During the United States' conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, special operations forces took a central role. However, little has been written about the aircrews that trained to support these warriors, and less still has been written about how special operations, across the military, developed into the lethal tool of national policy it is today.
This work analyzes these aviators during the 1980s to advance two complimentary arguments. The first argument builds on the idea that the different service branches develop different personalities and cultures. This work argues that there are subcultures within the military, like special operations, that do not align with the institutional culture. During the 1980s Air Force special operations aviators developed a unique culture to overcome the financial and doctrinal deficits.
Second, since the Air Force would not adequately support special operations aviation, it took direct action from Congress for cultural change to occur. Building on the works of Huntington, Janowitz, and Coen, the book provides another layer to the discussion of civil-military relations within the United States. The successful Air Force special operations forces today are a result of this Congressional intervention.