Virtue Ethics in the Conduct and Governance of Social Science Research

Nathan Emmerich

• Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781787146082
• eBook ISBN: 9781787149939
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy
• Index: Social Sciences

This collection focuses on virtue theory and the ethics of social science research. A moral philosophy that has been relatively neglected in the domain of research ethics, virtue ethics has much to offer those who wish to go beyond the difficulties generated by the biomedical model of research ethics and positively engage with the ethics of social scientific research. As the chapters contained in this volume show, the perspective provided by virtue ethics also exhibits a certain affinity with the emerging discourse regarding research integrity. Contributors develop various facets of virtue ethics in order to illuminate a range of issues in the practice and governance of social science, including integrity, the ethics of ethical review, ethics education, and the notion of phrón?sis (wisdom). 

SECTION 1

VIRTUE AND INTEGRITY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

CHAPTER 1

CULTIVATING RESEARCHER INTEGRITY: VIRTUE-BASED APPROACHES TO RESEARCH ETHICS

Sarah Banks

ABSTRACT

This chapter presents a virtue-based approach to research ethics which both complements and challenges dominant principle- and rule-based ethical codes and governance frameworks. Virtues are qualities of character that contribute to human and ecological flourishing, focussing on the dispositions and motivations of moral agents (in this case, researchers) as opposed to simply their actions. The chapter argues for the usefulness of ‘researcher integrity’, in the context of increasing interest internationally in ‘research integrity’ frameworks for regulating research practice. ‘Researcher integrity’ is analysed, including weak and strong versions of the concept (conduct according to current standards, versus reflexive commitment to ideals of what research should be at its best). Researcher integrity in its stronger sense is depicted as an overarching complex virtue, holding together and balancing other virtues such as courage, care, trustworthiness, respectfulness and practical wisdom. Consideration is given to educating researchers and university students as virtuous researchers, rather than simply ensuring that rules are followed and risks minimised. Several approaches are outlined, including Socratic dialogue, to develop attentiveness and respectfulness and participatory theatre to rehearse different responses to ethical challenges in research. Some limitations of virtue ethics are noted, including dangers of reinforcing a culture of blaming researchers for institutional failings, and its potential to be co-opted by those who wish to indoctrinate rather than cultivate virtues. Nevertheless, it is an important counter-weight to current trends that see research ethics as entailing learning sets of rules and how to implement them (to satisfy institutional research governance requirements), rather than processes of critical and responsible reflection.

Keywords: Research ethics; research integrity; researcher integrity, virtue ethics; Socratic dialogue; participatory theatre

INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been an increasing concern with ethics in the conduct of social research, resulting in a growth of ethical codes, guidance and policies for good conduct and governance. Furthermore, the discourse of research ethics has developed in such a way that the notion of ‘research integrity’ has emerged to offer a broader framework for understanding and governing the practice of research. Under this heading we now find principles, policies and procedures covering issues of plagiarism, the fabrication and falsification of data as well as protection of research participants from harm and efforts to ensure that their rights to privacy and informed consent are respected. Most policy and practice guidance takes the form of prescriptions for action and adopts a regulatory approach to ensuring good conduct through requiring researchers to submit applications for review by research ethics committees (RECs). In such applications researchers are expected to evidence their knowledge of, and an intention to follow, what are essentially principle- or rule-based codes of ethical research.

This chapter will discuss the concept of researcher integrity in the context of this rapidly growing concern with research integrity. I will explore the notion of researcher integrity as a complex quality of character or ‘virtue’, which has a focus on the motivations and commitments of the researcher as a practitioner and a member of a research community. This contrasts with the common focus of research integrity, which usually considers the integrity of the research practice – although clearly the integrity of the researcher and the research organisation influences the conduct of research. I will discuss the nature of virtue ethics and what it might contribute to the field of research ethics, before exploring what is meant by researcher integrity, including weak and strong versions of the concept (conducted according to extant standards versus reflexive commitment to ideals of what research should be at its best), and how character-based approaches to ethics complement and extend regulatory approaches focussed on the conduct of research.

In the light of this discussion, I will consider what the virtues of a good researcher might be, and how these can be effectively cultivated. This is an area that has been under-explored to date, although the work of Macfarlane (2009) offers a useful starting point on which to build. I will consider how education of researchers and university students might be configured so as to focus on the development of virtuous researchers, rather than simply ensuring that rules are followed and risks minimised. I will outline several approaches to research ethics education, including the use of Socratic dialogue to engage people in practising the virtues of attentiveness and respectfulness while discussing substantive ethical issues in a group; and the use of participatory theatre to act out and rehearse different responses to ethical challenges in research.

VIRTUE ETHICS

Virtue ethics is a philosophical approach that focusses on the excellent qualities of character or moral dispositions (virtues) of moral agents. Examples of virtues might include trustworthiness, courage or compassion. Often linked in Western philosophy with Aristotle, virtue ethics is experiencing a recent revival in moral philosophy (Adams, 2006; Alfano, 2015; Crisp & Slote, 1997; Foot, 1978; Hursthouse, 1999; Swanton, 2003), and a number of different theoretical perspectives have been developed. It is often contrasted with principle-based ethics (including Kantianism and utilitarianism), which focusses on abstract, general principles of action that pertain to right conduct, and questions of how moral agents ought to act and what they ought to do. In contrast, the key ethical questions in virtue ethics are: ‘What kind of person should I be?’ or ‘how should I live?’

A virtue-based approach to ethics can be regarded either as an alternative, or as a supplement, to principle-based ethics. In this chapter I will take virtue ethics as supplementary to a principle-based approach rather than as an alternative. Virtues can then be regarded as either subsidiary or complementary to principles. If virtues are subsidiary, then one approach is to take the principles and ask ‘what virtues can we derive from these principles?’ For example, taking the principle of respect for autonomy, we might ask what it might mean for someone to be respectful towards the autonomy of others. This is one useful way of starting to think about how to put the principles into practice. On the other hand, if virtues are regarded as complementary to principles, then this entails extending the concept of ethics from a narrow focus on abstract moral principles implemented by a process of deductive reasoning to include a range of different types of elements, including a person’s moral character, as well as the principles that should guide their actions in a particular domain. On this view of ethics, virtues and principles are not in direct competition with each other. Rather, they are fundamentally different types of values that are not commensurable with each other. This kind of pluralistic ethics eschews the search for a foundational ethical theory (similar to Kantianism or utilitarianism) and acknowledges that there are several different types of values that cannot be ranked or weighed against each other on a single scale, nor derived from each other (Nagel, 1979). It is interesting that Beauchamp and Childress (Beauchamp, 2003; Beauchamp & Childress, 2009), who have been very influential in the development and sustaining of a principle-based approach to research ethics, nevertheless reject the assumption that one must defend a single type of moral theory that is solely principle-based, virtue-based, and so forth. They express this view in the fifth edition of their text on biomedical ethics as follows:

In everyday moral reasoning, we effortlessly blend appeals to principles, rules, rights, virtues, passions, analogies, paradigms, narratives and parables…. To assign priority to one of these moral categories as the key ingredient in the moral life is a dubious project of certain writers in ethics who wish to refashion in their own image what is most central in the moral life. (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, p. 408)

Virtues are also required to specify, interpret, and implement principles. Indeed, in the fourth edition of their book, Beauchamp and Childress (1994) introduced a whole chapter relating to virtues in professional life and acknowledged the following:

Principles require judgement, which in turn depends on character, moral discernment, and a person’s sense of responsibility and accountability … Often what counts most in the moral life is not consistent adherence to principles and rules, but reliable character, moral good sense, and emotional responsiveness. (p. 462)

Retitled as ‘Moral Character’ in the fifth and sixth editions of their book, this chapter acts as a precursor to their account of the principles of biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001, 2009).

Whether we regard the virtues as primary, or as one among many sources of moral values, there is clearly a scope to explore the nature of virtues and the role they play in the ethical life of researchers. The discussion that follows will be illuminated by insights from virtue ethics, although this does not necessarily entail subscribing to virtue ethics as an ethical theory. Indeed, some philosophers distinguish ‘virtue theory’ (a theory about the nature of virtues) from ‘virtue ethics’ (a theory or theoretical approach to ethics that places virtues at the heart of ethical life). Therefore, my aim here is not to develop a virtue ethical theory for research, but to explore how a shift of focus from abstract principles and specific rules for research practice to the virtues of the researcher might help in improving ethical practice.

THE NATURE OF VIRTUES

In the philosophical literature, there is considerable debate about what counts as a virtue, including whether a virtue consists in good motives, good ends/effects or whether both are required (Battaly, 2015; van Zyl, 2015). Given the concern of this chapter – understanding and improving ethical practice in social research – I will use the term ‘virtue’ to refer to a moral disposition to feel, think and act in such a way as to promote human and ecological flourishing, entailing both a motivation to act well and, typically, the achievement of good ends. Virtues are often described as excellent traits of character, and entail a reliable disposition to act in certain predictable ways across contexts.

One of the recent challenges to virtue ethics, known as the ‘situationist critique’, draws on empirical (largely psychological) research to argue that the idea that human beings embody robust, enduring character traits may be little more that a folk concept, better thought of as a moral fiction rather than a reflection of reality (Alfano, 2013; Doris, 2002; Harman, 1999; Merritt, Doris, & Harman, 2010). For example, whether people respond in a caring way to a person in need seems to depend on whether or not they are in a hurry. Furthermore, as Milgram’s (1974) experiment infamously demonstrated, the majority of people seem to be prepared to torture others if instructed to do so by an authority figure. However, rather than concluding that the concept of a virtue is untenable, we could equally use this ‘evidence’ as part of an argument that becoming and being virtuous requires considerable work. The fact that people whom we would expect to be caring or honest may act in cruel or dishonest ways in certain contexts can lead to several conclusions, including that virtues are rare, or that character traits (and hence virtues as excellences of character) are not just qualities of the individual, but rather the interaction between person, social milieu and circu...

Table of contents

• Title
• Introduction: Virtue and the Ethics of Social Research
• Section 1. Virtue and Integrity in Social Science Research
• Section 2. Virtue and The Review/Governance of Social Science Research
• Section 3. Phrónēsis in the Practice/Conduct and Review/Governance of Social Scientific Research
• Index