Hezbollah

The Political Economy of Lebanon's Party of God

Joseph Daher

• Publisher: Pluto Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781783719983
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Économie
• Subtopic: Politique économique

Hezbollah provides a new, grounded analysis of the controversial and misunderstood Lebanese party. Where previous books have focused on aspects of the party's identity, the military question or its religious discourse, here Joseph Daher presents an alternative perspective, built upon political economy. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Lebanon and dozens of interviews, as well as new archival and other primary sources, Daher's analysis confidently positions Hezbollah within socio-economic and political developments in Lebanon and the Middle East. He emphasises Hezbollah's historic ties with its main sponsor, the Islamic Republic of Iran, its media and cultural wings and its relationship with Western economic policies. Further chapters examine the party's policies towards workers' struggles and women's issues, and its orientation towards the sectarian Lebanese political system. Hezbollah is a well informed and fresh analysis of a topic which remains central to our understanding of one of the world's most tumultuous and politically unstable regions.

1

Sectarianism and the Lebanese Political Economy

Hezbollah’s Origins

In September 1920, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the country of Greater Lebanon was established under the authority of the French Mandate. The territory of the new country included Mount Lebanon, which had gained a semi-autonomous status under Ottoman rule through the interferences of European foreign powers in 1860, and also the regions of the Bekaa Valley, Jabal ‘Amil (South Lebanon), Akkar, Beirut, Saida and Tripoli. These latter regions had been, until 1918, part of the two Ottoman wilāya of Damascus and Beirut. At this time, Lebanon was composed of seventeen religious groupings that each had particular geographical and social characteristics.¹ Christians, who composed 55 percent of the total population of the country in 1920, were mainly concentrated in Mount Lebanon. The Christian population was divided into various sects, the main ones being Maronite, Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic.² Muslims—Sunni, Shiʿa, Druze and Ismaeli—were a majority in the new territories incorporated into Greater Lebanon: the Bekaa Valley, Jabal ‘Amil, Akkar, Beirut, Saida and Tripoli. In these regions, Muslims formed a majority of 200,814 against 117,332 Christians (Picaudou 1989: 57).³

The French Mandate in Lebanon and Syria was a means of furthering France’s political and economic interests in the Middle East (Khoury 1981: 452; Makdissi 1996). Lebanon and Syria were controlled by two sets of French companies called “Intérêts communs” and “Sociétés concessionaires.” These two companies had a monopoly over public services and controlled the main sectors of the economy. Lebanon’s role as an economic intermediary towards Syria was also confirmed during French occupation (Owen 1976: 24), with Beirut continuing to act as the main port for the Syrian interior (Traboulsi 2007: 91). Beirut’s role as a regional warehouse was strengthened by the Mandate’s policy of reserving the large Syrian market for Beirut merchants in exchange for higher tariff protection for agriculture and industry, which was more important to the Syrian hinterland economy (Gates 1989: 14).

These projects consolidated the Christian bourgeoisie’s power linked to European capitalism and the tertiary sector—notably banking and finance (Gates 1989: 16). The large landowners of the periphery, who constituted the local notabilities, also benefited from the French Mandate. Projects of agricultural development and government aid in the Akkar, the South and the Bekaa principally benefited the large landowners supported by French governors (Traboulsi 2007: 92).

A principal means through which France dominated the country was the encouragement of sectarian patterns of rule, particularly its strategic alliance with the Maronite population. Under French control, elections for a representative council took place in 1922 followed four years later by elections for the Chamber of Deputies. These two elections were conducted along sectarian lines and were boycotted by the country’s Sunni Muslim population, who were generally opposed to the partition of Syria and the formation of Greater Lebanon.⁴ Sunni Muslim leaders complained that 83 percent of the fiscal revenues came from territories with a Muslim majority, in which 380,000 people lived, while 80 percent of those revenues were spent in Mount Lebanon that held only 330,000 inhabitants (Traboulsi 2007: 81). Furthermore, in the new Greater Lebanon under French rule, Maronite Christians from Mount Lebanon constituted a majority of state politicians and civil servants, as opposed to the previous wilāyat of Beirut, which were mainly Sunni Muslims and Greek Orthodox (Traboulsi 2007: 93).

Within the uneven political economy dominated by French capitalism, the Maronite population played a principal intermediary role involving themselves in international import and foreign trade, finance and the representation of European firms. For this reason, the announcement of the French Mandate was supported by the Maronite Patriarch Huwayk, and those sections of the Maronite population linked to (and dependent upon) French rule. Other smaller Christian denominations were less inclined to the Mandate, partly because they were more closely linked to regional trade networks—especially trade between Beirut and Damascus.⁵

Muslim populations, particularly the Sunni community, were on the whole opposed to the French Mandate (Firro 2003: 67). In addition to their marginalization within the political structures established by the French, Sunni notables feared threats to their position within intra-regional trading networks, including trade between the different ports of the Ottoman Empire, the export of agricultural products from the Syrian interior and the local trade in grain (Issawi 1982: 58). For these reasons, Sunni elites tended to support the political and territorial unity of Syria.

Throughout the 1930s, however, differences between the Sunni and Maronite elites began to narrow in favor of independence for both Lebanon and Syria (as two separate countries), albeit with strong political and economic links.⁶ Some Muslim leaders, notably Riyad al-Solh from Saida, argued for an alliance with Christian-led political forces that were supportive of the separation of Lebanon and Syria (while remaining opposed to the French Mandate).⁷ Initially this position was not widely supported within the Sunni population and led to a distancing between Solh and the dominant Muslim pro-union factions. Nevertheless, this opposition did not last, especially following the signing of the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence in 1936 in which the Syrian representatives of the National Bloc dropped their annexionist demands concerning Lebanon in return for France’s integration of the Druze and Alawite autonomous zones into the Syrian Republic (Traboulsi 2007: 101).

In addition to this, opposition to the French Mandate and harsh social and economic conditions spread throughout Lebanon. The bourgeoisie from across sectarian tendencies increasingly favored the independence option and supported the various workers and popular strikes and protests challenging the rule of the French Mandate. The opposition of the bourgeoisie targeted the economic privileges of the Mandate, as demonstrated by the monopolies exercised on behalf of the French concessionary companies, their fiscal exemptions and the export of their profit to France. Even the Maronite church, a traditional ally and supporter of the French in the country, joined the opposition to the French Mandate for reasons very close to those of the bourgeoisie (Traboulsi 2007: 105).

Lebanese independence was achieved in 1943. The National Pact, an unwritten understanding between Maronite and Sunni notables, and the new Constitution of 1943, would establish the founding principles of the newly sovereign Lebanon. Both documents confirmed political representation along sectarian lines and entrenched the domination of the Maronite community within the top echelons of the state. The President, according to Constitution, was required to be Maronite, and had extensive powers, while Christian deputies also had a majority in the parliament in a 6:5 ratio to Muslims (Salibi 1971: 83; Faour 1991: 631). The Sunni elite, however, was nevertheless promised greater participation in state affairs and decision-making, including the position of Prime Minister, than during the mandate period.

In contrast to their Maronite and Sunni counterparts, the political and socio-economic situation of the Shiʿa population was significantly weaker at the time of independence. They had the lowest social indicators with illiteracy rates reaching 68.9 percent in 1943, compared to 31.5 percent in the Catholic Christian community (Nasr 1985). Eighty-five percent of Shiʿa were concentrated in two main regions: South Lebanon (with the exception of the coastal city of Saida, which was predominantly inhabited by Sunni) and North-Eastern Lebanon, particularly the Baalbek-Hermel region (Nasr 1985). The Shiʿa population was also largely rural—a characteristic which in subsequent decades would change dramatically with very significant implications as we shall see. Indeed, the urban-based Shiʿa constituted no more than 10 percent of the whole community in 1948 (Nasr 1985).

The reason for the condition of great sections of the Shiʿa population was that they were located—as much as 85 percent of them—in the periphery of Lebanon (Bekaa, North and South Lebanon). At the time of independence, Lebanon’s periphery was characterized by large private properties owned by wealthy landowners. These properties accounted for three-quarters of the best land in the Shi‘a countryside, and enabled the quasi-feudal exploitation of private sharecroppers (Nasr 1985). The Shiʿa population had not yet experienced the social disruption, peasant revolts or rapid expansion of export farming that had already transformed the Maronite majority area of Mount Lebanon as it was integrated into the world capitalist economy.

The Shiʿa were also largely marginalized within the political system, despite the agreement (as part of the National Pact) that they would hold the position of Speaker in the National Assembly (Hazran 2010: 533). They had the lowest level of political representation of all communities, with very few Shiʿa holding a position of state official before 1974 (Daher 2014: 43). Empirical studies indicate that in 1946 only 3.2 percent of the highest civil service posts were held by Shi‘a, increasing to just 3.6 percent by 1955, although Shiʿa were then 18 percent of the Lebanese population (Hazran 2010: 533). In 1962, only 3 percent of Class I posts in the state administration were held by Shi‘a, who constituted 19.2 percent of the population at that time. In addition, similar figures were revealed for Class II and III governmental posts in the late 1960s (Halawi 1992 cited in Hazran 2010: 534).

Notabilities of important Shiʿa families typically governed the Shiʿa population during this period with political power monopolized by six “notable families”: the Asʿad, Zein and Osseiran in southern Lebanon, and the Hamadeh, Haydar and Husseini families in Baalbek and Byblos (Firro 2006: 750–51; Nasr 1985). These zu‘āma, as they were called, were generally large landowners who acted as intermediaries to access services for the vast majority of poor Shiʿa. This relationship meant that the Shiʿa population was heavily characterized by clientelism and patronage. Harel Chorev describes these characteristics as follows:

(1) control of landed families over their sharecroppers; (2) capital of merchant families; (3) control over the allocation of national resources; and (4) ability to mediate between the public and the authorities. All of these made it possible for a za‘īm to provide his clients with protection and employment, and help them in their contacts with the authorities. This patronage-based socio-political structure was presented as being all-encompassing, characterising not only the relationships between the za‘īm and the public, but also between senior zu‘āma and zu‘āma of lower standing.

(Chorev 2013: 308)

This zu‘āma system was not limited to the Shiʿa population, and was also present among Christian and Sunni populations.

1945–1975: From Independence to Civil War

Following Lebanon’s independence in 1943, control of the state and the country’s economy continued to be concentrated in the hands of a narrow oligarchy. Between 1920 and 1972, deputies in the parliament represented some 245 of Lebanon’s most prominent families. By 1972, and after nearly fifty years of parliamentary life, 359 MPs had been elected of whom slightly more than 300 had inherited their seat because of family ties (Khalaf 1979: 196). State policies reflected the interests of these political and economic elites, who aimed to maintain and strengthen Lebanon’s position as a key financial intermediary between the Arab world and Europe (Gates 1989: 32).

Due to this intermediary position between the West and the Arab world, the Lebanese economy in the first two decades after independence was largely dominated by the service sector, which in 1976 constituted 72 percent of the Lebanese economy (Dubar and Nasr 1976: 67; Owen 1988: 32). Within this sector, banking was dominant.

Alongside the predominant weight of finance and services, industrial production was limited, growing only minimally from 14.52 percent of GDP in 1950 to 16.7–18 percent in 1974 (Dubar and Nasr 1976: 76; Traboulsi 2007: 157). Lebanese industry followed a typical path of a dominated economy of the Third World (or the periphery), with most production concentrated in low-wage light industry (Dubar and Nasr 1976: 80).

The dominant position of the commercial and financial bourgeoisie, linked closely to Western capital, also imposed itself on the structure of the agricultural sector. In addition, government policies supported the interests of large landowners, who received the large majority of the Ministry of Agriculture’s assistance, while small farmers were neglected (Dahir 1974 cited in Nasr 1978: 10).

This situation had important consequences for the structure of social relations in rural areas. Most significantly, agricultural production became increasingly dominated by large farms located in areas such as the Bekaa Valley, Akkar and the southern coastal plains. These farms were frequently owned by urban elites, who forced traditional share-croppers to leave the land. The proportion of sharecroppers in the active population fell from 25 percent in the 1950s to 5 percent in the 1970s (Dahir 1974 cited in Nasr 1978: 6). After being displaced from their traditional livelihoods, former sharecroppers were forced to either move to Beirut, migrate abroad or to become agricultural wage laborers.

Smallholder farmers, who constituted 57 percent of the active agricultural population in the early 1970s, faced similar pressures to sharecroppers but were able to survive the increased pauperization by engaging in more than one type of activity. More than half of all farmers at the end of the 1960s worked in a secondary, usually non-agricultural job (Gaspard 2004: 91; Nasr 1978: 6). The relative share of agriculture in the national economy declined from 20 percent of the GDP in 1948 to less than 9 percent in 1974, while the share of the active population working in the sector decreased from 48.9 percent in 1959 to 18.9 percent in 1970 (Mallat 1973: 6; Nasr 1978: 13). The agrarian sector lost more than 100,000 active members in less than two decades (Dubar and Nasr 1976: 100).

In this context, Lebanon experienced large-scale rural to urban migration during the two decades following independence, with the urban population rising sharply from 25 percent of the overall population in 1950 to 65 percent in 1975 (Nasr 2003: 148). Most of these internal migrants came predominantly from Shiʿa rural areas. By 1973, 63 percent of Shiʿa were living in cities, including 45 percent in Greater Beirut (Harb 2010: 42). These newcomers found jobs in the service sector, where they were subjected to severe exploitation in terms of wages and working conditions. These trends were reinforced by the lack of work opportunities in services and public administration for new graduates. The level of unemployment grew from 70,000 people in 1969, about 10–13 percent of the workforce, to 120,000 people in 1974, representing 15–20 percent of the workforce (Nasr 1978: 3). Great disparities remained between the center (Mount Lebanon and Beirut) and the periphery (the suburbs of Beirut, South Lebanon, Akkar and the Bekaa). The annual per capita income in Beirut was estimated at $803 in the early 1970s, while in South Lebanon it did not exceed $151 (Traboulsi 2007: 160). Rapid urbanization meant that Beirut was surrounded by a massive poverty belt in which 400,000 people out of a total population of 1 million lived on the eve of the Civil War in 1975 (Traboulsi 2007: 161).

Class and Sectarian Divisions

By the early 1970s, Lebanese society was characterized by pronounced social, regional and sectarian inequalities. It was estimated in 1959–1960 by the Fr...