Israel and Palestine

Competing Histories

Mike Berry, Greg Philo

• Publisher: Pluto Press
• Year: 2006
• eBook ISBN: 9781783714919
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

This is a concise guide to the Israel-Palestine conflict. There are many different, competing histories of the conflict, however, this book collects those which are based on the most considered historical research. The book covers key events in chronological order, in each case examining the varied historical accounts and presenting the beliefs of key thinkers across the ideological spectrum, from Edward Said to Binyamin Netanyahu. Starting the with emergence of the Zionist movement in the nineteenth century, and the figures who shaped it, the authors go on to cover the founding of Israel and its subsequent history, up to and including the 'roadmap for peace', the construction of the wall, the death of Arafat and the withdrawal from Gaza.

ZIONIST ROOTS AND THE FIRST WAVE OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

The American historian Howard Sachar (1977) traces the contemporary emergence of Zionist thought to the European Rabbis, Judah Alkalai and Zvi Hirsh Kalischer, who from the 1830s onwards stressed the need for Jews to return to the Holy Land as a necessary prelude to the Redemption and the coming of the Messiah. Sachar argues that such messianic exhortations did not immediately or widely take root among European Jews. However, he suggests that by the 1870s societies generally known as Chovevei Zion (‘Lovers of Zion’) had formed across Russia, which viewed Palestine as a site for national renewal and a refuge from anti-Semitism.

In 1881, following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, large numbers of Jews were killed in a series of Russian pogroms. By 1914 up to two million Jews had fled Russia to escape persecution. The vast majority sought sanctuary in the United States but 25,000 arrived in Palestine in two waves of immigration in 1882–84 and 1890–91. At the time the Jewish population in Palestine was small. The official Ottoman census of 1878 had put the total at 15,011 living among a combined Muslim/Christian population of 447,454 (McCarthy, 1990). The newcomers, backed with Jewish capital from prominent families such as the Rothschilds, saw themselves as agricultural pioneers, who were working to establish the foundations of Jewish self-determination in Palestine. A letter dated 21 September 1882 from Vladimir Dubnow, a worker at the Mikveh Israel agricultural settlement, to his brother Simon, captures the sentiments and hopes of the early Jewish settlers:

My ultimate aim, like that of many others, is greater, broader, incomprehensible but not unattainable. The final goal is eventually to gain control of Palestine and to restore to the Jewish people the political independence of which it has been deprived for two thousand years. Don’t laugh this is no illusion. The means for realising this goal is at hand: the founding of settlements in the country based on agriculture and crafts, the establishment and gradual expansion of all sorts of factories, in brief – to make an effort so that all the land, all the industry will be in Jewish hands. In addition, it will be necessary to instruct young people and the future generation in the use of firearms (in free, wild Turkey anything can be done), and then – here I too am plunging into conjecture – then the glorious day will dawn of which Isaiah prophesised in his burning and poetic utterances. The Jews will proclaim in a loud voice and if necessary with arms in their hands that they are the masters of their ancient homeland. (cited in Gilbert, 1999: 5–6)

Relations between the new Jewish immigrants and the native population were mixed. Jewish settlements were built on land that was purchased from absentee effendi landlords. Often the locals who had tended the land were evicted with the help of Turkish police, and this led to resentment and violence. Some Zionists such as Ahad Aham were very critical of the way the settlers gained control of the land and treated the local population. In 1891 he argued that the settlers ‘treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty and, unscrupulously deprive them of their rights, insult them without cause and even boast of such deeds; and none opposes this despicable and dangerous inclination’ (1923: 107, cited in Hirst, 1977: 24). There was also evidence that the two groups were able partially to accommodate each other because the settlers also brought benefits. They provided employment opportunities, access to medical care, the loan of modern equipment and a market for produce. Sachar reports that in the 1890s the agricultural settlement of Zichron Ya’akov employed more than a thousand Arabs working for 200 Jews. The former Guardian Middle East correspondent David Hirst (1977) argues that the beginning of the twentieth century saw the arrival of a more militant type of settler to Palestine, inspired by the ideas of Theodor Herzl and determined to take control of the land and exclude non-Jews from the labour market. The Jewish National Fund, set up to manage Jewish land purchases, decreed in 1901 that all land it purchased could never be resold or leased to gentiles, and settlers began to boycott Arab labour (Hirst, 1977; Shafir, 1999).

THEODOR HERZL AND THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL ZIONISM

Theodor Herzl, who is commonly regarded as the father of political Zionism, was a Jewish Austro-Hungarian journalist and playwright. He had been deeply affected by the virulent anti-Semitism sweeping across Europe, and as a journalist for the Vienna newspaper Neue Freie Presse had covered the notorious Dreyfus trial in Paris, where a Jewish officer was falsely charged with passing secrets to the Germans. He had also been alarmed by the election of Karl Lueger as mayor of Vienna at the head of an openly anti-Semitic party. Herzl felt that a central issue for Jews was their dispersal across the Diaspora and their existence as a minority in each country they inhabited. This, Herzl argued, led to a dependence on the host culture and a suppression of self-determination. Furthermore Herzl believed that widespread anti-Semitism meant that complete assimilation into European society was an impossibility for most Jews. The solution he laid out in Der Judenstaat or The Jewish State (1896) was for Jews to create their own state, in which they would constitute a majority and be able to exercise national self-determination. In contrast to the ‘practical Zionism’ of the Jewish settlers who began to arrive in Palestine from 1882, Herzl adopted a political orientation, cultivating links with prominent imperial statesmen in an attempt to gain a charter for Jewish land settlement.

Herzl had two potential locations in mind for the prospective Jewish state: Argentina and Palestine. His diaries show that he was greatly influenced by the British imperialist Cecil Rhodes, and in particular the manner in which Rhodes had gained control of Mashonaland and Matabeleland from its inhabitants (Hirst, 1977). In his diaries Herzl suggests that the settlers should follow Rhodes’s example and ‘gently’ expropriate the native population’s land and ‘try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country’, but that ‘the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly’ (Herzl, 1960: 88, cited in Hirst, 1977: 18). In order to further this aim Herzl sought out an imperial sponsor prepared to grant a settlement charter. He canvassed Germany’s Kaiser, the Ottoman Sultan and Britain’s Joseph Chamberlain, stressing to each the benefits that a Jewish state and Jewish capital could bring. In 1901 Herzl travelled to Constantinople and met the Sultan. Herzl offered capital to refinance the Ottoman public debt in what turned out to be a failed attempt to gain a charter for the establishment of a Jewish Ottoman Colonisation Association in Palestine. Bohm (1935) claims that the third article of the proposed charter would have given the Jewish administration the right to deport the native population from Palestine.

Herzl subsequently switched his attention to lobbying British politicians. Hirst (1977) suggests that Herzl linked Zionist ambitions to British imperial interests, and tried to play on the anti-Semitism of certain British politicians by arguing that a Jewish homeland would lessen the flow of Jewish refugees, who were fleeing pogroms, into Britain. During this period there was a fear among some members of the British establishment that Jews were agents of Bolshevism. Herzl lobbied Lord Rothschild for the creation of Jewish colonies in Cyprus, the Sinai peninsula and Egyptian Palestine, but the plans met with resistance from the Egyptian authorities. In April 1903, Neville Chamberlain proposed to Herzl that the Zionists set up a homeland in Uganda under the sovereignty of the British crown. Chamberlain offered a territory under the control of a Jewish governor into which a million Jews could immigrate and settle (Gilbert, 1999). Herzl accepted the plan. Martin Gilbert suggests that Herzl ‘was determined to take up the first offer presented to the Jews by a great power, and to provide at least a place of temporary asylum for the Jews of Russia’ (1999: 21). The proposal did not receive universal endorsement from Zionists, but at the Sixth Zionist Conference in Basle in 1903 Herzl succeeded in securing a majority in favour of the Uganda scheme: 295 voted for the proposal, 175 voted against and 99 abstained. However, shortly afterwards, in July 1903, Herzl died at the age of 44 and with him the Uganda project, which was rejected by the 1904 Zionist conference. The task of forwarding political Zionism passed to the British chemist, Chaim Weizmann.

THE SECOND WAVE OF JEWISH IMMIGRATION INTO PALESTINE

1904 saw the beginning of another wave of Jewish immigration into Palestine, again as a result of Russian pogroms. Over the next ten years between 35,000 and 40,000 Jewish immigrants arrived. Among this group was a twenty-year-old Russian Jew, David Gruen (later changed to Ben-Gurion, or son of Gruen), who arrived in Jaffa in September 1906 and was later to play a pivotal role in the creation and development of the Israeli state. The new immigrants mostly worked as labourers on the agricultural settlements established by the previous wave of Jewish immigrants, or in the towns. They also established the first Jewish political parties, a Hebrew-language press, collective farms (kibbutzim) and in 1909 the first Jewish self-defence militia, Ha-Shomer (The Watchman), with the motto ‘By blood and fire Judaea fell; by blood and fire Judaea shall rise’ (Gilbert, 1999: 27). The Israeli sociologist Gershon Shafir argues that the struggle to create an all-Jewish labour force transformed Jewish workers into ‘militant nationalists’ who ‘sought to establish a homogenous Jewish society’ (1999: 88). Palestine became the site for two emerging and competing nationalisms: first, the native Muslim and Christian population keen to throw off Ottoman rule and, second, the Jewish newcomers determined to create their own homeland. Some Zionists began to stress the importance of armed force. Israel Zangwill, who had coined the Zionist slogan ‘a land without people for a people without land’, informed a meeting of Zionists in Manchester in 1905 that ‘[We] must be prepared either to drive out by the sword the [Arab] tribes in possession as our forefathers did or to grapple with the problem of a large alien population’ (Zwangill, cited in Morris, 2001: 140).

The Palestinians, as a subject population under Ottoman rule, were initially deferential in their protests. During the 1890s members of the Palestinian elite repeatedly and unsuccessfully petitioned their imperial overlords in Constantinople to limit Jewish immigration. The late nineteenth century had been a period of growing pan-Arab awareness, which had seen a renaissance in the appreciation of Arab literature and culture. Ovendale argues that both the Ottoman Empire and the spread of Zionism were seen as a threat to Arab development. He suggests that ‘between 1909 and 1914 nationalist opposition in Palestine to Zionism grew: there were fears that if the Jews conquered Palestine the territorial unity of the Arab world would be shattered and the Arab cause weakened’ (1999: 12). By 1914 the Muslim intellectual Rashid Rida argued that the Palestinians faced a decisive choice. They could either come to an accommodation with the Zionists in which the Zionists, in return for concessions would put a limit on their ambitions, or they could oppose them with arms:

It is incumbent upon the leaders of the Arabs – the local population – to do one of two things. Either they must reach an agreement with the leaders of the Zionists to settle the differences between the interests of both parties … or they must gather all their forces to oppose the Zionists in every way, first by forming societies and companies, and finally by forming armed gangs which oppose them by force. (Rida, cited in Hirst, 1977: 32–3)

THE BALFOUR DECLARATION AND THE BRITISH MANDATE

During the First World War the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was widely anticipated, and the Entente Powers began negotiating over their territorial ambitions. In 1916, negotiations between Britain, France and Russia (later to include Italy) led to the secretive Sykes–Picot agreement, which sought to establish ‘spheres of influence’ for the European Powers within the region. However, the agreement also accepted the realities of emergent Arab nationalism, and specified the recognition of ‘an independent Arab State’ or ‘confederation of Arab States’ within the region. British assurances of Arab independence after the defeat of the Central Powers (which had been pledged as a reward for Arab support during the First World War) can be found in the correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Sharif Hussein, Emir of Mecca, who was recognised as the Keeper of Islam’s most holy places.¹ However, these pledges by European Powers to strive for the recognition of Arab independence conflicted with British assurances also given at the time to Zionist leaders, that Britain would seek the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Zionist leaders established close links with prominent British politicians including Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel and Mark Sykes. In 1915 Samuel, in a memorandum entitled ‘The Future of Palestine’, proposed ‘the British annexation of Palestine [where] we might plant three or four million European Jews’ (Weisgal, 1944: 131, cited in UN, 1990). British support for a Jewish homeland was made explicit in the Balfour Declaration of November 1917:

His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

The ‘non-Jewish communities’, which comprised the 89 per cent of the population, who were Arab, Muslim and Christian, were angered by the declaration.² They noted that it only spoke of their ‘civil and religious rights’, making no mention of political rights. They also questioned the right of the British to give away a country that did not belong to them. Conversely, for the Zionists the declaration was regarded as a triumph. The Israeli historian Avi Shlaim, paraphrasing Chaim Weizmann, argues that it ‘handed the Jews a golden key to unlock the doors of Palestine and make themselves the masters of the country’ (2000: 7). The legality of the Balfour Declaration has since been questioned by some experts (Linowitz, 1957; Cattan, 1973).

After the First World War Britain was assigned control of Palestine, through the mandates system governing the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. In 1921, the British divided the area in two, with the sector east of the Jordan River becoming Transjordan and the area west of the river the Palestinian mandate. In July 1922, the League of Nations Council ratified the Palestinian mandate, article four of which stated that ‘an appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home’ (Gilbert, 1999: 50). For many supporters of the Israeli state the inclusion of the terms of the Balfour Declaration into the League of Nations mandate provide a legal justification for the creation of the Israeli state in Palestine. The view of Palestinians is that such agreements were essentially colonialist in nature and the Jewish presence no more legitimate than the French settler colonies in Algeria, which were evacuated after independence.

The indigenous population of mandated Palestine feared mass Jewish immigration would lead to the further colonisation of their country, and that this would be followed by their own subjugation. The view was shared by certain prominent British politicians such as Lord Curzon who, on 26 January 1919, commented to Lord Balfour:

I feel tolerably sure therefore that while Weizmann may say one thing to you, or while you may mean one thing by a national home, he is out for something quite different. He contemplates a Jewish State, a Jewish nation, a subordinate population of Arabs, etc. ruled by Jews; the Jews in possession of the fat of the land, and directing the Administration … He is trying to effect this behind the screen and under the shelter of British trusteeship. (British Government, Foreign Office, 1919a, cited in Ingrams, 1972: 58)

Some members of the British establishment believed that by supporting the Jewish national home they were directly violating the terms of the mandate.³ Others seemed less concerned about the opinions of the Arab population. A senior British official was cited as telling Chaim Weizmann that in Palestine ‘there are a few hundred thousand Negroes but that is a matter of no significance’ (Heller, 1985, cited in Chomsky, 1992: 435). Some historians, however, have disputed the notion that the Jewish immigrants intended to dominate or supplant the native Arab population. Martin Gilbert, for instance, has claimed that the Jewish immigrants intended to develop the country for the mutual benefit of both peoples and were very concerned about the impact of Jewish immigration on the indigenous population:

Ben-Gurion sought to combine the dynamic of Jewish settlement with the basically humane ideals of Judaism as it had evolved over the centuries. The rights of the inhabitants of the land – not always respected in biblical times – were for him of great importance. Co-existence with the Arabs would, as he saw it, benefit the Arabs considerably, without in any way dispossessing them. (1999: 38)

Other commentators such as ex-prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu have argued that the Jewish settlers had more of a right to the land than the native population because more than 2,000 years earlier Jews had lived there, and in the intervening years had never relinquished their claim over the land. Netanyahu also maintained that Jewish claims to the land were superior to those of the native population because the land had allegedly not been fully developed:

In many ways the argument between Jews and Arabs over their respective historic rights to a national home resembles an argument over the rights of an individual owner to his house. If the original owner is tossed out of his home but never relinquishes his right to return and re-occupy his premises, he may press his claim. But suppose a new occupant has fixed up the place and made a home of it while the original claimant is still around but prevented from pressing his claim? In such a case even if the new occupant has resided there for a considerable period of time and improved the premises, his claim to the place is considered inferior to that of the original owner. Yet in the meantime no one has set up house and the place has become a shambles, there can be no rival claim, and the original owner is clearly entitled to have his property back. (Netanyahu, 2000: 27–8)

Between 1919 and 1926 the Jewish presence in Palestine swelled with the arrival of a further 90,000 immigrants (Bregman, 2003). Gilbert claims that anti-Semitic violence in the Ukraine, in which 100,000 Jews were killed in the aftermath of the First World War, as well as increasing persecution in Poland acted as a ‘powerful catalyst for immigration’ (1999: 49). The Jewish community in Palestine also became increasingly militarised, with the creatio...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Zionist Roots and the First Wave of Jewish Immigration into Palestine
• Notes
• References
• Index