Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Essays in Honour of Koji Okuguchi

Pierre von Mouche, Federico Quartieri

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN:
  9783319292533
• eBook ISBN:
  9783319292540
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Economics

This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory.

Table of contents

• Preface
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Introduction
• On the Works of Professor Koji Okuguchi
• Cournot, a Non-strategic Economist
• Cournot Tatonnement in Aggregative Games with Monotone Best Responses
• Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment
• On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs
• Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discrete Cournot Games
• On a Discontinuous Cournot Oligopoly
• Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The Exponential Model
• Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy
• Cournot Oligopoly Theory for Simple Electricity Markets
• Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly
• Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities
• Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests
• Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups
• On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests
• Heterogeneity and Number of Players in Rent-Seeking, Innovation, and Patent-Race Games