Interrogating Illiberal Peace in Eurasia

Critical Perspectives on Peace and Conflict

Catherine Owen, Shairbek Juraev, David Lewis, Nick Megoran, John Heathershaw

• Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield International
• Year: 2018
• ISBN:
  9781786603630
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The collapse of the USSR wrought dramatic changes in Eurasia, both in terms of the structure of state power within the region, and the ways in which Western states and international organisations engaged with it. Analyses of conflict in this region remain rooted in supposed ‘global models’, often assuming that patterns of state failure are due to resistance to the liberal model of peacebuilding. This book sets out a challenge to these assumptions and framings. It not only questions but resolutely dismisses the notion that the peacebuilding methods favoured by Western states remain the most salient in Eurasia. Instead, it develops a framework that seeks to conceptualise the ways in which non-liberal actors contest or transform globally promoted norms of conflict management and promote alternative ones in their place. Authoritarian Conflict Management (ACM) consists of an ensemble of norms and practices in which non-liberal actors attempt to exert sustained hegemonic control over the local discursive, economic and spatial realms in a given territory. With case studies ranging from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan, Xinjiang to the Caucasus, the chapters shed light on the ways in which local and regional actors enact practice of ACM in order to impose stability in conflict-prone localities, thereby challenging the Western-led consensus known as the ‘liberal peace’.

Chapter 1

History, Memory and the Quest for Conflict Resolution in Southern Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley

Jeff Sahadeo

History and memory play crucial roles in Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley’s politics and everyday lives. Their power is manifest in statues of Manas and other heroes now claimed as Kyrgyz that proliferate countrywide; in the booklets that outline glorious exploits of local clans through time; and in the stereotypes that Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and other nationalities hold for each other. Peoples across Central Asia express pride towards familial, tribal and other affinities as well as cultural and land use patterns that have served to counter uncertainty and manage conflict across time. Even as histories and memories fluctuate to suit the tastes of current regimes and situations of ordinary citizens, both are treated across the region, as they are worldwide, as fixed points of orientation. They serve as ways to understand the present and as guides to the future. In a region where the Soviet system privileged the study of history to determine the discrete places of nations, Central Asians have absorbed identities and mythologies that underpin interethnic or cross-border exchanges and conflicts.

This chapter discusses how history and memory have intertwined to condition recent conflict, most prominently the violent clashes in the Ferghana Valley in 1990 and 2010, and continued tension thereafter. It frames potential paths to using history and memory to mitigate, instead of incite, regional conflict, with a focus on Kyrgyzstan. Pluralistic interpretations of the past have struggled to gain currency in a modern nationalist climate, but retain resonance among both decision-makers in Bishkek and the general population in Southern Kyrgyzstan, regardless of ethnic affiliation. Exposing these visions in popular and elite memory, this chapter argues, could play an important role in building a more accommodating and peaceful society across the Ferghana Valley, which encompasses Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and serve as a model for addressing ethnic tensions across Central Asia.¹

Since the Soviet Union’s erosion, history and memory have caused and legitimated actions that have favored one national group over another. Violence in the Ferghana Valley erupted in 1989. Uzbeks rioted against a Meshketian population, deported by Stalin, seen to challenge their “traditional” dominance in trade. The clashes in Osh that following year, killing over 200, emerged from claims and counter-claims based on history: the rights of the Kyrgyz people to the second-largest city in “their” republic, created under the Soviet Union, versus those asserted by the Uzbek population based on residence dating back centuries. Independent Kyrgyzstan initially sought to calm tensions in the wake of the 1990 violence. State efforts to propagate a nationalist history, however, and deepening national stereotypes, complicated by a poor economy, provided the context for the even deadlier clashes in 2010. Years later, underlying tensions and a full accounting of the violence have been swept aside as numerous political actors focus on making Osh a uniquely Kyrgyz space.

Kyrgyzstan’s state narratives, all the more so after 2010, highlight the founding and privileged place of the Kyrgyz majority and downplay past and present contributions of other ethnicities. Historical records, including those in national and regional archives, as well as personal and collective memories, allow for accounts that privilege common understandings and mutual respect. Pluralist retellings of the past confront not only the power of extant popular memories and state priorities, but also the underlying economic and geopolitical situation of Central Asia, based in large part on its colonial past. Nick Megoran identified “profound narratives of Uzbek and Kyrgyz insecurity” in post-2010 Osh (Megoran 2013: 904). National identities, ironically the product of their formal colonial overlord, offer a collective sense of belonging even as they stoke tension in Kyrgyzstan. Regional rivalries, as well as an uncertain place between global powers, in particular Russia and China, heighten popular and state apprehensions in a poor republic so heavily dependent on aid, transfers and remittances from abroad.

The possibilities and challenges of a pluralist history have particular resonance in the Ferghana Valley. National identities, now conforming to states with hard borders, coexist with a strong regional pride. State capitals are perceived as removed and remote. Sense of a common history and destiny encourages cooperation, which has traditionally characterized relations between Ferghana’s ethnic and social groups.

History and memory’s dynamic natures constitute important factors in the outbreak and management of conflict in today’s Central Asia. Section 1 outlines how history and memory operate, as well as their relationship in intellectual, political and everyday circles in the region. Section 2 delves into Kyrgyzstan’s and the Ferghana Valley’s past. Under multiple overlords, common understandings and cooperation bound local populations as much separation and conflict divided them. Section 3 reveals how, among others, “ethnic entrepreneurs” – community or political figures who foster exclusivist ethnic identities in order to pursue particular agendas – use history and memory to promote particular visions and understandings of the post-Soviet Kyrgyz nation and state (see Brubaker et al 2006). Section 4 discusses paths forward in the use of history and memory to manage conflicts and promote a pluralist understanding of Central Asia.

1. HOW HISTORY AND MEMORY WORK

History and memory are distinct, but generally mutually reinforcing. History represents what available evidence tells us about the past; memory is the set of meanings that people attribute to past collective experiences. Both are foundational components of group relations. They can be shaped to instigate or mitigate hostility.² Efforts to control history and memory, however, have limits and can produce unintended consequences.

History invests the past with meaning. Leaders, historians and the general population create narratives based on records, memories and stories. History is never neutral; it is always written for someone, for some purpose (Jenkins 1991). Memory is also a complicated process, especially in uncertain times. As Geoff Eley writes, memory is “a way of deciding who we are and of positioning ourselves in time, given the hugeness of the structural changes so palpably and destructively remaking the world” (Eley 2011). Modern states harness history and memory to manage and lead populations. Independent Kyrgyzstan has hewed closely to the Soviet version of modern, western nation- and state-building in this regard. Commemorations, monuments, textbooks, anthems and flags fuse collectivities – “imagined communities” in Benedict Anderson’s words – into nations and political units (Anderson 1983). These tools shape a collective memory to bind cohesive groups and create outsiders (Halbwachs 1992).

Violence and trauma, such as occurred in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1989–90 and 2010, heighten memory’s importance. As Katharina Schramm notes, “the memory of violence is not only embedded in peoples’ bodies and minds but also inscribed into space in all kinds of settings: memorials, religious shrines, border zones” (Schramm 2011: 5). Violent conflict significantly alters historical narratives and collective memories. Trauma launches a complicated process of remembering as individuals fit personal losses into broader social and political narratives.

This analysis of history and memory as constructed and malleable remains largely confined to western scholarly circles. Contemporary understandings in Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley follow Soviet-era positivism, where the study of history revolves around classifying works as correct or “objective,” or – generally if they disagree with popular understandings or state-based narratives – “biased” (Amsler 2011). Like their predecessors, Central Asian states carefully control historical output as they promote nationalized understandings of the past (see Sahadeo 2011). The challenge this poses to conflict management is increasingly recognized in post-Soviet peace-building and reconstruction spheres (Karpenko & Javakishvili 2013). Kyrgyz leaders’ use of historical narratives has important consequences, resulting in continued anxiety and a weakening status for ethnic minorities amid the 1990 and 2010 violence.

2. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF HISTORY: THE PAST IN THE FERGHANA VALLEY AND KYRGYZSTAN

Neither history nor memory operates untethered from the past. While historical narratives and collective memories gain power through their impact on intended audiences, professional and amateur historians seek evidence. Material based on archival sources, fieldwork and oral histories, as well as extensive interaction with Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Russian and other scholars, supports the alternative narrative of this section. The discussion focuses on events, distant and recent, that have become factors in contemporary ethnic identities and group relations, with a view towards privileging complexity and managing conflict. Local, regional and ethnic identities have evolved and shifted over centuries based on political and economic fortunes. The Ferghana Valley emerged as a contact zone, where interactions and exchanges coincided with periods of stability and growth. The section also highlights the importance of empire, imposed through violence and maintained through a complicated dynamic of accommodation and coercion. As control from Moscow weakened, grievances emerging from tsarist and Soviet policies, including nation- and state-building, population movement and economic development, burst into violence.

Early Leaders and Peoples

The lands of modern Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley have changed hands numerous times. Persian, Scythian, Chinese and other outside rulers presided over Indo-Iranians who mixed with aboriginal peoples around 2000 BCE (Saidov et al 2011). Southern Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley emerged as part of a network of trade routes known as the Silk Road from the 3rd century CE. Persian Sasanian overlords brought urban culture as well as Zoroastrianism, whose legacy remains, most notably in the Navruz or New Year festival. Turkic peoples from the north penetrated Central Asia in the 6th century. Shortly afterwards, invading Arab tribes brought Islam to the region.

Chinggis Khan and his invaders, including Kyrgyz tribes of the Siberian-Mongol regions, broke upon Central Asia in 1219–20. Legends of glory in battle continue to make Chinggis Khan a source of authority. Chinggisid family lineages provide legitimacy and prestige for pastoralist and sedentary leaders of Central Asia alike. Tribes referred to as Kyrgyz established themselves in the Tian Shan mountains in the 15th and 16th centuries (Levi 2007: 24). The Kyrgyz tribe from the Yenisey region of Siberia was described in Chinese records as fair-skinned and red-haired. Their relationship to today’s Kyrgyz, who emerged in the following centuries from Turkic groups, increasingly professing Islam through contact with Sufi priests, is unclear (Menges 1967: 89). As they settled in the mountains, Kyrgyz tribes developed a pastoral system and organization suited to highlands.

A Chinggisid successor, Uzbek Khan (1313–1341) emerged on the steppes of what is today southern Russia and northern Kazakhstan. The term “Uzbek,” taken from his name, came to designate the Turkic tribes of the southern steppe (Levi & Sela 2009: 199). Uzbek Khan’s successors seized and settled the Ferghana Valley (Bregel 1991: 62–3). Meanwhile, some who abandoned the Uzbeks became known as Kazakhs (“tribeless” or “freemen”). They formed three confederations or hordes: Great, Middle and Small. Lands around Lake Issyk-Kul, the home of the Kyrgyz tribe, came under the Great Horde. Mutual trade supplied pastoralists and urban inhabitants with vital goods. The cities of the Ferghana Valley remained hubs of economic activity even as the Silk Road declined due to regional instability and the growth of seaborne exchange. A strata of wealthy Ferghana merchants emerged and the Osh bazaar gained repute across Asia (Liu 2007).

In the 17th and 18th centuries, Central Asia faced expansionist neighbors, including Qing China, tsarist Russia and British India. Many Kyrgyz tribes allied with the Qing. Cotton was a key trade commodity. Conflict between Central Asian khanates, which were based on dynastic rule, prevented effective regional administration and resistance against outside powers. Over the 18th century, the emirate of Bukhara claimed control of the Ferghana Valley. By 1810, the khanate of Kokand, led by an offshoot of the Uzbek Ming tribe that ruled Bukhara, emerged as a challenger, controlling rich trading routes with Russia. Pastoralist tribes periodically swept in from the steppe or the mountains, sparking conflict. Kokand expanded to territories of what is today northern Kyrgyzstan and built fortifications on its borders, including Pishpek (today Bishkek) in 1825, subjecting local tribes to its rule.

Tsarist Rule

By the 1800s, Russia had manifold political and economic interests in Central Asia (Levi 2007: 226). Some Kazakh and Kyrgyz tribes fought Russian invaders; others supported the tsar in an effort to gain military support against Kokand. In 1868, Konstantin Petrovich fon-Kaufman became the governor-general of the new imperial province of Turkestan, which held much of modern Kyrgyzstan and the Ferghana Valley. Tsarist officials categorized their new subjects as either “Kirgiz”³ (pastoralists, which included the groups we refer to today as Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) or “Sarts” (urban-dwellers). The labels reflected economic interests, classifying peoples based on their uses to the imperial treasury. Numbers of tsarist administrators remained small. Local elites, placed on the imperial payroll, assured peace and collected tax revenue. Imperial officials, disdainful of the region’s consensus-based system of leadership, demanded elections. This change produced significant confusion and corruption.

Tsarist officials considered the area north of the Tian Shan mountains ideal for settling Slavic peasants. In 1906, Prime Minister P.A. Stolypin opened Siberia, the Kazakh steppe and Turkestan to the Russian peasantry. By 1914, the Semirechie province, in present-day northern Kyrgyzstan, had become home to about 300,000 Russian settlers (Brower 2003: 134). Many pastoralist tribes, who lost land, and could no longer traverse routes between winter and summer camps, became sedentary. Violent confrontations erupted over land rights. In the Ferghana Valley, tsarist interests focused on cotton. Russian demand grew as Moscow’s textile factories drove industrialization. Credit policies trapped local farmers in a type of debt slavery. Between 1888 and 1916, cotton production in the Ferghana Valley increased tenfold.

In return for accepting tsarist restrictions on enforcing sharia, many established Islamic leaders retained significant autonomy. New-method or Jadid Muslim thinkers challenged this accommodation. Jadids focused on the power of education and literacy and the teaching of science and geography, with the ultimate goal of challenging and overturning imperial dominance. Early Kyrgyz intellectual ferment centered on bards and akyns (story-tellers), who wove tales of resistance to tsarist rule and whose narratives wrestled with the challenges of modernity (Igmen 2012: 19).

Russia’s entry into World War I subjected Central Asians, who were not conscripted into military service, to punishing war taxes. In July 1916, the tsarist general staff ordered the local population’s mobilization for rearguard duty. News of the decree sparked riots, including in Ferghana, that were brutally suppressed. In pastoralist regions, outrage over Russian peasant settlement exacerbated resistance. By late summer, unrest raged around Pishpek and Issyk-Kul. Casualties for the local population numbered in the tens of thousands, and more than 2,000 Russians died (Brower 2003: 162). Hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz fled the violence and crossed the border into China, hence the contemporary Kyrgyz appellation of the rebellion as “the flight (urkun).”

As the tsarist regime collapsed in 1917, food grew scarce due to drought and wartime privations. Russian workers and soldiers in Pishpek and across the region organized in revolutionary councils (soviets) to seize power and disenfranchise the local population. Battles over food and land turned again to mass violence. Thousands of Kyrgyz died at Russian hands, and unrest convulsed the Ferghana Valley. Local opposition to Russian power across the steppe and in mountain areas coalesced at an all-Kirgiz conference in July 1917. The use of the tsarist nomenclature of “Kirgiz” belied the fact that many intellectual and political leaders on the steppe referred to themselves as Kazakhs, with Kyrgyz considered a subgroup of a Kazakh nation. The congress called for regional autonomy within the tsarist successor state, then led by the Provisional Government.

Early Soviet Rule (1917–45)

News of the Bolshevik Revolution intensified ...