Ethical Education in Plutarch

Moralising Agents and Contexts

Sophia Xenophontos

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9783110383317
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Greek Ancient History
• Index: History

In addition to being the author of the Parallel Lives of noble Greeks and Romans, Plutarch of Chaeronea (AD c.46-c.120) is widely known for his rich ethical theory, which has ensured him a reputation as one of the most profound moralists in antiquity and beyond. Previous studies have considered Plutarch's moralism in the light of specific works or group of works, so that an exploration of his overall concept of ethical education remains a desideratum.

Bringing together a wide range of texts from both the Parallel Lives and the Moralia, this study puts the moralising agents that Plutarch considers important for ethical development at the heart of its interpretation. These agents operate in different educational settings, and perform distinct moralising roles, dictated by the special features of the type of moral education they are expected to enact. Ethical education in Plutarch becomes a distinctive manifestation of paideia vis-à-vis the intellectual trends of the Imperial period, especially in contexts of cultural identity and power. By reappraising Plutarch's ethical authority and the significance of his didactic spirit, this book will appeal not only to scholars and students of Plutarch, but to anyone interested in the history of moral education and the development of Greek ethics.

Chapter 1Character change and character development in Plutarch: the significance of education in a range of settings

1.1Plutarch and his theory of nature vs nurture

Some eight centuries after Plutarch’s day, in a cultural environment that had developed a vested interest in the Greek literature of antiquity, a fascinating work was produced; it was the Bibliotheca (also known as Myriobiblos), the first-ever collection of book reviews compiled by the then Patriarch of Constantinople Photius (ca. 810 –after 893). This huge repository of literary knowledge is still a precious resource, not least for the many references it contains to books that have since been lost. Among his 279 entries, Photius included several of Plutarch’s mainstream works such as On tranquillity of mind and Political precepts, but he also added a less familiar treatise entitled On natural endowment and hard work (Περί τε φύσεως καὶ πόνων, Bibliotheca 161, 104a Henry) now lost.22 This treatise is an exception in Photius’ list of Plutarch’s works in that – appended to the title – is a short synopsis of its content, which reads as follows:

On natural endowment and hard work: How many men have often by hard work corrected an inadequate natural endowment (πολλοὶ πολλάκις πόνῳ τὴν φύσιν οὐκ εὖ φερομένην ὤρθωσαν), while others have spoiled a good one by neglect (ἕτεροι δὲ καλῶς ἔχουσαν ἐξ ἀμελείας διέφθειραν); also how some men have in their youth given everyone the impression of being slow and unintelligent (ἔνιοι ἐν μὲν νέοις βραδεῖς ἐνωρῶντο πᾶσι καὶ ἀσύνετοι), but when they reached their prime, a sudden change of character made them quick and intelligent (ἀκμασάντων δὲ εἰς τὸ ταχὺ καὶ συνετὸν αὐτοῖς ἡ φύσις ἐξέλαμψε).

(fr. 172 Sandbach)

Although the above citation is perhaps less of an extract from the original and more of a summary, written by Photius after reading the essay itself, this passage, so concise and to the point, raises a number of issues that are central to Plutarch’s theory of moral education as discussed in this book. First of all, it conveys the traditional opposition in ancient philosophical thought between nature and nurture, juxtaposing innate moral traits and those painstaking – at times tormenting – efforts at their enhancement by means of arduous and sustained training.23 Pertaining to Plutarch’s ethical ideology as articulated in his surviving works (e. g. Dem. 1.3),24 the passage also attests two competing responses to physis, which interestingly both implicate the role of human agents in their own moral makeup: less well endowed people are equipped with a determination to change, and aim to reform. This is backed up in the text with the appropriate register: ὤρθωσαν (corrected) is a cognate of ἐπανόρθωσις (moral correction/development), a standard term in Plutarch’s moral discourse, as will be seen below. The other group of people differ in that their negligence and passivity render them victims to a life of immorality, despite their excellent nature. Both attitudes imply the importance of the formation and management of character by means of proper instruction, encapsulating at the same time the long-term need for moral practice throughout life, and not just in the early stages of education.

Indeed this is the main thrust of the second half of the passage. Even in someone having the appearance of an idle character in youth, a more vigorous character can emerge in adulthood, raising the possibility of a character change. The passage specifically says that this is a ‘sudden shining forth of their nature’, which in turn affords further interpretations of what is truly stated here. The translation itself insinuates that physis in Plutarch is more complex than might initially be assumed, since, apart from innate natural inclinations, it could, under certain conditions, also denote acquired psychic (i.e. spiritual) characteristics no longer subject to the process of shaping. These are generally adult (rather than childhood or adolescent) traits (hence the participle ἀκμασάντων in the passage), a subject on which I will have more to say later in this Chapter. One of the main arguments addressed in this book is whether we can observe in Plutarch’s work a kind of continuity between early and adult moral education and, if so, whether this follows a rigid pattern or if Plutarch accommodates childhood or adolescent traits to adult behaviour in a more flexible yet consistent way. By extension then, the above quoted passage leads us to reflect on whether this ‘shining forth’ of one’s physis constitutes a true change in an inherited nature or a full revelation of traits developed over a long period. What we decide about this issue will affect our view of Plutarch’s philosophical affiliations too, so that, for instance, if he were shown to be accepting a sudden conversion, a central tenet of Stoicism, he might be deemed to embrace (at least some) Stoic views, whereas he generally rejects their philosophy. Finally, even in the version in Photius’ catalogue, the passage evokes the moralising tone pervading Plutarch’s diverse works, which consolidates his ethical discussions relating to a range of institutional settings, treated in a series of separate Chapters of this book.

Before turning to a detailed analysis of the practical application of Plutarch’s individual and communal ethics, it is necessary to discuss the theoretical underpinnings of his ethical system, in order to gain an understanding of his conceptualisation of the function of education. To begin with, by education Plutarch mostly means ethical and not strictly cognitive training. As its name suggests, ethical education aims at the formation of the human character, what Plutarch calls ἦθος, and the attainment of ethical excellence (ἠθικὴ ἀρετή), which enables people to live a good and happy life (εὖ ζῆν). Despite Plutarch’s acknowledged position among the Middle Platonists, his theories on character formation are of Aristotelian provenance,25 though they may, at least in part, be shaped by the diffusion of post-Aristotelian attitudes rather than (or as well as) from a direct association with previous Peripatetic philosophers.26 In any event, as regards terminology his ‘functional Aristotelianism’27 pervades Plutarch’s technical essay called On moral virtue (Περὶ ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς). Here the author begins his argument by contradicting by way of polemic the opinions of the Eleatic and Stoic schools of thought regarding the nature of aretē. He rejects their monistic stance, which holds that virtue is a single entity (μιᾶς οὔσης, De virt. mor. 440E–441C) and that passion (πάθος) is a perverted form of reason (λόγος) (De virt. mor. 441C–D, 446F–447A).28 By contrast, following Plato’s psychological model, Plutarch believes that the human soul (ψυχή) is subdivided into two parts or faculties (De virt. mor. 441F); it contains a rational part (νοερὸν καὶ λογιστικόν, De virt. mor. 442A–C) that manages thoughts, calculations, and mental judgments, and an irrational part (παθητικὸν καὶ ἄλογον, De virt. mor. 442A–C) dealing with passions, primitive needs, and desires (De virt. mor. 442A–C).29 Whereas the rational part is firm and stable, the irrational part is changeable; so the former needs to prevail over the latter and regulate passions (De virt. mor. 442A) in a balanced state between excess and deficiency (De virt. mor. 442A, 444B–445B).30 Related to this is Plutarch’s approval of Pythagoras’ approach in employing music as a means to subjugate the bewildering passions of the soul (De virt. mor. 441E–F),31 which is once again, of course, a Platonic position.32 The rational logos should therefore govern emotions without extinguishing them,33 for the complete elimination of passions (itself reminiscent of the Stoic apatheia to which Plutarch was opposed) would have lead to undermining the effectiveness of reason (De virt. mor. 452B–C). That is why Plutarch also speaks of the strengthening of virtues by means of the passions in another instance (De virt. mor. 451E). For one thing, intense emotions often stimulate our author to compose whole treatises that are far frommerely psychotherapeutic, focusing as they do on major beneficial passions as well: erōs becomes for Plutarch the basis for his approach in the Dialogue on love, and a qualification for the development of virtue between married couples.34

Influenced by other Aristotelian doctrines, Plutarch then describes how the irrational part of the soul is subjected to the rational (De virt. mor. 442C–443C),35 defining what ἦθος is: i.e. the quality that the irrational part of the soul takes from the rational, not suddenly but through long‐term habituation (ἔθος),36 thus creating habits (ἕξεις). This standpoint relates to the further tripartite division of the soul into δύναμις (capacity), πάθος (passion), and ἕξις (acquired state) (De virt. mor. 443D), which is equally crucial for the understanding of Plutarch’s moral theory. Capacity is the starting-point, the raw material of passion, e. g. irascibility, temerity. A passion is a kind of stirring or movement of the capacity, e. g. anger, boldness. Finally, the acquired state is a settled force and condition of the capacity of the irrational, being nourished by habit and becoming vice (κακία), if the passion has been poorly educated, but virtue (ἀρετή), if it has been well educated by reason (De virt. mor. 443D). This means in practice two related things: first, that any given person is capable of both great good and great evil depending on the nurture s/he receives (expressed as ἄσκησις, διδασκαλία or παιδαγωγία); and second, that a good nature alone, if not accompanied by equally good nurture, does not guarantee a good character. Plutarch advances this idea elsewhere, for instance, in Demetrius 1.7, where he admits that heroic natures exhibit great virtues as well as great vices, a notion expressed also in On moral virtue 450D–E.37 On god’s slowness to punish 552C–D offers a similar insight, i.e. that great natures may also develop trivial features depending on the training they get. These passages recall and bring into play Plato’s theory of ‘great natures’ (expanded upon especially in the Republic 491e–492a and Gorgias 525e–526b),38 which assumes that naturally well attuned men can turn to the bad if they do not get the proper kind of education that will rectify their flawed passions.39

Having assimilated the convictions of his predecessors, Plutarch consistently ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Editions, abbreviations, and other conventions
• Symbols, orthography, and transliteration of Greek terms
• Introduction
• Chapter 1 Character change and character development in Plutarch: the significance of education in a range of settings
• Chapter 2 Moral education between parents and children
• Chapter 3 Moral training in the classroom
• Chapter 4 The marital chamber as a school for well-ordered comportment: women’s education
• Chapter 5 Politics as a site of moral education
• Chapter 6 Moralising in the military field: Plutarch and the ethics of generalship
• Chapter 7 Educating over wine: moral pedagogy in Plutarch’s Table Talk
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index of names and topics
• Index of Plutarchan passages
• Index of passages in other authors
• Footnotes