This book critically examines how the international norm of the Responsibility to Protect has been effectively limited by its interpretation by liberal states.
Under the Responsibility to Protect, states agree to use 'diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means' to help protect populations – often refugees – from mass atrocities when the state is 'manifestly failing' to do so. Through an analysis of official discourse, as well as interviews with government officials and civil society representatives, this book examines how the Responsibility to Protect articulated by UK and US governments was understood in the case of Syria. As the book demonstrates, the aspirations relied upon in the advocacy of the Responsibility to Protect are in constant tension with states' conceptual understandings and practice of this norm. As the Syrian case indicates – and in a way that the book maintains as more generally representative – the Responsibility to Protect is routinely interpreted and modified in ways that effectively limit both its meaning and its implementation. In conclusion, the book's analysis contributes to realising a more coherent government policy on atrocity prevention and response that does not undermine humanitarian protection and international consensus on the Responsibility to Protect.
This book will appeal to scholars, research students, practitioners, and policymakers in the areas of international law, human rights, international relations, peace and conflict studies, and refugee studies.