Yemen in Crisis

Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State

Helen Lackner

• Publisher: Saqi Books
• Year: 2023
• ISBN:
  9780863561887
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

'Written with compassion and insight, Lackner confirms her standing as the foremost authority on Yemeni politics at work today.'- Eugene Rogan

The democratic promise of Yemen's 2011 uprising quickly unravelled, triggering a shocking political and social crisis with serious implications for the future of the country and region.

Fuelled by Arab and Western intervention, the infighting in Yemen descended into civil war, with thousands killed and millions facing starvation and deep social and political fragmentation. Suffering from a collapsed economy, the people of Yemen now face a desperate choice between the Huthi rebels on the one side and, on the other, a range of forces propped up by a Saudi-led coalition fed by Western arms.

In this incisive, invaluable analysis, Helen Lackner uncovers the roots of the conflicts threatening the very survival of the Yemeni state and its people. This updated edition features a new preface and a new chapter on the problems of humanitarian aid in the country.

'Brimming with erudition and rich in analysis, Yemen in Crisis offers invaluable insight to seasoned observers and newcomers to the region alike.' - Moustafa Bayoumi

'An eminently valuable account of Yemen's modern history and current travails by someone who has made it her life's work to understand the country and its people.' - Roger Owen, Harvard University

'This timely book analyzes the deep roots of the crisis that gripped Yemen even before the destructive war against it created the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Lackner is superbly equipped to trace the causes for the failure and collapse of the Yemeni state, under the inexorable pressures of neo-liberalism and regional and global rivalries.' - Rashid Khalidi, Edward Said Professor of Arab Studies at Columbia University

'A matchless geopolitical profile of the country, its history, its economic structures, and above all, its people.' - Tariq Ali, New Left Review

This book is the best compact presentation of the background and dynamics of the social and political explosion that turned Yemen into the worst humanitarian crisis of today's world.' - Gilbert Achcar

CHAPTER ONE

How the 2011 Uprising
and the Transition Led to War

From the mid-2000s, Yemenis and close observers alike considered that President Saleh’s regime was on its last legs. All wondered what would finally bring it down. The descent into civil war was predictable. The series of wars in the far north against the Huthi rebels, the increasingly militarised confrontations with Southern separatists, numerous localised military conflicts, increasing tension between the official opposition and the regime, worsening poverty, the water crisis, reduced oil exports, unmeasurable rates of youth unemployment, increasingly open popular anger and frustration, all led to paralysis of the formal political system. The end of the regime and the disintegration of the existing polity were the obvious outcomes of this situation, with the likely fall into fragmentation and multiple military conflicts. What I, alongside many others, failed to predict was, first, what would trigger change; and, second, the fundamental transformation in neighbouring Saudi Arabia from a regime which pulled strings in Yemeni affairs from behind the scenes, to one willing to openly intervene militarily.

By mid-2017 Yemen faced total humanitarian disaster, its first famine since the 1940s and the world’s worst cholera epidemic. This situation was unprecedented and avoidable: both were the result of a civil war dramatically worsened by international intervention. Concerning cholera, the collapse of the medical services as well as the long-lasting absence of clean water partly explain the intensity of the epidemic and the speed at which it has been spreading. As pointed out by Stephen O’Brien, the UN’s Under-Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs, by mid-2017, the country’s health system had been devastated and ‘55 percent of [medical] facilities closed due to damage, destruction or lack of funds. Some 30,000 healthcare workers have not been paid in nearly a year and no funding has been provided to keep basic infrastructure such as hospitals, water pumping and sanitation stations operating … This cholera scandal is entirely manmade by the conflicting parties and those beyond Yemen’s borders who are leading, supplying, fighting and perpetuating the fear and fighting.’¹

As for the famine, under ‘normal’ conditions, Yemen imports 90 percent of its main staple, wheat, and 100 percent of its rice, tea, and sugar; overall, 70 percent of its food needs. The prime cause of the situation where almost 21 million of Yemen’s 27 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance and 10 million of these were ‘in acute need of immediate assistance to save or sustain life’,² that is, on the verge of starvation, was the war. Specifically, the constraints on its main sea port Hodeida, combined with the economic warfare against the Central Bank, prevented commercial importers from getting the letters of credit necessary to buy grains on the international market. Leaders of the warring factions prioritised military objectives over the needs of Yemeni men, women and children. The international community complacently allowed this situation to persist to the greater benefit of arms traders, fuel and food smugglers and other war profiteers. Stephen O’Brien told the UN Security Council on 10 March 2017 that Yemen ‘is already the largest humanitarian crisis in the world and the Yemeni people now face the spectre of famine’.³ He continued to remind his audience that the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2017 needed US$ 2.1 billion to reach 12 million people, only two-thirds of those in need. By mid-July, into the second half of the year, it was 40 percent funded, receiving less than half the funds needed to help less than two-thirds of desperate Yemenis. A month earlier, in June, US President Trump signed agreements to sell arms worth US $110 billion to Saudi Arabia, some of them likely to be used to kill Yemenis.

So, how did Yemen reach such a sorry state? What role has the international community played? This chapter examines the second decade of the twenty-first century, which started so hopefully with the 2011 uprisings that strove to bring about democratic governance, an equitable economy and an end to elite appropriation of the country’s wealth.

The 2011 Popular Uprisings

As the first decade of the century came to an end, the political crisis in Yemen accelerated. Throughout 2010, the frequency and intensity of demonstrations increased and, by the beginning of 2011, there was already a long-term encampment in Sana‘a by a group of villagers from Ja‘ashin in Ibb Governorate, whose lands had been illegally appropriated by a local shaykh whose poetry was appreciated by Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. Among other regular protests in Sana‘a, the Women Journalists Without Chains, led by future Nobel laureate Tawakkol Karman, a representative of the more ‘progressive’ branch of the Islah party, had been demonstrating weekly outside the prime minister’s office for many months, demanding freedom of speech and protesting about restrictions and oppression of journalists.

Parliamentary elections scheduled for 2009 had been postponed to 2011 with the reluctant agreement of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) opposition which was involved in an ongoing struggle with President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) over who would be included in the electoral register.⁴ In January 2011 Saleh added fuel to the fire of his tense relations with the opposition by attempting to change the constitution so that he could stand for an unconstitutional third term in the 2013 presidential elections,⁵ although he had already been in power for thirty-three years. This move confirmed the widespread suspicion that he intended to remain as president until his eldest son, Ahmed, reached the constitutional age to succeed him.

In addition to demonstrations in the capital and beyond, the latest developments in Parliament triggered protests in Sana‘a starting on 17 January 2011; by 27 January, they brought between 15,000 and 20,000 people on the streets calling for Saleh’s departure. On 2 February Saleh made a speech meant to defuse the situation: he announced the postponement of the parliamentary elections due that April, increased authority for governorates, i.e. an intensification of decentralisation, the cancellation of the proposed constitutional amendments, the establishment of a government of national unity and salary increases of 33 percent⁶ for security and military personnel, the latter move being a frequently used tactic to ensure the loyalty of this essential constituency.

The apparent success of the Tunisian and Egyptian people in ousting their presidents gave a great boost to the demonstrations which immediately increased in size and turned into a ‘live-in’ on the road crossing at the main entrance of Sana‘a University, re-named ‘Taghyeer’ or ‘Change’ Square. People had been prevented from following the examples of other countries and taking over Tahrir or Liberation Square by Saleh’s skilful pre-emptive installation of large tents full of his supporters including mostly military/ security personnel on 2 February. All of Saleh’s backers were fed and supplied with daily rations of qat,^* thus ensuring that they stayed and came out on pro-Saleh counter-demonstrations during the following months.

The tents set up on Taghyeer Square were very varied in style and activities, and included both smaller ‘residential’ ones and others devoted to meetings. Within a longer term perspective a number of points need to be noted about the Yemeni Change squares.⁷ First, the movement lasted longer and was far more widespread than in other countries: although attendance reduced and was affected by increasing factionalism over time, the demonstrations and tents continued well into 2013, when major thoroughfares were still closed. The capitals of all Yemeni governorates had Change Squares, including large cities such as Hodeida, Aden and Taiz and small towns such as al-Ghayda, al-Jabeen and Zinjibar.

Second, they were sites where all social groups mixed and discussed a wide range of issues, involving many who had previously assumed that they had nothing in common. Given that about 75 percent of Yemen’s population are tribespeople, it is unsurprising that they played a major role in the movement. But people joined as citizens, not as members of tribes, professions or occupations like students, farmers, or unemployed graduates. Age was a factor, and youth dominated, but this is to be expected as 70 percent of the population are under twenty-five years old. Participants found themselves mixing with people both from other tribes with whom they might have been in historic conflict, and from other social groups in Yemen’s stratified society, including some from low status groups. Women’s participation was both noticeable and important, although their numbers were far fewer and attracted significant opposition from different quarters. Societal characteristics of the movement will have a long-term influence on Yemeni politics as they contributed to the emergence of new connections and ideas, thus challenging many preconceptions about the nature and type of politics that can take place within Yemen’s social structure, as is discussed further in Chapter 7.

While individual members of political parties and other organisations were present in the squares from the beginning, the movement’s earliest days were dominated by independent youth who helped initiate a wide range of discussions and cultural events on all aspects of Yemeni life. It was the dynamism of these events, as well as the persistence of the encampments, which rapidly forced the formal opposition of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) to join in and take an active role as parties, though they were unable to dominate the situation till the dramatic events of the ‘Friday of Dignity’ massacre of 18 March 2011 when ‘dozens of men wearing civilian clothes and armed with military assault rifles ... opened fire. Over the course of three hours, the gunmen killed at least 45 protestors ... and wounded 200, while state security forces made no serious effort to stop the carnage.’⁸ This massacre perpetrated by Saleh’s forces outraged the population at large and had a fundamental impact on the nature of the movement.

Not only did it lead to the largest set of defections from Saleh’s party (ministers, Members of Parliament, ambassadors, and others) thus seriously weakening his regime, it also triggered a split in the army, when the First Armoured Brigade, led by Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, changed sides and swore to protect the demonstrators. He was joined by the leadership of the Islah party, the al-Ahmar brothers (unrelated to Ali Mohsen, see glossary); they now followed many of their rank and file members who were already active participants in the movement. The JMP then officially declared its allegiance to the revolution. While this ‘protection’ limited physical repression by Saleh’s forces, it also reduced the independence of the movement. Thereafter, for example, the main speaking platform in Sana‘a was largely controlled by the Islah party, which prevented many independents from speaking. Segregation between men and women’s areas was strictly enforced and women found themselves under attack from their conservative male colleagues, including physical assaults. Despite the expansion of the movement to include traditional political forces, and despite the movement’s insisting on remaining peaceful, violence increased in following weeks with clashes between the two military sides taking place alongside the rival Friday mass demonstrations which were a feature of Sana‘a in life during 2011.

By April, the threat of full-scale fighting between elite forces on both sides added to the political crisis. Representatives of the major foreign powers present in Yemen came to the conclusion that Saleh would be unable to control the situation. Internal discussions within the GPC and with the official opposition had produced a proposal for a transition in which Saleh would hand over power to his vice president, new presidential elections would be called within sixty days, a new constitution would be drafted to be approved by referendum, and Saleh and his associates would be immune from prosecution. This agreement became known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative and was signed on 21 April by all political parties and witnessed by the GCC secretary general and the UAE foreign minister.⁹ Saleh refused to sign it under different pretexts on various occasions, including the farcical performance of 22 May 2011 when foreign ambassadors and emissaries from the GCC were assembled at the UAE embassy in Sana‘a waiting to travel to the Presidential Palace for the formal signature. Saleh organised his supporters to besiege the embassy, demanding that he stay in power. The ceremony was cancelled and the emissaries had to be helicoptered out.¹⁰ Needless to say, this move did not endear Saleh to the likes of the GCC Secretary General Abdul Latif Al Zayani and other senior GCC officials.

The following months were marked by a succession of similar manoeuvres, continued mass demonstrations and counter-demonstrations throughout the country, and occasional military clashes in Sana‘a and beyond. The crisis merely worsened with the 3 June explosion in Saleh’s palace mosque which seriously wounded him, Saleh’s evacuation to Saudi Arabia for treatment, and his unexpected return to Yemen on 23 September against the wishes of both his Saudi hosts and the majority of the Yemeni people. Additional pressure was put on him through Resolution 2014 of the United Nations Security Council which called for immediate implementation of the GCC Initiative¹¹ and regular follow-up reports from the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Yemen who had been appointed in April. Pressure from a combination of these forces, the international community, the deteriorating military situation as well as Saleh’s very shaky medical condition finally persuaded him to sign the agreement in Riyadh on 23 November 2011. Some people did note that at that ceremony, attended by many senior Yemenis and officials from supporting countries, the GCC and Saudi Arabia, the only smile was to be seen on Saleh’s face.

The Transition to Good Democratic Governance¹²

Documents signed on 23 November included the original GCC Initiative Agreement, but also a more comprehensive one titled Implementation Mechanism of the GCC Initiative¹³ which outlined the components of the transition process ‘to good democratic governance’.¹⁴ In brief, the transition was to last for two years from the formal election of Vice President Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi as President as he would stand unopposed. During these two years, while a new governing structure was to be developed, the country would be managed by a government of national unity including equal representation of Saleh’s GPC and a partnership between the JMP and the new movements arising from the 2011 popular movements. The process to bring about a new governance system was to include a National Dialogue Conference also addressing issues of transitional justice, a Constitutional Drafting Committee and a committee to reform the military and security sectors.

While most terms of the first phase of the GCC Agreement were formally implemented, in practice the transitional re...