On Being and Cognition

Ordinatio 1.3

John Duns Scotus, John van den Bercken

• Publisher: Fordham University Press
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780823270736
• eBook ISBN: 9780823270750
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European Medieval History
• Index: History

In On Being and Cognition, the first complete translation into English of a pivotal text in the history of philosophy and theology, Scotus addresses fundamental issues concerning the limits of human knowledge and the nature of cognition by developing his doctrine of the univocity of being, refuting skepticism and analyzing the way the intellect and the object cooperate in generating actual knowledge in the case of abstractive cognition. Throughout the work Scotus is in discussion with important theologians of his time, such as Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, and Godfrey of Fontaines. Anyone interested in the pertinent philosophical problems will find in this book the highly sophisticated and subtle answers of a giant in the history of thought.

OUTLINE OF ORDINATIO 1.3

Part 1: On the possibility of having knowledge of God

Question 1: Can God be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer?

Question 2: Is God the first thing that is naturally known by us in our present state?

• Initial arguments for both questions nn. 1–9

• Clarification of the first question

Some irrelevant distinctions nn. 10–15

A note on the distinction between “if it is” and “what it is” {nn. 16–18}

The meaning of the first question n. 19

• The opinion of Henry of Ghent concerning question 1 nn. 20–21

• The opinion of Henry of Ghent concerning question 2 nn. 22–23

• Scotus: A quidditative concept of God is possible n. 25

The concept of being is univocal to God and to creatures n. 26

Five arguments:

(1) nn. 27–30 {nn. 31–34}

(2) n. 35

(3) {nn. 36–37

(4) n. 38} nn. 39–40

(5) {nn. 41–44} n. 45

Objections and reply {nn. 46–55}

In its present state man cannot know God as to his proper essence nn. 56–57

A concept proper to God alone: Infinite being nn. 58–60

God is known through species of creatures nn. 61–62

• Reply to the initial arguments of question 1 nn. 63–66

• Reply to the arguments for Henry’s opinion nn. 67–68

• Scotus’s reply to the second question n. 69

The first object in the order of origin n. 71

Regarding actual cognition n. 71

Preliminary remarks

Irreducibly and reducibly simple concepts n. 71

Grasping something confused and grasping something confusedly n. 72

The first object grasped confusedly: The most specific species n. 73 {nn. 73–75} nn. 76–78 {n. 79}

The first object grasped distinctly: The most common concept: being nn. 80–81

Comparing these kinds of cognition n. 82

Three objections nn. 83–85

Reply nn. 86, 87 {nn. 87–90} n. 91

Regarding habitual or virtual cognition nn. 92–93 {n. 94}

The first object in the order of perfection nn. 95–96

With respect to the most perfect knowledge absolutely

The most perfect object of knowledge is God n. 97

With respect to the most perfect knowledge proportionally

Sense objects n. 98

What is known first in the order of adequacy or causality nn. 99

(see below, Question 3: nn. 108–201)

• Reply to the initial arguments of the second question nn. 100–103

• Reply to the arguments for Henry’s opinion on question 2 nn. 104–7

Question 3: Is God the first natural and adequate object of the human intellect in its present state?

• Initial arguments nn. 108–9

• The view of Thomas: The quiddity of material things

Summary of the opinion nn. 110–12

Against Thomas’ view nn. 113–19

Reply to the arguments for Thomas’ view nn. 120–22

{Further comments nn. 123–24}

• The view of Henry of Ghent: God

Summary of the view n. 125

Refutation nn. 126–28

• Scotus’s opinion: Being, for its primacy of commonness and its primacy of virtuality nn. 129–30

The meaning and extension of univocity n. 131 {n. 131}

Univocity does not apply to ultimate differences nn. 132–33

Univocity does not apply to the proper attributes of being nn. 134–36

How being is the first object of our intellect n. 137

Being is univocally common to all quidditative concepts nn. 138–40 {nn. 141–44} n. 146

Scope of the arguments for univocity nn. 147–49

Summary and conclusion nn. 150–51

Dispelling some objections against univocity nn. 152–66

• Henry of Ghent’s opinion that the true is the first object of the intellect nn. 167–84

Summary of the opinion nn. 167–70

Refutation of the view itself nn. 171–74

Reply to the arguments for this view nn. 175–84

• Remark on the scope of the author’s claims nn. 185–88

The intellect in its very nature vs. the intellect in its present state:

In its present state man cannot naturally know God or the immaterial substances

• Reply to the initial arguments nn. 189–93 {n. 194} nn. 195–96 {nn. 197–200} n. 201 {n. 201}

Question 4: Can we know a certain and genuine truth by natural means without any special illumination?

• Initial arguments nn. 202–7

• The opinion of Henry of Ghent nn. 208–17

• Against Henry’s opinion n. 218

It implies the impossibility of certain knowledge nn. 219–22

It does not correctly represent what Augustine wants to say nn. 223–28

• The possibility of certain knowledge (against skepticism) n. 229

Self-evident principles nn. 230–34

Experiential (empirical) knowledge nn. 235–37

Knowledge of our own acts nn. 2...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Announcement Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Preface
• Half Title
• Outline of Ordinatio 1.3
• Introduction. Scotus on being and cognition: Ordinatio 1, distinction 3
• Part 1: On the possibility of having knowledge of God
• Part 2: On the trace of the Trinity
• Part 3: On the image of the Trinity
• Notes to the translation
• Notes
• Further reading
• References
• Series Page