Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma

Paul Roe

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2004
• Print ISBN: 9781138811638
• eBook ISBN: 9781134276882
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma explores how the phenomenon of ethnic violence can be understood as a form of security dilemma by shifting the focus of the concept away from its traditional concern with state sovereignty to that of identity instead. The book includes case studies on: * ethnic violence between Serbs and Croats in the Krajina region of Croatia, August 1990
* ethnic violence between Hungarian and Romanians in the Transylvania region of Romania, March 1990.

1

The security dilemma

Of all the dilemmas in world politics, the security dilemma is quintessential. It goes right to the heart of the theory and practice of international relations.¹

Like security itself, the security dilemma might also be regarded as an ‘essentially contested concept’, with several different formulations apparent in the IR literature. Apart from a security dilemma itself, the interested reader will find a ‘structural’ security dilemma, ‘a perceptual security dilemma’, a ‘state-induced security dilemma’, a ‘system-induced security dilemma’, and a ‘security paradox’. Besides which, there is a ‘power struggle’, a ‘security struggle’, a ‘spiral model’, and a ‘deterrence model’. But despite the often confusing array of terms and models, the ‘basic’ nature of the concept is accepted by most scholars. And this is summed up neatly by Barry Posen: ‘This is the security dilemma: what one does to enhance one’s own security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure’.²

In this chapter, my purpose is essentially twofold: first, to provide a brief overview of the security dilemma concept; and second – and crucially so – to propose a new categorisation of the security dilemma into three types: ‘tight’, ‘regular’ and ‘loose’. This re-categorisation of the security essentially derives from some degree of dissatisfaction I have with much of the concept’s application to instances of ethnic conflict, where arguably quite disparate cases have been erroneously lumped together simply by virtue of exhibiting the security dilemma label. In distinguishing between tight, regular and loose security dilemmas, my intention is to thus provide a more nuanced conceptual tool in accounting for ethnic violence and war.

The chapter is split into four main sections. In the first section, I outline some of the security dilemma’s main constitutive elements. In the next three sections, in turn I elucidate the notions of tight, regular and loose security dilemmas.

The security dilemma: constitutive elements

There are a number of elements common to most definitions of the security dilemma. The following sections will deal with each in turn. The starting point for the concept might be seen as the inherent ambiguity of military preparations – although the security dilemma is invariably informed as much by political as by purely military postures – what is mostly referred to as the ‘indistinguishability of offence and defence’.

The indistinguishability of offence and defence

States usually try to increase their security by building up their arms. But most arms that can be used for defence can also be utilised for offensive purposes too. A tank, for example, can just as easily be employed to attack a neighbour’s territory as it can be to defend my own. Thus, as Robert Jervis points out:

Unless the requirements for offense and defense differ in kind or amount, a status-quo power will desire a military posture that resembles that of an aggressor. For this reason others cannot infer from its military forces and preparations whether the state is aggressive.³

Arms, therefore, can be seen as essentially ambiguous in nature: on the one hand, they can be a means to protect myself, while on the other hand they can also be an instrument to harm others. It is the crucial role that arms play in being able to generate both security and insecurity that has led the vast majority of writers to conceive of the security dilemma in almost exclusively military terms.

Uncertainty

The ambiguity of some military postures results in what Nick Wheeler and Ken Booth call ‘unresolvable uncertainty’. They explain:

The military preparations of one state [can] create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations are for defensive purposes only (to enhance its security), or whether they are for offensive purposes [to weaken its security].⁴

In much the same way, Erik Melander writes that as a prerequisite for a security dilemma, ‘there must exist enough uncertainty about the intentions of one’s adversaries that a hostile move can neither be excluded, nor guaranteed’.⁵ Faced with the indistinguishability between offence and defence, decision-makers must therefore come to distinguish between ‘status quo states’ and ‘revisionist states’.

Those factors that determine how such uncertainty might ultimately be resolved can be readily identified on each of IR’s three traditional levels of analysis: the individual, the state and the structure of the international system.

Uncertainty and human nature

According to ‘classical’ Realists such as John Herz and Herbert Butterfield, uncertainty can manifest itself at the level of the individual. Butterfield describes the uncertainty that decision-makers feel in trying to determine others’ intentions:

It is the peculiar characteristic of... Hobbesian fear... that you yourself may vividly feel the terrible fear that you have of the other party but you cannot enter the other man’s counterfear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous. For you yourself know that you mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realise or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurances of your intentions that you have. As this operates on both sides... neither sees the nature of the predicament that he is in, for each only imagines that the party is being hostile and unreasonable.⁶

Uncertainty produces the fear in both parties that the other wishes to harm them: each side misperceives the other’s intentions. On top of this, the actors themselves fail to realise their predicament: each party is unaware that they themselves are creating insecurity in the other. This suggests that security for both sides could be achieved if only they could come to see the nature of the situation they are in.

Butterfield’s concentration in this respect lies with the nature of the individual. Keeping with the classical Realist view that humans are ultimately both greedy and fallible, the essence of Butterfield’s argument is that people are basically insecure: uncertainty as to others’ intentions is therefore considered as an inherent product of this condition. Like Butterfield, Herz also originally conceived of the security dilemma at the individual level.⁷

He argues that while on the one hand human interaction is of course both desirable and necessary, on the other hand it is also tremendously risky, as each person possesses the capability to do harm to others. Herz claims, therefore, that humans can be faced with a security dilemma, inasmuch as they may find themselves in a situation of kill first or run the risk of being killed.⁸

To make the point again briefly: for classical Realists, uncertainty is mainly attributable to human nature, human fallibility that precludes entering the ‘other man’s counterfear’. In this same regard, their particular view of human nature enables classical Realists to indeed resolve Wheeler and Booth’s unresolvable uncertainty : people are inherently greedy, aggressive and therefore highly dangerous. This determines that decision-makers must assume the worst, or risk suffering the consequences.

Uncertainty and international anarchy

While classical Realists tend to locate explanatory value at the individual level, neo-Realists instead see outcomes being driven by the anarchical nature of the international system. Under the condition of anarchy, states cannot look to any higher authority to provide their security: they are in a ‘self-help’ situation. While decision-makers may very well wish to cooperate with others, because they cannot know for sure their intentions, there is a tendency towards mistrust. Buzan notes how this ‘structural imperative lies at the core of the power–security dilemma’.⁹

Among others, Posen’s work epitomises the neo-Realist approach to the security dilemma: ‘Often statesmen... do not empathize with their neighbours; they are unaware that their own actions can seem threatening. Often it does not matter if they know this problem. The nature of their situation compels them to take the steps they do’.¹⁰ In other words, even if decision-makers come to realise their predicament, anarchy and self-help nevertheless deter them from entering into a cooperative relationship through an overriding fear of being cheated or taken advantage of. This is a particular powerful line of argument in as much as it implies that security dilemmas are an inherent part of the international system.

In short, for Neo-realists structural imperatives always force decisionmakers to assume the worst, always to play it safe. Intentions are, indeed have to be, directly equated with capabilities. Moreover, uncertainty concerning others’ current intentions can be separated from uncertainty as a more general product of the system: a friendly neighbour today might just as easily become a dangerous enemy tomorrow.¹¹

Uncertainty and state structures

In addition to the classical Realist and neo-Realist positions concerning the security dilemma, Charles Glaser’s work highlights a further level of analysis, what might be described as the Liberal position.

Focusing on military insecurities between states, Glaser refers to worst-case scenarios resulting from ‘overall national evaluative capabilities’. He notes how in terms of the state there are certain organisations dedicated to the analysis of others’ foreign policies and military capabilities; ‘analytical units within the government, think tanks, and universities’, for example.¹² The quality of a country’s evaluation, Glaser goes on, depends not only on the information supplied by these organisations, but on the influence that particular organisations have. In other words, decision-makers’ perceptions will be negatively shaped when: one, national evaluative capabilities are poor; and/or two, when certain institutions dominate in policy debates, thereby producing misleading information.

Glaser argues that organisational behaviour and domestic political dynamics can be used to explain why ‘states often exaggerate an adversary’s hostility and overlook the threatening nature of their own policies’.¹³ Referring to militaries, Glaser notes that there is a tendency for them to overestimate others’ capabilities, and that the worst is invariably ascribed even when the nature of others’ military forces is ambiguous. Moreover, ‘[i]nterest groups that would benefit from large investments in military capabilities and/or expansion are often in control of their state’s policy; they then advance self-serving strategic arguments that exaggerate the state’s insecurity and the benefits of expansion’.¹⁴

Other Liberal arguments tend to revolve around whether states are either overtly democratic or not, or, more specifically, how culture and identity impact on actors’ sense of self and other; what is often referred to as strategic or security culture.¹⁵

While all three levels of analysis are invariably important in explaining why decision-makers might be disposed to assume the worst, the security dilemma literature is, in the main, dominated by the influence of neo-Realist scholarship and its emphasis on structural imperatives. In the next chapter, when switching the focus to the intra-state level, the pertinence of the role of anarchy is explored more fully; in particular, I assess the Constructivist challenge to the security dilemma. For the moment, though, it is appropriate to introduce some of Alexander Wendt’s contentions.

Wendt argues that there is nothing inevitable about anarchy leading directly to worst-case scenarios, as threats in the international system are not natural but socially constructed. By this, Wendt means that state behaviour is determined by actors’ conceptions of their own identities, and state identities are constituted in relation to others. In simple terms, as Wendt himself puts it:

‘States act differently towards enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not’.¹⁶ In this way, state behaviour is a product of the nature of relations with others (both past and present). Perceptions concerning others’ intentions are dependent on interaction. Wendt makes his point to this effect by creating a scenario in which two actors, humans and aliens, encounter each other for the first time. He claims that prior to either side taking any substantive action, there is no reason to assume that the other is a threat. Wendt poses the question:

Would we assume... that we were about to be attacked if we were ever contacted by members of an alien civilization? I think not. We would be highly alert of course, but whether we placed our military forces on alert or launched a counter-attack would depend on how we interpreted the import of their first gesture for our security... [as] prior to their gesture, we have no systemic basis for assigning probabilities.¹⁷

Wendt’s central claim in this respect is that there is nothing prior to interaction.¹⁸ This leads him to conclude: ‘We do not begin our relationship in a security dilemma; security dilemmas are not given by anarchy or nature’.¹⁹

Indeed, the role of anarchy in generating security dilemmas is still very much open to debate: for Wendt and Constuctivists, it plays no part; for neo- Realists, however, it is seen as fundamental. For the moment, it suffices to quote Alan Collins:

For some anarchy is not a cause of the security dilemma but rather a necessary condition. That i...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Ethnic Violence and the Societal Security Dilemma
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Series editor’s preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The security dilemma
• 2 The ‘ethnic’ security dilemma and the former Yugoslavia
• 3 Societal security
• 4 The societal security dilemma
• 5 Serbs and Croats
• 6 Krajina and the societal security dilemma
• 7 Romanians and Hungarians
• 8 Transylvania and the societal security dilemma
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Selected bibliography
• Index