Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity

Martin Heidegger, John van Buren

• Publisher: Indiana University Press
• Year: 2008
• ISBN:
  9780253004468
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophers

This probing analysis of the history of ontology is "of enormous significance for students of the development of Heidegger's early thought" (Daniel O. Dahlstrom Boston University ). First published in 1988, Ontology—The Hermeneutics of Facticity is the text of Heidegger's lecture course at the University of Freiburg during the summer of 1923. In these lectures, Heidegger reviews and makes critical appropriations of the hermeneutic tradition from Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine to Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Through this critical survey, he reformulates the question of being on the basis of facticity and the everyday world. Specific themes deal with the history of ontology, the development of phenomenology and its relation to Hegelian dialectic, traditional theological and philosophical concepts of man, the present situation of philosophy, and the influences of Aristotle, Luther, Kierkegaard, and Husserl on Heidegger's thinking. Students of Heidegger will find initial breakthroughs in his unique elaboration of the meaning of human experience and the "question of being, " which received mature expression in Being and Time.

PART ONE

PATHS OF INTERPRETING THE BEING-THERE OF DASEIN IN THE AWHILENESS OF TEMPORAL PARTICULARITY

“Facticity” is the designation we will use for the character of the being of “our” “own” Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: in each case “this” Dasein in its being-there for a while at the particular time (the phenomenon of the “awhileness” of temporal particularity, cf. “whiling,” tarrying for a while, not running away, being-there-at-home-in . . . , being-there-involved-in . . . , the being-there of Dasein) insofar as it is, in the character of its being, “there” in the manner of be-ing.^[9] Being-there in the manner of be-ing means: not, and never, to be there primarily as an object of intuition and definition on the basis of intuition, as an object of which we merely take cognizance and have knowledge. Rather, Dasein is there for itself in the “how” of its ownmost being. The how of its being opens up and circumscribes^[10] the respective “there” which is possible for a while at the particular time. Being—transitive: to be factical life! Being is itself never the possible object of a having, since what is at issue in it, what it comes to, is itself: being.

As that which is in each case our own, “Dasein” does not mean an isolating relativization into individuals who are seen only from the outside and thus the individual (solus ipse [myself alone]). “Our own” is rather a how of being, an indication which points to a possible path of being-wakeful. Not a regional demarcation in the sense of an isolating contrast.

Accordingly, “factical” means something which is of itself articulated with respect to, on the basis of, and with a view to such a factical character of being and “is” in this manner. If we take “life” to be a mode of “being,” then “factical life” means: our own Dasein which is “there” for us in one expression or another of the character of its being, and this expression, too, is in the manner of being.

Chapter One

Hermeneutics

§2. The traditional concept of hermeneutics

The expression “hermeneutics” is used here to indicate the unified manner of the engaging, approaching, accessing, interrogating, and explica facticity.

The word ἑϱμηνευτιϰή [hermeneutics] (ἐπιστήμη [science], [art]) is formed from ἑϱμηνεύειν [interpreting], ἑϱμηνεία [interpretation], ἑϱμηνεύς [interpreter]. Its etymology is obscure.¹

It is related to the name of the god Ἑϱμη̑ς [Hermes], the mes of the gods.

A few references will allow us to narrow down the original meaning of this word and understand as well the way its meaning has changed.

Plato: οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ ἢ ἑϱμηνη̑ϛ εἰσιν τω̑ν ϑεω̑ν (“the poets are but the heralds of the gods”).² Thus the following applies to the rhapsodes who for their part recite the poets: Οὐϰου̑ν ἑϱμηνέων ἑϱμηνη̑ϛ γίγνεσϑε; “Will you not thus turn out to be heralds of heralds?”³ A ἑϱμηνεύϛ [interpreter] is one who communicates, announces and makes known,^[11] to someone what another “means,” or someone who in turn conveys, reactivates, this communication, this announcement and making known. Cf. Sophist 248a5, 246e3: ἀφεϱμήνευε, “shall report about”^*: making known what the others mean.

Theaetetus 209a5: Λόγοϛ [discourse] = ἡ τη̑ϛ ση̑ϛ διαφοϱότητοϛ ἑϱμηνεία [the expression of differences]. The making known is a making explicit of differences in addition to and in relation to what is ϰοινóν [common].^† (cf. Theaetetus 163c: what we see of the words and what interpreters of them communicate.)^‡ — not theoretical comprehension but “will,” wish, and the like, being, existence, i.e., hermeneutics is the announcement and making known of the being of a being in its being in relation to . . . (me).

Aristotle: τῃ̑ γλώττῃ (ϰαταχϱη̑ται ἡ φύσιϛ) ἐπί τε τὴν γευ̑σιν ϰαὶ τὴν διάλεϰτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γευ̑σιϛ ἀναγϰαι̑ον (διò ϰαὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάϱχει), ἡ δ’ ἑϱμηνεία ἕνεϰα του̑ εὖ. “Living beings use their tongue for tasting as well as for conversing as they go about their dealings^[12]; of these, tasting is a necessary mode of their dealings (hence it is found in most of them), but addressing and discussing something with others (conversation about something) exists in order to safeguard the authentic being of living beings (as they live in their world and by means of it).”⁴ Here ἑϱμηνεία simply stands for διάλεϰτοϛ [conversation], i.e., discussing the world as we go about dealings with it. And such discussion is simply the factical mode of the actualizing of λόγοϛ, and this (discourse about something) has as its concern δηλου̑ν { . . . } τò συμφέϱον ϰαὶ τò βλαβεϱόν (i.e., discourse “makes beings openly manifest, accessible for our seeing and having of them in their expediency and inexpediency”).⁵

See also ἑϱμηνεύειν, Philostratus.⁶ Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum Commentaria.⁷ Pericles in Thucydides: ϰαίτοι ἐμοὶ τοιούτῳ ἀνδϱὶ ὀϱγίζεσϑε ὃϛ οὐδενòϛ οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι γνω̑ναί τε τὰ δέοντα ϰαὶ ἑϱμηνευ̑σαι ταυ̑τα, φιλόπολίϛ τε ϰαὶ χϱημάτων ϰϱείσσων. [“And yet I, with whom you are angry, am as competent as any man, I think, to know and announce the right measures, and as good a patriot and superior to the influence of money.”]⁸

Aristotle: λέγω δέ, . . . , λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τη̑ς ὀνομασίας ἑϱμηνείαν. [I mean that . . . the language is making something known through words.”]⁹

Among the “writings” of Aristotle, one has been handed down with the title Πεϱὶ ἑϱμηνείας [On Interpretation]. It deals with λόγος in terms of its basic accomplishment of uncovering beings and making us familiar with them. The title of this text is very fitting in light of what was noted above. However, neither Aristotle nor his immediate successors in the Peripatos introduced the text under this title. It was handed down from Aristotle’s literary estate to his students as an “unfinished draft” and “without a title.” The title was already in use in the time of Andronicus of Rhodes. H. Meier, who has established the authenticity of the text on solid grounds, conjecturally puts the earliest appearance of the title in the first generation after Theophrastus and Eudemus.¹⁰

In the present context, what is solely important for us about ἑϱμηνεία functioning as the title of Aristotle’s particular investigation is what this tells us about the history of the meaning of this word. What discourse accomplishes is making something accessible as being there out in the open, as being available. As such, λόγος has, regarding what it accomplishes, the distinctive possibility of ἀληϑεύειν [being-true] (making what was previously concealed, covered up, available as unconcealed, as there out in the open). Because Aristotle’s text deals with all this, it is rightly called πεϱὶ ἑϱμηνείας.

This sense of ἑϱμηνεύειν took on a general meaning among the Byzantines and corresponds to our term “to mean.” A word or combination of words means something, “has a meaning.” (A Platonism of meaning deriving from this.)

Philo describes Moses as a ἑϱμηνεύϛ ϑεου̑ [interpreter of God], a messenger who announces and makes known the will of God.¹¹

Aristeas: τά τω̑ν Ἰουδαίων γϱάμματα “ἑϱμηνείαϛ πϱοσδει̑ται” (the writings of the Jews “require translation,” “interpretation”).¹² Translation: making what was presented in a foreign language accessible in our own language and for the sake of it. In the Christian churches, ἑϱμηνεία then came to mean as much as commentary (enarratio): ἑϱμηνεία εἰς τὴν ὀϰτάτευχον [“commentary on the Octateuch”]. Commenting, interpreting: pursuing what is authentically meant in a text and thereby making the matters which are meant accessible, facilitating access to them. ἑϱμηνεία = ἐξήγησις [exegesis].

Augustine provides the first “hermeneutics” in grand style. Homo timens Deum, voluntatem ejus in Scripturis sanctis diligenter inquirit. Et ne amet certamina, pietate mansuetus; praemunitus etiam scientia linguarum, ne in verbis locutionibusque ignotis haereat; praemunitus etiam cognitione quarumdam rerum necessariarum, ne vim naturamve earum quae propter similitudinem adhibentur, ignoret; adjuvante etiam codicum veritate, quam solers emendationis diligentia procuravit: veniat ita instructus ad ambigua Scripturarum discutienda atque solvenda.

“Man should approach the interpretation of ambiguous passages in Scripture with the following provisions: in fear of God, with the sole care of seeking God’s will in Scripture; thoroughly educated in piety lest he should take pleasure in falling into quarrels over words; equipped with knowledge of languages lest he should get hung up on unfamiliar words and locutions; supplied with knowledge of certain natural objects and events which are introduced for purposes of illustration, lest he should misjudge the strength of their evidence; supported by the truth which the texts contain. . . .”¹³

In the 17th century, we meet up with the title Hermeneutica sacra [Sacred Hermeneutics] for what is otherwise designated as Clavis Scripturae sacrae¹⁴ [A Key to Sacred Scripture], Isagoge ad sacras literas¹⁵ [Introduction to Sacred Writings], Tractatus de interpretatione¹⁶ [Treatise on Interpretation], and Philologia sacra¹⁷ [Sacred Philology].

Hermeneutics is now no longer interpretation itself, but a doctrine about the conditions, the objects, the means, and the communication and practical application of interpretation. Cf. Johannes Jakob Rambach:

I.	“De fundamentis hermeneuticae sacrae”^18 [“On the Principles of Sacred Hermeneutics”]. On the right plan of approach for the interpretation of texts, of the meaning of the texts.
II.	“De mediis hermeneuticae sacrae domesticis”^19 [“On the Internal Means of Sacred Hermeneutics”]. Religious analogy as a principle of interpretation. Circumstances, affects. Arrangement, relations. Parallelism in Scripture.
III.	“De mediis hermeneuticae sacrae externis et litterariis”^20 [“On the External and Literal Means of Sacred Hermeneutics”]. Grammatical, critical, rhetorical, logical, and scientific ones. Translation and commentary.
IV.	“De sensus inventi legitima tractatione”^21 [“On the Proper Treatment of Discovered Meaning”]. On communication, supplying arguments, porismatic and practical application. (Porismata [inferences], ποϱίζειν: “to infer” in the sense of drawing conclusions.)^[13]

With Schleiermacher, the idea of hermeneutics which had formerly been viewed in a comprehensive and living manner (cf. Augustine!) was then reduced to an “art {technique} of understanding”²² another’s discourse, and seen as a discipline connected with grammar and rhetoric, it was brought into relation with dialectic—this methodology is formal, as “general hermeneutics” (theory and technique of understanding any foreign discourse) it encompasses the special disciplines of theological and philological hermeneutics.

A. Boeckh took up this idea of hermeneutics in his Encyclopedia and Methodology of Philological Disciplines.²³

Dilthey adopted Schleiermacher’s concept of hermeneutics, defining it as “the formulation of rules of understanding” (“technique of interpreting written records”),²⁴ but he supported it with an analysis of understanding as such a...