the Republic by eliminating the dialectical arguments from it. (5) We shall be strict in speaking succinctly of all this. Yet on account of the ordering of teaching, we ought to preface an introduction in which the [subject of] study is presented in due order, for Plato set down ^┌this^┐ book only after [other] books of his on this science. We shall also mention as well something of the utility of this science, and its intention and its parts.

We say: This science, known as practical science, differs essentially from the theoretical sciences. Now this is clear inasmuch as its subject differs from the subject of each and (10) everyone of the theoretical sciences and its principles differ from their principles. This is because the subject of this science is volitional things, the doing of which is within our power, and the principle of these things is will and choice; just as the principle of natural science is nature and its subject the natural things, and the principle of the divine science is God (may He be exalted!) and its subject the divine things. Furthermore, this science differs from the (15) theoretical sciences in that their end is knowledge alone; if there is anything of action in them it is by accident, as happens in many of the matters that the mathematicians study. Now the end of this science is action alone, even though its parts differ in their proximity to action. For of the general rules [whose account] is supplied by this science, (20) the more general is further removed from action and the less general is nearer, just as in the art of medicine. Hence it is that the physicians call the first part of the art of medicine the scientific part, and the second the practical. That is precisely why this art has been divided into two parts. In the first part the habits and volitional actions and conduct are treated generally, and here is made known (25) their relation to each other and which of these habits is for the sake of the others. In the second part is made known how these habits are established in the souls, which habit is ordered to which other habit so that the resulting action from the intended habit may become as perfect as can be, and which habit hinders which other habit. In general, this part supplies those matters, taken in their generality, that (22.) admit of being actualized. | The relation of what is in the first part of this science to the second part corresponds to the relation in the art of medicine of what is in the “Book of Health and Disease” to what is in the “Book of the Preservation of Health and Removal of Disease.” The first part of this art is in Aristotle’s book known as the Nicomachea, and the second in his book known as the Governance [Politics] and also in this book of Plato’s that we intend to explain (5) since Aristotle’s book on governance has not yet fallen into our hands. Before we begin a point-by-point explanation of what is in these arguments [of Plato], we ought to mention the things pertinent to this part and explained in the first part that serve as a foundation for what we wish to say here at the beginning.

We say: It has already been made clear in the first part (10) of this science that the human perfections in general are of four kinds—theoretical virtues, cogitative virtues, moral virtues, and [proficiency in the] practical ^┌arts^┐—and that all these perfections are only for the sake of the theoretical ones and a preparation for them in the way in which preparations preceding an end are for the sake of the end. It also has been made clear there that either it is impossible for one man to attain all these virtues or, if it is possible, it (15) is improbable, whereas it is as a rule possible that [all these virtues] be found [separately] among a multitude of individuals. It also appears that no one man’s substance can become realized through any of these virtues unless [a number of] humans help him and that to acquire his virtue a man has need of other people. Hence he is political by nature. This is not something that is needed for human perfection alone, but [even] for matters necessary for [mere] life—matters that man in a certain way shares with the (20) animals, such as appropriating food, securing dwelling places and clothing, and generally anything that man is in need of because of the appetitive or vital faculties within him. This arrangement exists for various reasons: [a] because of an unavoidable necessity (e.g., its being impossible for an isolated man to secure what he needs by way of food, housing, and clothing); or [b] because it is the easier way (e.g., its being possible for Zayd not to till the soil and sow (25) seeds [beyond his own needs], but if he tills and sows [with a view to others’ needs too] he will live at greater ease); or [c] because it is the best way, for if a man has chosen an art since his early youth and has practiced it for a long time, his performance in that art will be better. That is one of the causes that led Plato to hold it inappropriate that any of the citizens engage in more than one art, as we shall state later on. Hence the employment of a man in more than one (30) art is either altogether impossible or, if possible, not best. Since it is impossible that the human perfections be attained other than in different individuals within a given population, (23.) | the individuals of this species are all different in natural disposition corresponding to the difference in their perfections. For if each individual among them were potentially prepared for all human perfections, nature would have wrought something in vain; for it is absurd that there be something possible whose realization is (5) impossible. This matter has already been made clear in natural science. The sense[s too] attest that individual humans exist with such characteristics. All the more is this evident in the noble perfections, for not every man is fit to be a warrior or an orator or a poet, let alone a philosopher. All this being as we have characterized it, there ought to exist an association of humans—[an association] perfect in every species of human perfection and [whose members] are (10) helped to their completion in that the less perfect follows the fully perfect by way of preparing for his [own] perfection, and the more perfect aids the less by giving him the principles of his perfection. A case in point is horsemanship and the art of bridle-making: the art of bridle-making serves the art of horsemanship as a preparation, and the art of horsemanship prescribes for it the best form for the bridle and how they [sc., the two arts] may associate in a single (15) intention. The various kinds of priority of rank of one art ^┌over^┐ another are discussed in the first part [of political science]. If, however, such an association does not exist, the human virtues either will not be attained at all or their attainment will be defective. In general, the relation of all these virtues to the parts of this city will be [as] the relation of the faculties of the soul to the parts of a single soul, so (20) that this city will be wise in its theoretical part through which it rules over all its parts in the manner in which a man wise in the rational part rules through it over all the faculties of the soul—i.e., the part [of the faculties of the soul that is] linked to reason rules the spirited and appetitive part in which the moral virtues are to be found. Hence it [sc., the city] will draw itself toward appropriate objects in the measure and time judged by intellect. It will also be (25) courageous in [its] spirited part, but at the place and in the measure and in the time required of it by wisdom, just as a man will be courageous in [his] spirited part only when he uses it in the case, time, and measure required by intellect. It is the same with moderation and with each and every other virtue. In general, it will possess all the cogitative and moral virtues; and priority of rank within it will (30) correspond to the priority of rank of these virtues. This is the very justice that Plato investigated in the first book of this book and explained in the fourth book. It is nothing more than that every human in the city do the work that is (24.) his by nature in the best way that he possibly can. | This is only conceivable when the parts of the city are in submission to what theoretical science and those who rule over it decree. Hence it is evident that this part—i.e., those who possess the theoretical sciences and the one who rules over them—is predominant within it. Just as justice in the soul of each consists in every one of its parts doing only what it has to do in the appropriate measure and at the appropriate time—(5) this necessarily occurring in the parts of the soul only when intellect rules over them—so too in the case of the city. You ought to know that some of these virtues are ascribed to a city because they are in one of its parts—such as wisdom and courage—while others are ascribed to it because they are in all of its parts—such as justice and moderation. This (10) is evident in itself. But whether the virtue of liberality is in all parts of this city or only in one part of it is something that we shall investigate later on, because there is room for inquiry here. If all this is as we have described it (it having already been made clear in the first part of this science what these virtues are unqualifiedly), then ^┌three^┐ things remain (15) to be done here for a complete knowledge of them. [a] One of them is understanding the conditions given which any of these [virtues] can be actualized. For example, it has already been said what courage is unqualifiedly and that it is something in the soul intermediate between rashness and timidity —a habit by which a man acts courageously in the appropriate way and in the appropriate measure and time. But at the moment of one’s acting on it, this definition is in need of particular conditions; otherwise it would be impossible to act [in accord with that definition]. The end of (20) knowledge in this [matter] is only, as Aristotle says, that one should act, not that he should know. [b] The second concerns how these virtues may be established in the youths’ souls and gradually develop in them, how these [virtues] may be preserved once they have been completed, and also ^┌how^┐ the vices may be removed from the souls of the bad. In general, the case here resembles that in the art of medicine, the latter part of which encompasses and makes known how bodies can grow up in health, how one preserves (25) it, and how one removes diseases from them when they have departed from [the condition of] health. Just so is the case here. [c] The third thing is that we should describe which habit and which virtue when joined to some other virtue will make the effect of that virtue more complete, and which habit hinders which other habit. Just as the physician will tell which thing joined to what other thing in the body will (30) lead to health and preserve ^┌it^┐, so is the case here. All this can be understood only by knowing the ends of all these perfections and what is intended through them inasmuch as they are a part of a city, just as the preservation of the health of the organs and their restoration to it is understood for the most part only by knowing their relation to the other organs and their rank among them. |

(25.) After having made all this clear, we shall state through explanation the way in which each and every virtue comes to exist in the citizens’ souls and how to bring this about. You ought to know, besides, that however possible it may be to formulate these in speech, that does not yet suffice to bring them about in deed in cities and nations until such time as the cogitative faculty is joined to it, as is the case in (5) the art of medicine. Hence it is said that the governance of cities is appropriate for the old in whom knowledge of the theoretical sciences is associated with long experience; just as the physician will only be complete when, together with knowledge of the immutable universals of the art, there is realized in him through experience the cogitative virtue—[the virtue] through which he can actualize them [sc., the universals] in matter. All this has been made clear in the first part of this science; we return, then, to what we were about.

(10) And we say that the virtue of courage is that with which Plato began to introduce the discussion of the bringing­about of these virtues. As we have said, the way of understanding how it is attained by the citizens and preserved with respect to them in the most perfect manner [requires that] we consider what is primarily intended by the actions of this virtue in the city. We say that there are two ways by which the virtues in general are brought about in the souls (15) of political humans. [a] One of them is to establish the opinions in their souls through rhetorical and poetical arguments. This is limited to theoretical sciences presented to the multitude of humans, while the way by which the elect few learn the theoretical sciences are the true ways, as shall be stated later on. In teaching wisdom to the multitude he used the rhetorical and poetical ways because they [sc., (20) the multitude] are in this respect in one of two situations: either they can know them [sc., the speculative truths] through demonstrative arguments, or they will not know them at all. The first [situation] is impossible [for the multitude]. The second is possible—since it is fitting that everyone ^┌obtain^┐ as much of human perfection as is compatible with what is in his nature to obtain of this and with his preparation for it. Furthermore, their believing what they endeavor to believe of [what pertains to] knowledge(25) of the first principle and of the final cause, as far as it is in their nature to believe, is useful with regard to the other moral virtues and practical arts, which they were being prepared [to acquire]; and once the moral virtues and practical arts are established in their souls in this first way they can also be led toward performing the actions of these arts and virtues through the two kinds of arguments together, namely persuasive and affective arguments, which (30) will move them toward the [good] qualities. This first way of teaching will mostly be possible only for whichever of the citizens grew up with these things from the time of his (26.). youth. Of the two ways of teaching, this one is natural. | [b] The second way [of teaching], however, is the way applied to enemies, foes, and him whose way it is not to be aroused to the virtues that are desired of him. This is the way of coercion and of chastisement by blows. It is evident that this way either will not be applied to the members of the virtuous city or, if it is applied, it will be nothing other than (5) the training that is most effective for learning discipline, namely the art of war and military training. As for the other nations, which are not good and whose conduct is not human, why there is no way of teaching them other than this way, namely to coerce them through war to adopt the virtues. That these two ways of teaching the multitude are natural is clear from how the heads of households instill (10) discipline in their children, youths, and servants. Also similar to this is the way followed by those who govern cities that are not good: they castigate their people by means of disgrace, occasional flogging with rods, and execution. But that city which we are describing in speech will minimize the occurrence of this way in it—i.e., discipline secured through coercion. This way, however, will be necessary with (15) respect to the other nations—those without; in the case of the coercion of difficult nations, nothing will be without war. This is the way in which matters are arranged in those ^┌Laws^┐ belonging to this our divine Law ^┌that^┐ proceed like the human Laws, for the ways ^┌in it^┐ that lead to God (may He be exalted!) are two: one of them is through speech, and the other through war. Since this art of war is (20) not completed other than by a moral virtue by which it draws near to what is appropriate and in the appropriate time and measure—i.e., the virtue of courage—it is necessary that this virtue be found in virtuous cities as a ^┌preparation^┐ for this activity. It may be seen from the character of this virtue that it will not complete its activity unless the art of war is joined to it, as is the case with many of the (25) moral virtues and practical arts. For it is apparent in many of the virtues that they are only preparatory for the sake of the arts, and many of the arts for the sake of the virtues. This is what Aristotle asserts about the wars of the virtuous...