Bound by Conflict

Dilemmas of the Two Sudans

Francis Mading Deng, Daniel J. Deng

• Publisher: Fordham University Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780823272075
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Politique africaine

Since its independence on January 1, 1956, Sudan has been at war with itself. Through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, the North–South dimension of the conflict was seemingly resolved by the independence of the South on July 9, 2011. However, as a result of issues that were not resolved by the CPA, conflicts within the two countries have reignited conflict between them because of allegations of support for each other's rebels. In Bound by Conflict: Dilemmas of the Two Sudans, Francis M. Deng and Daniel J. Deng critique the tendency to see these conflicts as separate and to seek isolated solutions for them, when, in fact, they are closely intertwined. The policy implication is that resolving conflicts within the two Sudans is critical to the prospects of achieving peace, security, and stability between them, with the potential of moving them to some form of meaningful association.

Chapter One: Overview of the Crisis

A Dream Turned Nightmare, and Worse

For decades, the South Sudanese liberation struggle was the beacon of hope for those who wanted Sudan to be transformed into a country of inclusivity, equality, and nondiscrimination, a country whose citizens would enjoy the dignity of belonging without discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender. Now, as South Sudanese wake up, they discover that their dream has not only turned into a nightmare, but, worse, that their country is falling apart in intensive ethnic violence. The violence erupted within the presidential guard on December 15, 2013, and soon escalated into a rebellion that quickly spread like wildfire to several states. Adversaries had used the possibility of such a rebellion as a reason for opposing the independence of South Sudan, but, though predictable on the basis of objective ethnic and historical factors, the warning signals were not heeded, and no preventive measures were taken.

During the six-year interim period and the two years of independence, South Sudan seemed to prove the prophecies of doom wrong, almost to the point of complacency. While intertribal violence, human rights violations, and rampant violent crimes continued to manifest themselves as remnants of the long North-South Sudan civil war that had militarized the society and created a culture of violence, South Sudan’s independence still seemed a promising venture, especially given the amount of goodwill the new country enjoyed in the international community. And yet, in my public statements and private conversations with the leadership of South Sudan, I continuously argued that we must prove the prophets of doom wrong every day and avoid becoming complacent.

Relations between Sudan and South Sudan remained a challenge and a threat to sustainable peace, security, and stability across the two Sudans’ borders. The conflicts in the two countries remained intertwined due to the rebellions within Sudan, especially among those in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile who had been allies of South Sudan, as well as various militias in South Sudan that Khartoum had recruited, trained, armed, and unleashed to wage a proxy war against the SPLM/A. The uneasy relations between the two countries became a cause of great concern to the international community.

The international community was also becoming increasingly critical of the government of South Sudan (GoSS) on issues of financial mismanagement, especially with reports of rampant corruption, and it was demanding reform and accountability. President Salva Kiir, in response to these allegations and to the open criticism of his leadership by his vice president and the secretary-general of his party, the SPLM, suspended two leading ministers on allegations of corruption and dismissed his vice president, Dr. Riek Machar; the secretary-general of his ruling party, Pagan Amum; and leading members of his government. He eventually dissolved his whole cabinet, and, after a period of uncertainty, appointed a new one that included members of Sudan’s ruling party, the NCP of the Islamic Front. Khartoum rejoiced, and Sudan and South Sudan, especially their respective presidents, became closer, a development that was welcomed by the international community but proved divisive within the SPLM/A.

The dismissed veterans of the SPLM/A armed struggle, including Vice President Riek Machar, initially seemed to take the president’s decision in good grace. But, in retrospect, that might have been the calm before the storm that exploded on December 15, 2013, the immediate causes of which remain controversial. The government’s version is that it was an attempted coup, while the opposition argues that it was the result of interethnic differences and misunderstandings among members of the presidential guard that the government is projecting as an abortive coup to incriminate its opponents. Some of the Nuer leaders argue that it was a retaliation against an attempted purge of Nuer elements of the Presidential Guard.

Given the known tensions within the SPLM/A and the armed rebellion of Dr. Riek Machar that soon followed the violence of December 15–16 aimed at overthrowing the government, the debate that raged over whether what happened was an attempted coup or not seemed superfluous, as the objective of each was the same: unlawful change of the government. A different perspective is raised by the so-called detainees who did not believe that there was a coup attempt and that they were certainly not involved in any such attempt. This is reflected in the reports of my meetings with them, in Juba, with the four detained there, and in Nairobi where those remaining were transferred. The international community viewed the crisis as essentially political, and felt it should be addressed as such.

The targeted killings of members of the Nuer community on December 15–16 were profoundly shocking to the nation. Even the Dinka, whose members had allegedly committed the atrocities, were outraged. President Salva Kiir himself declared that those who were targeting the Nuer in his name were not for him, but against him, and ordered them to stop. That did not, however, stop the escalation of the violence along ethnic lines or eliminate the perception that the government, led by a Dinka, pitted the Dinka against the Nuer.

The interethnic violence that soon engulfed the nation, spreading from Juba to the states of Jonglei, Upper Nile, and Unity, became notorious to the world. It is, however, important to put this national catastrophe in perspective. Such an exercise can be approached by taking several aspects into account.

First, South Sudanese societies, in particular the Nilotics, have long been documented by anthropologists as exceedingly ethnocentric, autonomous, and egalitarian. They are intensely resistant to authoritarianism. These are characteristics of an indigenously democratic society, but they make the country difficult to govern in a modern state-centric system.

Second, their culture has been presented as structurally acephalous and stateless, characterized by a segmentary lineage system in which those who identify as one group unite against an external adversary, but once that external adversary is removed, become divided among themselves, down to the level of clans, families, and even individuals. It is what the famous British anthropologist Professor Edward Evans-Pritchard, when describing Nuer society, called “balanced opposition” resulting in “ordered anarchy,” a system of governance devoid of centralized coercive power of the state.

Third, despite this internal orientation, groups enter into alliances with external interest groups for support against their immediate adversaries, who are closer to them than the external allies. This explains the use of South Sudanese militias by the Sudanese government against their own South Sudanese freedom fighters.

Fourth, traditionally, power has been structured around two major role divisions: Chiefs and elders are peacemakers, while the youth, organized into warrior age sets, find their identity and dignity in warring, often using the slightest provocation to go to war, against the wise counsel of their elders. These young warriors are motivated in significant part by the desire to impress their female counterparts, who are metaphorically their future wives and who sing songs of praise for their husbands-to-be in their capacity as warriors. It is from this perspective that the role of females can be transformed to promote peace instead of values of masculine violence.

The end result is a paradoxical system that both emphasizes peace, unity, harmony, and reconciliation and is warlike, pragmatically soliciting external support for divisive, anticommunal advantages in conflict situations. This complex conflict situation calls for a multifaceted approach to both internal and external conflicts within and between Sudan and South Sudan.

First, unless there is internal peace in Sudan and South Sudan, there can be no sustainable peace between the two countries. The reverse is also true: Without peace between the two countries, there can be no peace within either of them.

Second, the basis for peace within and between the two Sudans has to be a genuine system of decentralization or devolution of power that gives all identity groups, however small, the right to govern themselves, be the primary beneficiaries of the resources in their areas, and have an equitable share in the national power and wealth distribution. As noted earlier, whether such a system is called autonomy, federation, or confederation is not as important as the manner in which powers and resources are distributed. The real objective must be that all groups, whether they identify themselves ethnically or geographically, large or small, must feel in charge of their own affairs and have an equitable share of national power and wealth.

Third, Sudan and South Sudan have a mutual interest in the way the two countries manage their diversities to achieve internal unity, peace, harmony, and a common sense of identity and national purpose. When I was undersecretary-general and adviser to the UN secretary-general on the prevention of genocide, I visited Juba and gave a public lecture organized by the Human Rights Office of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on July 29, 2011, only twenty days after independence, on the theme of diversity and nation building. A summary of the lecture posted by UNMISS stated, “Dr. Deng has urged his compatriots to recognize and manage their diversity so as to build a strong and vibrant state.” The summary went on to say, “Diversity is a phenomenon which successful nations have endeavored to manage so as to promote a sense of common belonging, dignity and respect. … The independence of South Sudan has been brought about by the lack of effective diversity management mechanisms by successive Governments in the North. … If the new nation of South Sudan wants to build a strong and inclusive state, it should not repeat the same mistakes. … South Sudan struggled for so long on the basis of the principles of democracy and good governance.” The summary added, “Deng calls on the leaders to respect and build on these ideals.”

Fourth, the militarized youth must be given a positive interest in peace through training and employment, away from violence as the source of identity and dignity. In Nilotic traditional society, a boy had to reach a certain age of maturity, not much different from the required international standard of eighteen, before he could be initiated into a warrior age group. Unfortunately, this tradition seems to be abused by armed groups, encouraging boys who are eager to become men and warriors to be initiated at a much younger age than is traditionally required and be recruited into their militias or armed forces as what is now known as child soldiers. This has given South Sudan a bad image in the international community, which is particularly unfortunate as it also violates indigenous cultural values related to the rules of war.

Fifth, women, and especially girls, have an important role to play in fostering peace. If young men display their valor in war to impress females, who sing for them in praise, then by condemning war as a show of manhood and instead praising peace, they might influence men toward the value of peace.

Building on these interconnected conflicts and challenges, the two countries need to put their houses in order internally and thereby improve their bilateral relations. Reforming their governance systems toward the vision of a New Sudan of full equality, without discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender, would make the systems in the two countries more compatible than they have been and therefore enhance cooperation between the two independent states.

Tracing the Roots of the Crisis

It has always been my deeply rooted belief that every crisis also presents opportunities. This belief is an act of faith that is in part reflective of my optimistic disposition, which is in turn based on my conviction that optimism is a motivation for positive action, while pessimism leads to a dead end. But optimism should not be blind faith, or it, too, would lead to disappointment. There must be a basis for believing that what is optimistically desired is indeed achievable. This calls for analyzing the root causes of problems in order to develop strategic ways of addressing them. So, where does one begin the search for opportunities in the current crisis in South Sudan?

Background to the Crisis

A brief look at South Sudan’s recent history is a worthwhile starting point for understanding the current crisis. In a broad sense, the present situation should be seen in the context of South Sudan’s history as an area of the Sudan that was neglected during colonial rule, and exploded in conflict with the central government in the North at the dawn of independence. That conflict lasted intermittently for half a century.

While the British administrators maintained law and order with very limited presence on the ground at the lower level, and effectively used indirect rule through traditional leaders, there were hardly any structures of governance in most rural areas of South Sudan, and no social services, except for rudimentary education and health care provided by the Christian missionaries as by-products of their main preoccupation, which was to recruit converts for their churches.

The situation was also characterized by ethnic diversity and the propensity toward violence among the warrior herding tribes, where cattle rustling, conflict over grazing lands and sources of water, and competing territorial claims often generated intercommunal violence. For these reasons, as well as an inadequate capacity for preventative governance, those who were opposed to the independence of South Sudan argued that it would be a failed state. They argued that once the uniting factor of the war with the North was removed, South Sudan would be torn apart by intertribal warfare. In many ways, the war itself prepared the ground for this prediction of doom, as tribal militias were recruited and supported by Khartoum to fight the Southern rebels by proxy.

With independence, President Salva Kiir promoted national unity, peace, and reconciliation by granting amnesty to the militias, most of whom were from the Nuer ethnic group, and incorporating them into the national army, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). Former militias, mostly Nuer, composed an estimated 75 percent of the army. But they were not fully integrated and remained under their former commanders. This is why it was so easy for the former vice president, Dr. Riek Machar, to rally support within a short period of announcing his rebellion, following the eruption of violence among the presidential guards on December 15, 2013.

In terms of the immediate cause, the manner in which Vice President Riek Machar and Pagan Amum, the secretary-general of the SPLM, publicly criticized the president for alleged failed leadership, and the president’s reaction—dismissing Riek Machar, Pagan Amum, and key ministers of his cabinet—should have been perceived as elements of an early warning. The crisis was compounded when the president then decided to dismiss his whole cabinet and reappoint a new one that included former members of the NCP of President Omar al-Bashir and excluded central figures in the leadership of the ruling SPLM.

These changes, which removed personalities that Khartoum considered hardliners against them, brought the leadership of the two countries, Sudan and South Sudan, closer, much to the satisfaction of the international community, which wanted relations between the two countries to improve. Little did they know, however, that the positive development of relations between the two countries was at the cost of internal cohesion and unity of purpose within the ruling party in South Sudan. The eruption of violence on December 15, 2013, was not predicted with any precision, but in hindsight, it should have been predictable in some form, and measures could have been taken to prevent it.

Developments on the Ground

During this critical period, I visited the country on two occasions. My first visit was in the aftermath of President Kiir’s dismissal of leading members of his government in rapid succession. The first to go were Deng Alor, minister of cabinet affairs, and Kosti Manibe, minister of finance, for authorizing payment for security installations in government buildings that was considered excessive in the amount paid and irregular in the procedures followed. These dismissals were strongly criticized by both Vice President Riek Machar and SPLM secretary-general Pagan Amum. President Kiir also dismissed the elected governor of Unity State, Taban Deng Gai, for which Vice President Riek Machar also criticized him. This was followed by the dismissal of Riek Machar and Pagan Amum, which was in turn followed by the dissolution of the entire cabinet.

After a period of suspense, during which the government was run by undersecretaries of the ministries, with oversight by the secretary-general of the government, the president formed a downsized cabinet. As noted, this excluded a number of senior ministers from the SPLM and included several South Sudanese former members of Sudan’s ruling NCP. The political climate was reaching a boiling point, with open contestations for the presidency within the party leadership, including by Riek Machar and Pagan Amum. Tensions were ripe in the air and many, including prominent personalities, voiced their fears that the country might explode in violence. When I asked repeatedly what could be done to prevent that, I got no positive response. This clearly indicated that the leaders involved did not have a clear understanding of what was wrong and what could be done to correct it. Nevertheless, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the state of affairs, the dissident members of the SPLM, including Riek Machar himself, ostensibly ruled out the use of violence and committed themselves publicly to pursuing their cause through the political process.

During my first visit, I had the opportunity to meet with President Kiir, who explained to me in considerable detail the reasoning behind his decisions. He appeared very much at ease and satisfied with the decisions he had made. In particular, he said something I had already anticipated in my discussion of the situation with concerned persons abroad. He said he had come to the conclusion that his tolerant and conciliatory style of leadership was being misconstrued as weakness, and that he had to strike back to prove otherwise. I told him that I had myself given that explanation, but that I had also said in my discussions of the situation that if I had the opportunity to advise him, I would say that while his actions were understandable, in view of the way his vice president and SPLM secretary-general had behaved toward him, he should not allow that to change his character and the values for which he was known as a man of peace, unity, and reconciliation. I told him that he was what our people call a man with a “cool heart,” which is an important attribute for leadership. The president nodded with apparent appreciation, and even said that he would reach out to “them,” meaning his adversaries.

In my subsequent meetings with Riek Machar, Pagan Amum, and other former members of the cabinet, I found their attitude remarkably magnanimous, relatively understanding of the president’s actions from his perspective and decidedly opposed to any violent reaction, but determined to push for political reform and their bid for the presidency. I left feeling encouraged that our leadership had reached a reassuring level of political maturity. And that was indeed what I expressed in my discussions of the situation within the United Nations and in the think tanks in the United States.

Briefing the Ambassadors

My second visit to Juba was after the December 15–16 eruption of violence and the ensuing rebellion led by Riek Machar. The visit was part of the South Sudanese ambassadors meeting called by the government to brief them on the situation. The briefing was conducted by several ministers and focused on reaffirming that what happened was an attempted coup by Riek Machar and his followers, that it was not a Dinka-Nuer ethnic conflict, and that those responsible, some of whom were being detained, would be charged and tried for treason. A number of ministers elaborated on the impact of the conflict on the country from the perspectives of their ministries. The ministers were indignant that the world did not share the view of the government that there had been an attempted coup.

The briefings by the president and the successor of Riek Machar as vice president, James Wani Igga, chronicled the political tensions and conflicts within the ruling party that culminated in th...