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Class
Class is a communist concept. â Margaret Thatcher
Austerity is a class strategy.
But surely not? Arenât we simply obliged to make cutbacks now that times are tough? Who can honestly say that the country isnât broke? It would be nice to keep spending on all the gold-plated public sector pensions and bedroom scroungers and wasters, but there simply isnât enough money in the kitty, darlings. People will just have to pull their socks up. And tighten their belts. And figuratively rearrange other parts of parts of their apparel until the mess is sorted out.
And isnât âclassâ itself something of a relic anyway, like the Madonna sex book, or a paid-for copy of Londonâs Evening Standard? Or, at best, an abstraction remote from the messier realities of everyday life, like logging on to Twitface, sharing electrifying hoof fetish porn, and then ordering copious quantities of something via eBay to get richly and joyously shit-faced with? What sort of political fundamentalist bangs on about âclassâ while the inhabitants of online heterotopias are obliviously fapping away together? What room is there for âclassâ in these many proliferating life-worlds?
Despite these well-thought-out objections, and many more like them, I will insist on advocating the bland thesis that austerity is a class strategy. What else could it be? There is no socially neutral way of interpreting and resolving the multiple crises of production, politics and ideology triggered by the âcredit crunchâ. There is no way that any strategy for confronting these problems could not respond to definite social interests, whether by proactively seeking to cater to them, reactively adapting to pressure, or anticipating and out-manoeuvring attempted obstructions. And these interests, whether concentrated in the form of the investment banks or the TUC, look a great deal like class interests.
The programme of austerity itself seems straightforward, as political scientist Mark Blyth explains: âAusterity is a form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the stateâs budget, debts, and deficits.â1 Yet the case for this is not, on the face of it, a compelling one. The austerians maintain that a programme of cuts, properly implemented, can boost growth. The simple version of the argument is that government spending crowds out private sector spending. Freeing up wealth by cutting the tax burden should spur investment and dynamism. The more elaborate version is that cuts, or âfiscal consolidationâ, will increase the confidence of investors, lenders and households. Knowing that the governmentâs finances are being put in order, and that this is part of a sustained policy, they can look forward to a period of renewed growth, and thus expect more income in the future. As a result, households will borrow to spend, capital will invest, and banks will lend, thus precipitating a new phase of economic expansion. This is the austerity road to prosperity: expansionary austerity, as it is known.
The origins of this particular idea can be traced to an attempt by economists to theorise the practice of Western European governments undergoing fiscal consolidation in the 1980s. The argument essentially expressed the view of the West German government, or more specifically the Council of Economic Experts which advised it. It was the West German leadership in particular that advocated austerity as a basis for a future, leaner growth model for Europe.2
Of course, this contradicts the macroeconomic commonplace that cutting public spending at a time of economic weakness merely reduces consumer spending power and thus leads to lower growth. With lower growth, the state will take in less revenues with which to pay its debts. Any deficit will be increased, bond holders will become less confident of the stateâs ability to pay its debts and will thus drive up the cost of government borrowing, and the government will be forced into a new round of cuts merely to keep up its repayments. This sort of vicious cycle has already blighted Eurozone economies such as Greece and Ireland.
The empirical evidence from the UK, according to the Office for Budget Responsibility, seems to support the claim that austerity policies reduced growth in the UK in 2011â12 by around 1.4 per cent.3 A 2011 IMF working paper points out that much of the empirical support for the claim that austerity is expansionary is based on studies which are biased by the inclusion of effects which donât arise from the cuts themselves but from external factors. The paper estimates that far from producing expansion, âa 1 percent of GDP fiscal consolidation reduces real private consumption over the next two years by 0.75 percent, while real GDP declines by 0.62 percentâ.4
Of course, the IMF has experience of implementing austerity, generally in the form of âstructural adjustment programmesâ. These programmes have usually been applied to countries which urgently need to borrow. The result, almost invariably, has been to suppress growth. It is not even clear if the short-term goals of these programmes â improving the balance of payments and reducing inflation â are actually achieved. The research is ambivalent on this point. But the evidence is that, for as long as austerity is implemented, growth is reduced.5
However, it isnât good enough simply to point this out. The pro-austerity argument acknowledges the conventional âKeynesianâ macroeconomic wisdom, but nevertheless insists that in certain limited conditions fiscal austerity can be paradoxically growth-inducing: provided fiscal austerity is part of a sustained reform, provided private sector business really believes that the tax burden will decline over the long term, then it can be expansionary. It would be a mistake, both analytical and political, to dismiss this too lightly.
Further, it would be just as mistaken not to acknowledge that there is something eminently rational, from a certain point of view, about the desire to reduce the amount of public debt. Capitalist democracies have experienced a rising level of debt since the 1970s, linked to weak growth, higher structural unemployment, and a growing tax resistance on the part of the rich.6 And since the banking crisis became a generalised economic crisis, this has turned into a sharp rise in public debt. US, UK and Eurozone states saw an increase in public indebtedness by between 20 and 40 per cent of GDP in the years from 2007 to 2009.7
There is a tendency on the Left to relativise about this, invoking by comparison the extraordinarily high levels of public debt during the Second World War. But there are rational reasons why those same capitalist democracies sought to constrain public debt during the 1990s, and why they seek to do so now. The problem with austerity as a debt-reduction strategy is not necessarily that it identifies debt as an issue. It is, firstly, that it falsely and tendentiously blames debt on the tendency of democratic politicians and state bureaucrats to inflate budgets, rather than looking at the growing gap between the structural commitments of national states and the declining growth of national economies.8 Secondly, to the extent that debt-reduction is a rational priority, it is not universally so. It is only rational if one accepts that capitalism, and specifically neoliberal capitalism, is the only game in town. And, if one accepts that the interests of elites â businesses and banks â are the most important interests in any national economy.
With this said, what kind of class strategy could austerity be?
No Such Thing as Society: Classes and Neoliberalism
A few words about the ontology of social classes are necessary before we proceed any further. This is because everything you know about class is just so much teak-hued horseshit. It isnât your fault. The attempt to obscure, or âdisappearâ, the concept of class is a deliberate, politicised mission.
Class, argued Mrs Thatcher, is a âcommunist conceptâ. In a way, this is obviously preposterous. The valences of class are as varied as those of âindividualâ, ânationâ, âpeopleâ and so on. But as a disciple of Friedrich Hayek, Thatcher had a specific point in mind. This is linked to her more famous insistence that âthere is no such thing as societyâ, only individuals and families.
What Thatcher meant is that at base, âsocietyâ is composed of nothing but entrepreneurial, self-maximising units. Collectivities are at best âthinâ associations, or convenient fictions that enable people who are otherwise in permanent rivalry to work together for a shared goal. But these are potentially dangerous in that they can distort âthe marketâ and suppress individual freedom â which is nothing other than the freedom to be an entrepreneur. It is typical of neoliberal ideology that this rather bleak, brutal, Social Darwinist perspective of eternal struggle and competition is conveyed in the cuddly language of self-help books. Mrs Thatcher explained: âI remember practically exploding when I heard some Americans talking about âthe underclass,â as if they werenât individuals with feelings. Each one is entitled to his own dignity, to develop his talents and abilities. Underclass? Socialist claptrap!â9
Intriguingly, US Congressman Rick Santorum attempted to emulate Mrs Thatcher in August 2013 when rallying the Republican faithful. He said:
What does Barack [Obama] talk about all the time? The middle class. Since when in America do we have classes? Since when in America are people stuck in areas, or defined places called a class? Thatâs Marxism talk. When Republicans get up and talk about middle class weâre buying into their rhetoric of dividing America. Stop it.10
This was, again, tone deaf and absurd. The âmiddle classâ in US culture is the-class-of-no-class. It is a broad, indeterminate mass of people ranging from cleaners to stockbrokers, a pea soup in which classes are dissolved. Not only does this have nothing to do with the Marxist conception of class; it is not particularly relevant to any rigorous conception of class.
Why do the more doctrinaire neoliberals become so defensive about the concept of class that the mere use of the term is sufficient to get their sinewy lips beating together? The concept of class is dangerous for neoliberals because it cuts against the grain of their social theory, permitting that there are forms of collective organisation that have nothing to do with enterprise. It authorises the perpetuation and expansion of collective forms of organisation that lead to the gradual, ineluctable suppression of capitalist freedom. Which, to neoliberals, does look a great deal like communism. However, Mrs T...