Chapter 1

AN IMAGINED MIDDLE CLASS

The Birth of the Ideal National Subject, 1961–1979

By the end of the 1970s when the Third Economic Development Five Year Plan is completed, we will have built an affluent society of mass production and mass consumption, with a new motto: “Consumption is a virtue.”
—PARK CHUNG HEE, THE PRESIDENT’S ANNUAL ADDRESS TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1/18/1966), 1973A, P.584.
In 1966 chungsanch’ŭng (middle class) was a keyword1 in Korea, the centerpiece of social agendas in both politics and academic circles. Beginning with an address by an opposition party leader, the government, politicians, state officials, and intellectuals talked about the middle class. The term “middle class” appeared everywhere—in newspaper columns and op-eds, popular magazines, academic journal articles, and political speeches. The issues related to the middle class were diverse: how to define and conceptualize the Korean middle class, what the political orientations of the middle class were, what lifestyles the middle class pursued, and what roles the middle class should play in Korean national modernization. Ironically, in 1966, when the idea of the middle class—as opposed to the working or lower classes—was prevalent in the political arena, the middle class had not yet arisen as a visible mainstream social force in Korean society; in post–Korean War society, the majority of the population was destitute and could barely make ends meet on a day-to-day basis. One might ask, then, why was the idea of the middle class so popular among political elites? Why was it so urgent to address the issues of the middle class? How did the state create the idea of the middle class even prior to its existence? And who was actually considered part of the middle class?
This chapter explores how the authoritarian Park Chung Hee regime (1961–1979) promoted social imaginaries of the urban middle class and cultivated the urban middle class as the foundation of its hegemonic nation-building project during the very early stages of industrialization in Korea, when the making of the middle class was equated with the making of a modern nation. I argue that urban middle class formation in Korea was a political-ideological project of the authoritarian Park regime to reconstruct the nation and strengthen its political legitimacy. While according to conventional wisdom the middle class was a subsequent outcome of economic development and modernization (for example, Huntington 1968; Lipset 1959), I pay attention to the discursive construction of the middle class by the state, politicians, and intellectuals. The ideal middle class comprised disciplined, responsible citizens who practiced frugal living and worked hard, but it also symbolized comfortable lifestyles and mass consumption. By embodying economic success and upward social mobility, the middle class could represent a prosperous and modern nation—one that had successfully overcome a “backward and humiliated” national past haunted by colonialism, partition, and civil war (B. S. Shin 1970, 287).
In this chapter, I illuminate the process through which a specific category of the “middle class” was formulated by the state; how the middle class was framed by different groups, including the state, political parties, intellectuals, and mass media; what kinds of discourse the state formed around the middle class; what meanings and implications this class category held; and how middle-class discourse served to promote national modernization. By disseminating particular cultural norms, embodied in the middle class, throughout society, the authoritarian state attempted to strengthen national identity and its vision of development. In doing so, the state could legitimize the developmental process and mobilize the entire population as part of the developmental project.

Building a New State, Constructing a New Nation

The three years of the Korean War (1950–1953) were a traumatic experience for all Koreans. Most families lost members and had to leave their homes behind to escape the atrocities of the war. The tragic experiences and suffering of ordinary citizens during the war left deep, indelible scars on Korean people’s minds and hearts. The war also caused enormous economic damage to both North and South Korea, with most economic infrastructures and facilities completely demolished. Amid the ruins of the war, the most important tasks for both North and South Korea were consolidating their own political systems and rebuilding the economy.
It was an extremely challenging situation. Shortages were ubiquitous, and the South Korean economy was completely dependent on aid from the United States and the United Nations. Many people were displaced—approximately 450,000 citizens escaped from the North to the South (Gong 1989, 233). Most refugees had no economic means; they frequently went hungry and struggled to survive. During the 1950s, the number of the unemployed was estimated at between 500,000 and 600,000 out of the total population of 20 million (Gong 1989, 261). Because of the extreme shortage of jobs, many people worked as day laborers or peddlers. The historian Bruce Cumings vividly describes what everyday life was like during the postwar era: “South Korea in the 1950s was a terribly depressing place, where extreme privation and degradation touched everyone. Cadres of orphans ran through the streets, forming little protective and predatory bands of ten or fifteen; beggars with every affliction or war injury importuned anyone with a wallet, often traveling in bunches of maimed or starved adults holding children or babies; half-ton trucks full of pathetic women careened onto military bases for the weekend, so they could sell whatever service they had” (Cumings 1997, 303). South Korea also experienced dramatic population change and rapid urbanization in the 1950s (S.-G. Cho and Oh 2003). Cities, particularly big cities such as Seoul, Busan, and Daegu, experienced explosive growth as they absorbed refugees from the North and migrants from rural areas. As a result of this growth, the already damaged cities acquired even more problems. In particular, housing became a life-or-death issue for many people. City-dwellers were crammed together in tiny houses, and many migrants clustered in new, disordered neighborhoods, haphazard collections of temporary wooden shacks that blossomed on the cities’ hillsides.
Amid social chaos and extreme poverty, almost no one imagined that the South Korean economy would recover. On the eve of General Park Chung Hee’s military coup in 1961, socioeconomic conditions were dismal. Although the extremely corrupt and incompetent Syngman Rhee regime (1948–1960) was overthrown by student protests, and the new, democratic Chang Myun regime came to power, ordinary citizens’ lives did not improve. In 1960 and 1961, inflation became serious: the price of rice increased by 60 percent from December 1960 to April 1961, and the price of oil and coal rose by 23 percent over the same period; the GDP growth rate decreased by 12 percent from November to February; and the unemployment rate reached 23.7 percent in 1960 (Hankook Ilbo 4/23/1961). Despite this urgent economic situation, political leaders focused on factional strife and did not effectively address the social demands from below.
In the midst of economic crisis and political disorder, Park Chung Hee justified the coup as necessary to save the Korean nation; he claimed that the coup would eradicate corruption and social evils and establish new and sound social morals (Supreme Council for National Reconstruction 1961, title page). Park identified Korea as “historically dependent on and exploited by other countries, and always vulnerable to military attacks and political interventions” (C. H. Park [1962] 1970, 166). Thirty-six years of Japanese colonialism, the Korean War, and the division into two Koreas had brought national humiliation.2 Park Chung Hee believed that his military revolution was like surgery to remove diseased flesh. His ultimate goal was to build a strong and modernized nation-state that would be on equal terms with world powers such as Japan, China, the United States, and the Soviet Union. In his view, only strong leadership could fix the prevailing problems, rebuild the state, and lead to national unification. Though Park came to power through an illegitimate military coup, his urgent call for extensive and thorough social reforms appealed to the entire population, including liberal progressive students and intellectuals (B. Kim 2006; H.-A. Kim 2004).3
For Park Chung Hee, the building of a new nation-state, represented by economic development and national modernization, meant two different but complementary projects: institutional reform and “spiritual revolution” (chŏngsin hyŏngmyŏng). First, Park maintained that the most important task was to build a new social system, resistant to corruption and inefficiency, that would lead to political stability, a new social order, and ultimately victory against communism (C. H. Park [1962] 1970, 164). As soon as he came to power, Park attempted to implement political reforms and anticorruption campaigns. He imprisoned corrupt politicians, army officers, and businessmen and reined in smuggling, the black market, dance clubs, and prostitution (ibid., 92–95). In doing so, he reinforced his image as a reformer, differentiating his administration from that of the corrupt Rhee regime and the incompetent Chang regime. Prioritizing economic development above all, the Park regime began to spearhead export-oriented industrialization in the early 1960s. The government bureaucracy was streamlined to promote rapid economic growth. Park instituted the Economic Planning Board (Kyŏngje Kihoegwŏn), which centralized economic information and produced economic policies. The regime also nationalized banks and centralized the financial system (Amsden 1989; Chibber 2003; Evans 1995; Kohli 2004; Waldner 1999; Woo-Cumings 1999). The regime’s “reformist” actions were intended to compensate for its lack of political legitimacy and to draw societal support: after its “original sin” of overthrowing the previous democratic government, improving people’s livelihoods became the key to maintaining stability.
Along with this institutional reform, the Park regime also encouraged people to change their mind-sets and attitudes, which Park called a “spiritual revolution.” He accused Koreans of being lethargic and feeling inferior to Western countries (B. S. Shin 1970, 287). Park thought that in order to overcome Korea’s “backward” and “shameful” past, it was necessary to improve the “quality” of the population (ch’ejil kaesŏn). In this logic, the ups and downs of the nation depended completely on the mentality and willingness of the citizens to change the existing system and to improve current living standards. National wealth could be produced only after transforming both society’s value system and the thinking of individuals (B. Kim 2006, 130). The Park regime argued that the biggest obstacles to realizing the goal of reaching an advanced industrialized country were indolence, inertia, resignation, and a lack of determination (B. S. Shin 1970, 127). Unless these “old” mentalities and dispositions changed, Park warned, prosperity would be impossible. He maintained that “modernization of the mind” and “rationalization of social life” were necessary to accelerate economic development, and he called for eliminating traditional habits and advocated living diligently and frugally (ibid., 127–28). Through slogans such as “Founding an advanced Korea [sŏnjin Han’guk ŭi kit’ŭl],” “Creating Korea in the world [segye sok ŭi Han’guk ch’angjo],” “Pioneers who create tomorrow [naeil ŭl ch’angjohanŭn sŏn’guja],” and “New vigor for modernization of the fatherland [choguk kŭndaehwa rŭl wihan saeroun hwallyŏkso],” the Park regime tried to disseminate a message of optimism and confidence (Baek 2004, 215–16). When the majority of Korean society became enthusiastic about building a new nation-state, Park claimed, it would be possible to break the vicious cycles of poverty and backwardness.
The Park regime promoted discipline in everyday life. Frequently citing the case of German rehabilitation as an exemplar for Koreans, Park maintained in his speeches that Koreans should endure the long years of reconstruction with diligence and patience, as the Germans had done: “They [the Germans] refused to eat or dress well, solemnly determined only to rebuild Germany again. Housewives saved cloth by cutting one more inch from their skirts. To save matches, only when three met together did they strike a match. Workers resolved not to strike until the day the German economy was rehabilitated, and not to raise their own salaries until their factories were healthy. Germans ate very frugally even after the economic recovery, and invested their savings in production and construction” (B. S. Shin 1970, 25). As reflected in this speech, Park believed that the entire population should tolerate the current difficulties and sacrifice themselves for the nation’s glory. While encouraging savings and frugal living in domestic life was an essential component in making the state’s development project successful, the state also justified repressive labor practices by adopting nationalist language—workers had to tolerate low wages and long work hours to participate in the modernization project. These were the “patriotic” actions that ordinary people could undertake in daily life. Conversely, demanding higher wages or shorter work hours would delay modernization. Therefore, labor activism and political demonstrations were branded as unpatriotic and even procommunist, as those actions could lead to social instability and thus vulnerability to military attack from North Korea.
In this sense, Park’s national development project was a “disciplinary revolution”:4 just as the Protestant ethic shaped the rise of capitalism in western Europe (Weber [1930] 2001), the Korean state’s emphasis on savings and frugality crucially affected the effort to build a new nation. The state tried to impose new societal values and create new social subjects to overcome what it perceived as the traditional and backward past. While promoting economic growth and sustaining specific political regimes are political and administrative processes, they equally involve disseminating social discipline and knowledge (Gorski 1993, 266). As Philip Gorski notes: “States are not only administrative, policing and military organizations. They are also pedagogical, corrective, and ideological organizations” (2003, 165–66).
The state could manage its population with less coercion and violence by imposing social discipline throughout society and creating more obedient and industrious subjects (Foucault 1977; Gorski 1993). This is not to say that the state was not repressive. Rather, it tried to achieve its goals by employing specific discourses so as to avoid cruder methods. The problem was how the state could effectively impose discipline on a whole society. The solution was to focus on a particular “carrier” group that would help extend the new forms of discipline more efficiently and deeply into the population (Gorski 1993, 270–71). In Korea’s case, the state and intellectuals emphasized the role of the middle class in the development of a disciplined and productive citizenry, whose education and hard work earned them enhanced living standards and modern lifestyles—an alternative to the way of life of “backward and traditional” peasants.

Discovery of the Middle Class as Model Citizens

In the early 1960s, Korea was a largely agricultural country, with more than half of its population living as peasants in rural areas. The rural space—bucolic and idyllic—often symbolized traditional Korean society, yet it was also seen as “left behind” or in need of modernization. In the eyes of the state, which saw industrialization as the path to national modernization, this largely agrarian economic structure had to be transformed. Small-scale farmers, therefore, could not be the future of the industrial Korean nation. The state needed a new and progressive social body to represent a new, modern nation-state. Many intellectuals participated in this modernization project by producing discourses on development. Though some liberal intellectuals were critical of the Park regime’s authoritarianism, they did not necessarily disagree with its overall picture of national modernization (B. Kim 2006). Instead, a number of intellectuals, including university professors and journalists, actively engaged in discourse about national modernization and modern citizenship in the new Korea.5 In the mid-1960s, many intellectuals were concerned that Koreans’ own culture was subordinated to the strong influence of Japanese culture (Cha [1965] 1998; “Saenghwalmunhwa ǒmnǔn Han‘guk” 1965). Both the state and intellectual circles agreed that the colonial mentality had to be overcome through modernization and economic development. Intellectuals believed that the rise of the middle class would enlighten the rest of society and develop Korea’s own culture in opposition to commercial and foreign infiltration (Cha [1965] 1998, 275).
In 1966 middle-class issues emerged as an important political and social agenda. In a New Year’s keynote address in 1966, the opposition party leader, Park Soon Chun, first brought them up: she argued that the growth of the middle class was an urgent issue. She asserted that because the middle class was the driving f...