Social Influence and the Logic of Collective Action

Sergey Gavrilets

• Publisher: Princeton University Press
• Year: 2026
• Print ISBN:
  9780691275963
  9780691275956
• eBook ISBN:
  9780691294834
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Data Modelling & Design
• Index: Social Sciences

An integrated quantitative framework for understanding the dynamics of collective action

Collective action has been a fundamental aspect of human societies throughout history, from building irrigation systems and defenses in Neolithic times to coordinated disaster relief and scientific collaborations today. In this book, Sergey Gavrilets explains when and why groups of people cooperate, presenting a quantitative framework that unifies game theory with models of social influence, cognition, and individual and cultural variation. He shows how humans’ deep susceptibility to social influence—grounded in evolutionary need to cooperate and learn from peers, reinforced by deference to parents and elders, and extended to cultural, religious, and political leaders—shapes norms, beliefs, and collective outcomes.

Integrating previously separate literatures, Gavrilets introduces explicit dynamics for norms and beliefs, quantifies the effects of individual and cultural differences, and tests predictions across societies. Drawing on formal, data-based mathematical modeling supported by behavioral experiments and studies of online behavior, he concludes that successful collective action depends on six interacting forces: material payoffs, personal norms and attitudes, social influence, cognition, evolving social norms and beliefs about others, and individual and cultural differences. Lasting cultural change, he argues, depends on norms and institutions that shape behavior through persuasion, nudging, and enforcement. Gavrilets translates this theory into practical, testable strategies for policy and design, including targeted messaging, dynamic norms, and culturally sensitive approaches, and connects it to broader theories of behavior change.

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Brief Contents
• Detailed Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Common Mathematical Symbols
• 1. Human Behavior in Collective Action
• 2. Collective Action in Classical and Evolutionary Game Theories
• 3. Evolutionary Emergence of Social Influence
• 4. Dynamics of Social Influence
• 5. Dynamics of Behavior with Social Influence and Stable Personal Norms
• 6. Dynamics of Behavior with Social Influence and Evolving Personal Norms
• 7. Coevolution of Actions, Attitudes, and Beliefs About Others
• 8. Testing and Validating the Integrative Model in Behavioral Experiments
• 9. Modeling Online Behavior
• 10. Synthesis
• Bibliography
• Index