Convincing Rebel Fighters to Disarm

UN Information Operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob

• Publisher: De Gruyter Oldenbourg
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9783110612592
• eBook ISBN: 9783110469776
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

One of the key mission objectives of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) was to disarm and repatriate foreign combatants in the eastern region of the country. To achieve this, MONUC adopted a "push and pull" strategy.

This involved applying military pressure while at the same time offering opportunities for voluntary disarmament and repatriation for armed combatants of the elusive but deadly Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) – a predominantly Rwandan Hutu armed group in eastern DRC. As part of its "pull" strategy, MONUC embarked on one of the most sophisticated Information Operations (IO) campaigns in UN history with the core objective of convincing thousands of individual combatants and commanders of the FDLR to voluntarily disarm and join the UN's Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration programme (DDRRR).

This book is derived from studies of the narratives, coordination and effectiveness of the UN's IO in support of DDRRR and how the UN has integrated IO as part of its Mission peace support operations.

This book advances contemporary understanding of the relative importance of communication models and their interactions within conflict settings. It provides instruments with which conflict and communication analysts can compare predictions and rationalize Information impacts for future conflicts.

About the author

Dr. Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob teaches Communications & Media Studies at the American University of Nigeria. He earned his PhD in Communication Studies from the University of Leeds, United Kingdom

1From Peace Propaganda to Information Intervention

The atrocities of the 1990s in the Balkans and Rwanda generated a consensus among a section of communication and conflict scholars that preventing genocide which can result from hate speech, ethno-nationalist propaganda and information deprivation in conflict areas are justifications for “information intervention”. Metzl (1997a) has argued for an information intervention mechanism within a UN rapid deployment force to counter “situations where media activities incite mass violence”. Price and Thompson (2002) have significantly built on Metzl’s work on Information Intervention. They define information intervention as “the extensive external management, manipulation or seizure of information space in conflict zones” (2002, 8). In their introduction to Forging Peace: Intervention, Human Rights and the Management of Media Space, Monroe Price and Mark Thompson (2002) write eloquently on the rationale for a form of humanitarian intervention that involves the use of information. They see information intervention, not necessarily as a quick-fix media intervention programme but as an intervention architecture that involves several mechanisms and actors – undertaken by states or IGOs in response to misuse of mass communication especially when there is potential for mass violation of human rights. Strategies can range from providing counter information that opposes harmful incitement to proscribing or suppressing the medium of harmful incitement itself. The legal framework surrounding information intervention with coercive powers such as jamming without the consent of the home state remains debated (Price and Thompson 2002).

Information Intervention has not featured prominently on any specific UN mandate or recommendations of any high-level panel of the UN. Although The Responsibility to Protect document of the ICISS notes the role of information in conflicts, it does not see information intervention as a stand-alone intervention mechanism but as an arm of a comprehensive or multidimensional humanitarian intervention. Section 7.37 of the document states that “operational planning for an operation to protect should contain a fairly sub-concept for public information”. The document adds that the proper conduct of an appropriate information campaign is not only critical to maintaining public support for an intervention but also to maintaining the cohesion of the coalition. The document, subtly supporting any kind of necessary media intervention, stresses that “appropriate information campaign” must aim to erode to all extents possible “the support the opposing leader may enjoy with his or her own people or with allies”. Achieving this would involve perception management activities aimed at affecting or manipulating the psychological disposition of specific audiences using the tools of psychological operations or psyops. The question of whether the UN should use the tools of psyops in its peace operations has occupied the attention of several blue ribbon and high-level review panels of the United Nations ever since its creation. The August 2000 (Brahimi) report on UN Peacekeeping Operations, for instance, has made interesting recommendations for the involvement of the media in peace operations. The document emphasized the imperatives of designing a public information campaign strategy particularly for key aspects of a mission’s mandate as part of the first elements of deployment in a new peace support mission. However, the major failing of the report in terms of public information is that it did not provide a clear framework for mission public information operations. Moreover, it failed to include media restructuring as an element of post-conflict peace-building. Also its recommendations were mostly structural or administrative, and not doctrinal. But the document did criticize the DPI’s Peace and Security Section as having “little capacity to create doctrine, strategy or standard operating procedures for public information functions in the field other than on a sporadic and ad hoc basis” (United Nations 2000, par. 235). This seems to be a major problem with the UN doctrines – absence of a clear framework. For instance, UN doctrine on Information Operations recommends the use of the most appropriate media of reaching specific target audience in a conflict area, but it also fails to provide a clear framework for operationalization. Spotting this gap, Peter Krug and Monroe Price in Price and Thompson (2002) recommend a pre-packed toolkit or “module” with a self-contained set of formal rules and procedures for conflict zones (p. 148). They have suggested a module for peacekeeping-related information intervention that comprises a self-contained set of mechanisms. While accepting the need to have a universal set of agreed objectives for information intervention, it is important to be wary of self-contained information intervention modules that import a set of standards and measurements of practice. An effective information intervention plan needs to be “home-grown” and participatory. It may be necessary to involve local communities and local journalists in the identification and design of communication strategies and indicators for assessing outcomes. A successful use of this strategy may involve the use of participatory field-based visualization techniques, interviews and focus groups to generate information for the design of communication strategies, and media messages. A lot more will be discussed on this later in the book.

1.1Information Intervention in History

Information Intervention is not new. It can be traced back to the Entnazifizierung processes of the Allied Occupational Forces after WWII. According to Thompson and Price (2002), the de-Nazification programmes of the Allied Occupational Forces remain the prototype of post-conflict information management. It involved “wholesale attempts to empty the information space of its previous political content and recast its relationship to executive government” (Thompson and Price 2002, 4). Different approaches were adopted by the four occupying powers (the US, Britain, Soviet Union and France) in their zones of control. The American zone provided a classic example of the application of Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and disciplinarity in information intervention processes. The US Army and the Office of Military Government US (OMGUS) exercised a complex and firm control over the information space to prevent any form of Nazi propaganda and pursued a “collective guilt” and “collective responsibility” campaign agreed upon by the Allied powers. Between 1945 and 1949, the Americans effectively shaped the content of information in their zone (Goldstein 2008; Ziemke 1990).

In the American zone, the Information Control Division headed by General Robert McClure eased the information campaign programme into three functional phases. The first phase involved a total blanking of the Nazi Information space. To this end, German newspapers, radio stations, theatres, moving picture houses and concert halls were shut down. The intention was to restrict the information space and ensure a total control thereof. Information for Germans was completely controlled, and it all came from Die Mitteilung, Radio Luxemburg and other US Army newspapers. After a total blackout of Nazi information, the second phase of the intervention involved a psychological reconditioning of Germans to “maintain and deepen the mood of passive acquiescence (to the occupation), to encourage food production; and to arouse a sense of collective responsibility for Germany’s crimes” (Ziemke 1990, 368). The third phase involved selecting and licensing “disciplined” German editors and journalists to operate newspapers. Goldstein (2008) writes that by mid-1946 press licences had been given to 73 Germans drawn from fairly heterogeneous ideological leanings, including 29 Social Democrats, 17 Christian Democrats and 5 Communists. There was a pre-publication censorship until August 1946 when it was switched to post-publication censorship. After 1946, with the start of the cold war, both the US and the Soviets started using the German publications in their zones to attack the other’s policies and spread propaganda (Goldstein 2008). In March 1946, OMGUS took over the editorial of Neue Zeitung, the major newspaper in its area of control, to counteract Soviet propaganda.

1.2Metzl’s Concept of Information Intervention: Clearing Conceptual Landscapes

Metzl first used the term Information Intervention in 1997. Since then, the term has attracted interests from Communications scholars interested in media interventions in crises societies. In an interview with Mark Thompson in October 2000 contained in Price and Thompson (2002), Metzl describes information intervention as “a soft form of humanitarian intervention” (p. 41) involving the use of information in an aggressive manner when it is justified on strong human rights grounds. The core of Metzl’s thinking on information intervention is the role information plays in situations of conflict where “humanitarian intervention” might be necessary. He argues that all the major humanitarian crises and human rights conflicts over the past century began with a propaganda phase involving a control of the means of mass communication by extremists and using them as an instrument of incitement against other groups. A major case in point is Rwanda where Hutu extremists used RTLM to organize the extermination of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. He believes that if information intervention had been applied in Rwanda, genocide could possibly have been avoided (Metzl 1997). As a counter strategy information intervention seeks to

address those patterns of misuse of mass communications, and asks how we can use a more aggressive form of information related action, first to provide counter-information that opposes harmful incitement and second to proscribe or suppress the latter in extreme circumstances. (Metzl interview in Thompson 2002, 42)

Beyond these two functional scopes of information intervention which I will describe as Reactionary Information Intervention, Metzl also talks of a broader use of information by the UN in its peace support operations which he terms “Phase II” – coming after the international community has established itself in a conflict area. Phase II and reactionary information intervention both demand a totally different legal and political framework and will demand different strategies. In both cases however, Metzl argues, the most important and most sustainable objective is to empower voices of moderation and reason within the crises society; where this is unachievable, the next objective of information intervention is to bring in news and information from outside the society to create objectivity. The third objective and likely the most controversial is an aggressive interference with negative media activity in the crises society which may involve jamming of incendiary media broadcasts. But this would always have to be a last resort after pre-agreed thresholds have been crossed. One of his recommendations in this regard is the formal introduction of an information intervention component in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. A Chapter VII mandate implies a tacit acceptance of the need for reactionary information intervention to deal with threats to international peace and security (Blinderman 2002). This would, of course, demand the UN developing an enhanced capacity to monitor provocative propaganda, reporting an occurrence, supporting independent media and engaging in peace broadcast of reliable news in conflict areas even in situations where there are no full-fledged peacekeeping deployments. This, Metzl believes, would place a huge functional demand on the UN in terms of how it addresses pre-conflict propaganda and how it utilizes information tools in peacekeeping and other operations. Of particular interest is his call for a cohesive unit within the UN that brings together best practices, develops guidelines, trains and maintains a database of skills and equipment while serving as a focal point for information intervention activities. This is essential to avoid the problem of interveners having to reconstitute themselves for each conflict and the “ad hoc syndrome” which has been the feature of most UN Public Information activities.

For Metzl, Information Intervention is not sporadic, it should involve careful planning – an understanding of how people in the conflict society obtain their information, the sort of information they trust, how they process it, how they think about their problems and why they think the way they do. Fundamental to Metzl’s doctrine on Information Intervention is an awareness of how people get information because “bombarding a country with radio broadcasts doesn’t achieve anything if people don’t get their information from radio” (Thompson 2002, 44). Moreover, he reasons, people need to feel they are involved in some form of dialogue because people tend to develop their ideas and opinions through dialogue. A dialogue model of Information Intervention according to Metzl enables audiences to form their own opinions based on multiple and reliable information. Metzl does acknowledge that his proposed Dialogue Model is more complicated and difficult to manage than the traditional propaganda methods of leaflet dropping. Essentially, Information Intervention is not merely reactionary or always coercive but a long-term well-planned process of media development in crises states. Metzl’s framework of information intervention involves three goals:

1. Media intervention: a clear explanation of the models used, the resources available and a plan of how interveners and local actors would work together.
2. Establishment of an effective Mouthpiece of the International Community with a transparent structure.
3. A responsible environment where all actors act responsibly “explaining that different models and frameworks have been used successfully elsewhere in the world to develop media responsibility, with a system of sanctions for those who don’t abide by minimum standards” (Ibid, 52).

Doubtless, as a concept, information intervention is not new. As a form of practice, though suffering from a crisis of terminology, information intervention has proliferated. In many parts of the world, particularly in Africa, several NGOs, Church organizations, foreign governments, etc are involved in producing radio programmes and in some cases running radio broadcast stations intended to inform and change the attitude of people in divided societies and in some respects build a culture of peace. Moreover, the concept, according to Price and Thompson, “has not yet congealed to the point where analysts can get to work” (Ibid, 3), and according to Kyrke-Smith (2007) on key issues, the debate is stale and remains unresolved. However, there is yet a clearly defined framework of specific and time-referenced actions as well as a detailed evaluation of a specific information intervention mechanism to understand areas of success and areas of failures for each conflict phase. Price and Thompson have divided information intervention into three temporal phases: pre-conflict, mid-conflict and post-conflict. Approaches they rightly reason, should be defined by the phase of the conflict. But fundamental to their strategy in all phases is counter information and suppression of harmful information where necessary.

1.3Reactionary and Developmental Information Intervention

Based on contemporary works on information intervention so far, two streams of activities have emerged and deserve conceptual distinction:

1. Information intervention activities aimed at enhancing public affairs and media relations (or public diplomacy) that seek to project a certain message at a certain audience either with or without the sovereign’s consent. The intention usually is to influence opinion or action. (Reactionary Information Intervention)
2. Media development activities carried out by foreign state or non-state actors that aim to assist in building a democratic media sphere within a crises state. (Developmental Information Intervention)

The two streams, it must be noted, are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they could be complementary. The danger though is in the application of techniques of military information activities such as Deception Operations in information intervention efforts particularly with the expanding usage of the term “psyops” (Taylor 2002). Taylor has drawn conceptual lines of comparison between techniques of information intervention and techniques of cyber warfare, noting that both approaches emphasize the importance of information to strategy during times of conflict. “Cyberwar and information intervention are, in this sense, related phenomena” (Ibid, 313), when information becomes an element of strategy in a post-conflict situation, and not merely an undifferentiated product of public sphere, it becomes difficult if not hypocritical to apply traditional thinking on free expression and human rights (Ibid). Using examples from NATO information campaigns in Kosovo aimed at transforming ethnic hatred, Taylor argues that “information warfare and techniques used in information warfare are slowly becoming part of the arsenal used during post-conflict information interventions” (Ibid, 317). It is propelled by a new sensitivity to the imperatives of adopting effective communication strategies in supporting mission objectives – ranging from prevention of ethnic clashes to transforming ethnic hatred in divided societies. Somehow the two streams of information intervention seem to have managed to find a confluence, in terms of techniques of implementation. But Taylor warns it is essential to delineate the boundaries however conceptually similar they seem. The broadening definition of psyops has tended to merge its focus with media operations. However, it is essential to differentiate between both doctrines. According to Taylor

It is essential for psyops and Media Operations to be kept as completely separate, albeit co-ordinated, activities; a press conference is not, and never should be, a psychological operation in the strictest sense. (Ibid, 321)

The problem of information intervention particularly when it is supported or mounted by powerful states in the global North, or executed by the military such as the MIST in the UN Mission in Haiti, is that it runs the risk of being perceived as an external propaganda tool meant to serve the interests of its originators. In such circumstances, there is the danger of information interveners wittingly or unwittingly becoming a part of the conflict they seek to transform. Moreover, any corresponding media development effort would be viewed with suspicion with a huge consequence on the credibility of the entire peace operation. To avoid this, Price and Thompson (2002) and Price (2000) argue for the involvement of NGOs in information intervention either as partners or as watchdogs. It is not just about the purveyor of the information intervention programme but the resonance of content across the parties or networks involved in the conflict and how the entire intervention programme is perceived including the development elements by the parties to the conflict. In Rwanda, for instance, it is hard to argue that development information intervention activities by the weak UN Mission would have countered the propaganda messages of RTLM well enough to prevent the genocide. An element of reactionary information intervention involving coercive action such as jamming and/ or using techniques of psyops designed primarily to transform ethnic tensions between Hutus and Tutsis could probably have been more impactful. The major letdown in UN efforts in Rwanda was that its public information attempts were feeble if not completely lacking. Also, some development information activity involving broadcast of reliable information could have saved lives and reduced the humanitarian catastrophe. For instance, during the advancement of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), RTLM had broadcast that the RPF were killing everyone on their way into Kigali and that there was no Hutu left alive in RPF’s areas of control. As a result, huge Hutu populations fled the RPF advance and within two weeks over one million Hutus had fled alongside retreating Rwandan Government Forces into the Democratic Republic of Congo. RTLM’s strategy was to create panic, cause huge p...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• List of Abbreviations
• Preface
• 1 From Peace Propaganda to Information Intervention
• 2 A Foucauldian View of UN Information Intervention
• 3 The Liberal Institutionalist Foundations of Post–Cold War UN Information Operations
• 4 Between Propaganda and UN’s Public Information Operations
• 5 A Brief History of Ethnicity, Conflicts and Crisis of Citizenship in the DRC
• 6 From Authenticity to Governmentality: A Brief History of the Media in the DRC
• 7 Radio Okapi: The Making of a “Congolese Voice”
• 8 Information Operations: Contents and Metrics of Effectiveness
• 9 Local Meanings and Perceptions of UN Information Interventions Programmes
• 10 No Intention to Return to Rwanda
• 11 Impacts of Dialogue Entre Congolais
• 12 “Hutus are the ones that have kept us where we are today”: When Psyops Backfire
• 13 Revisiting Unfinished Debates on Information Intervention
• Appendix 1
• Appendix 2
• Bibliography
• Endnotes