The Risk of Freedom

Ethics, Phenomenology and Politics in Jan Patocka

Francesco Tava, Jane Ledlie

• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781783483778
• eBook ISBN: 9781783483792
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

The Risk of Freedom presents an in-depth analysis of the philosophy of Jan Patocka, one of the most influential Central European thinkers of the twentieth century, examining both the phenomenological and ethical-political aspects of his work. In particular, Francesco Tava takes an original approach to the problem of freedom, which represents a recurring theme in Patocka's work, both in his early and later writings.

Freedom is conceived of as a difficult and dangerous experience. In his deep analysis of this particular problem, Tava identifies the authentic ethical content of Patocka's work and clarifies its connections with phenomenology, history of philosophy, politics and dissidence. The Risk of Freedom retraces Patocka's philosophical journey and elucidates its more problematic and less evident traits, such as his original ethical conception, his political ideals and his direct commitment as a dissident.

Chapter IV

Movement, World, History

1. OPENNESS TO THE WORLD

In previous chapters we have made frequent reference to the phenomeno-logical content which seemed to be at the centre of Patočka’s thinking. So far, this has been done by taking a somewhat negative approach, examining his analysis and criticisms of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s positions. Having come this far, we must now go a step further and directly engage with the positive content of Patočka’s phenomenology. In doing so, it will become clear how harmoniously his different areas of thought are connected; from ethics to phenomenology and politics.

The harmony which lies at the foundation of his thought can be deduced from some of the elements which differentiate Patočkian phenomenology from that of Husserl. One of the first elements is movement (pohyb), intended as a unique and characteristic aspect of human interaction with the lifeworld; a second element is the idea of body (tělo), where the subject is considered from the point of view of its carnal essence and as the only possible protagonist for this movement in the world.

Patočka was given an important opportunity to clarify these points when his friend, Eugen Fink, invited him to hold a lecture at the University of Freiburg, where Husserl had taught and where Patočka himself had spent a research period in 1933, during which the groundwork for his phenomenological training was laid.1 In this particularly significant setting, Patočka stressed how his attempt to develop phenomenology towards a metaphysics of movement was not to be considered as a denial of Husserl’s interpretation but as a coherent development of it. The elements of movement and body were, in fact, already present in the reflections of Husserl, who certainly noted their importance: ‘The same phenomenology, already in its Husserlian form, shows clearly how finiteness and corporeity are closely connected, and that a finite subject is always an embodied subject [Leibsubjekt], a subject inserted into the world with his body [Leib] and fused to the world with his body.’2

According to Patočka, the subject’s contact with the world cannot be measured in terms of a detached concept, but requires a movement which can only be realised by an embodied and finite subject. As such, there is no possible way of defining this relationship between the subject and the world, namely the human being’s situation in the world, in terms of a transitive cause-and-effect type relationship, as would apply in the natural sciences. Instead, movement in the world is characterised by ‘a relationship of motivation which lets itself be determined by impulses stemming from the givenness’.3 It is impossible to escape from the flux of worldly impulses into a subjective space which is not contaminated by its being in the world and all the problems associated with this; the subjective body is characterised as follows: ‘namely the body not as an object, but as a living, perceiving, agent, which is in an immediate relationship with objects’.4 This description of the particular theoretical foundations of the individual and his or her intricate relationship with the living world was the starting point which would lead Patočka, in the space of a few years, to coin the idea of asubjective phenomenology, thus markedly distancing himself from Husserl’s subjective position.5

From this point of view, there is a recognisable link between Patočka’s interpretation and the ideas which Maurice Merleau-Ponty was developing at around the same time in France. Merleau-Ponty, in his attempt to explain the carnal type of relationship which is established between the embodied subject and his world, makes use of one of Husserl’s examples of the touching hand from Ideen II,6 which could also be of use in understanding the notions of movement and body as Patočka intended them. By appealing to the image of the hand in the act of touching, Merleau-Ponty is able to justify how the relationship of the subject faced with the world cannot amount to a form of ‘total knowledge’, nor even tend towards it in any way. The only form of knowledge granted to the subject is a kind of tactile knowledge: a knowledge which is gained step by step, by coming into contact with the substance of things, encountering them and determining their resistance, without the subject having any further reference points which allow him or her to break away from this personal and limited perspective. This is how Merleau-Ponty can state that ‘logical objectivity derives from carnal subjectivity’.7 By following a parallel line of thought, Patočka came to very similar conclusions in the Freiburg lecture:

In the living body, the world becomes present and opens itself to itself; it becomes a phenomenon, taking itself, so to speak, by the hand, but in a limited way, as only a hand can do: only bit by bit, holding back; namely with the help of its corporeality, grabbing and feeling its carnality, but never integrating itself in a perfect objectivity.8

As a result, in contrast with Husserl’s position, Patočka can also maintain that ‘no transcendental ego is the foundation of the synthesis of experience, but rather the embodied subjectivity [leibliche Subjektivität]’.9

This idea of the inextricable contamination between the subject and his or her world helps us to understand Patočka’s concept of phenomenology and its potential. Based on this interpretation, the situation of the subject in the world inevitably entails an involvement in it, a personal commitment with regard to the world. There is clearly a political element to this debate which slowly takes shape, and which I will try to explore later. This movement can neither be defined as subjective nor objective; it is an activity which lies beyond both mere perception and objectification, as practised in science. Through movement, the subject goes beyond his or her own subjectivity, giving it a body and an actual reality by putting it to use: ‘the act does not stay in subjectivity, but has its own plan, its own consequence and residue in the exterior world’.10 This movement therefore becomes the unique element which allows for the subject’s life to develop its own possibilities, starting from its finiteness, in experiencing the world without ever becoming lost in it, maintaining a gap between one’s own body and the world with which it comes into contact. Therefore, it can be said that ‘with subjective movement we are firmly anchored in reality’.11

Rather than stopping here, Patočka tries to lead this debate to its final consequences. This movement, which describes the situation of human beings in the world – from the point of view of their embodied finiteness and without ever straying away from this aspect – is also the origin of their freedom. This freedom is inevitably singular, individual and limited to the conditions of our existence in the world, but it also allows us to initiate purposeful action in the world, taking on a task within it.

In fact, this analysis follows the same framework which we have seen on other occasions. On the one hand, the subject is analysed by looking at its finiteness, while on the other hand there is a description of the activity of this subject who, precisely because of his or her finiteness and the fact that this person does not adhere to a schematism which is deducible in a purely objective way, is situated in the world but at the same time, never completely reducible to it.12 What is maintained is the disparity; this gap which can be found throughout Patočka’s analyses. If it is true that there cannot be a pure subject, but only a subjectivity in the concrete subject’s positioning in his or her lifeworld, it is equally true that the world itself cannot do without this subjectivity as, in order to be the world, it needs to be moved and to be made the object of the actions and involvement of the thus-characterised subject. Movement becomes the deep and unsettling manifestation of this irreducibility, insofar as it brings the subject and the world together and favours their bond, but does not suppress the distance which forever separates them.

Therefore movement, even in its exterior manifestation, is something eminently multiple gathered into a unit: in movement, the personal uniqueness of the agent can be observed at the same time as the expression of its projects of possibility, intentions and aims (Intentionen und Absichten). This is mainly a means, but can also become an end in itself.13

It is precisely in this movement, as an end in itself and the finite subject’s initiation of projects and purposes, that the individual finds his or her own freedom. Once again, freedom is an action, an attempt at liberation; freedom in movement is never peacefully gained, but achieved inch by inch, in the repeated encounters and clashes between the subject and the world.

The question of movement and the subject who carries out this movement is not only traceable to the Freiburg conference but is also evident in Patočka’s research from the sixties. On returning from his trip to Germany, he found himself faced with Prague in a state of ferment. The season of political reforms had reached its pinnacle and, with the start of the Prague Spring, conditions for intellectuals within the regime had impr...

Table of contents

• Cover-Page
• Halftitle
• I The Call of Freedom
• II Risk and Shelter
• III The Non-Evidence of Reality
• IV Movement, World, History
• V The Praxis of Dissent
• Bibliography
• Index