Human Value, Environmental Ethics and Sustainability

The Precautionary Ecosystem Health Principle

Mark Ryan

• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9781783487974
• eBook ISBN: 9781783487998
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

It is widely acknowledged that we have a duty to protect the environment. Yet, current environmental policy discussions demonstrate that fulfilling this in practice is a difficult, complex, and costly task.

There are many ethical questions arising from such discussions. Should we care about the environment because it is economically valuable or because nature has intrinsic value? How do we establish an ethical trade-off between our current needs and those of future generations? Should we protect individual species or entire ecosystems instead? What way should we discuss societal values and ideals, or should scientific analysis take precedence within decision making practice?

This book aims to tackle some of these thorny sustainability issues and responds to them with a cohesive, original alternative in the form of the precautionary ecosystem health principle (PEHP). It provides a detailed philosophical approach and advocates that a PEHP approach is able to overcome many of these stark and challenging difficulties within sustainability theory and environmental policy.

Chapter 1

Introduction

If you were asked what things you value in life, most of you will respond with answers such as wealth, happiness, a long life and good relationship with family and friends. One thing that will always appear on every individual’s wish list is health, both the individual’s and that of the family and friends. It is a value we all know and cherish, despite it having a somewhat vague and undefinable meaning. By health, do we mean simply absence from illness, or do we mean something more active like physical well-being and mental well-being? Despite the wide variation of definitions and understandings of health, people will have a common ground about the parameters of what health means to them personally. However, when defining health, it is usually not associated with or linked to the environment or the ecological world. When defining health, the terms ‘environment’ and ‘health’ are not typically placed together. Our health is usually seen as a combination of our responsibility towards what we eat, our exercise and sleeping patterns, and our way of dealing with and managing stress and health-related issues. However, the environment is often seen as external to our health, such as our responsibility towards others’ health, other organisms, species, ecosystems and places.

Generally, we do not view the health of the environment as being codependent with our own, at least not to the degree we should. We should view ecosystem health in much more than a simple metaphor for adequate functioning and we should view it as essentially and fundamentally linked to human health. The concept of ecosystem health will propose that this emphasis should be acknowledged, while the application of the precautionary principle will provide it guidance and formulation within policy recommendations. The PP analyses how we value risk and proposes that we should err on the precautious side when we are unsure about the consequences of the risk to human health and EH. However, the successful merger between the PP and EH is hindered by many of the problematic issues contained within the environmental field and discussions around how to effectively implement environmental action.

There are some striking dichotomies on issues that seem to split the movement into opposing factions: anthropocentrism/non-anthropocentrism, intrinsic value/instrumental value, economic/ethical, and theoretical/practical. These preliminary dichotomies have the potential to divide and undermine the movement’s goals, through stagnation and disagreement, but even more importantly they have the power to stagnate or even stop effective environmental action. While debate and dialogue is important for any field, these dichotomies become locked into a battle of wits where there is little compromise, middle ground or recourse for action. We are often left with an either/or decision, where both possibilities are still inadequate because of their inherent weaknesses and lack of acknowledging the opposition’s benefits – such as in the example of anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism.

Anthropocentrism claims that human beings are at the top of the chain of being; we have characteristics superior to other species, which gives us the ability to use the environment as we see fit. On the other hand, non-anthropocentrism was created to combat the detrimental outcomes that were being caused by the exploitative effects of strong anthropocentrism. Non-anthropocentrism claims that non-human organisms, species and environmental systems have a value in themselves and that we should protect them from interference and destruction. Either we are allowed to interfere with non-human entities as we see fit (anthropocentrism) or else we should respect them because of their intrinsic value (non-anthropocentrism).

Both positions are also divided on the value they give to the non-human world: intrinsic value and instrumental value. Instrumental value refers to value that a thing brings to us, or the benefit we receive from it. Intrinsic value, on the other hand, is a value that a thing has in itself, regardless of any benefit we derive from it. Intrinsic value is a value that implies an obligation on others not to harm or maltreat the possessor of intrinsic value for one’s own benefit. Critics of the instrumental value claim that, without considering the intrinsic value, instrumentalists view the environment in a reductionist manner, proposing that everything in the non-human world is merely there for our benefit and is essentially disposable. Instrumentalists, on the other hand, typically state that only human beings can possess intrinsic value, therefore non-human organisms and systems cannot possess it as a result.

One problematic outcome of this division is that instrumental value would reduce all non-human things to merely what value they bring to human beings, and as a result, they would be valued in simple economic terms. Organisms, species, ecosystems, and everything in the non-human world would be equated to a fixed economic cost and worth, and their ‘value’ would be reduced to simple monetary numbers. On the one hand, there is the position that states we can measure things only through their monetary benefits; on the other hand, there is another theory that states the economic worth alone cannot add value to society. Furthermore, the proponents of economy state that it is the most practical to add monetary value to things because theoretical value cannot be included in policymaking decisions.

There is an on-going debate between the practical and the theoretical approaches in categorizing environmental system. Policymakers claim that theoretical viewpoints may be convincing in principle, but because of their rhetorical nature, it becomes extremely difficult in application. Concepts of intrinsic value and oneness with nature can guide individuals’ morality, but they cannot bring effective change in negotiations on a global scale. It is often said that environmental ethics is far too theoretical, philosophical and impractical in real-life situations. However, theorists often claim that policymakers do not take into account the many important issues that are discussed in theory, but only discover the problems once they occur. Policymakers can also lose out on the richness of data that is economically or politically most beneficial. The approach in this book will provide a formidable system for policymakers, such as designing policy guidelines (i.e. the PP), with an explanative and analytical rigour found within environmental ethics framework. Overall, the book tries to find solutions to the dichotomous positions discussed here within the merger of two conceptual approaches – the PP and EH. This book will propose an innovative synthesis between ‘EH’ and the ‘PP’, which can open up new and fruitful avenues for sustainability theory and will provide solutions to the problems within the field and within both positions individually. For example, the PP is rarely grounded on an ecological or ethical basis because of its roots in policymaking, while EH has never been guided by a politically oriented approach, because it is usually confined to philosophical and ecological discussions. The PP will provide EH with greater guidance and thresholds to work within, while EH will guide the PP with a stronger ecological and ethical basis. The precautionary ecosystem health principle (PEHP) discussed herein will be based on a weak anthropocentric framework, guided by contributory value, and will be promoted holistically with an ecologically beneficial approach within the sustainability debate.

Chapter 2 will explain how EH and biological integrity (BI) are underpinned by the functionalist and compositionalist worldviews and are guided by the ecosystem and evolutionary ecology. It also demonstrates how BI is based on a compositionalist worldview and is guided by evolutionary ecology, while EH is based on a functionalist worldview and is guided by the ecosystem ecology. The fact that BI’s promotion of wilderness and the endorsement of habitats free from human interference are flawed is demonstrated with examples. The book establishes that EH needs the assistance of PP, and that the integration of the two concepts paves the way for a robust sustainability theory. However, these concepts require defensible ethical frameworks and strong valuative concepts to guide them in practice; the two options are usually anthropocentrism or non-anthropocentrism.

The book identifies the dichotomy between non-anthropocentrism and anthropocentrism, but will propose that both approaches are inadequate for the PEHP. I will show that Callicott’s Bio-Empathy approach (Hume, Darwin, Leopold axiology) is a misleading and fractured approach for intrinsic value to be based upon, because Hume did not endorse a holistic approach (he was a communitarian), and Darwin described the origin of value instrumentally, not intrinsically (as an instrumentalist who cares for others). In addition, Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold as a non-anthropocentrist and pioneer for intrinsic value is false, because Leopold only referred to species and ecosystems as adding value to humans – option values for future generations – and not having an intrinsic value.

The book also addresses the use of intrinsic value in the PEHP. This book proposes that humans cannot equate non-human entities intrinsically, and non-anthropocentrism cannot overcome the criticism of ecofascists. It is proposed to use a long-sighted anthropocentric position, because it is more theoretically and practically conclusive. The characteristics of weak anthropocentrism are similar to strong anthropocentrism, but the former manages to overcome many of the problems, which the latter cannot, for example, always favouring human preferences over considered preferences, such as placing economic benefits and demands over the future sustainability of the planet.

Weak anthropocentrism will prevail over the PEHP because it defeats the criticisms that usually cripple strong anthropocentrism and non-­anthropocentrism. By doing so, it will overcome the criticism of the ecofascism (the descent into abusing individual human interests for the benefit of a greater ecological whole) and will also avoid environmentally destructive and economically beneficial outcomes. Instead, the PEHP will take an enlightened anthropocentric position that will incorporate a long-sighted approach to human actions and values and will be guided and directed by the parameters that are established within the EH.

However, one major disadvantage for the PEHP is that definitions of ‘health’ are not clear or concise, and it is uncertain what value should be attributed to it. When health is applied to the ecosystem, it is usually described metaphorically, making it vague for implementation. The PEHP will provide us with a clear definition of health, and its objective nature (empirical and analysable) will make it a useful, sustainable concept. The chapter shows that health is holistic because it is concerned with the whole rather than isolated, and it is also a variable because it changes in different contexts and situations.

The definition of health should analyse an organism’s functioning capacity instead of incorporating a thing’s well-being or interests. This means inclusion of the ecosystem into a literal definition of health, strengthening it as a concept and enhancing its practical application. A definition of health should include the characteristics of self-organization and self-generation in order to overcome the problems of including inanimate human-made objects within the definition of health. These problems include viewing inanimate human-made objects as having a value similar as living things, which may lead to humans and animals being maltreated in favour of material things. However, one of the disadvantages in defining EH is how to distinguish between normal and abnormal or unhealthy ecosystem change. For the PEHP to sustain, it must differentiate between normal and abnormal changes to protect, avoid and ensure these standards are met to obtain a healthy ecosystem.

The book also analyses normal ecosystem functioning and types of routine historic change for the PEHP and claims that if routine historic change were seen as both erratic and steady, all changes would be deemed normal. Instead, ecosystems are constantly changing and they do not have clear definable thresholds; therefore, we should create an adaptive, resilient and dynamic approach instead of relying on fixed benchmarks of what a normal ecosystem change should be. The characteristics of self-renewal and self-organization will be used as guidelines to determine a healthy functioning ecosystem. However, even if we know what is healthy or what is not, we are still left with our responsibility towards protecting and maintaining EH.

This book will show that health is instrumental in fulfilling all our mission and goals in lives. It shows that health is a thick descriptor – fact followed by value – but disagrees that it needs to be intrinsically valued. Instead, the book proposes that we should focus our obligations on the present and future human beings because of the benefits we receive from them, such as ecosystem goods, ecosystem benefits and cultural utilities. Ecosystem service refers to any services we receive from ecosystems, such as water purification, nutrient recycling, composition of waste, provision of clean air, flood supply flood regulation, climate regulation and pest control. The book establishes that a healthy ecosystem paves the way for an economically beneficial ecosystem and that valuing cultural and ecosystem services in monetary terms is often questionable and disadvantageous. Ecosystem goods are any tangible goods that we consume, use or can physically manipulate to our benefit. This includes food, minerals and raw materials and energy from fossil fuels. While ecosystem goods are in favour of the economy, they should not trample upon the non-economic values of cultural and ecosystem benefits. The book establishes that there are ways to evaluate the benefits of the ecosystem without having to put a price tag, and sometimes they need to be considered as inclusive goods and services that are worthy of our protection. While ecosystem goods are favourably regulated by socio-economic means, this does not exempt them from being politically regulated when their consumption is beyond sustainable levels.

We need to acknowledge the utilities that the ecosystem and culture provides us with for their functional capacity, because they enrich our lives in non-material, non-monetary ways. However, even if this fact is established, we still need the PP to guide the EH within the decision-making and application process because it gives greater clarity and guidance, as EH is usually not explicit in its policy orientation. The merger of EH and the PP strengthens the former’s practical application, while it benefits the latter’s ecological and ethical underpinnings. However, very often it is difficult to define the PP, and as a result, it tends to be seen as vague and problematic.

The book divides the PP into three specific sections: the trigger (damage and knowledge thresholds), decision and application stages. The first stage determines the permissible levels of damage to EH, that is, if we can cross any of the commonly used PP damage thresholds, such as irreversibility and catastrophic harm. The book demonstrates how using benchmarks such as irreversibility is too catastrophic to guide the PEHP, as it would imply freezing of the environment, which is practically impossible and ethically undesirable. It is also proposed that the irreversibility benchmark does not adequately depict a species’ contribution to the ecosystem and that other damage benchmarks, such as ‘catastrophe’ are inadequate, because they only formulate risks in quantitative manners, and defining catastrophic harm is too controversial per se. The irreversibility and catastrophe benchmarks do not take into account the fact that ecosystems are open, non-linear systems that may be open to a wide range of different bifurcations and pathways.

I will instead propose that the edges of chaos concept, guided by bifurcation theory, will be given as a suitable damage threshold approach for the PEHP, because it acknowledges the complexity of open systems (ecosystem) and predicts the outcomes of our actions. The PEHP differs from standardized risk assessment models, because it incorporates valuative judgements and does not place the sole burden of responsibility in the hands of the experts. However, approaches that give full authority to the public may lead to poor choices being taken. The book proposes that a deliberative democratic approach, guided by post-normal science, be taken to overcome these issues. The book claims that precautionary actions may lead to detrimental outcomes, and demonstrates that the PEHP is not liable for this charge, because it is theoretically and practically impossible to prevent all risks, especially those that are not known. Another problem is being forced into a state of inaction in our attempt to avoid risks. This criticism is being rejected by this author because the PEHP does not force us into a state of inaction, as it is completely action-oriented and forces us to take decisions in difficult and complex situations, such as ecosystem protection and maintenance.

Although the research on implementation stages of the economical and political PEHP is quite preliminary in the field of environmental practice, it aims to provide a ground work for later works. Some of the initial findings that will become evident are the cost–benefit analysis (CBA), which does not adequately determine the value of the non-human world and does not account for the consequences of adversely affecting the functioning of the ecosystems’ health. The book emphasis on the need to evaluate the benefits of the ecosystem and cultural values instead of taking advantage of them for economic gains. Overall, the approach discussed will contribute to the sustainability theory by offering an analysis of the PP and EH and by integrating them into a hol...

Table of contents

• Cover-Page
• Halftitle
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Origin and Development of Ecosystem Health
• 3 Weak Anthropocentrism and Contributory Value
• 4 Health is Objective (Empirical and Measurable)
• 5 The Value of Health
• 6 The Precautionary Principle
• 7 The Trigger, Decision and Application Stages
• 8 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index
• About the Author