Hermann Paul's 'Principles of Language History' Revisited

Translations and Reflections

Peter Auer, Robert W. Murray, Peter Auer, Robert W. Murray

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9783110384734
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Languages & Linguistics
• Subtopic: Linguistics
• Index: Languages & Linguistics

Hermann Paul's Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte served as the most important codification and development of Neogrammarian thought for more than four decades. Four well-known linguists have translated specially selected chapters of the Prinzipien into English and provide their reflections on Hermann Paul's contribution on a range of topics.

Part 1: Translations

Introduction (§§?1–10)

(Translated by Peter Auer)

§1. Like every product of human culture, language is an object of historical analysis. But like any branch of historical science, language history must be accompanied by a science that deals with the general conditions of language as it develops historically, i. e. a science that investigates the nature and operation of the factors that are constantly present in all change. We are lacking a generally valid and suitable name for this science – what is generally understood under “philosophy of language” is something different. In addition, there is another reason why this expression is better avoided: in our unphilosophically inclined era this term has suggestions of metaphysical speculation, which we need not be concerned with in historical language research. The truth is that what we are aiming at is no more and no less philosophy than, for example, physics or physiology are. Above all, one should not oppose this general part of linguistics with historical linguistics by calling the latter empirical. One is just as empirical as the other.

Only rarely is knowledge of a single experimental science sufficient for an understanding of the historical development of an object. Rather, it is part of the very nature of all historical movement (particularly in the case of a branch of human culture), that very different forces are simultaneously at work in constant interaction; the scientific fields concerned with exploring these forces are also very different. It is therefore only natural that a general science of this type, which is the counterpart of every historical science, cannot be a closed entity as in the so-called exact natural sciences, or in mathematics or psychology. Rather, it is a conglomeration of various pure nomological sciences, or, as a rule, of parts of these sciences. One may question whether such an assemblage, which will always seem somewhat haphazard, should be called a science. But whatever one may think of this, the fact remains that historical investigation requires a unified involvement with such disparate elements [from different nomological sciences] as a necessary aid – if not as independent research, at least by acquiring a knowledge of the results gained by others. However, it would be wrong to think that the simple combination of pieces of different sciences would already result in the type of science that we envisage here. Rather, work remains with which these nomological sciences that are used in an ancillary way are not concerned. These compare individual events without regard to their temporal relationship simply to discover their similarities and differences, and thereby find what remains the same in the fact of ever-changing exteriors. The idea of development is completely alien to the nomological sciences, indeed, it seems to be irreconcilable with their principles. Therefore, they stand in stark contrast to the historical sciences. In order to bridge this divide we need an approach that is worthier of the name “philosophy of history” than that which the term normally denotes. But here again, we prefer to avoid the term philosophy and use instead the term science of principles. For this science, the following difficult problem is central: given constant forces and conditions, how is a historical development possible, a process in which the simplest and most primitive structures develop into the most complex ones? As I have already alluded to above, the method of such a science of principles also differs from the nomological sciences in another sense. While these sciences always aim at isolating the operation of the individual forces in the general commotion in order to discover their pure nature and build up a system by combining what is similar, the historical science of principles has to focus specifically on the intertwining of the singular forces. It has to investigate how the most diverse forces can lead to a common outcome through constant interaction, whereas the nomological sciences ignore the relationships among the forces as much as possible. Of course we need to have a clear grasp of the individual forces and the nature of their operation in order to understand their complex intertwining. Isolation must precede synthesis. For as long as unsolved complications remain, a scientific analysis of the matter cannot be attained. It is therefore clear that while a science of principles as we envisage it rests on the experimental, nomological sciences (among which I count psychology), it also involves significantly more, which gives us the right to claim its independent status among the other sciences.

This large science is subdivided into as many branches as there are branches of history, where history is understood here in its widest sense and not restricted to the development of humankind. We can start from the assumption that there are certain general foundations that form the necessary basis of any kind of historical development. But it is even more certain that an object’s particular nature must condition its development in a special way. When we endeavour to state the principles of any one particular historical discipline, we have to take into account the other, especially the most closely related, branches of the historical sciences, in order to grasp and not lose sight of the most important general considerations. At the same time, however, we have to avoid becoming lost in mere generalities, which we then fail to adapt to our special case. We also have to avoid transferring the results of a different field in a metaphorical way, thereby obscuring the real conditions we want to uncover.

It is only by founding such a science of principles that the specific historical discipline assumes its true value. Only in this way does it rise above the stringing together of seemingly coincidental data and – in regard to the universal meaning of its results – approaches the nomological sciences, which always tend to deny historical research an equal standing. On the one hand, the science of principles is thus the ultimate goal towards which all efforts of the specific historical disciplines are directed. On the other hand, the science of principles is the indispensable guide of the historical disciplines, without which they could not take a single step beyond simple givens, which are, after all, always fragmentary and wrapped up in complications that must first be untangled. Elucidating the conditions of historical emergence, in combination with general logic, provides the foundation of the methodology that must be followed in the ascertainment of every single fact.

§2. Matters of principle have certainly not been investigated in all areas of historical research with the same seriousness and thoroughness. This investigation has been carried out much more for the historical branches of the natural sciences than for cultural history. One of the reasons for this is that in cultural history we encounter much greater difficulties. Cultural history usually has to deal with much more complicated factors. Their entanglement needs to be resolved before an exact knowledge of the causal relations is possible. In addition, its most important basis, experimental psychology, is still a young science which needs to be gradually connected to historical research. Furthermore, the greater difficulties in the field of cultural history have been matched by a lesser – or at least less palpable – need to deal with matters of principle. For the history of humankind, contemporary witness reports about the facts, even if they were perhaps only handed down in multiply indirect ways, have always been considered the true sources. Only secondarily have the products of human culture – which have more or less preserved their given shape – been taken into consideration.

In fact, we speak of historical and pre-historical times, where the division is based on the beginnings of historical records. For the later period, the picture of a historical development is thus already given, even though it may be distorted; it is easy to understand that scientists might think that a critical cleaning up of this picture is enough. All speculation beyond this point is deliberately rejected. But things are completely different in the case of the pre-historical period of human culture, and even more so for the development of organic and inorganic nature, which dates back to infinitely more remote times. Here there is hardly the slightest historical description available. Apart from the very few observations of former times that have been handed down, all attempts at a historical understanding are built solely on inferences. And no results will ever be reached without addressing the matters of principle and determining the general conditions of historical emergence. These matters have thus always stood at the centre of research, and it is around them that academic battles have always been fought. At the moment it is in the field of organic nature where this battle is being most vigorously fought, and we must acknowledge that the most fruitful ide...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Content
• Peter Auer and Robert W. Murray: Introduction
• Original Table of Contents: Principles of Language History (Paul 1920: ix–xiv)
• Part 1: Translations
• Part 2: Reflections
• Appendix: A Note on Strong’s (1891) Translation
• Index