The Palestinian National Movement

Politics of Contention, 1967–2005

Amal Jamal

• Publisher: Indiana University Press
• Year: 2005
• Print ISBN: 9780253217738
• eBook ISBN: 9780253028389
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

"A comprehensive, up-to-date account of the dynamics in the Palestinian political arena." —Ann M. Lesch, Villanova University

This innovative study examines the internal dynamics of the Palestinian political elite and their impact on the struggle to establish a Palestinian state. The PLO leadership has sought to prevent the rise of any alternative in the West Bank and Gaza Strip that can challenge its authority to represent Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. Drawing on Palestinian sources and interviews with Palestinian political leaders, Jamal argues that the Fatah leadership has attempted to mobilize new social forces—local secular-nationalist and Islamist movements—while undermining their ability to develop independent power structures. This policy has served to radicalize the younger local elites, contributing to the tensions that precipitated the first and second intifadas. Israel's policies have undermined the legitimacy of the national elite, while enhancing the Islamist opposition's ideological legitimacy. In this way, internal elite disunity and growing political differentiation have worked against development of a common Palestinian strategy of state-building.

ONE

The Structural and Historical Context

_____________________

The June 1967 war influenced both Arab nationalism and the Palestinian national movement. The Pan-Arab integrative ideologies of the preceding era, such as Baathism and Nasserism, were discredited, and particularistic nationalism legitimized, reinforcing the multistate structure of the Arab world. The war marked a transition in Palestinian politics, putting an end to the belief that Israel could be defeated by military means and confronting Palestinian leaders with the predicament of where to go from there. Arab regimes that had lost part of their sovereign land to Israel shifted their policies from the liberation of Palestine and “eradication of the Zionist entity” to “erasing the tracks of aggression,” which meant the liberation of those lands occupied in June 1967.

The defeat forced the Arab “confrontation states”¹ to face their internal stress and growing public discontent. None of them was in a position to dictate strategies and tactics of liberation to others. All of them were busy rebuilding their own armies and regaining their internal legitimacy. As a consequence, revolutionary discourse was replaced by a more realistic one in tune with the current reality. Regimes that had considered themselves revolutionary and progressive began slowly reassessing their approach toward the conflict and considering other options for resolving it.² The Rogers plan was accepted by Egypt and Jordan, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 was accepted first by them and then later by Syria. Egypt and Syria embarked upon an incremental strategy of military might combined with diplomatic options, which culminated in the October 1973 war.

In the Palestinian arena the June 1967 war resulted in two major events that were to change the whole history of the Palestinian national movement. The first was the definitive loss of parts of Palestine to Israel, which permanently disconnected the leadership of the national movement from a portion of its homeland and from a central and coherent part of its constituency. The second was the rise of a new power elite in exile that utilized new forms of political organization and political ideology to mobilize Palestinians for the liberation of their homeland.³ In this sense, the June 1967 war launched a new era in Palestinian nationalism in which a new Palestinian elite began, for the first time after the dispersal in 1948, to systematically take the initiative away from the Arab states and to organize the Palestinian people as the main force in the struggle for liberation.⁴ This development, especially the eagerness of the new national elite to achieve recognition of its representative character, became the central issue that has shaped the development of Palestinian politics to this day.

Any understanding of Palestinian elite formation in the last three decades has to start with explication of the sequelae of the 1967 war. Three central factors played a role: first, in exile, the rise of a new political elite of lower-middle-class origins and the establishment of the PLO as the main representative of Palestinian nationalism; second, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, a change in the political structure of Palestinian society under Israeli occupation; and third, in the occupied territories, the effects of Israeli policies, especially efforts at de-Palestinianization and de-development aimed at undermining national sentiments and suppressing allegiance among Palestinians across the boundaries of the Israeli control system.

THE NEW POWER ELITE AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF RESISTANCE

In the conclusion of his seminal study on the history of armed struggle in Palestine, Yezid Sayigh states that the Palestinian resistance organizations that had turned the 1967 defeat into an opportunity “remained a modest force in terms of combat strength and military effectiveness,”⁵ but that they made a more significant contribution to Palestinian political development. Sayigh maintains that this led to four intertwined consequences. First, it confirmed a Palestinian national identity that had begun to be reforged during the social reconstruction of the 1950s. Second, it stimulated the consolidation of a new Palestinian entity, institutionalized in the PLO. Third, it produced a common political arena in which objectives and strategies of mobilization could be defined. Fourth, it initiated a shift in the political process from nation building to state building.⁶ This shift is exemplified by the composition of the power elite that emerged after the 1967 war. Members of this elite had experienced the catastrophe of 1948 but had been too young to actively participate in the war. Most of them came from the lower middle class of small cities or market towns. The altered socioeconomic composition of the guerrilla organizations and the changes within the power structure of the rest of the Arab world would have a major influence on the future course of Palestinian nationalism.

The new circumstances in the Arab world paved the way for the rising Palestinian political elite to establish itself as an authentic and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This new elite, by no means homogeneous, incorporated a militaristic model of guerrilla warfare that caught the imagination of many Palestinians and enabled the mobilization of most of the 1948 refugees for struggle against Israel.⁷ Because their political vision was accompanied by a liberation strategy of active armed struggle, the resistance organizations that were the institutional embodiment of the new elite found strong support among a majority of Palestinians.

Although this rising political stream was ideologically and organizationally diverse, it was able to challenge the representative character of the PLO, which was established by political participants who had had active political experience prior to 1948. In 1968, almost one year after the disaster of the June war, the PLO was transformed into a coalition of organizations jointly advocating the Palestinians’ right to an independent political entity that would represent them and lead them in the struggle for the liberation of their entire homeland.⁸

In order to understand the importance of the change within the Palestinian national movement, it is essential to take note of two factors that illustrate this change and can elucidate its significance. The first is the new social elite that crystallized and introduced itself as a coherent force seeking to implement its vision in the new circumstances. The second is the appearance of new doctrinal and political ideas on the political stage.

Political Ideology and the Social Origins of Elites

A brief look at the leaders of the different resistance organizations shows that they come primarily from a uniform socioeconomic background.⁹ Despite some exceptions, the leaders of the two main organizations, Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), are educated Palestinians, generally from the coastal areas of Palestine and mainly from petit bourgeois socioeconomic origins. They experienced the exodus of 1948 and grew up in the surrounding Arab states,¹⁰ where they spent their youth as active Palestinians. They were educated in either Cairo or Beirut and became successful professionals.¹¹ Their experiences in exile, especially the difficulties that their families had to face in the various Arab host states, figure prominently in the crystallization of their political attitudes. Their awareness of the deficiencies of the national movement during the mandate period and of the crucial role that the traditional modes of organization played in the movement’s disruption, as well as their understanding of the current political conditions in the Arab world, structure their perception of themselves and the conflict.¹² Modern revolutionary thinkers, such as Hisham Sharabi, criticize the class structure of the Palestinian national movement before 1948 and influence the doctrines of the two major groups among the guerrilla organizations.¹³ Leaders of the new political force developed the “guerrilla nucleus into a political organization” that would overcome the fragmentary character of Palestinian society.¹⁴

The resistance organizations were able to mobilize the majority of Palestinians in exile, especially those refugees who had suffered the most as a result of the 1948 dispersal. While the Palestinian bourgeoisie had succeeded in integrating into the surrounding Arab societies, the refugees, who were mainly villagers, faced growing political harassment by the hosting Arab regimes, which were afraid of losing control over the distressed masses, even more so after the defeat of June 1967.

The Palestinian refugees in the Arab confrontation states were fertile ground for the growth of the resistance organizations. The refugees had suffered from economic as well as political suppression and were eager to return to their “lost paradise.”¹⁵ Therefore, they earnestly embraced the guerrilla organizations and formed the “soldiers of their army.” The workers, the youth, and the pupils of the refugee camps became the fidai’yon, those willing to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the homeland.¹⁶ Thus began a new era and a new division of labor in Palestinian nationalism. People who originated from the lower middle class of the big cities in pre-1948 Palestine took the lead in the national movement, establishing their power over the refugees, mostly from rural areas, who had lost their lands and homes during the 1948 war. The latter became the social base of the new political elite and the soldiers of the resistance organizations. The difference in social origin developed into a major factor, influencing patterns of leadership, modes of control, and forms of political alignment in the future.

Despite the similarity in the social backgrounds of the leadership of the resistance organizations, they were unable to form a united front or to merge into one organization. Two main explanations are usually given for this:¹⁷

1. Objective factors relating to the differences in organizational and ideological perceptions

2. Personal factors related to the inability to overcome the barrier of mistrust between the different leaders, which led to the lack of coordination on organizational, military, and political levels

The competition among the various resistance organizations evolved less along ideological lines than around differences between the political programs of the organizations and on the basis of personal relationships,¹⁸ resulting in a tendency toward fragmentation and the creation of temporary coalitions for the sake of immediate goals. The Fatah movement utilized the image of the refugee and the icon of the freedom fighter in an attempt to establish itself as the authentic representative of the Palestinian people. It began marginalizing contending resistance organizations on the basis of their social origin, ideological worldview, and strategic doctrine.¹⁹ As a result, instead of national unity developing, two camps were formed, one led by Fatah and the other by the PFLP. The former sought organizational hegemony, while the latter attempted to build a united national program as a precondition to an effective united national front.

Both of these camps viewed the liberation of Palestine as their main goal, but they differed on the method. The Fatah movement viewed armed struggle as a means for advancing political goals, and its militaristic rhetoric was accompanied by diplomatic measures and initiatives.²⁰ As early as January 1968, during the first conference of the resistance organizations, the idea of establishing a democratic state in Palestine was presented. In developing relations with Arab regimes, Fatah combined military and diplomatic means. Instead of following a clear ideological line, it established parallel relations with the conservative regime in Saudi Arabia and with the more radical regimes of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.

Fatah emphasized its Palestinian character, defining itself as a popular movement that had “its roots in the people,” rather than as an organization or front, and claimi...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1. The Structural and Historical Context
• 2. From Dissension to Coordination: The PLO Leadership and the National Elite in the Occupied Territories
• 3. Mobilization under Control: The Political Economy of Steadfastness
• 4. Engineering Compliance: New Modes of Political Entrepreneurship and the Co-optation of Contenders
• 5. Seizing Structural Opportunities: The Islamist Elite and the Framing of Authenticity Discourse
• 6. The Politics of Symbolic Capital and the Institutionalization of Neopatrimonial Power
• 7. The Second Intifada and Its Impact on Elite Structures
• Conclusion
• notes
• Bibliography
• Index