Freedom and Limits

John Lachs, Patrick Shade

• Publisher: Fordham University Press
• Year: 2014
• Print ISBN: 9780823256754, 9780823256747
• eBook ISBN: 9780823257928
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Freedom and Limits is a defense of the value of freedom in the context of human finitude. A contribution to the American tradition of philosophy, it focuses attention on moral problems as we encounter them in daily life, where the search for perfection and the incessant drive to meet obligations make it difficult to attain satisfaction. The book argues that uniformity is unproductive: Human natures are varied and changeable, making the effort to impose a unitary good on everyone futile. Moreover, we don't need to strive for more than what is good enough: Finite achievements should be adequate to satisfy finite people.The ultimate aim of the book is to reclaim the role of philosophy as a guide to life. In doing so, it presents discussions of such important philosophers as Fichte, Hegel, Peirce, Dewey, James, and, above all, Santayana.

PART ONE

MIND AND REALITY

ONE

THE IMPOTENT MIND

My task in this chapter is to show that epiphenomenalism cannot be disposed of in a “conclusive fashion.”1 Epiphenomenalism is a theory that consists of two universal propositions: one about the origin of mental events and another about their causal efficacy. They are (1) every mental event has as its total cause one or a set of physical processes; and (2) no mental event is a total or a partial cause of any physical process. I leave the question of the precise distinction between the mental and the physical for another time. For our present purposes, it will suffice to say that by “physical process” I mean such events as the explosions of supernovas, the ionization of gases, and the firing of neurons, and by “mental event” I mean such occurrences as the thought of feasting ghosts, the remembrance of things past, and the lust for life. I presume that all of us are acquainted with some such events. The nature of the causal connection between physical processes and mental events is an issue I have explored in another place.2 My only concern here will be with the validity of the claim that epiphenomenalism (or, as I shall also call it, the “impotence hypothesis”) is a “thoughtless and incoherent theory.”3

To show that this contention is unfounded, I will examine six of the most popular arguments against the impotence hypothesis. Each of these arguments has been considered conclusive against epiphenomenalism by one distinguished philosopher or another. My strategy will be to separate the arguments into three major groups; I will then state each as clearly as I can, and attempt to assess their force impartially.

I

Professor Taylor contends that epiphenomenalism is “incompetent to take account of the obvious facts of mental life.”4 The claim is that our everyday experience acquaints us with numerous instances of the mind’s action on the body, as well as of the body’s action on the mind. I will term this set of objections “The Counterintuitive Arguments,” since their essence is the insistence that careful attention to the plain facts of experience is sufficient to prove the epiphenomenalist wrong.

There are three forms of the Counterintuitive Argument, each stressing the efficacy of a different type of conscious experience. The first is the argument from volition; the second is based on a consideration of some special forms of thought or purely cognitive experience; and the third takes as its point of departure certain acknowledged features of the emotive life.

The Counterintuitive Argument from Volition runs as follows. Volition is a consciousness of effort that often stands in a peculiarly intimate connection with subsequent physical (or mental) events. There is a high degree of correlation between conscious efforts directed at performing certain actions and the actual execution of these actions. The relationship is especially intimate in that not only are volition and action constantly conjoined, but the former is precisely the attempt to bring the latter into existence. Further, an essential part of any volition is envisagement of its effect. It appears, therefore, that merely by reflecting on the nature of volition we can recognize that it is a cause, and that when we will something we have an actual experience of a causal process. All of this is borne out by the fact that we ordinarily believe that certain bodily movements occur at certain times because certain conscious events had occurred at immediately antecedent times, that is, that mental events are causal factors in bringing about at least some bodily states.

Now, I do not think anyone would have the audacity to deny that we do believe in the causal efficacy of volition. However, the possession of this belief proves nothing. The issue turns on what reasons we can give to support it. It seems that there are three distinct but interconnected reasons. First, in volition we seem to have firsthand experience of creative process; we seem actually to be observing the smooth passage involved in the conversion of a thought into reality. Second, it seems patent that the relation of volition to willed bodily event is intimate in the extreme since the volition forecasts the event and is “active” in the sense that it appears poised to bring it about. Finally, we have the over whelming spectacle of effectuated will, the apparent harmony of will and nature. Our belief that the bond of volition with the willed bodily (or mental) state is authentic and indissoluble is enhanced not only by our appreciation of the intimate connection of the two and by the alleged experience of process, but also by the steady success of volition at fulfilling its promise.

If the claim that in volition we are immediately aware of causative process could be substantiated, the fate of epiphenomenalism would be sealed. However, there is nothing to be said for this dictum, and the remaining two considerations do not suffice to establish the truth of the belief in the efficacy of volitional consciousness. We are no more aware of causal process in volition than we are in observing the transmission of a shove down a line of freight cars. When I decide to wriggle my nose, what I experience is the conscious effort to do just that with the appropriate kinesthetic (and possibly visual) sensations immediately following. The experience, as Hume pointed out long ago, is that of one event succeeding another, not that of the production of the later event by the earlier. If per impossibile we could actually observe the creative process, we would not be in the dark as to how it comes about that sometimes our will is done; as it is, with the method of birth concealed we are left to delight in the occasional achievement.

But if we do not have immediate experience of the alleged creativity of consciousness, it is of no avail to insist on the intimate connection of volition and achievement, on the tendency of will to predict the future and the fact that it appears to be an “active” experience. The epiphenomenalist has a ready explanation. Volition gives the appearance of being a causal factor, because it is the mental counterpart of a process in the physical organism that is a causal factor. Instead of being the necessary and sufficient condition of a certain action, consciousness of effort to bring it about is a concomitant of the necessary and sufficient condition; instead of being the cause of the physical effect, it is the coeffect of the physical cause, the mental “transcript” of a physiological state. It is the physical processes of the body that cause the occurrence and determine the content of conscious events. The harmony of volition and achievement will, then, no longer seem mysterious once we recall that the processes that give rise to a consciousness of effort are the same that initiate fulfillment of its promise.

One might urge that if epiphenomenalism were true all states of consciousness would be “passive” accompaniments of physiological processes. This would eliminate the distinction between active and passive forms of awareness, yet volition clearly appears to be an “active” experience. But this argument also has a fatal flaw. Accounting for the possibility of the distinction does not present any difficulty for the epiphenomenalist, for if there are passive (receptive) and active (out-directed) states of the organism, then it is no secret why we have “passive” and “active” experiences. Now the organism is evidently passive with respect to external stimulation and active when outgoing process is centrally induced. It may, therefore, well be that the appearance of activity on the conscious level is due to the occurrence of movement and action within the animal. Volition throws lame sparks testifying that electric current is busily at work.

The epiphenomenalist’s defense derives its strength from two quarters. First, it is clear that the premises of this form of the Counterintuitive Argument do not suffice to prove its conclusion. Second, facts that serve as the basis of this argument can as well be accounted for on the hypothesis of the impotence of consciousness. If epiphenomenalism were true, it would be reasonable to expect the kind of confusion about the efficacy of thought which is perhaps implicit in our everyday beliefs and which has been raised to the status of dogma by philosophers. The unsophisticated man easily confuses the conspicuous attendant of the cause with the cause; when the mainspring is hidden, what is really a part of the complex effect may itself be construed as the causal source. We still tend to believe that flashes of lightning cause thunder (instead of being its coeffects, since both the thunder and the lightning are brought about by the same electrical disturbance) and the early history of medicine is replete with cases where one of a set of symptoms is singled out as the unitary “cause” of the disease. The epiphenomenalist may well argue that the explanation of the miracle of effectuated will, the persistent harmony of will and nature, is not to be sought in some mind that mysteriously imposes its designs on the recalcitrant stuff of the world, but in a living animal that, struggling in the universal flux, for a brief moment overcomes the renitency of its surroundings and produces in the process an inner sense of its effort and passing dominance. Volition is a form of consciousness indicative of the fact that physical changes directed at the execution of some action are occurring or have just occurred.

Let me devote brief attention to the two remaining forms of the Counterintuitive Argument. The claim that cognitive experiences are physically efficacious is based on the following type of consideration. It is well known that the thought of ripe plums makes the mouth water, and recognition of a speeding car may be under suitable conditions a mental fact with radical issue in the realm of action. Now, the critic may urge, since experiences of this type are common, and the intimate connection between mental event and physical outcome is admitted on all sides, the epiphenomenalist’s claim that the mind is causally lame carries no conviction.

This argument is open to the same objections as the previous one. The “intimate” connection of mental event and physical outcome does not imply direct causal relatedness: we may even make a fair case for the view that the antecedent probability of such a direct causal tie is not appreciably greater than that of the rival hypothesis that their tie is indirect, running through a common physical source. The fact that thought is followed by appropriate physical change is by no means unambiguous evidence for the view that it was a causal factor in bringing about that change. To argue as though it were may well be to commit the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. At any rate, the claim that recognition as a mental fact has physical consequences is at best a hypothesis, and the fact that the common man tends to embrace it does not help in the least to show that it is a conclusively established one.

Exactly the same considerations apply to the Counterintuitive Argument from Emotion. The fact that fear is correlated with a wild pounding of the heart or rasping dry throat, or that anger tends to make a man breathe fast and even to cloud the eyes, is no evidence against epiphenomenalism. The sole fact that the Counterintuitive Arguments suffice to establish beyond all reasonable doubt is that epiphenomenalism is counterintuitive. However, I do not see why any exponent of the doctrine should consider this in the least alarming. The Copernican system of the universe is wildly counterintuitive, as are Freudian theories of subconscious motivation and any number of other respectable hypotheses. It is, of course, necessary to remind ourselves that it is no virtue for a theory to lack the recommendation of being in accord with the everyday intuitions of mankind. There have to be good reasons for preferring such counterintuitive hypotheses to their less counterintuitive rivals. But it is not my present purpose to consider the reasons for epiphenomenalism; I am concerned only with evaluating some of the arguments against it. And my conclusion is that none of the Counterintuitive Arguments comes even remotely near to refuting the impotence hypothesis. Moreover, the facts adduced against epiphenomenalism in these arguments can be readily and adequately explained on the hypothesis that epiphenomenalism is true. Finally, I must remark that the impotence hypothesis is by no means completely counterintuitive, for while it appears to run counter to a number of our common beliefs and experiences, certain other common experiences tend directly to confirm it.

II

The unifying character of the next group of arguments I will consider is that each of them is based on a feature of “the natural history of consciousness.”5 I will give them the name “Arguments from the Distribution of the Intensity of Consciousness,” a phrase that combines the vice of being cumbersome with the virtue of descriptive accuracy. The deployment of awareness is such, it is argued, as would be reasonable to expect if it were efficacious. It seems to be present whenever intelligent actions are performed, and absent whenever activity is restricted to an in variable, automatic level. Moreover, it is most intense when the need for intelligence is greatest, and sinks to a minimum when truncated forms of discernment suffice for the performance of the action. I will present two subsidiary forms of this argument. Although I intend to judge each on its own merits, I will make a general comment at once. It appears that any force this type of argument may have is derived from its successful application of the Method of Concomitant Variation. The claim is that the intensity of consciousness varies concurrently with some such feature as the complexity or the urgency of the action to be performed. Now my remark is that even on the most charitable interpretation, even if—and this is by no means beyond doubt—a clear case can be made for such concomitance, the argument cannot prove the causal efficacy of consciousness. Mill’s Fifth Canon of Induction states quite explicitly that a phenomenon that varies whenever another phenomenon does “is either a cause or an effect of [the latter] … or is connected with it through some fact of causation.”6 Mill goes on to point out with great acuteness that concomitant variation of two phenomena is no proof of the causal efficacy of either, since the same concomitance would be observed if they were “two different effects of a common cause.”

The first form of the Argument from the Distribution of the Intensity of Consciousness is perhaps its most common one. We notice that we have to pay no attention at all to automatic actions such as the beating of the heart, and little if any to habit-actuated ones. However, consciousness is agonizingly intense in situations where indecision is great or the complexity of some task excessive. A person caught in some inimical state will think furiously to find a way out, or will, at least, be acutely aware of the danger to which he is exposed. Since conscious consideration appears necessary for the resolution of the worst predicaments and the consummation of exacting performances, the causal efficacy of at least some mental events cannot be reasonably denied.

Now even if there were such an invariable concomitance of intense consciousness with complex problem solving, it would, as I have suggested before, not prove the mind’s efficacy. But not even this invariable concomitance can be established. For some of the most complex, nonhabitual performances are executed without the least thought. Trying to prevent falling on the back of my head once I have slipped on an icy hill involves a series of actions of staggering speed and complexity. But even if I had an hour to reflect, I could not think out what to do and how. If it be objected that this example prejudices the issue, for what is involved here is a set of automatic body adjustments, it may be well to remind the critic that it is by no means a unique case. Solutions of complex mathematical or philosophical problems “pop” into our heads, sometimes without effort. And sometimes the intensity of attention directed at solving a problem is directly proportional to the resultant frustration: the only way the required result can be reached is by diverting attention from the issue or by “sleeping on it.” The correlation of intense consciousness with high-grade problem solving is too spotty to serve as the premise of any compelling argument.

The general form of the epiphenomenalist answer to counterarguments should be clear by now. Confronted with an apparent instance of effective consciousness, the characteristic move is to disjoin efficacy and awareness, assigning the former to the physical organism while the latter, in its varied modes, is left as the distinguishing mark of the mental. The significance of this procedure is that it reminds us that the efficacy of consciousness is not “given”: it is not an indubitable fact of experience but a theory we frame to account for observed conjunctions. The weaker the evidence in favor of this theory, the more epiphenomenalism remains unrefuted. Incidentally, of course, this method of rejoinder also calls attention to the fact that epiphenomenalism is itself but a hypothesis. This is an issue about which a great deal should be said; nothing, however, in this essay. Let me just remark, before I go on to the second form of the Argument from the Distribution of the Intensity of Consciousness, that while its refutation or confirmation is by no means independent of the findings of physical science, epiphenomenalism itself is not a scientific hypothesis.

An examination of our everyday beliefs would probably turn up considerable public support for the view that pain functions as a biological deterrent to action. I will not touch an electric wire because of the excessively disagreeable sensation of shock, and one may even check one’s tendency to be a glutton, if only the memory of the previous night’s dyspepsia is vivid enough. As is clear in the case of such experiences as toothaches, the more intense the pain, the more it functio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Announcement Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgments
• Half Title
• Introduction by Patrick Shade
• Prologue: The Personal Value and Social Usefulness of Philosophy
• Part I: Mind and Reality
• Part II: Self and Society
• Part III: Pluralism and Choice-Inclusive Facts
• Part IV: Meaningful Living
• Part V: Human Advance and Finite Obligation
• Epilogue: Physician Assisted Suicide
• Notes
• Further Reading
• Index
• Series Page