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INDEX
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Accenture, 287
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), 179, 212–213
option ARM, 179, 180, 186, 189, 202, 213
subprime loans, 189, 202, 222–223
AIG (American International Group), 192–196
auditor report, 226–227
bailout by Federal Reserve, 236–237
credit default swaps, 195–196, 205–206, 211–212
credit default swaps collateral, 219–221, 223, 225, 226
credit rating, 193, 194, 195, 205–206, 212, 219, 235–236
credit rating collateral, 206, 212, 219, 235–236
mortgages will recover, 225–226
algorithmic trading. See electronic trading
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (1982), 189
American economy
1896 to 1900, 5–6
1927 strength, 73
1929 auto production, 103
1970s, 117, 123
1980s, 123–124
2000 Internet bubble, 197, 198
2008 job losses, 242
2010 recovery, 248
Great Depression, 54, 70, 115, 229
post-World War One, 62, 63–64, 65–66
World War One GDP, 62
American Founders Group, 78–79
antitrust actions
Knight Sugar trust, 10–11, 12, 13
Northern Securities, 12–15
Roosevelt trust injunctions, 25
Sherman Antitrust Act, 10, 24
Standard Oil, 19–21, 22–27
Babson, Roger, 97–99, 101, 107
Babson Break, 98, 108
Bair, Sheila, 204
Baker, Howard, 171, 172
Bank of America, 226, 232, 233–234, 235, 240
Bank of England
gold for earthquake claims, 17–18, 21
gold standard after war, 67–70, 102
structure of, 72
banking
1929 Crash consortium, 108–110, 111, 113
1987 crash, 163–165
call money cost, 50–51, 52, 53, 75–76
call money from nonbanks, 75–76, 83–84, 85, 88, 89–90, 93–94
capital reserve and default risk, 184, 185, 186
capital reserve and tranched mortgages, 196
chain banks, 31, 45
Glass-Steagall Act, 298, 299
mortgage correlation, 206–209
mortgage “lenders” to “originators,” 180, 182, 201
mortgage lending fraud, 203–205, 241, 243
mortgage originator buybacks, 214–215, 216–217
mortgage securitization, 190–191, 199–200, 201–203, 205, 206, 222, 299
rating agency complicity, 208, 209–211, 218
redlining, 189–190
savings and loans, 177–180
stocks as collateral, 31, 32–33, 35, 37–38, 52, 78, 83, 100
subprime loans, 189. See also subprime mortgages
Troubled Asset Relief Program, 237–241, 242, 243, 299
trust companies, 41–44, 45–51, 53, 122
Barclays
2010 Flash Crash, 272–277, 282–283, 289, 296
Lehman purchase, 232, 234–235
Barney, Charles, 35, 40–41, 42, 45, 46
Bear Stearns, 130, 156, 217–218, 220–221, 223, 227–228, 299
Bernanke, Ben, 204–205, 222–223, 225
Bies, Susan, 204
BISTRO (Broad Index Secured Trust Offering), 186, 195
Black, Fischer, 118–119, 120, 139, 158
Black Monday of 1987
1987 crash, 149–160, 163–164
Black-Scholes model, 118–119, 120, 139, 158
buybacks, 172–174
CME clearinghouse, 161–164
Designated Order Turnaround, 154–155, 165, 166
DOT and index arbs, 154, 156–157, 165, 167, 168
“highly confident” letter, 134, 136, 142
interest rates and bull market, 124, 130, 138, 144
interest rates and inflation, 145–146, 148
interest rates and trade deficit, 144–145, 150–151, 152
Iran attack, 153–154
junk bonds, 135–136, 137
leveraged buyout, 124–126
liquidity, 121, 139, 143, 158, 161
Major Market Index futures, 171–172, 173, 174
NYSE trading halt, 147, 156, 157, 158, 160, 169–171, 173
portfolio insurance, 118–122. See also portfolio insurance
portfolio insurance and futures, 133–134, 142. See al...
