The Phenomenology of Henry James

Paul B. Armstrong

• Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781469622910
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Existentialism in Philosophy

Armstrong suggests that James's perspective is essentially phenomenological--that his understanding of the process of knowing, the art of fiction, and experience as a whole coincides in important ways with the ideas of the leading phenomenologists. He examines the connections between phenomenology's theory of consciousness and existentialism's analyses of the lived world in relation to James's fascination with consciousness and what is commonly called his Originally published in 1983. A UNC Press Enduring Edition -- UNC Press Enduring Editions use the latest in digital technology to make available again books from our distinguished backlist that were previously out of print. These editions are published unaltered from the original, and are presented in affordable paperback formats, bringing readers both historical and cultural value.

1. Consciousness And Moral Vision In What Maisie Knew

One

Joseph Conrad calls Henry James “the historian of fine consciences.”¹ As many have noticed, Conrad’s description is particularly apt because it plays on the French “conscience”—a word that refers to both consciousness and morality as does the double focus of James’s art. The vicissitudes of consciousness fascinate James. To know and how to know, that is the question for James the epistemological novelist. But James is also a moral dramatist. His novels and tales dramatize the explorations of a deeply probing moral vision. These two aspects of James’s achievement raise a question that many of his readers and critics have pondered: What is the relation between James the epistemological novelist and James the moral dramatist? Namely, what connections join his interest in consciousness and his concern with moral themes?

A phenomenological approach to describing and explaining these connections suggests itself because of the close relation between James’s art and his brother William’s philosophy. Many critics have been intrigued by Henry’s surprised discovery that he had “unconsciously pragmatised” in much of his life and work. They have shown the extent to which he was right when, politely ignoring their marked differences in temperament and taste, he told William that “philosophically, in short, I am ’with’ you, almost completely.”² But William James’s pragmatic, pluralistic radical empiricism itself anticipates the concerns of phenomenology and its scion, existentialism. Husserl read James’s Principles of Psychology early in his career and later acknowledged its influence on his thought. Moreover, along with his friend and colleague Charles Sanders Peirce, William James has come to be regarded as a founder of an American phenomenology. The growing awareness in philosophical circles of William’s significance as a pioneering precursor of Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Sartre should lead us to inquire whether Henry’s achievement has affinities with the phenomenological tradition.³ I will attempt to explain the phenomenological implications of William’s philosophy as I use his thought in my interpretations of his brothers art. It seems obvious, though, that if Henry and William share similar concerns and, further, if William and phenomenology share similar concerns, then (almost by syllogism) we can reasonably expect Henrys work to have phenomenological significance.

Guided by this expectation, we can pose the following questions about consciousness and morality in James: What is the relation between James’s understanding of consciousness and phenomenological theories of knowing? Does James’s moral vision converge with existential theory in such areas as freedom, responsibility, and the dilemmas of personal relations? Can the links between phenomenology and existentialism help to illuminate the connections between James’s epistemological and moral concerns?

James often acknowledges in his critical writings that for him the epistemological and the moral are a single concern, not separate issues. In his preface to The Portrait of a Lady, for example, James claims that “the ’moral’ sense of a work of art. . . is but another name for the more or less close connexion of the subject with some mark made on the intelligence, with some sincere experience.” According to James, the artist decides “the projected morality” of his work at the same moment he chooses which of the innumerable “possible windows” in “the house of fiction” to look through at the world and how to do this looking.⁴

At least two major implications about the relationship between the epistemological and the moral can be drawn from these deceptively simple but remarkably rich remarks. First, with a radical empiricism similar to his brother’s insistence on the primacy of experience, Henry James suggests here that we cannot go behind or beyond our lived engagement with the world. Specifically, an artist cannot claim foundations in some ideal or universal realm for his moral values or, by extension, for any other aspect of his vision. An artist’s moral vision rests on his experience as a knowing being, and experience provides a foundation that rests on nothing but itself. Second, James suggests that the epistemological and the moral are unified because they are systematically related to each other. They are correlated in such a way that an artist’s way of knowing—his way of looking at the world through his own particular “window”—necessarily implies and agrees with the “projected morality” of his work.

Just as James argues that the morality and truth of a novel depend at bottom on how the artist knows the world, so phenomenology finds that morality and truth in general can claim no other foundation than lived experience. This discovery throws conventional certainties about knowledge and human activity into a crisis both for James and for phenomenology. Since we cannot directly grasp the thing-itself, Husserl explains, but have only the phenomenon directed toward it, “knowledge, which in ordinary prephilosophical thought is the most natural thing in the world, suddenly emerges as a mystery.”⁵ When the myth of absolute knowledge falls, the dream of moral certainty collapses as well. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “morality is not something given but something to be created.” And so, “morality cannot consist in the private adherence to a system of values. Principles are mystifications unless they are put into practice” and “animate our relations with others.” Since morality depends solely on what we make of our experience, Merleau-Ponty concludes, “nothing guarantees us that morality is possible”—although “even less is there any fatal assurance that morality is impossible.”⁶ This perilous struggle to achieve morality on foundations no more certain than experience itself is a privileged subject for James’s dramatic art.

Because ethics depends on experience for James, he defines the moral realm broadly. His moral vision addresses more than criteria of judgment or standards for conduct. Rather, it surveys the whole field of human activity. It thereby cuts beneath the claim of inherited conventions to provide indubitable criteria for guiding and evaluating behavior. James is fascinated with social conventions, but he does not consider them fundamental as arbiters of right and wrong. This perceptive student of manners recognizes that conventions are socially codified ways of interpreting the world and relating to others—culturally contingent customs that organize experience along particular lines and that owe their existence to the agreement of the community to practice them. For James, then, morality cannot find its ultimate justification in conventions; derivative rather than fundamental, conventions are structures of experience.

James is intrigued by the endless complications and ambiguities that arise in trying to differentiate between right and wrong. But he is less interested in where the line between them lies than in how one draws it, and with what legitimation. For James, questions of morality can only be decided—to the extent they are answerable at all— by consulting the structure of experience and studying the basic constituents of human activity. Descending beneath the contingency of conventions and the abstractions of ethical debate, his moral vision probes the concrete immediacy of human experience: the risks and values of the imagination, the dialectic between possibilities and their limits, the shifting balance between conflict and care in personal relations, and the struggles over power that give a political dimension to daily life. These matters are more fundamental to James than the right and wrong of conduct because they provide the ultimate basis upon which any distinction between these ethical poles must rest. Where James the epistemological novelist explores the vicissitudes of knowing, the moral dramatist takes as his domain human doing in all its many aspects. Consciousness and moral vision are consequently unified for James just as knowing and doing are; knowing is a kind of activity, and modes of doing grasp the world according to a particular understanding of it.

This description of James’s moral vision leads us back to the second major implication of the remarks I quoted earlier about the relation for him between an artist’s way of knowing and the “projected morality” of his work. If James assumes that the epistemological and the moral realms form parts of a systematically unified whole—a whole where each part implies and agrees with all the others—then this unity depends on the unity of knowing and doing I have just described. Our worlds do not naturally divide themselves into independent parts like mind and body, consciousness and behavior, knowing and doing. Phenomenology regards such divisions as artificial categories that we construct after the fact in order to understand various aspects of existence that actually resist such compartmentalization because they belong to a seamless totality. In refuting the subject-object split, for example, William James argues that experience is all a unity and that we divide it up into subject and object only by looking at it retrospectively in particular ways that serve particular purposes.⁷ With Henry James, this holistic unity of our worlds is what supports the unity between matters of knowing and doing, consciousness and activity, epistemology and morality.

The relation between knowing and doing in James finds an instructive parallel, I think, in the historical connections between Husserl’s first phenomenological investigations on the foundations of knowledge and later existential researches on the activity of being-in-the-world. Like James, only as a philosopher rather than an artist, Husserl devoted much of his life and work to reflecting on the activity of knowing. He found that “objects exist for me, and are for me what they are, only as objects of actual and possible consciousness.” Equally and oppositely, he declared, all consciousness is “consciousness of something.”⁸ For Husserl, consciousness is not a passive receptacle for contents from the outside world but, instead, directs itself actively and even creatively toward its objects to posit, constitute, and give meaning to them. For example, when we are presented with three sides of what seems like a cube, he argues, we assume the existence of the other three hidden sides as we construct the “intentional object” that our “intentional acts” presume to deal with. If we discover later that these sides do not exist, our surprise only shows that we had been intentionally active in assuming them earlier.⁹ We know the world through phenomena that endow objects with meaning through this process of “intentionality.” The basic structure of consciousness is the relation between intentional acts and intentional objects. When Husserl describes consciousness as “intentional,” however, he does not mean to portray it as self-consciously purposive in the colloquial sense of the term. Rather, for him, “intentionality” refers more broadly to the entire activity of engaging ourselves with the objects in our world.

This theory of knowing invites an existential turn, as first Heidegger but then many others after him realized, including Husserl himself. Existentialists are phenomenologists who have taken Husserl’s theory of intentionality as a guide for studying a wider range of phenomena than he at first considered. Existential phenomenologists contend that “it is not only the mind of man which is intentionally related to the world . . . it is man himself, as a concrete, living, experiencing, thinking, perceiving, imagining, willing, loving, hating, communicating being who is intentional of the world.”¹⁰ This reformulation of intentionality builds on Husserl’s assertion that knowing is an activity by pointing out that all human activity is a way of knowing the world. As Sartre points out, “knowledge and action are only two abstract aspects of an original, concrete relation” between man and the world.¹¹ Heidegger calls this relation “being-in-the-world”— a concept that describes how man comes to know himself, his objects, and other people in his world by the activity of projecting himself in the present toward his possibilities in the future. Working from Husserl’s theory of intentionality, existential phenomenologists have studied such aspects of being-in-the-world as the imagination, freedom, our relations with others, and our relation to social history. Although different from each other in many respects, these aspects of experience are not only unified as parts of a coherent whole but also have homologous structures to the extent that they share the characteristics of intentionality that Husserl first posited for consciousness.

Henry James’s achievement has phenomenological significance because of the similarities between the ways in which he and Husserl’s compatriots understand the various aspects of experience. Through interpretations of James’s works in the chapters that follow, I will attempt to describe these aspects of experience and to explain further how and why they combine to form a systematically unified whole for him and phenomenology. Obviously, only concrete interpretation can hope to demonstrate the usefulness of a phenomenological approach to James both in the particular task of explicating his writings and in the general work of clarifying the relation between his epistemology and his moral themes. Let me therefore single out one work for detailed analysis to provide a vehicle for introducing my overall argument. What Maisie Knew offers a kind of paradigm of the relation between consciousness and moral vision in James’s fictional universe. By showing the underlying unity of Maisie’s epistemological and moral crises, I hope to clarify further the unity between knowing and doing that both James and phenomenology assert. My interpretation will also introduce the conceptual framework that will guide the rest of my study.

Readers of What Maisie Knew customarily ask what she knows and whether she develops a “moral sense.” They are divided, though, over whether she triumphs morally or ends up utterly depraved. One side argues that she transcends her vulgar surroundings by learning to penetrate the evil ways of her parents and stepparents. For example, in a classic statement of this side’s claim, Pelham Edgar insists that Maisie acquires “a sense of the distinction between the right and the wrong of conduct.”¹² Those on the other side agree with Oscar Cargill, however, that Maisie remains to the last “the refuse-catching vortex about whom a current of dissolute life pulses and whirls.”¹³ We may be able to cut beneath this controversy if we rephrase the central issues under dispute. Instead of asking “What did Maisie know? And was she moral?,” we should turn to the more fundamental problems that make these questions possible. That is, we should ask: “How can Maisie know? And how does her initiation into the activity of knowing involve her in struggles where the stakes are her freedom and her relations with others?” We shall address these questions one at a time from a phenomenological perspective that, in exploring the relation between Maisie’s epistemological and existential dilemmas, may clarify further the relation between James’s fascination with knowing and his “moral vision.”

Two

Maisie’s dilemma begins as a distressing epistemological situation. James observes in his preface that, in general, “small children have many more perceptions than they have terms to translate them; their vision is at any moment much richer, their apprehension even constantly stronger, than their prompt, their at all producible, vocabulary.”¹⁴ But in Maisie’s situation, this general condition has taken on extreme proportions. “It was to be the fate of this patient little girl to see much more than she at first understood, but also even at first to understand much more than any little girl, however patient, had perhaps ever understood before.”¹⁵ No matter how valiantly Maisie translates what she sees into something she can understand, she seems ever unable—at least until the end—to eliminate the obscurity caused by the excess of her seeing over her understanding. It is her burden to carry “in her mind a collection of images and echoes to which meanings were attachable—images and echoes kept for her in the childish dusk, the dim closet, the high drawers, like games she wasn’t yet big enough to play” (p. 12). She can only grow “big enough” to manage her dilemma by learning to attach meanings to these ambiguous, bewildering “images and echoes.” The excess of seeing over understanding that imprisons Maisie in a world of ambiguity is the surplus of her unreflective experience over what she can appropriate in reflection. Maisie’s dilemma presents an extreme instance of a general condition Merleau-Ponty has described. Once we begin to reflect, he argues, all of us find that we—like Maisie—have already been thrown into unreflective engagement with the world. Some obscurity will always haunt us because our efforts to achieve self-conscious clarity can never completely catch up with our original experience.¹⁶ Maisie’s challenge is to make the unreflected less obscure so that she can gain knowledge and freedom in a situation that threatens her with ambiguity and bondage. Maisie’s “moral sense” and her overall development depend on her struggle to achieve epistemological competence.

Many obstacles impede Maisie’s work of transforming her confusion into clarity. For example: “To be ’involved’ was of the essence of everybody’s affairs, and also at every particular moment to be more involved than usual” (p. 137). Consequently, it is that much more “involved” a job for her to make sense of her situation. It is difficult, for example, to achieve a coherent understanding of your world’s interpersonal structure when that structure refuses to hold together coherently. Maisie’s trouble here begins with “the opposed principles” in which her parents try to “educate” her—each insisting on the other’s irremediable evil. Instead of helping her develop confidence in herself and her world, they confront her with contradictory perceptions and then abandon her “to fit them together as she might” (p. 6). Maisie’s entanglement in everyone’s conflicting affairs only gets more incoherent, unstable, and contradictory as her story unfolds. Maisie is not just thrown into a situation; she finds herself thrown from situation to situation with unsettling unpredictability. The rude shocks, the sudden stops and starts in Maisie’s world frustrate any historical genesis of meaning. Husserl points out that the creation of meaning develops temporally—that children and adults build and change their worlds by adding to acquired habits of intentional activity.¹⁷ But Maisie cannot trust her life to develop steadily from one minute to the next so that she might increase her competence as a knower by modifying and refining past practices of understanding. Such habits might even be more a liability for her than an asset, since they would limit the flexibility she needs to react quickly to unexpected temporal jolts. She cannot build much meaning without the foundations that confidence in the reliability of past experience would provide. And the construction of meaning seems futile without assurances about continuity with the future.

Still, despite the odds against her, Maisie does try again and again to wrest meaning from her confusion and thus to ...