1
Im-Personation
A Reading in the Guise of an Introduction
Jane Gallop
ON APRIL 15â17, 1993, the Center for Twentieth Century Studies of the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee hosted a conference entitled âPedagogy: The Question of the Personal.â The present volume represents the transformation of that event into a book. As such, a number of changes have occurred: some papers presented at the conference have not been included; a few of the essays here were not presented (although all authors were major participants in the conference); all of the papers have undergone various degrees of revision since the conference. Such changes are typical of collections which are not, strictly speaking, âconference proceedingsâ but rather belong to a related hybrid genreâpublications which originate in but grow out of conferences. This introduction will not comment on such typical changes (although I recognize their inevitable local historical interest). The purpose of this introduction is rather to gloss a more singular, more dramatic alterationâthe new title.
How and why did âthe personalâ become âimpersonationâ? What does this substitution say about the two terms? In attempting to answer these questions, I propose to link them, through the hybrid term âim-personation.â This introduction will try to theorize im-personation through reading its articulation in the essays collected here. But I want to begin by telling the how and the why of this change of garb. (A version of the first part of this story has already been told by David Crane.)
The semester of the conference, I taught a graduate seminar likewise entitled âPedagogy: The Question of the Personal.â Other Center conferences have been accompanied by graduate courses and such a pedagogical enactment particularly suited this topic. During the weeks just preceding the conference, the seminar read essays by the speakers (not the ones they would present but others which the speakers chose as related). The night before the conference the class was discussing Lynne Joyrichâs article on Elvis impersonators andâin what for this class was not unusual behaviorâbegan to play with applying the idea of impersonation in any direction we could make it go (vying for the honors of who could push it furthest). As we gathered in the hall for our mid-class break, we milked impersonation for all the fun we could get (beyond even our usual jocularity), moved by our excitement that the next day the people we had been reading would show up and talk to us in person. During our corridor impersonation shtick, Joyrich (who teaches at UWM) showed up and we couldnât resist turning our class joke on the person who was, without knowing it, its author. Although Joyrich attempted to get us to tell her seriously what we thought of the essay, she was nonetheless clearly amused to find that our boisterousness was in fact some version of response to her essay. This encounter with an actual speaker on the very eve of the conference seemed a foretaste of the possible surplus pleasures of group attendance at this public event.
One of the prime pleasures here is the group feeling itself, marked in this narrative by an undifferentiated first-person-plural subject: we, the class. My version of the narrative avoids either individuated students or any differentiation between teacher and students. This construction of the undifferentiated class âweâ is explicitly taken up in several of the essays that follow. Naomi Scheman, Chris Amirault, Susan Miller, and my own essay all confront the teacherâs desire to merge herself in the student group. Getting personal, or rather in this case social, playing a member of the class like any other, the teacher impersonates a student.
Craneâs version of this story, unlike mine, focuses on individuals telling jokes (in particular, him and me). While casting this as a story about individuals, Crane troubles over the way a class dynamic is betokened by a special relation between teacher and individual student. Craneâs worry finds its echo at the end of the book in Millerâs pointed critique of the evasion of the class as a class through narrative dyads where the teacher interacts with one student. Such dyads not only crop up throughout the volume butâas instanced in Craneâs and my storyâare both unavoidable in and in fact constitutive of the present attempt to think pedagogy at the place where the personal becomes impersonation.
In considering the individual student, the teacher cannot help but take him, at least in part, as a token for the whole class of students. At the same time, any perception the teacher has of the class as a whole is necessarily focused and embodied by individual students.1 Crane wittingly navigates the contradictions of his token position in his preface; my attempt to tell the story founders against narrative conventions which force me to choose between a personal story about individuals or a group history. It feels unseemly to tell this as a story of my relation to David and inaccurate to tell it as an undifferentiated story about my relation to the class. However I tell it, it is, inextricably, both.
The morning of the second day of the conference, after Madeleine Grumetâs paper, I stood to ask about her âimpersonationâ of her student, referring to the thespian flair with which she had read her studentâs papers. The question, although unremarkable to the public audience, was a private communication, a wink reassembling the class in the corridor where we had accosted Joyrich. âImpersonationâ was a code word, an in-joke that could communicate effectively to select individuals dispersed among a larger public which remained unaware that any private communication had even occurred. The question was itself an impersonation: posing as a serious intervention, it was in fact meant as something else. Even though I was in public and had a formal obligation as conference coordinator to relate to the public as a whole, I performed the question as class clown, to make the students laugh (to give them pleasure, to make them like me), to tell them I was still thinking of them, still with them.
We talk a lot about students trying to please the teacher. Sometimes we discuss this matter-of-factly as a structural necessity; sometimes it seems scandalous and exploitative. But I want to draw your attention to this incident in which my professional behavior (in a context which included peers whom I very much wanted to impress) was motivated by my desire to please the students. I flag it not because I believe it an unusual occurrence but rather because it seldom appears in our writing. We all know (and loudly proclaim) that we must not care if our students like us if we are to do our duty as teachers. As embarrassing as the identity of âbrownnoseâ might be for students, it can beâand frequently isâjustified as what students must do to succeed professionally. A teacher trying to please students doesnât have that rational, pragmatic excuse. I pause at this frequently experienced, generally denied scene of playing to the students, because I suspect it is a prime site where the personal tangles with impersonation.
I asked the question to make the class laugh, but it also must be said that I asked the question to make David laugh. In the jocular sociality of the class, David was my best audience, my best partner in repartee. When later I learned that David had been out of the room and not heard my question, I was disappointed.
That afternoon, after Cheryl Johnsonâs paper, I asked a second âimpersonationâ question, referring to her impersonation of academic discourse in the definition of the Afro which closes her paper. Had David been in the room for the first, I might not have asked this second question. Yet this question was for me more serious, not just played for laughs. Johnson had begun by talking about masks and went on to warn us that she was a trickster. When her definition marked its comic exaggeration with the word âquadrangleâ (used to define the shape of the comb used for Afros), I glimpsed in her paper a reflection about performance which rendered what might have been an impertinent question pertinent.
Johnson spoke in the last session of the second day. The next day, the last of the conference, I frequently found myself thinking in terms of impersonation. But it was no longer a joke. I asked Naomi Scheman about her evident pleasure in reading to us bell hooksâs scathing remarks about white feminists.2 While I may have used the word âimpersonationâ in my question, I was no longer trying to get my class to laugh. My intention now was to get speakers to talk about their dramatic taking on of otherâs voices, what George Otte in this volume calls âin-voicing.â No longer merely an enjoyable bit of social silliness, âimpersonationâ had become for me a productive category of analysis.
After the conference, the class met for four more weeks. During those four class periods, the term âimpersonationâ was frequently heard. Although it still retained some of the pleasures of an in-joke, it was now also clearly a useful category organizing our discussions. When the final assignment for the semester asked each student to write about the course, Marsha Watson devoted a page to the word âimpersonation.â I quote from her account:
One of the words that has been weaving through the second half of the class is âimpersonation.â It has been both serious and comic; a topic for breaks as well as for papers; sometimes only appearing in a title, or in an off-hand comment in the middle of a discussion. First used in our classroom vocabulary late in the [semester], the concept now seems to me to have been undergirding the course from the start Rousseau impersonated a father, Bloom impersonated Socrates, Freire impersonated Christ, feminist teachers impersonated studentsâŚ.
I am fascinated by Watsonâs idea that âimpersonationâ was âundergirding the course from the start.â No one had uttered the word until we read Joyrich three-quarters of the way through the semester. I who made up the syllabus and led class discussions had never thought of it. To illustrate that it was there from the start, Watson goes back and recaps our discussions of the books we read during the first half of the course, using the term âimpersonation.â The term works, is surprisingly appropriate to the discussions we had where it was never mentioned. It is in fact more effective for unifying our various class discussions than terms we used at the time.
Watson goes on to propose that âthe term âimpersonationâ caught hold in this course because of a view of pedagogy that we encountered in all our texts; a view that accepts that the aim of pedagogy is really reproduction.â Although she introduces âreproductionâ as overarching explanation, it is also a reference to another of the texts for the courseâBourdieu and Passeronâs Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture.3 In Bourdieu and Passeronâs account, education involves, not only the specific case of the student as reproduction of the teacher, but the more general case of the student as impersonation of an educated person, taking on and reproducing the style and tastes of a class.4
âWatson brings in âreproductionâ in order to explain why ââimpersonationâ caught hold.â While the classâs concern with âreproductionâ does not, to my mind, seem to sufficiently explain the peculiar effect of the term âimpersonation,â I agree that the term âcaught holdâ with a vengeance that demands explanation. Furthermore I share Watsonâs sense that âimpersonationâ not only âcaught holdâ but was âundergirding the course from the start.â This last idea is rich in epistemological implications. Her word âundergirdingâ connotes something that is hidden, not on the surface (hence the word was not in evidence, not used or even thought of) but structurally necessary to support what is on the surface. That a concept never considered should prove to have been a necessary structural support is surprising enough. But in our case, I want to draw attention to the accidental, marginal, and even silly derivation of this hidden structural principle.
Given the topic of the course, almost all the texts we read were about teaching. But since Joyrich had never written on pedagogy, when I asked her to recommend a relevant earlier paper, she chose the closest thing she had: an investigation into modes of knowledge. Because it was not at all about pedagogy, the paper on Elvis which introduced âimpersonationâ into the class was, of all the texts we read that semester, arguably the most marginal to the course.
Not only was our initial discussion of impersonation off the courseâs topic; it was also not serious. Using Joyrichâs paper we could have had a considered dikussion of the meaning and implications of impersonation, but we did not. I suspect that impersonation âcaught holdâ in our class precisely because we made a joke of it.
Not every joke is so successful. Perhaps because impersonation, always already âundergirding the course,â was more than a jokeââboth serious and comic, a topic for breaks as well as for papers,â as Watson says. Whereas âpapersâ are arguably the most serious business of a class, the site of requirement, anxiety, and evaluation, âbreaksâ are the most social, personable part. Standing around drinking pop, smoking, or snacking during break, the class members (both students and teacher) relate casually, socially, âas if we were just people,â rather than professionally. Yet a topic which could be âfor breaks as well as for papersâ crosses the line that would separate the social from the intellectual, the personal from the pedagogical, rendering that boundary porous and less decisive.
This double structureââboth serious and comicââcan be found not only in the odd effect of the word âimpersonationâ in our course; it also plays a major role in the professional performance that goes by the name impersonation. There are two major forms of such performance: Elvis impersonators and female impersonators.5 Elvis impersonators, Joyrich explains, have an odd epistemological status; they both are and arenât believed, taken seriously as Elvis. While female impersonation is familiar stock comedy, Marge Garber demonstrates in Vested Interests how it can be understood as undergirding culture itself. Appreciating these two most organized forms as emblematic, I would argue that impersonation must be taken at one and the same time both as a joke and as serious. The general structure of impersonation would thus be not unlike the double structure Watson ascribes to the impersonation effect in our class.
By the end of the semester, I was convinced that âimpersonationâ was, for the class, both a great joke and a productive category. But when the semester and the class ended, I thought I was leaving impersonation behind. It was still a class joke and, however interesting it had become, you had to be there to get it.
I was sorry for that class to end. I felt considerable regret at the loss of the context in which the issues of the conference had grown more and more lively, complex, and fun. Despite my regret, by the end of May I had turned in my grades and read my student evaluationsâthe course was definitively overâand I turned to work on this book. George Otteâs paper had opened the conference, so I began my editorial reading there. Three-quarters of the way through his paper, I came upon the following:
If ventriloquism is dangerous for writing teachers, it may be just the thing for our studentsâŚ. students are good at role playing, at in-voicing identities not their own.
Ventriloquism, role playing, in-voicing identities: I wrote...