Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark

Corporate and Police Spying on Activists

Eveline Lubbers

• Publisher: Pluto Press
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN:
  9780745331850
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781849646413
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

*Shortlisted for the Bread and Roses Prize, 2013* The exposure of undercover policeman Mark Kennedy in the eco-activist movement revealed how the state monitors and undermines political activism. This book shows the other grave threat to our political freedoms - undercover activities by corporations. Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark documents how corporations are halting legitimate action and investigation by activists. Using exclusive access to previously confidential sources, Eveline Lubbers shows how companies such as Nestlé, Shell and McDonalds use covert methods to evade accountability. She argues that corporate intelligence gathering has shifted from being reactive to pro-active, with important implications for democracy itself. Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark will be vital reading for activists, investigative and citizen journalists, and all who care about freedom and democracy in the 21st century.

1

Introduction: The Waste Paper Man

This book is about intelligence and activism. It addresses the ways in which large corporations seek to manage and manipulate public protest, and it reveals the informal dimension of information-gathering hidden behind the politics and practices of public relations and reputation management. It brings together a set of case studies examining corporate espionage, based on exclusive access to previously confidential documented sources. Each story is systematically unravelled to map the different aspects of the spying process. Detailing chronology, agents and strategy, each case is analysed as an actual intelligence operation, creating a new perspective on the events.

To make a proper risk assessment, first and foremost a company needs to know what is coming its way. Nowadays business intelligence has gone beyond details about the world economy, overseas wars and news about the competition. It must also include an evaluation of the risks of becoming the target of campaigners, boycotters or net activists. Publicly available information is not sufficient for this task. Informal data, however obtained, are invaluable. Desirable information is not limited to concrete action scenarios but can be as broad (and vague) as long-term strategy discussions, impressions of the mood inside a campaigning group, connections between organizations, networking possibilities, funding details, and so on. As it turns out, corporate issue management is evolving into more than an occasional exercise of ‘damage control’. Secret Manoeuvres in the Dark shows how intelligence gathering facilitates covert strategies designed to frustrate and undermine the critics of corporations.

Globalization and neoliberal politics provide the contexts for this investigation. The stories in this book highlight the privatization of intelligence, and the increasing value of information as capital in power relations. The research reveals increasingly blurred boundaries between public and private in secret operations, which, in my opinion, represents a potential danger to democracy. The importance of the issues at stake calls for a more active role for social scientists, investigative journalists, politicians and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and others concerned about the role of public protest in society. This book seeks to broaden the understanding of the policies of large corporations in their pursuit of power, and their efforts to avoid public debate and silence critics.

BATTLING BIG BUSINESS

The first time I encountered a case of corporate spying was in 1994, when I was involved in exposing a spy called Paul Oosterbeek. At the time, I was working with buro Jansen & Janssen in the Netherlands, monitoring police and intelligence. Founded in 1984, the buro investigated the ways in which social movements were curtailed and undermined, by supporting people and groups who had become involuntarily targeted by the police, intelligence agencies or their corporate counterparts. Buro Jansen & Janssen has since developed a broader perspective on monitoring and intervening in debates on issues like repression and privacy. For me, the shift of focus included an increasing interest in private intelligence agencies.

The case of the Waste Paper Man serves as a typical illustration of the issues at stake. It shows how an individual infiltrating activist groups can work for long periods of time collecting information in several different ways. It also illustrates how the information gathered is processed into ‘intelligence products’ and used by clients to undermine activist groups. The case reveals how the intelligence can end up in the hands of the press. When used to incriminate activist groups, this can work to the advantage of prosecuting authorities.

Oosterbeek was active in groups I worked with, and had tried to get involved in a network of activists investigating intelligence-related topics in the Netherlands. Although several people did not trust him, it took years to act upon the plans to screen Oosterbeek’s background. Only when several campaigners compared experiences was it discovered that he had used a variety of cover stories to hide his true identity. It emerged that Oosterbeek had created quite a network of information sources, and had worked for several activist organizations and NGOs. Going by the name of Marcel Paul Knotter, he posed as a volunteer and managed to stay under cover for more than seven years. He promoted his computer skills – rare in the late 1980s and the early 1990s – and offered to install software and set up computer databases. He would handle the input of contact addresses, new subscribers and possible sponsors into IT systems, and also assisted with archiving work. To explain his background Oosterbeek claimed to be engaged in investigating large corporations and their involvement in apartheid, child labour or other human rights violations – tailoring the details of his cover to the needs of his audience. Meanwhile, he took advantage of his position to collect the groups’ discarded paperwork, pretending he would sell it to a pulp mill and donate the proceeds to a charity project of the groups’ choice. At the time of his exposure, no fewer than 30 organizations, ranging from small activist groups to big church-affiliated research foundations like Pax Christi, knew Oosterbeek as their ‘Waste Paper Man’. In fact, Oosterbeek delivered boxes of faxed originals, photocopies and printouts to the offices of ABC, a small security consultancy owned by Peter Siebelt. There, behind a high wall and a sharp-spiked iron fence and under guard of security cameras, the data were processed. Every sheet was carefully combed for information, from financial data to the details of internal strategy discussions. The networks between organizations and the overlap in personnel were mapped, and the special interests of groups’ individual members scrutinized. ABC thus compiled numerous files on activists and NGOs, supplementing them with information available from public sources such as magazines, annual reports and other records filed with the Chambers of Commerce, the Dutch equivalent of the UK Companies House (Lubbers, 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 2002a).

What we had discovered was a new, cleaner form of garbology – which is detective slang for a particularly dirty kind of research. Activists and advocacy groups in the Netherlands knew their waste paper was being gathered, but not what it was being ‘recycled’ into: intelligence files for companies those groups were criticizing. Little did they realize how interesting their paperwork could be to the companies they campaigned against, to the tabloids, and occasionally even to the police, the public prosecutor and the secret service.

Siebelt maintained good contacts with the Dutch daily De Telegraaf, a newspaper with a reputation for mudslinging and activist bashing. Over the years, the paper frequently published articles based on internal documents that could be traced back to the Waste Paper Man (see, for instance, De Haas and Koolhoven, 1993a, 1993b; Koolhoven, 1996, 1997; de Haas and Sanders, 1997a, 1997b). In one case, an article randomly linking alleged networks of progressive organizations to terrorism served as the sole piece of evidence to launch a criminal investigation. The paper claimed to know that the Dutch secret service BVD identified this network as potentially terrorist (De Haas and Koolhoven, 1993b). Based on a small quote in a De Telegraaf article, freelance journalist Hans Krikke ended up as the main suspect of two bomb attacks aimed against authorities responsible for the contentious Dutch asylum policy. According to the police, Krikke ‘doesn’t rule out the practice of bomb attacks.’ The police conveniently left out the rest of the quotation: ‘in times of severe oppression, like World War II’ – which qualifies the statement somewhat. Krikke and his colleague were arrested and their offices raided; it took months before the case was dismissed. The two received 230,000 in Dutch guilders (worth €136,000 or more than £11,000 today) in compensation, but their non-profit company did not survive (Lubbers, 1996, 1997a, 2002a).

The Waste Paper episode also demonstrates how inside information can give companies a strategic advantage. Used at the right moment, it can be an effective weapon. The formula industry, for instance, had acquired some internal correspondence of Wemos, a Dutch group monitoring pharmaceutical companies and the marketing of infant formula products in the Third World. In 1994, Wemos tried to convince the infant formula industry that it was not targeting specific companies. Dutch formula maker Nutricia (now Numico) produced a letter Wemos had sent to its partners in the Nestlé boycott campaign. The request for examples of companies circumventing the WHO code that restricts advertising infant formula in Third World countries was an example that proved otherwise in the eyes of the industry. Wemos had been a long-time client of the Waste Paper Man (Lubbers, 2002b).

Companies do not necessarily acknowledge that they have inside information on their critics. Using the information to anticipate future actions can be sufficient. In 1990, the Clean Clothes Campaign started a protest action against the use of child labour by clothing chain C&A. Customers were encouraged to ask shop assistants where their clothes had been manufactured. No sooner had the campaign begun than C&A came out with printed fact-sheets, and a booklet explaining the company’s CSR policy. Until then, C&A had been known as a closed, family-run company that never even published annual reports – and did not do so until 2005 (van der Hoff, 2006; NDH, 2006). Its rapid response to the Clean Clothes Campaign was remarkable. In fact, Oosterbeek had joined the Clean Clothes Campaign as a regular volunteer just before the campaign was launched. Oosterbeek’s inside information permitted C&A to anticipate and facilitate the rapid response.

The exposure of the Waste Paper Man revealed that there is a market for informal information about activists. It brings up questions about the kinds of information required, how this intelligence is gathered and how it may be used in subsequent strategizing. This book seeks to answer these questions by presenting a set of detailed well-sourced case studies. To address the blind spots in investigating corporate spying I will outline a specific field of research best described as activist intelligence, focused on the gathering of information, the methods used and the people professionally involved. It also includes the processing of the information into intelligence, and the strategic planning by corporations to make use of it: the covert corporate strategy.

The Impact of Infiltration

My commitment to do the research for this book originates from my work with buro Jansen & Janssen. Investigating cases of infiltration by either the state or private spies hired by corporations, I discovered the impact of such intrusions for the groups involved. The result, as explained below, was a quest for a wider and deeper understanding of what was behind the stories I encountered.

Buro Jansen & Janssen was rooted in the same network as the movements it sought to support. Although this made us a trusted party, our investigations were sometimes hampered by differences of opinion about the implications of infiltration, and the need for security awareness. Exposing stories was part of the Jansen & Janssen strategy, challenging the power of the responsible authorities. However, this strategy was not always seen as being in the best interests of the people involved. Some of the infiltrated groups preferred to avoid publicity, afraid that it would affect the perceived trustworthiness and reliability of their work.

A group that has experienced infiltration often wants to return to business as usual sooner rather than later. Dealing with surveillance and infiltration is not part of their core activities; it is often regarded as a waste of time and contrary to the aims of the group. It can also be uncomfortable, even painful, as it involves profound breaches of trust. Feelings of unease at the personal level are matched with fears that the effects of exposure are counterproductive for the group at the organizational level. To have their experiences with spying and infiltration made public could suggest that they had been careless or sloppy with security; it could keep possible allies or whistleblowers from sharing crucial information. For similar reasons, groups often refrain from taking legal action. Of course, in the absence of a legal framework, the option to file a complaint or to report a crime is rare. The remote chance of success fuels the reluctance to allocate money and energy to activities regarded as counterproductive for the organization.

A clear conflict of interest emerged that sometimes hindered cooperation in investigations. While groups had understandable reasons not to go public, sometimes Jansen & Janssen’s intervention was regarded as yet another disturbance. In order to help a group understand what had taken place and what it meant, and to advise them how to prevent it from happening again, an in-depth investigation of each case of infiltration was required. Exposing well-documented cases seemed consistent as a next step. Instead of acknowledging the existence of conflicting interests, the problems between an activist group and buro Jansen & Janssen were occasionally dealt with as irritations on the personal level, or – worse – as political differences.

During my time with buro Jansen & Janssen, I also worked as a consultant for NGOs to raise security awareness. The work involved screening organizations on a variety of levels, ranging from their access control to personnel management and recruitment policies, using methods such as in-depth interviews covering different parts of the organization. However, plans to raise security awareness within these groups proved to be difficult to put into practice. For many activist groups and NGOs, openness and inclusivity are highly respected principles, as the need for new members is an essential condition for survival. Security measures are often viewed as superfluous or counterproductive.

In a broader context, these experiences show that infiltration as a strategy to undermine corporate critics has damaging effects regardless of the sensitivity of the information gathered. Essentially, the fear of being publicly associated with infiltration is harmful in itself. At the personal level, people are hurt, while at the organizational level the work of the groups is disrupted. The fear of press coverage keeps people from making a serious assessment of the actual damage of an information-gathering operation. Moreover, the perception of publicity as counterproductive leads to a form of self-censorship. The reluctance to expose detailed findings implies abandoning the opportunity – waiving the right – to hold corporations accountable for their practices of abusing power. Few political organizations that have been the victims of infiltration are willing to take official action that might disclose the extent of the operation. Patrice Brodeur of the University of Montréal, who studied the policing of political activities, confirms this. From 1979 to 1981, he was involved in the Keable inquiry into police wrongdoing in Québec, and he concluded that for political groups, revelations about the extent of infiltration are ‘liable to drastically reduce their credibility in the eyes of other movements and their membership’ (Brodeur, 1983: 510). Ironically, he argues, this makes the victims partners in secrecy with the police, politicians, the courts and the press (ibid.). The police, well aware of this reluctance to expose experiences, deliberately spread rumours of infiltration to destabilize political groups.

The issues that arise regarding the exposure of cases of infiltration illustrate the chilling effects of covert corporate strategy. The fear of being associated with espionage keeps the groups involved from addressing the issue in a public debate. This indicates a need for evidence-based research, as substantiation is essential on the road towards comprehending the meaning and effects of infiltration and espionage. Furthermore, in order to comprehend the significance and the implications of this issue, corporate spying needs to be understood in the broader context of corporate strategy.

Undercover Operations

To explain the dangers of infiltration and espionage, only strong arguments and evidence will persuade people to consider any form of security. To substantiate my arguments, I felt the need to put my experiences and knowledge into context. I set out to understand the broad range of corporate strategies for dealing with critics. A key event in this was the 1999 Next 5 Minutes conference in Amsterdam, where I brought together experts in the field, mostly people who identify themselves as researchers, activists and freelance journalists. The panel discussion on corporate counterstrategies was the beginning of a network, which eventually resulted in the book Battling Big Business, Countering Greenwash, Infiltration and other Forms of Corporate Bullying (Lubbers (ed.), 2002a) and the founding of SpinWatch.org in 2004.

Battling Big Business was inspired by the work of Naomi Klein (2000), who also wrote the preface to the book. Her own book, No Logo, investigated how corporations experienced growing pressure from their critics over the last few decades. In an effort to manage the adverse publicity their environmental, labour and consumer records so often attract, many giant corporations looked for new strategies to counter the activities of their opponents. Klein identified two important developments that characterize the current timeframe. Today, brand identity and corporate image are key to a corporation’s value, over and above its actual products or services. The more companies shift towards being all about brand identity, the more vulnerable they are to attacks on this image. At the same time, corporations are becoming less restricted by national laws or unilateral treaties. In some cases, they are more powerful than governments, and must expect to be held to account in the same way (Klein, 2002). Consumers are demanding sustainability, accountability and transparency. Losing control in the media arena as a result of activist pressure has become a public relations nightmare for the modern multinational. The industry learned that lesson the hard way. Shell’s lost battle over Brent Spar in 1995 and the human rights situation in Nigeria haunt the oil company to the present day. These cases have become landmarks in the field of corporate responsibility. Likewise, Monsanto gained damaging notoriety for its underestimation of European resistance to the introduction of genetically engineered products.

The power of spin cannot easily protect big business’s growing vulnerability. This was the starting point of Battling Big Business. Public relations (PR) departments struggle to deal with today’s complicated stakeholder demands. Accordingly, reputation management now includes the gradual embrace of mostly voluntary and non-binding corporate social responsibility (CSR) guidelines. This ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Dedication page
• Acknowledgements
• Contents
• Preface: Corporate Spying Today
• 1. Introduction: The Waste Paper Man
• 2. Covert Corporate Strategy in the Past
• 3. Rafael Pagan, Nestlé and Shell: Case Study
• 4. McSpy: Case Study
• 5. Cybersurveillance and Online Covert Strategy: Case Study
• 6. Hakluyt and the Jobbing Spy: Case Study
• 7. The Threat Response Spy Files: Case Study
• 8. Conclusion: Secrecy, Research and Resistance
• Appendix 1: Manfred Schlickenrieder Documents
• Appendix 2: Evelyn le Chêne Documents
• Notes
• Bibliography and References
• Index