Central banks' independence in historical perspective

Fausto Vicarelli, Richard Sylla, Alec Cairncross, Jean Bouvier, Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, Giangiacomo Nardozzi, Gianni Toniolo

• Publisher: De Gruyter
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9783110114409
• eBook ISBN: 9783110856309
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

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Table of contents

• Chapter 1. Central Bank Autonomy: A Historical Perspective
• Chapter 2. The Autonomy of Monetary Authorities: The Case of the U.S. Federal Reserve System
• 1 The Two Banks of the United States, 1791–1836
• 2 The Independent Treasury System, 1840–1914
• 3 The Federal Reserve System, 1914–Present
• 4 The Independence of the Fed
• 4.1 Subservience to the Treasury during World War I
• 4.2 The Great Depression: Failure and Reform
• 4.3 Subservience to the Treasury Again: World War II and After
• 4.4 The Treasury-Fed Accord of 1951
• 4.5 The Controversial 1965 Discount Rate Increase
• 4.6 Partisan Monetary Politics? The 1972 Election
• 4.7 Congressional Oversight, 1975
• 4.8 1979: Changes in Fed Operating Procedures
• 4.9 Pressure from the Supply Side, 1981–1985
• 5 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 3. The Bank of England: Relationships with the Government, the Civil Service, and Parliament
• 1 Historical
• 1.1 The Period before the Nationalisation in 1946
• 1.2 After Nationalisation
• 2 Analytical
• 2.1 The Legal Position and the Working Relationship
• 2.2 The Working Relationship
• 3 Conclusion
• References
• Chapter 4. The Banque de France and the State from 1850 to the Present Day
• 1 The Problems of Being a Historian
• 2 The Manifold and Complex Factors that Determine Relations Between the State and the Banque de France
• 3 New Developments from 1850 to 1936
• 3.1 The Development of State Control in the 19th Century
• 3.2 The Ups and Downs of the Period 1920 to 1936
• 4 Change and Continuity from 1936 to the 1980s
• 4.1 1936–1944
• 4.2 1945–1986
• References
• Chapter 5. Relations between Monetary Authorities and Governmental Institutions: The Case of Germany from the 19th Century to the Present
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Historical Evolution
• 2.1 From the Foundation of the Reich to the First World War
• 2.2 From the Beginning of the First World War to the End of Germany’s Great Inflation 1923
• 2.3 From the End of Hyperinflation to the End of the Weimar Republic
• 2.4 The Nazi Period (1933–1945)
• 2.5 From 1945 to the Present
• 3 Conclusion: The Prime Motives for the Legal Changes in Relations between Germany’s Central Bank and Government and a Summary of Arguments Pro and Con the Bank’s Autonomy
• References
• Chapter 6. A Central Bank Between the Government and the Credit System: The Bank of Italy after World War II
• Introduction
• 1 Credit Legislation and the Bank of Italy
• 2 The Bank of Italy’s Structural Superversion and the Evolution of the Financial System
• 2.1 Alternative Views on the Financial Structure
• 2.2 The Development of the Structure of the Credit System under Menichella
• 2.3 The Rationale of the Bank of Italy’s Choices with Regard to the Structure of the Credit System in the Period 1948–59
• 2.4 The Early Sixties and the Start of Carli’s Governorship
• 2.5 Carli and the Structure of the Financial System
• 2.6 The Structure of the Financial System and the Relationship with the Government
• 2.7 Monetary Versus “Real” Policy Making
• 2.8 The Change in Strategy During the Seventies
• 3 The Major Monetary Policy Choices
• 3.1 Monetary Policy Between 1947 and 1960
• 3.2 From 1964 to 1973
• 3.3 From 1973 to the Present
• 4 From (Italian) History to (General) Theory
• References
• About the Authors