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Mapping the Risk Society
Since the mid 1980s, the concept of risk has acted as a fulcrum for the sociological project of Ulrich Beck. The seminal Risk Society (1992) has been widely acclaimed as the centrepiece of Beck’s work. The book, which has sold well over 60,000 copies worldwide, propelled its author into the spotlight and produced significant reverberations, both within and outside academic circles (McGuigan, 1999; Rustin, 1994). Risk Society (1992) is amongst the most ambitious and provocative of texts written within the social sciences in recent years. Not only does it sweep through an extensive range of topics, it is also – by turns – furious, projective, ironic and humorous. Predictably, the book broke the mould within academic publishing, casting the writer forth as part heretic, part sociological clairvoyant. In his native Germany, Beck is esteemed not only for academic achievement, but also for his thought provoking contributions to high circulation newspapers and magazines (Bronner, 1995: 67). As McGuigan notes, the ripples produced by Risk Society (1992) have extended well beyond the confines of the university campus: ‘It is not just a work of abstract social theory, but a significant intervention in the public sphere of the Federal Republic, a bestseller and required reading for the chattering class’ (McGuigan, 1999: 125).
It should come as no surprise that the academic and social debate about risk has mushroomed since the publication of Risk Society (1992).1 Reflecting on the author’s background, one comes to understand the unprecedented breadth and diversity of the risk society approach. Beck’s work is truly eclectic; he is ‘the master of many traditions and the servant of none’ (Bronner, 1995: 68). Through doctoral research, Beck developed an interest in the production of social knowledge and the application of science. In the risk society thesis, concern about the construction of scientific ‘objectivity’ is illuminated in the ecological problematique and consolidated through a sustained critique of expert systems. Beck’s early research into industrial sociology and the sociology of the family finds voice in his analysis of structural changes in employment, family life and social relationships. In addition, German political conventions – in particular, the politics of the Green movement – have sculpted the risk society perspective. As far as academic tradition is concerned, the concentration on social structure and the negative consequences of capitalist development are indelibly Germanic, following in the footsteps of Marx, Weber and Simmel. Within contemporary sociology, Beck’s work has been contrasted with the drier and structurally inspired projects of Luhmann and Habermas (see Lash, 2002).
In a nutshell, Beck’s groundbreaking approach charts the relationship between the unbinding of social structures, qualitative changes in the nature of risk and shifting patterns of cultural experience. Following on from the publication of Risk Society (1992), the concept of risk has remained an omnipresent feature of Beck’s work (1994; 1995b; 1997; 1999; 2000b; 2002). In more recent offerings, Beck has continued to mobilise risk as an articulation point for debate about the restructuring of employment relations (2000a), the diversification of political activity (1997; 1999) the contents of globalisation (2000b) and the threat of international terrorism (2002). Despite focussing on an extensive range of subjects, Beck has reserved risk as a vital theoretical referent. In the midst of a peculiar mixture of acclaim and bitter criticism, Beck has consistently maintained that contemporary western society is embedded in a culture of risk which has profound impacts on the nature of everyday life.
In this opening chapter, I wish to provide an inventory of the theoretical materials used to assemble the risk society perspective. Firstly, the essential features of the argument will be recounted with reference to the ‘pillars of risk’ which prop up Beck’s thesis. Secondly, the two rudimentary processes that propel the risk society – namely individualisation and risk distribution – will be outlined. By reviewing the defining features of the risk society, an appropriate theoretical framework for the issues discussed in subsequent chapters will be erected. Insofar as our review will remain exegetical, the pillars and processes of risk will be revisited with a more critical eye throughout the book. However, in order to appreciate the resonance of Beck’s work, it is necessary to consider the broader concept of risk. Thus, prior to emptying out the risk society perspective, it may first prove instructive to briefly chronicle the semantic history of risk.
DEFINING RISK
As Lupton (1999a: 8) notes, ‘risk’ is a word that is commonly used to indicate threat and harm. In everyday parlance, the term ‘risk’ is used as ‘a synonym for danger or peril, for some unhappy event which may happen to someone’ (Ewald, 1991: 199). Whilst this definition is apposite to the modern age, it is important to recognise that the meaning of risk has evolved over time. In historical terms, risk is a relatively novel phenomenon, seeping into European languages in the last 400 years. However, there remains a distinct lack of consensus about the etymology of ‘risk’. Some historians believe that the term derives from the Arabic word risq, which refers to the acquisition of wealth and good fortune (Skeat, 1910). Others have claimed that ‘risk’ finds its origins in the Latin word risco and was first used as a navigational term by sailors entering uncharted waters (Ewald, 1991: 199; 1993: 226, Giddens, 1999: 1, Lupton, 1999a: 5; Strydom, 2003: 75). Curiously, these two derivations of risk were soldered together in the seventeenth century through the principle of maritime insurance. Under this banner, risk came to relate to the balance between acquisitive opportunities and potential dangers (Wilkinson, 2001: 91). Such quantitative conceptions of risk were bolstered by the probability theorems of seventeenth-century mathematicians, such as Pascal and de Fermet (Bernstein, 1996: 68). The process of economic development in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries further cemented risk to calculation. In this period, the steady expansion of industry and capital ensured that risk became associated with the economy through the activities of investors and bankers. By the beginning of the twentieth century, ‘risk’ was commonly used in insurance and finance to describe the possible outcomes of investment for borrowers and lenders. In modern times, risk remains firmly coupled to the economic world through forms of statistical calculation, stock-market speculation and company acquisitions. Capitalist markets cannot be sustained without risk, which is ingrained in the decisions of fund managers, the speculations of market makers, the borrowing of business managers and the valuations of insurance companies.
In economic and statistical terms, the concept of risk has traditionally been set apart from uncertainty. As Frank Knight explained many moons ago:
The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known … while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique. (Knight, 1921: 233)
The distinction between risk and uncertainty became received wisdom amongst insurers, economists, analysts and technical practitioners in the early and mid twentieth century. It would appear that many professionals – including those involved in insurance and health protection – still adhere to this logic in their decision making. Nevertheless, in contemporary society, the degree of overlap between risk and uncertainty militates against simple division. For example, the link between Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle and a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD) in humans began as an uncertainty which transmuted into a risk. Seemingly unique cases of uncertainty can rapidly evolve into risks, as and when harm is established. Further, the BSE case illustrates that a high degree of uncertainty often surrounds the extent and the geography of harm (see Adam, 2000b: 119). Contemporary risks contain residual uncertainties, which render quantification problematic. At the height of the BSE crisis, expert estimations of future sufferers of vCJD ranged from 100 to 1 million (Hinchcliffe, 2000: 142). Given such a range of harm, distinguishing between risks and uncertainties seems a thankless – and a fruitless – task.
In modern society risk is inextricably linked to notions of probability and uncertainty. Theoretically speaking, a risk only arises when an activity or event contains some degree of uncertainty: ‘the essence of risk is not that it is happening, but that it might be happening’ (Adam and van Loon, 2000: 2). Today, the properties of probability and uncertainty are themselves welded to the idea of futurity. Risks are perceived to be hazards or dangers associated with future outcomes (Giddens, 1998: 27, Lupton, 1999a: 74). In modern discourse, risk relates to a desire to control and predict the future: ‘To calculate a risk is to master time, to discipline the future. To provide for the future does not just mean living from day to day and arming oneself against ill fortune, but also mathematizing one’s commitment’ (Ewald, 1991: 207).
By unloading the composite features of probability, uncertainty and futurity we can begin to get a taste for the meaning of risk. However, at this stage, I do not intend to delve much deeper into the etymology of risk.1 Indeed, ‘defining’ risk may prove to be something of a red herring. Firstly, understandings of risk will differ over time and place (Hinchcliffe, 2000; Lash and Wynne, 1992). Secondly, the indeterminate character of risk ensures that perceptions will invariably be contested between individuals and social groups (Caplan, 2000; Fox, 1999). As Luhmann (1993: 71) points out, what are ‘risks’ for some, can be construed as ‘opportunities’ by others. Thirdly, in prioritising generality, catch-all definitions of risk tend to concede concrete meaning. Given the multidimensional nature of the concept, it is perhaps misguided to pursue a single definition. Putting aside epistemological issues, in closing down the meaning of risk we are liable to lose sight of the various takes on risk which illuminate Beck’s project. When push comes to shove, compact definitions tell us little about the changing context of risk – or about how risk is constructed, interpreted and experienced through everyday interactions. Taking on board these qualifications, restricting our understanding of risk is contrary to the usage – and the spirit – of risk in the risk society thesis. Indeed, these provisos may go part way in explaining Beck’s reluctance to provide a precise definition.1 In many ways, the concept of risk is beyond concise articulation. Instead, we might profitably see risk as a container for a bundle of issues that are not readily disentangled:
The concept refers to those practices and methods by which the future consequences of individual and institutional decisions are controlled in the present. In this respect, risks are a form of institutionalised reflexivity and they are fundamentally ambivalent. On the one hand, they give expression to the adventure principle; on the other, risks raise the question as to who will take responsibility for the consequences, and whether or not the measures and methods of precaution and of controlling manufactured uncertainty in the dimensions of space, time, money, knowledge/non-knowledge and so forth are appropriate. (Beck, 2000e: xii)
Acknowledging such networked complexities, we can recognise the polysemic quality of risk and approach the concept in an inclusive fashion. With this in mind, the first stage of our journey into the risk society perspective entails a review of the socio-historic context which risks both arise out of and shape.
EPOCHAL PHASES OF RISK
The risk society thesis makes two crucial propositions about the nature of risk in contemporary society. Firstly, Beck posits that the composition of risk has fundamentally mutated. Secondly, the increasingly hazardous quality of risk is said to have generated apocalyptic consequences for the planet. In both Risk Society (1992) and Reflexive Modernization (1994), the concept of risk is encased within the wider framework of an historical narrative. Broadly speaking, three distinctive epochs are recalled: ‘pre-industrial society’ (traditional society), ‘industrial society’ (first modernity) and ‘risk society’ (second modernity). The crux of Beck’s argument is that changes in the composition of risk, allied to major structural transformations, have facilitated a transition from pre-industrial to industrial modernity and, latterly, into the risk society (Beck, 1995a: 78; Goldblatt, 1995: 159). To draw contrasts between different periods, paradigmatic forms of risk are described. Drawing upon a fairly light historical contextualisation,1 Beck differentiates between ‘natural hazards’ and ‘manufactured risks’. Natural hazards such as drought, famine and plague are associated with the pre-industrial period. At the level of risk consciousness, natural hazards were commonly attributed to external forces, such as gods, demons or nature (Beck, 1992: 98; 1995a: 78). In the period of industrial modernity – roughly encompassing the first two thirds of the twentieth century – natural hazards are steadily complemented by a growing set of humanly produced dangers, such as smoking, drinking and occupational injury. At this stage of development, a discrete pool of knowledge exists about how to regulate both natural disasters and man-made risks. This is evidenced by the applied practices of health and welfare systems, environmental agencies and insurance companies (Beck, 1992: 98). Finally, in the advance into the risk society, environmental risks – such as air pollution, chemical warfare and biotechnology – prevail. These potentially catastrophic risks stem from industrial or techno-scientific activities and come to dominate social and cultural experience. For Beck, the risk society can be described as: ‘A phase of development of modern society in which the social, political, ecological and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly allude the control and protective institutions of industrial society’ (Beck, 1994: 27).
In stark contrast to natural hazards, manufactured risks are decision-contingent, endogenous entities which are generated by the practices of ‘people, firms, state agencies and politicians’ (Beck, 1992: 98). Because manufactured risks arise out of the developmental processes of modernisation they can be seen as socially rather than naturally produced. Beck (1992: 21) ties resultant public cognition of risk to broader social transitions, such as globalisation, the individualisation of experience, the questioning of expert systems and the burden of identity construction. These all-embracing structural shifts are said to be steering western cultures toward a distinctive form of ‘reflexive modernity’ (Beck, 1994: 2). Circumventing the theoretical quicksand, reflexive modernisation refers to the way in which patterns of cultural experience are uprooted and disembedded by underlying changes in social class, gender, the family and employment. As the structural certainties previously provided by governing institutions evaporate, people are pressed into routinely making decisions about education, employment, relationships, identity and politics. Consequently, in reflexive modernity individuals assume greater responsibility for the consequences of their choices and actions. According to Beck, the changing nature of risk is intrinsically wedded to the broader process of reflexive modernisation. Far from remaining static, both the constitution and the effects of risk have fluctuated over time. In industrial society, via the process of socio-economic development, a coterie of unmanageable risks emerge. As scientific, technological and economic practices become entrenched as instruments of social progress, manufactured risks continue to appear as environmental ‘side effects’. In the movement into the risk society – from the 1970s onwards in Britain and Germany – the unremitting production of environmental risks forces society to confront the harmful consequences of capitalist development (Beck, 1999: 9). Beck urges us to recognise that risks are no longer an inevitable and benign aspect of social development. Qualitative variations in the nature of risk mean that dangers produced by the system can no longer be contained. In contemporary western society, recurrent economic, scientific and technological expansion has resulted in the creation of ‘serial risks’ which breed with such intensity that existing mechanisms of risk management become swamped (Beck, 1996: 27).
In the risk society thesis a toolbox of concepts is employed to distinguish between manufactured risks and natural hazards. In particular, we can identify a trio of ‘pillars of risk’ which hold Beck’s argument together, namely: transformations in the relationship between risk, time and space; the catastrophic nature of risk and the breakdown of mechanisms of insurance. In order to understand the foundations underpinning the risk society thesis and its working rationale, we relate each of these in turn.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RISK, TIME AND SPACE
The changing dynamics of the relationship between risk, time and space is a central feature of the risk society thesis. Beck believes that pre-industrial and early industrial cultures were prey to forms of risk that were geographically and temporally contained (Beck, 1999: 143). Natural hazards such as earthquakes, famine and flooding are depicted as archetypal dangers faced in traditional cultures. Despite possessing substantial force and harbouring negative consequences, Beck contends that ‘natural hazards’ are temporally ‘closed’ phenomena which impact within a specific locale. Of course, natural hazards still threaten human life in many areas of the globe. However, the detrimental effects of natural hazards have been countered, managed and dissipated. In western cultures, natural hazards such as drought and famine have been all but banished (Giddens, 1991: 116). Further, the adverse effects of earthquakes have been lessened by construction restrictions in volatile areas and the production of shock-resistant buildings. From pre-industrial to industrial society, the incidence of economic and technological risks rises and accidents are recognised as the products of faulty human decisions (Beck, 1995a: 78). In the transition from pre-industrial to risk society, hazards and accidents become displaced by an aggregation of man-made risks. These socially produced risks are both more mobile and more oblique than preceding forms of danger. For Beck, the paradigmatic manifestation of environmental risk is the Chernobyl disaster (Beck, 1987; 1992: 7). In comparison with the natural hazards which typified pre-industrial life, the Chernobyl accident shattered geographical boundaries. The risks created by the reactor explosion were not tied to locale, endangering citizens far and wide. Toxins leaked from the plant not only caused ill health to citizens in Belarus and the Ukraine, but also glided over national boundaries, producing unknown effects (Beck, 1992: 7; Wynne, 1996: 62). Leaning heavily on the Chernobyl example, Beck postulates that environmental risks such as nuclear and chemical pollution remap the geography of risk. In the Chernobyl case, the safety procedure for nuclear accidents only covered a radius of 25 kilometres (Beck, 1995a: 78).
On top of transcending spatial limits, Beck asserts that the perils of the risk society cannot be temporally limited. The deleterious effects of environmental risks do not necessarily occur instantaneously (Adam and van Loon, 2000: 5). Years after the Chernobyl explosion, thousands of Ukranians and Belarussians developed serious cancers and breathing disorders. Given that nuclear fallout is indestructible, toxins harboured underground and in the atmosphere continue to produce damage to future generations: ‘the injured of Chernobyl are today, years after the catastrophe, not even all born yet’ (Beck, 1996: 31).1 The sequential knock-on risks associated with the Chernobyl accident bear testament to the seriality of manufactured risks. As we shall see in Chapter 7, a decade after the reactor explosion, radiocaesium related to chemical fallout from the Chernobyl accident was discovered in Cumbria in the North-West of England (Wynne, 1996: 62). In the Cumbrian case, radioactive chemicals stored in the ground generated a kaleidoscope of potential risks to the natural environment, grazing animals...