The Expression of Predicative Possession

A Comparative Study of Belarusian and Lithuanian

Lidia Mazzitelli

• Publisher: De Gruyter Mouton
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9783110412352
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Linguistic Semantics
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

This book discusses the constructions used in Belarusian and Lithuanian to express predicative Possession. The work is written within a typological frame: the Belarusian and Lithuanian constructions are analyzed in the light of the typology of the possessive predicative constructions proposed by Heine (1997).

Part I: Possession: an introduction

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1 Defining possession

Possession has been recognized by most scholars as a linguistic universal: that means that every human language is expected to have some morphosyntactic strategies for its expression (Heine 1997a¹, Stassen 2009²). However, despite its universality and its evident central role in everyday life, it is very difficult to define clearly the notion of possession. Many attempts have been made to find a satisfying definition of the semantics of possessive relations, but, as Clancy (2010: 121) admits, this remains a “thorny problem.”

Perhaps, the most neutral way to define possession is to term it as an asymmetrical relationship between two entities, called possessor and possessee (Seiler 1983, Langacker 2009, Stassen 2009). This definition, however, does not adequately elucidate the semantic content of this relation: the concept of ‘asymmetrical relation’ is not sufficient, because there are many other relations that fit this description (relations of spatial inclusion, for instance). Therefore, it is necessary to find some other elements that may effectively describe the elusive meaning of possession. With this aim in mind, several scholars have attempted to find the quid that makes possessive relations different from all other kinds of relationships.

1.1 Approaches to a definition of possession

Among the authors, who have undertaken the difficult task of defining possession, Seiler (1983) must be remembered for his choice to consider possession as a “bio-cultural” concept that cannot be explained without referring to extralinguistic knowledge:

Semantically, the domain of POSSESSION can be described as bio-cultural. It is the relationship between a human being, his kinsmen, his body parts, his material belongings, his cultural and intellectual products. In a more extended view, it is the relationship between parts and whole of an organism (Seiler 1983: 4; capital letters by the author).

Lyons (1968) and Clark (1978) have tried to define possession with reference to the semantic theory of localism, according to which possessive relations are traced back to the class of locative expressions. The principal argument Lyons and Clark produce in support of their interpretation is linguistic evidence itself. It is easily verifiable, in fact, that, in many unrelated languages, possessive constructions formally coincide with locative ones or are derived from them through a process of grammaticalization. Russian gives an excellent example of this, as it expresses possession through the construction u + GEN, literally meaning ‘at’: u menja mašina ‘at me (is) car = I have a car’. Consequently, Lyons concludes, “it can be argued that so-called possessive expressions are to be regarded as a subclass of locatives (as they very obviously are, in terms of their grammatical structure, in certain languages)” (Lyons 1977: 474).

According to Lyons, thus, possession is represented in language as a form of abstract location: two objects are put in a formally locative relation, whose meaning is not spatial but otherwise abstract. Yet, the question arises, how, then, location and possession can be distinguished, provided they are linguistically often encoded in the same way. Both Lyons and Clark solve this problem, assuming that the discriminating criterion between location and possession is animacy:

I argue that the possessor in […] possessive constructions is simply an animate place. The object possessed is located in space, just as the object designed in existential or locative sentences. In possessive constructions, the place happens to be an animate being, such that a + Animate Loc becomes a Pr [possessor] (Clark 1978: 89)

Now, it cannot be denied that, by all means, possession and location are conceptually connected, proven by their often identical formal encoding in languages. Nevertheless, Lyons’ and Clark’s reductionist claim that possession can be reduced to abstract location has received several critical remarks (inter alia, Payne 2009, Tham 2009, Stassen 2009):

I do not dismiss the clear linguistic evidence that human beings can and even often do see conceptual connections between predicating location of an object, possession of an object and existence of an object […]. I do, however, believe it is too reductionist to say that they are simply the same. (Payne 2009: 116)

Actually, neither Lyons (1968, 1977) nor Clark (1978) have ever claimed that the two notions are conceptually identical. Rather, they say, that possession is represented in language as a form of abstract and animate location (Lyons 1977: 722). However, even from the point of view of the linguistic encoding, the hypothesis that possession is (only) animate location cannot be completely accepted either. It is demonstrated that possessive constructions can also be derived from comitative, agentive and topical constructions, and not only from locative ones (see Heine 1997a and Stassen 2009 on this point).³ Moreover, as Tham (2009) points out, even in the languages where possessive and locative constructions formally coincide, not all animate locations are interpreted as possessors by the speakers:

even in languages where PSRs [possessors] are encoded by a locative case and the PSR [possessor] interpretation is the only one possible for an animate-denoting nominal marked by this case, true animate locations are always available for expressing such spatial relations as BEHIND, BESIDE etc. (Tham 2009: 12)

It follows that a possessor must be, conceptually, ‘something more’ than simple animate (or human) location: otherwise, logically, any human location could be interpreted as a possessor. Besides, it is also possible (at least in some languages) that a locative construction, grammaticalized into a possessive one, still retains its original spatial meaning: that is, it may be associated with a human location, without thereby acquiring a possessive meaning. This is exactly the case in Russian: the expression u menja mašina [lit. ‘at me (is) car’] means ‘I have a car’, but, with a different word order, mašina u menja [lit. ‘car (is) at me’], has a locative meaning ‘the car is at my place (in my garage)’. The adessive construction u ‘at’ + GEN has been grammaticalized in Russian into a possessive construction, but it can still express location. If human location were a sufficient criterion to determine a possessive interpretation, such cases would not be permissible, as they would involve immense ambiguity.

Seliverstova (2004 [1975, 1990]) presents a different interpretation of the locationist approach. She tackles the question of the interdependence of location and possession in semantic terms, proposing a metaphorical interpretation of it. She defines the semantic content of possessive relations in terms of localization of the possessee in the possessor’s existence, where the term ‘existence’ is understood as the set of all the entities with which a human being can be related: his/her material possessions, his/her moral and physical characteristics, his/her actions, his/her social relations, and so forth (Seliverstova 2004 [1975]: 142–143). The localization process of the possessee in the possessor’s existence is defined as the possessor’s ‘spread’ (rasprostranenie) over the possessee. This ‘spread’ may be realized in three ways:

a) X spreads its “force field” over Y, that is, Y finds itself under X’s control (physical, juridical, moral);

b) X is spread over Y physically or functionally, that is, Y is a part of X or a part of X’s existence (vital activity, functioning);

c) Y brings in itself an element of the possessor (it has a property, which represents a relationship to the possessor- his friend, his enemy) (Seliverstova 2004 [1990]: 578–579; my translation; italics by the author)

According to Seliverstova, thus, ‘X has Y’ can be understood either as ‘Y is under X’s physical or legal control (Y is in X’s hands; X owns Y)’, or as ‘Y is a part of X’s body’, or, finally, as ‘Y is socially (or biologically) related to X (Y is X’s brother, friend, neighbor)’. In the case of Y being under X’s physical control, X and Y are also physically located close to each other. In all other cases, the locational element must be understood as metaphorical. Possessors therefore are understood as locations only insofar as they may be metaphorically represented as the place where the possessee is found.

Langacker proposes a similar conception of possession (1991, 2000, 2002, 2009 and elsewhere), although in cognitive terms. He defines possessive expressions as belonging to the class of the so-called reference-point relationships. These are relations, where one of the two terms is chosen to be the reference point from whose perspective the situation is considered. The ability to establish reference points is a basic human cognitive capacity that Langacker defines as follows:

[the] capacity for invoking one conceived entity as a reference point in order to establish mental contact with another, i.e. to mentally access one conceived entity through another. The entity accessed in this way is called the target in the reference point relationship. The set of entities accessible through a given reference point (the set of potential targets) are collectively referred to as its dominion. (Langacker 2009: 46)

In the case of possessive relations, the reference point is the possessor, the target is the possessee and the dominion is identified with the possessor’s ‘experience’, a concept that can be roughly identified with what Seliverstova calls ‘existence’. Possession is therefore seen as the operation of localizing an entity in a dominion, which is neither a...

Table of contents

• Studia Typologica
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgments
• Table of Contents
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I: Possession: an introduction
• Part II: Belarusian and Lithuanian in context
• Part III: Encoding predicative possession in Belarusian and Lithuanian
• Sources
• References
• Appendix
• Index of Authors
• Index of Languages
• Index of Subjects