This book examines Moving Target Defense (MTD) as a strategic and institutional response to the weaknesses of static cyber defense in democratic states.
Using Canada as the principal empirical case, and drawing comparisons with the United States, the UK, and Australia, the book argues that adaptive denial is a governance problem before it is a technological one. It develops a framework for evaluating MTD against alliance interoperability, digital sovereignty, and democratic accountability, and examines real-world threats, including Chinese state-sponsored hacking groups such as Volt Typhoon, ransomware attacks on hospitals and pipelines, and foreign interference in democratic institutions. Bridging cybersecurity technology, national security policy, and democratic governance, this work provides practical insights for policymakers, security professionals, and scholars seeking to understand how liberal democracies can better protect themselves in an era of relentless digital competition.
This book will be of much interest to students of cybersecurity, strategic studies, law and technology, and international relations.