Ethics of Nature

Angelika Krebs

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9783110158304
• eBook ISBN: 9783110802832
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Is nature's value only instrumental value for human beings or does nature also have intrinsic value? Can traditional anthropocentrism be defended or must we move to a new, physiocentric moral position? This study develops a critical taxonomy or "map" of thirteen arguments for the conservation of nature. It defends the moral intrinsic value of sentient animals, but not of nonsentient nature. The arguments are phrased in a simple, plastic, and concise language.

Table of contents

• Guest Foreword by Bernard Williams
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1. Synopsis of Argument
• 2. Why an Ethics of Nature?
• 3. The Philosophical Discipline of the Ethics of Nature
• 4. The Objective of This Study
• Part I.: Basic Concepts
• One: Nature
• 1. A Definition of “Nature” for Environmental Ethics
• 2. Oikos, Cosmos, and the Human Body
• 3. Conservation versus Cultivation of Nature
• Two: Ethics
• 1. The Object of Ethics and the Distinction between Intrinsic and Instrumental Value
• 2. Good Human Life and Right Human Life
• 3. Good Human Life
• 4. The Well-Being and the Agency Aspect of Good Human Life
• 5. The Objection to Paternalism
• 6. Moral Concern and Self-interest
• 7. The Hermeneutics and the Justification of Moral Culture
• Three: Anthropocentrism versus Physiocentrism
• 1. The Boundaries of the Moral Universe - “Extensional Anthropocentrism” versus “Extensional Physiocentrism”
• 2. The Absolute Strategy in the Ethics of Nature - “Epistemic Anthropocentrism” versus “Epistemic Physiocentrism”
• Four: Summary of Part I
• Part II.: Seven Anthropocentric Arguments for the Value of Nature
• One: The Basic Needs Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. General Comments
• 4. Lost Peace with Nature? The Need for Environmental History
• 5. Some Reasons Why the Basic Needs Argument Is Not as Effective as You Might Expect
• 6. Two Versions of the Basic Needs Argument which Incorporate Intrinsic Value Claims for Nature
• Two: The Aisthesis Argument
• 1. Literary Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Aisthesis and Aesthetic Theory
• 4. The Universality of Feeling
• 5. The “Grammar” of Sensation
• 6. Two Objections to the Aisthesis Argument
• Three: The Aesthetic Contemplation Argument
• 1. Literary Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. The Aesthetic Intrinsic Value of Nature
• 4. The Universality of the Aesthetic Contemplation of Nature
• 5. The Irreplaceability of Nature as an Aesthetic Object
• Four: The Natural Design Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Comments
• Five: The Heimat Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Comments
• Six: The Pedagogic Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. General Comments
• 4. The Channelling Aggression Objection
• 5. “Is It Only for Practice that We Should Have Compassion for Animals?” A Caveat
• Seven: The Meaning of Life and the True Joy of Living Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Comments
• Eight: Summary of Part II. and Preliminary Results
• Part III.: A Hermaphroditic Argument for the Value of Nature
• One: The Holistic Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. General Comments
• 4. The Ontological Identity Thesis
• 5. The Harmony of Good Lives Thesis
• 6. The Dependency Thesis
• Two: Summary of Part III
• Part IV.: Five Physiocentric Arguments for the Value of Nature
• One: The Pathocentric Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Practical Consequences: The Case of Animal Experimentation
• 4. The Question of Criteria for the Attribution of Sensations and Feelings
• 5. The No Language, No Interests, No Rights Objection
• 6. The Contractualist Objection
• 7. The Kantian Objection
• 8. The Anti-Egalitarian Objection
• 9. The “First Comes the Food, then Come the Morals” Objection
• 10. The Policing Nature Objection
• Two: The Teleological Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. General Comments
• 4. The Ambiguity of the Concept of “End”
• 5. Nature Follows Functional, Not Practical Ends
• 6. Two Objections to Our Criticism of the Teleological Argument
• Three: The Reverence for Life Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Refutation of the Reverence for Life Argument
• 4. The Moral Justification of the Right to Life
• 5. Animals and Death
• 6. Digression on Human Abortion, Infanticide, and the Moral Right to Life of the Gravely Ill, the Senile, and the Severely Mentally Disabled
• Four: The Following Nature Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. General Comments
• 4. Why We Cannot and, Even if We Could, Should Not Follow Nature
• 5. The Inevitability of Epistemic Moral Anthropocentrism
• 6. The Disanalogy between "Anthropocentrism" and "Sexism"
• 7. The Preservation of Species
• 8. Complexity, Stability, Age
• 9. “Following Nature?”
• Five: The Theological Argument
• 1. Classical Thoughts
• 2. The Argument
• 3. Comments
• Six: Summary of Part IV
• Conclusion
• Works Cited
• About the Author
• Index