Protest Movements and Parties of the Left

Affirming Disruption

David J. Bailey

• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield International
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9781783486779
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Democracy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How successful are social movements and left parties at achieving social and political change? How, if at all, can movements and parties work together to challenge existing hierarchies? Is the political left witnessing a revival in contemporary politics? This book highlights some of the key achievements of left parties and protest movements in their goal of challenging different types of inequality – and considers the ways in which their challenge to authority and power could be intensified. It combines new theoretical ideas with rich empirical detail on the debates and concrete activities undertaken by left parties and protest movements over a broad historical period, from the early European labour movement to the recent anti-austerity global protests. The book will offer unique insight into the broad history and theory of emancipatory politics; as well as making an important contribution to ongoing debates between left-leaning academics, researchers and activists.

Part 1

LABOUR MOVEMENT STRUGGLES

Chapter 1

The Russian Revolution and ‘all power to the Bolsheviks’

The history of the Russian Revolution is both contentious and contested. For many, it represents a tragedy of human folly, in which what might have been a transition to democracy was instead the launch of one of the most powerful totalitarian states in history (Figes 2017). For others, the emancipatory potential of 1917 was subverted by the ruthless and power-hungry Bolsheviks, with Lenin bearing most responsibility (Voline 1990). For others still, what could have been a successful revolution was hindered by its bureaucratic lack of ambition and especially its failure to continue the struggle, in Trotsky’s words, by continuing to push for a ‘permanent revolution’ (Trotsky 1936). As noted in the previous chapter, however, rather than seek to resolve these disputes one way or the other, the aim instead with the present chapter is to highlight the way in which the revolution emerged, and in doing so, how it was able to challenge and disrupt established structures of power and authority. While clearly such a narrative cannot avoid the question of ‘what went wrong’, this is addressed indirectly, as part of an alternative question: how did such important and disruptive forms of rebellion come about in the first place, and with what effect?

The chapter provides an overview of the key historical features of the Russian Revolution, considering, in particular, the strategic options open to the radical movements that emerged leading up to the revolution, including the important development of councils or soviets, in the workplaces, barracks and towns and cities across the crumbling Russian empire. The chapter considers the conditions in place that enabled the key revolutionary groupings – especially the Bolsheviks – to replace the tsarist regime and prevent the establishment of a ‘conventional’ liberal democracy. Finally, it considers the way in which perhaps the central slogan of the Russian Revolution, ‘All power to the soviets’, resulted, in effect, in all power going to the Bolsheviks. As we shall see, therefore, the Russian Revolution both showed the world that alternative ways of governing were possible, posing a threat to the global capitalist order that would be central in stimulating efforts at class compromise for much of the twentieth century, and ultimately was defeated by a ruthless bureaucratic tendency, personified first in the case of Lenin but then in its most extreme form with the ascent of Stalin. Throughout the period under investigation, however, the capacity for disruptive emancipatory agency was repeatedly displayed, and it is on this that we shall seek to focus in the account that follows.

1905

It is difficult to tell the story of the 1917 Russian Revolution(s), without first going over an account of the earlier 1905 Revolution. Indeed, for Lenin, ‘Without the ‘dress rehearsal’ of 1905, the victory of the October Revolution in 1917 would have been impossible’ (Lenin 1920). While it is difficult to substantiate this claim, it was undoubtedly the case that the 1905 Revolution marked a significant rupture for the tsarist regime of Nicholas II. Ever since its defeat during the Crimean War (1853–1856), the Russian authorities had been concerned that the country’s relative economic and social underdevelopment was undermining its international standing, prompting the so-called Great Reforms of the 1860s and 1870s, which saw a number of relatively liberal measures introduced in the country (Ascher 2004: 4–6). These created sufficient autonomy for certain constituents – especially the gentry, now organized within the local councils, or zemstvos, to eventually form a threat to the authority of the tsar.

From the early 1890s to the beginning of the First World War, Russia also began a period of industrial modernization, rapidly becoming the fifth industrial power in the world with manufacturing undergoing a massive expansion. At the same time, however, Russia remained a largely agrarian society, with manufacturing heavily concentrated in certain key areas (especially St Petersburg). This concentration of manufacturing, in turn, made it more easy for labour organizers and militants to mobilize resentful workers; of whom there was a growing number as rapid industrialization resulted in extremely draconian working and living conditions for a new proletariat that remained, in part, connected to the countryside (which they traveled to and from depending upon the season), often experiencing very poor living conditions during the times that they were in the cities (Smith 2017: 36–37). By the beginning of 1905, therefore, the preconditions for revolutionary activity had become increasingly present, with workers’ grievances central to the growing tensions.

In addition to the grievances of the workplace, the new industrial workers were unhappy about the harsh prison sentences that were routinely meted out, fines for insubordination, poor living conditions and routine condescension from employers. The impact of this combination of conditions was a rapid growth in strike activity, in which employees proved especially effective in organising mass, well-organized strikes; growing from only six strikes in total between 1862 and 1869 to 550 work stoppages in 1903 alone (Ascher 2004: 4–6). In addition to the grievances of workers, the gentry became restive in the period immediately preceding the 1905 Revolution. The zemstvos became increasingly antagonistic towards tsar Nicholas II, seeking a new national representative body. Upon being denied their request, moreover, the gentry moved to create their own semi-legal congress that would repeat their demand for a representative body of some kind (Smith 2017: 46). Alongside growing opposition from workers, therefore, Nicholas faced growing dissent from the liberal elite.

At the same time, the main Marxist party of Russia and member party of the Second International, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party, split between two factions: the majority (Bolsheviks, led by Lenin) and minority (Mensheviks). The Bolsheviks had a firmer commitment to revolutionary action and would eventually come to believe that the time was ripe for a transfer to communism. The Mensheviks, in contrast, had a more open and democratic attitude to party organization and came to consider the next ‘phase’ in modernization to be a move towards a liberal democratic regime (with more revolutionary developments anticipated at some unspecified time in the future) (for a discussion of this division within the RSDLP, see Townshend 1996: 72–81).

By the time of the 1905 Revolution, workers, peasants and the gentry were all lining up against the tsar, with all sides committed to an end to what was considered an archaic regime based upon the hereditary principle. This therefore created escalating political tension and heightened prospects for unrest. On 9 January 1905, a date which would come to be known as Bloody Sunday, a mass demonstration of striking workers, led by radical priest Father Gabon, was staged in opposition to an earlier sacking of four workers due to their involvement in Gabon’s Assembly, and in demand of a series of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, the right to association, the right to strike, and an eight-hour working day (Smith 2017: 47). The demonstration was fired on by Russian soldiers, killing and injuring around 1,000 of the workers and their families. This enflamed the striking workers, leading to a wave of further strikes and demonstrations throughout the year. Workers demanded improved working conditions, democracy, living conditions and an end to the repression they frequently suffered. Liberals drawn from Russia’s small middle-class demanded political reforms. Unable to determine how best to respond to the uprising, Nicholas II and his government vacillated between repression and concessions throughout the year, yet was almost entirely unable to respond effectively to the challenge to its authority. As one commentator describes:

From mid-1904 until late in 1905, there occurred an assault on authority from below so massive, potent, and successful that by all appearances the old regime was disintegrating. Civil order broke down, and for several months the government seemed incapable of little more than biding its time until the outbursts of defiance, generally unplanned and unorganized, had spent themselves. So effective a challenge to the state’s monopoly of power, even though temporary, may justifiably be characterized as a revolution. (Ascher 2004: 39)

This strike wave continued to escalate throughout the year, spurred on by Bloody Sunday and the government’s intransigence in the face of the demands for civil liberties. Strikes were often spontaneous (as indicated by the fact that demands were often drawn up after the workers had gone out on strike) and took on a range of forms, including outright strikes, but also more subtle forms, such as purposeful ‘go-slows’, or finishing an hour or two early for each shift. A common demand articulated sought permission for workers’ committees to be created. Trade unions were established, especially in St Petersburg, but also in Moscow, directly and openly flouting the law which had prohibited them (Ascher 2004: 40–44). The scale of the mass mobilization faced by the tsarist regime was therefore such that it could not simply be repressed. Instead, the disruption that it had caused required more substantial concessions to be granted if Nicholas II was to remain in place. Failing to appreciate the scale of the crisis that he faced, however, he waited until August until he would agree to a consultative assembly, which as Smith speculates might have been sufficient to appease the liberal opposition, had it been introduced earlier (Smith 2017: 51). In failing to do so, however, Nicholas prompted the mobilization of opposition to continue throughout much of the year.

In addition to the outbreak of mass strikes and demonstrations, the year 1905 saw the first creation of the council, or soviet, which was to be perhaps the most influential of the new forms of disruptive activity to emerge in 1905. The experience of the St Petersburg Soviet represented a significant experiment in popular association and decision-making, posing a direct challenge to the authority of both the regime and also to the notion of the centralized state as the only mode of decision-making. In this sense, it planted a seed of expectation in the minds of many workers and leftist intellectuals, providing practical ways in which the radical egalitarian (Marxist) critiques of capitalism and property relations might be replaced. This, it came to be viewed, could be achieved through the democratic functioning of councils, in both the workplace and the community. For many commentators, including Lenin, this would subsequently come to be viewed as encapsulating the spirit of the earlier 1871 Paris Commune, in which the working classes took power directly for themselves. As Anweiler (1974) puts it,

Though existing only briefly, the soviets of 1905, especially the St. Petersburgh Soviet of Workers Deputies, left behind a revolutionary tradition which became strongly ingrained in the working masses… . When revolutionary disturbances in Petrograd began in February 1917, therefore, the idea took hold of reestablishing the soviet, both in the striking factories and among the revolutionary intelligentsia. Eye-witnesses report that as early as Feburary 24 spokesmen were elected in some factories to a projected soviet. (Anweiler 1974: 104)

The soviets of 1905 brought together representatives from multiple striking workplaces and factories, forming associations that could coordinate disputes and become something of a strike committee, and providing communication, discipline and direction for strikes that spanned several workplaces.

As Ascher (2004: 46) describes, in the case of the Assembly of Delegates in the city of Ivanovo-Voznesensk, which for many is considered the first soviet (despite not in fact adopting the title), the council brought together delegates from all of the striking factories in the textiles-focused city. This acted to close down production almost entirely in the city. In addition, it took responsibility for policing duties, coordinating information between the striking factories and negotiating on behalf of the striking workers. In this sense, it was considered to be one of the first experiences for many workers where an institution was created that would enable their own direct participation in an organization designed to coordinate their own self-government.

The year 1905 also saw a mass mobilization in the sphere of education – spanning both higher education and secondary schools – largely mobilized around demands for greater participation in the running of education institutions, the removal of police surveillance and greater access to education institutions for the poorer classes, along with support for many of the political reforms being demanded by the liberals. The education movement witnessed the staging of increasingly popular mass education meetings, which both popularized education and acted as an opportunity for assemblies where people could share grievances and discuss options for further mobilization. For instance, 13,000 people, with a large attendance by the city’s workers, gathered at a meeting in St Petersburg University on 9 October. Topics at these meetings included questions of political strategy, reforms and class structure. They would last for hours and also be platforms for organising further acts of dissent. A massive wave of peasant protest also swept across the Middle Volga region and Ukraine, witnessing peasants take advantage of the pressure already placed upon the regime to attack the landlords and property owners, through rioting, burning and looting (Ascher 2004: 62–66; Smith 2017: 54; see also Perrie 1972; Edelman 1987). The range of groups mobilizing in opposition to the tsar was therefore becoming overwhelming, especially as they increasingly connected with each other, facilitating their mutual development.

Opponents of the Russian Empire also used the unrest sparked by Bloody Sunday to mobilize in opposition to Russian rule. This commonly took the form of further mass strikes. For instance, a general strike in Warsaw on 16 January was followed in February by students at both Warsaw University and the Polytechnical Institute abandoning classes and joining street demonstrations. In Georgia, rebellious peasants formed a revolutionary peasant committee which was predominantly responsible for governing the country for much of the year. In Revel (modern day Tallin), a general strike took place involving almost all of the city’s 15,000 workers. In Riga, the capital of Latvia, an initial strike was rapidly crushed through military means, although this prompted alternative forms of ongoing dissent, including minor strikes, tax and rent strikes and attacks on the castles and estates of the German barons who owned most of the land. In the countryside peasant disorder increased rapidly. This normally took the form of 500–600 peasants gathering in response to a signal (usually burning straw) and then attacking the local landlord, stealing his grain and livestock and also extended to felling trees and seizing lumber. This type of activity was most pronounced in the western regions, where up to half of the districts were affected. It is estimated that around 20 per cent of the peasants in total participated in some way in the disturbances. This unrest also fed into a vibrant petition movement, in which peasants began formally calling on St Petersburg to allow democratic reforms (the extension of local self-government) and economic reforms (transfer of land to the peasants). The period also witnessed a series of mutinies among the military – the most famous being the mutiny on the battleship Potemkin, in which sailors responded to their poor treatment on the ship and the shooting of their lead representative, by killing the captain and some of the officers, before sailing to support the uprising in Odessa, where strikes and demonstrations had been ongoing for the previous two weeks (Ascher 2004: 54–57; for more on the different types of rebellion within the military, see Bushnell 1985). The scale of opposition, and the degree to which it was taking on an increasingly well-organized form, was therefore to pose a significant threat to the tsar. While he had sought throughout the year to portray himself as implacable and unbending in the face of opposition, this was beginning to look increasingly untenable in the face of continued uprisings, strikes, demonstrations and the formation of representative bodies for the different groups excluded by the regime.

In October 1905, a general strike involving around two million workers was sparked by a dispute over pensions with the railway workers. At this point, Nicholas II was persuaded that he had no option other than to agree to substantial political reforms – signing a constitution that would guarantee the rule of law, freedom of speech and association, an elected parliament (Duma) and a government with more clear lines of accountability (although how this would operate in practice was yet to be seen). This brought to a halt the workers’ strike but was insufficient to bring to an end a new wave of peasant unrest and disobedience within the military (with 211 separate mutinies between late October and mid-December 1905, normally in pursuit of better pay, food, clothing and less draconian management styles most of which were granted, in part, in a series of reforms introduced in December). The period following the agreement to a new constitution also saw a wave of far-right mobilizations – around the notorious Black Hundreds – including a wave of anti-Jewish pogroms (Ascher 2004: 77–84).

Once Nicholas agreed to the Constitution, there followed ten weeks of remarkable leniency by the regime – known now as the ‘days of liberty’. During this period, dissent was freely tolerated and soviets sprang up across the country, including within the military. By December, however, these began increasingly to clash with the regime. Prompted by the arrest of the St Petersburg soviet leadership, the Moscow soviet (reluctantly) called a general strike, which to its surprise prompted 80,000 workers to follow the call. Buoyed by this success, the Bolsheviks pushed for an armed insurrection. This, however, was brutally crushed, prompting the beginning of a new period of repression by the regime (Smith 2017: 52–53; for more on this series of working-class led clashes, see Engelstein 1982).

FROM THE 1905 REVOLUTION TO THE 1917 REVOLUTION

The Duma was initially intended as a device by the tsar to pacify the rebellion that had been occurring throughout 1905 and had reached uncontrollable levels by October of that year. Upon its election in February 1906, however, it became clear that the strategy was not to be straightforward. A large proportion of the workers followed the call made by the Bolsheviks, among others, to abstain from the election. The winning party was the Kadets. These were liberals who would use their position within the parliament to call almost immediately for reforms that would prove to be unacceptable to Nicholas, including the accountability of the government to the Duma and agrarian and land reforms. The government was initially reluctant to clash with the Duma, in part due to ongoing resistance exhibited by the workers and (especially) peasants. However, by July 1906, the Duma was disbanded on the orders of the tsar, on the grounds that it had overstepped its remit in seeking to adopt measures for land reform that were beyond its jurisdiction (Ascher 2004: 149–58). Having caused problems for Nicholas throughout the 1904–1906 period, therefore, the combination of peasants, workers and liberal gentry began increasingly to face moves by the tsar to reassert his.

Despite these efforts at repression, however, the second Duma, elected in 1907, proved even more radical, with a clear left-wing majority. Indeed, many on the left in the Duma were more intent on disrupting the parliament than they were in cooperating with it – despite the efforts of the liberal Kadets to maintain a degree of consensus between the Duma and the government of Prime Minister Stolypin. One of the most contentious events occurred when the government issued a call for nearly half a million new military recruits. Upon debating this in the Duma, the Social Democrat, A. G. Zurabov, was part of a number of radical opponents to the move. In speaking against the proposal, he insulted the Russian army, chastising them for being useless and destined for defeat. In response, the government ministers stormed out of the parliament and the Kadet leader, Golovin, was forced to plead with Stolypin to keep the Duma open. In the end, however, Stolypin was convinced that the Duma as it currently stood could not coexist with his government. In response, he disbanded the second Duma and held a third election to the parliament – this time under rules which ensured that the landowners would be massively over-represented, and with the left thereby reduced to a powerless minority (Ascher 2004: 185–93). By 1907, therefore, the tsar had removed the most important concessions that had been won through the course of the 1905 Revolution, in large part as a result of the Duma exercising (and, indeed, exceeding) the authority that it had been granted.

In addition to the repression of the liberal institutions that had been created in October 1905, following their crushing at the end of 1905 the revolutionary workers entered a period during which they were initially quietened. Between 1906 and 1910, opposition to the tsar seemed to have been successfully dealt with. This was subsequently used as an opportunity to exact revenge upon those who were held responsible for the uprisings of 1905, with 26,000 people either executed (3,000 insurgents were hanged), exiled or imprisoned during the period (Waldron 1998; Smith 2017: 62).

By 1910, however, a new strike wave had begun. Following the partial legalization of unions in ...