1. SUÁREZ CRITICAL OF THE CONCEPTION OF METAPHYSICS AS AN ONTOLOGY
In past works of mine, I have argued that Francisco Suárez cannot be considered the father, nor yet a supporter, of a conception of metaphysics as ontology. On the contrary, he firmly opposed such a possibility, disputing Benet Perera’s position (even if he — as it was to be expected — never mentioned the latter explicitly) on the nature of the first philosophy.
My thesis rests on four reasons, corresponding to four constituents of Suárez’s doctrine. First of all, according to our author, being taken as the object of metaphysics does not include all the rationes that are inferior to the ratio of being, but only some of them.
[…] haec scientia non considerat omnes proprias rationes seu quidditates entium in particulari, seu ut talia sunt, sed solum eas quae sub propria ejus abstractione continentur, vel quatenus sunt cum illa necessario conjunctae.
[…] pertinere ad hanc scientiam tractare in particulari de omnibus entibus seu rationibus entium, quae non nisi in rebus immaterialibus inveniri possunt, ut est communis ratio substantiae immaterialis, ratio primae seu increatae substantiae, et spiritus etiam creati, et omnium specierum, seu intelligentiarum quae sub ipso continentur.
In particular, the object of metaphysics includes the rationes relating to spiritual substances and the rationes relating to material substances in a nonsymmetrical way. Metaphysics deals with all that one can know about spiritual substances (and, according to Suárez, one can know more about them than the mere fact that they are ens, unum and aliquid); by contrast, it does not deal with all that one can know about material substances.
[…] substantiam immaterialem per se et directe considerat, omnia in universum tractando, quae de illa cognosci possunt; substantiam autem materialem non ita contemplatur, sed solum quatenus necesse est ad distinguendam illam a substantia immateriali, et ad cognoscendum de illa omnia metaphysica praedicata, quae illi ut materialis est, conveniunt, ut, verbi gratia, esse compositam ex actu et potentia, et modum hujus compositionis, et quod est quoddam ens per se unum, et similia.
Beside this (and even before this) one should notice that, according to the Spanish Jesuit, being, taken as the object of metaphysics, includes more than transcendental rationes. As Suárez writes, metaphysics also deals with substance, accident, created or uncreated being, finite or infinite substance, absolute or relative accident, quality, action, operation or dependence, cause, each type of cause, and with the causes of the whole universe. Actually, according to Suárez, about all these rationes metaphysics discovers more than the attribution to them of transcendental rationes: it seizes them in their own nature.
The third reason proving that Suárez’s conception of metaphysics and the conception of metaphysics as an ontology are poles apart is the following: according to Suárez, the ratio of being on which the ratio of being qua being is founded presupposes the existence of spiritual beings. Consequently, in Suárez’s view, the ratio of real being — at least insofar as it forms the foundation of the ratio of being qua being — is not the result of a mere generalization performed by the mind.
In posteriori autem loco [Aristotelis] conditionalis illa (Si non esset alia substantia superior praeter materiales, naturalis philosophia esset prima, neque esset alia scientia necessaria ) verissima est, non quia substantia immaterialis sit adaequatum obiectum primae philosophiae, sed quia hac substantia ablata, auferretur tam proprium quam adaequatum obiectum primae philosophiae, quia non solum auferretur immaterialis substantia, sed etiam omnes rationes entis vel substantiae communes rebus immaterialibus et materialibus, et data illa hypotesi, sicut nulla essent entia immaterialia, ita nullae etiam essent rationes entium abstrahentes a materia secundum esse, et ideo non esset necessaria alia scientia distincta [a naturali philosophia].
[…] nihil […] aliud est abstrahere a materia secundum esse, quam quod possit in rerum natura vere ac realiter existere absque materia; hoc autem verum est non tantum de substantia immateriali ut sic, sed etiam de quacumque ratione superiori, quae cum sufficienter existere possit in substantia ipsa immateriali, constat posse etiam in rebus existere sine materia.
[…] in eo casu [i.e.: Si non esset alia substantia superior praeter materiales] non fore necessariam scientiam metaphysicae specialem, et a naturali philosophiam distinctam. Ratio est, quia tunc philosophia ageret de omni substantia […] ad eamdem philosophiam spectaret omnium praedicamentorum divisio et consideratio […] omnium essentiarum, omniumque causarum realium consideratio […] eadem ageret de praedicatis communibus substantiae, et accidentibus, nec propter illa sola oporteret specialem scientiam constituere, quia non abstraherent a materia sensibili, et conceptus entis non esset alius a conceptu entis materialis.
Thus Suárez coherently states that metaphysics shows that its subject/object occurs (and this thesis is the last of the four constituents at issue of his doctrine).
[…] hanc scientiam in hoc superare reliquas, quod ipsa non solum supponit suum obiectum esse, sed etiam, si necesse sit, illud esse ostendit, propriis principiis utens, per se loquendo; nam per accidens interdum utitur alienis et extraneis propter excellentiam sui objecti, et defectum nostri intellectus, qui non potest illud perfecte attingere, ut in se est, sed ex inferioribus rebus. Cum autem dicitur scientiam supponere suum obiectum esse, intelligitur per se loquendo, ut notavit Cajetanus, prima parte, q. 2, art. 3; per accidens vero non inconvenit scientiam aliquam demonstrare quoad nos objectum suum. Quod si illa scientia suprema sit, non indiget ope alterius, sed in vi sua id praestare potest, et hujusmodi est metaphysica […].
As a corollary of the previous observations, one may notice that in Suárez’s view the ratio of being qua being (i.e. the ratio that is the subject/object of metaphysics) is not formally identical with the ratio of being. There is no doubt that the former is founded on the latter; notwithstanding, the latter is a metaphysical notion, whereas the former is an epistemological notion. The latter embraces all beings and, according to Suárez, is included in each of them; the former expresses and recapitulates the network of links holding all that metaphysics deals with. In point of fact, what is somehow problematic in Suárez’s doctrine is not the unity of the science of rationes generalissimae (let us say “ontology”) with the science of spiritual substances (let us say “rational theology”); what is somehow problematic in his doctrine is that, on some occasions, he establishes an identity between transcendental being and being qua being, i.e. between transcendental being and the subject/object of metaphysics. I say “somehow” because one might think that he conce...
