Labor Under Fire

A History of the AFL-CIO since 1979

Timothy J. Minchin

• Publisher: The University of North Carolina Press
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781469661544, 9781469632988
• eBook ISBN: 9781469632995
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: North American History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

From the Reagan years to the present, the labor movement has faced a profoundly hostile climate. As America’s largest labor federation, the AFL-CIO was forced to reckon with severe political and economic headwinds. Yet the AFL-CIO survived, consistently fighting for programs that benefited millions of Americans, including social security, unemployment insurance, the minimum wage, and universal health care. With a membership of more than 13 million, it was also able to launch the largest labor march in American history — 1981’s Solidarity Day — and to play an important role in politics.

In a history that spans from 1979 to the present, Timothy J. Minchin tells a sweeping, national story of how the AFL-CIO sustained itself and remained a significant voice in spite of its powerful enemies and internal constraints. Full of details, characters, and never-before-told stories drawn from unexamined, restricted, and untapped archives, as well as interviews with crucial figures involved with the organization, this book tells the definitive history of the modern AFL-CIO.

CHAPTER ONE

The Roots of Decline

The AFL-CIO in the Meany Years

At 9.30 A.M. on December 5, 1955, the AFL-CIO was born when AFL president George Meany and CIO leader Walter Reuther brought down a single gavel at the Seventy-First Regiment Armory in New York City.1 With this simple act, a former plumber from the Bronx and a one-time auto worker from Detroit created the largest trade union federation in the Western world, one made up of 141 affiliates from craft and industrial unions. Both men recognized the significance of the moment. The formation of the AFL-CIO, thought Reuther, represented “a great, new beginning,” while for Meany this was “the most important trade union development of our time.” At 2.30 P.M., President Eisenhower saluted the new organization in a telephone call from his headquarters in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, where he was recuperating from a heart attack. In a warm congratulatory message, Eisenhower claimed that the labor movement had made a “unique contribution to the general welfare of the Republic.” Messages of congratulations were delivered by several other prominent figures, including NAACP special counsel Thurgood Marshall, U.S. presidential candidate Adlai Stevenson, and former First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt. “I am very happy to be here at this historic meeting when the two great labor groups in this country are coming together to join their forces,” commented Mrs. Roosevelt. “The growing strength of labor,” she added, had “given us strength as a nation.”2 A few months later, a healthy Eisenhower attended the dedication of the Federation’s headquarters in Washington, DC. Because the impressive eight-story building was located at the foot of Sixteenth Street, straight across Lafayette Square from the White House, Eisenhower walked to the ceremony.3

Eisenhower’s actions illustrated how the AFL-CIO occupied a place at the very heart of American life. As Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter C. P. Trussell noted in the New York Times, the new federation represented “perhaps the greatest union force in United States history.” At the time, the creation of a 15 million-member labor body caused some concern. Reporters asked Eisenhower whether the new organization was too powerful, yet the president insisted that the American people were too “independent” to be bossed around. Even the liberal press discussed the dangers of a “labor monopoly,” yet Meany was having none of it. “How can there be too much power if the power is for good and is used only for good?” he replied.4 A few years later, the blunt leader dismissed renewed claims that the AFL-CIO was too influential as “a lot of bunk.” There was, however, no doubt that the Federation began life as a political force to be reckoned with. According to respected labor writer A. H. Raskin, the AFL-CIO was “the new colossus of American labor.”5 As President Eisenhower told the Federation’s founding convention, “Never before have so many people banded together in a single organization to promote their mutual welfare.” Eisenhower urged the AFL-CIO to use its power wisely, and expressed his hope that it would grow.6

On the surface, the next twenty-four years—the Meany years—were the AFL-CIO’s heyday. Throughout this period, the Federation remained a major force in American life, an influential lobby group that helped to pass a lot of progressive legislation, especially during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Even in the 1970s, as the economy weakened and Meany became increasingly frail, the Federation retained a lot of power, especially within the Democratic Party. On the eve of the 1976 presidential election, Jimmy Carter addressed the General Board, deferentially telling its members that they were “always in the forefront in battles for minimum wage, health care, social security, public education, fairer tax laws, strong national defense, job opportunities, housing and the quiet dignity of free human beings.” Throughout the Meany years, presidents, cabinet officials, and White House aides all courted the Federation. Former AFL-CIO staff also remembered the influence that they had over Congress, where the Democrats controlled both houses from 1954 to 1980. According to retired lobbyist Jim Kennedy, the AFL-CIO really functioned as a “People’s Lobby” during these years. “We were powerful,” he recalled. “It’s hard to consider today’s circumstances, and remember that in 1965 and for many years thereafter we were the people’s lobby. I mean we used it as a term, but we actually functioned that way.” A lobbyist in the legislative department in the 1960s, Ray Denison added that the Federation worked closely with House Democrats to push—and often pass—important legislation. “There were victories and defeats, and thousands of hours of painful, ever-so-slow stitching together, like needlepoint, the fine points in bill after bill,” he recalled. Sitting in an office overlooking the White House, Denison felt that he was at “the center of power in Washington.” As another former staffer summarized, the AFL-CIO in these years had “tremendous power.”7

Beneath the surface, however, all was not well. For some critics, the Federation’s closeness to the White House was problematic, symbolizing the way that its leaders acted more like lawmakers and lobbyists—with whom they spent most of their time—than the workers they represented. More importantly, the Federation failed to keep up with the growth of the economy, which created millions of jobs in the white-collar and service sectors. Union membership was concentrated in manufacturing, yet in the three decades after World War II blue-collar jobs expanded by just 19 percent, much less than the 32 percent average for all jobs, and four times less than the growth rate in clerical posts. Between 1958 and 1978, the Federation’s membership increased only slightly, from 13.8 million to 15.5 million, largely because of the growth in the economy.8 The changing nature of the American workforce meant that union density—the key indicator of union influence—declined from 32 percent in 1955 to 24 percent in 1979. The AFL-CIO had become trapped, its membership concentrated in a dwindling sector.9

While the drop in union density was not as rapid as it became, corporate opposition to organized labor was increasing. Between 1955 and 1980, the Federation reported that National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) complaints against employers for illegal dismissals during organizing campaigns rose by 600 percent. The percentage of representation elections won by unions fell steadily over this period, from around three-quarters to little more than half.10 The Federation’s figures also showed that a number of affiliates, especially in manufacturing, lost members under Meany, chiefly because of rising import competition and automation. Between 1955 and 1975, membership in the Textile Workers Union fell from 203,000 to 105,000, while the Garment Workers lost one third of its membership, or about 150,000 workers, between the late 1960s and the early 1980s. Imports also hurt affiliates in the electrical and furniture industries, while declining passenger numbers led to membership falls for the railroad unions.11

Throughout this era, however, Meany refused to be concerned about decline, insisting that the Federation was strong and healthy. To be sure, much of it was, at least on the surface. While significant decline was concentrated in industries that were particularly sensitive to imports, membership in other large industrial affiliates held steady. Between 1955 and 1977, the membership of the United Steelworkers dropped only slightly, from 980,000 to 954,000, while the comparable figures for the Machinists were 627,000 and 653,000.12 Most affiliates concentrated on servicing their members rather than recruiting, a pattern that Meany did not challenge. “Why should we worry about organizing groups of people who do not appear to want to be organized?” Meany told a reporter in 1972. A skilled political operator, Meany concentrated on wielding power in Washington. While the AFL-CIO president bequeathed Lane Kirkland a federation that still had considerable power, it was ill-equipped for the more hostile political and economic climate that it would soon face. Meany also left other legacies, including a deeply anticommunist foreign policy—which Kirkland embraced—and a fractured organization that had expelled some major affiliates, something that he was determined to fix. Finally, Kirkland inherited an organization that had been slow to reach out to women and non-white workers. While he moved to address this, his efforts were not as rapid as many would have liked. Kirkland’s presidency was thus shaped by the troubled legacy he inherited from Meany.13

At the time of the AFL-CIO’s foundation, however, the mood was upbeat. On June 4, 1956, when the eight-story headquarters was formally dedicated, it was a proud moment for Meany. The new building, he noted, would be the place where the labor movement would secure “even greater advances by American wage earners in the years to come.” To mark the occasion, Meany secured a permit to close off an entire block of Sixteenth Street for two hours during the dedication ceremony. The building’s centerpiece was “Labor is Life,” a huge mosaic mural that greeted visitors as they arrived. Seventeen feet high and fifty-one feet wide, the marble and gold masterpiece was one of the largest single panels of its type. Created by artist Lumen Winter, it celebrated the diversity of workers’ jobs and the way that unions had helped many different groups.14 In August 1957 the Executive Council also approved the purchase of the large adjoining property, increasing the Federation’s street presence and expanding its operations.15

The dedication of the building was the culmination of a merger process that had taken several years. In 1935 dissident industrial union leaders had broken away from the timid, craft-dominated AFL because of its reluctance to organize mass production workers. In the years that followed, significant differences between the two groups remained, especially when the CIO undertook mass organizing drives in the late 1930s and early 1940s.16 After World War II, however, with the main parts of the industrial economy solidly organized, this militancy dissipated. By the early 1950s, both the AFL and CIO had new leaders—George Meany replaced William Green, and Walter Reuther succeeded Philip Murray—and this allowed for some of the divisions of the past to be set aside. With the CIO well established, most of its unions concentrated on serving their large memberships. “The organizing fervor that marked the early days of the CIO died out during the war,” thought labor writer A. H. Raskin. In addition, both Meany and Reuther wanted an increased emphasis on political action, sharing a desire to tackle a rising tide of conservatism that had seen Congress enact the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, which significantly pared back the freedoms given to workers under the landmark National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935. During what he later described as “many months of tedious, patient conference negotiations,” Meany also stressed the necessity of ending twenty years of division in the labor movement. To meet the challenges of the postwar era, it was vital to create a powerful and united “trade union center.”17

During the winter of 1954–55, the agreement to bring the AFL and CIO together was drafted. On February 9, 1955, it was approved by the Joint Unity Committee and signed by Meany and Reuther. Under the agreement, the “integrity” of affiliates was closely protected, a core provision. Furthermore, this was a voluntary federation; affiliates could leave at any time without penalty, and most jealously guarded their autonomy. As former staffer Gerry Shea explained, “The AFL-CIO is a federation of independent national unions, who prize their independence … in many cases more than solidarity.” While the merger agreement declared that affiliates should not conduct raiding against each other, there was no enforcement mechanism or mention of penalties for those who did. Interunion rivalry would be a constant problem under Meany.18

Several other parts of the merger document were particularly significant. In a landmark clause, the agreement recognized the right of all workers, “without regard to race, creed, color, or national origin” to share in the “full benefits” of membership in the new organization. Despite this breakthrough, an enforcement mechanism was again lacking, and the remaining AFL affiliates that continued to bar or segregate blacks were not compelled to end these practices. In contrast, both the merger document and the Federation’s constitution contained clear procedures—and penalties—for dealing with affiliates that were tainted by corruption or Communist influence, two areas that Meany was particularly interested in.19

Despite affiliates’ autonomy, the running of the AFL-CIO was highly centralized. The new organization had two executive officers, a president and a secretary-treasurer, who were elected at the biennial conventions. The president had considerable power, including the “conclusive” authority to interpret the constitution between meetings of the Executive Council. The president played the decisive role in setting policy, although the independence of affiliates often constrained his ability to implement it.20 In addition to twenty-seven vice presidents, the executive officers made up the Council, the body that ran the AFL-CIO between its conventions. In establishing the Council, which met at least three times a year, the merger document guaranteed the dominance of the numerically larger AFL, decreeing that its unions would contribute seventeen vice presidents and CIO unions just ten. The constitution also established a General Board, which was composed of Executive Council members plus one representative (usually the president) from each of the affiliates. The Board met at least once a year to decide “all policy questions referred to it by the executive officers, and the Executive Council.”21 Funding for the new Federation was provided by the assets of the AFL and CIO, as well as by a per capita tax payable by national and international unions—and organizing committees—of four cents per member per month...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter One: The Roots of Decline: The AFL-CIO in the Meany Years
• Chapter Two: A New President and a New Decade
• Chapter Three: Kirkland Fights Back: The 1981 Solidarity Day Mass March
• Chapter Four: From Solidarity to Defeat
• Chapter Five: Defending What We Have: Survival and Decline in Reagan’s Second Term
• Chapter Six: Partial Détente: George H. W. Bush and the AFL-CIO
• Chapter Seven: He’s on Our Side?: Hope and Betrayal in the Clinton Years
• Chapter Eight: Saying No to the Status Quo: The 1995 Leadership Challenge
• Chapter Nine: Big Visions and Big Hopes: The Early Sweeney Years
• Chapter Ten: Our Job Has Never Been Harder: The Sweeney Presidency in the Bush Era, 2001–2009
• Epilogue: Holding On in the Trumka Years
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index