Don't Mention the War

Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media

David Miller

• Publisher: Pluto Press
• Year: 1994
• Print ISBN: 9780745308364
• eBook ISBN: 9781783718320
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Journalism
• Index: Biological Sciences

The media has told us for over twenty five years that the conflict in Northern Ireland is irrational and has 'no objective social basis'. The role of the British Army in Northern Ireland is still described as a peacekeeping one: the cause of the 'troubles' as 'terrorism'. Yet, even in the light of the peace initiatives, many people in Britain and abroad know little about the war that has not been called a war. Why is this so? Don't Mention the War explains some of the fundamental reasons why there is such a dearth of knowledge and concern about Northern Ireland and how the problem has been defined both publicly and politically. Miller argues that the central strategy of the British state since 1969 has been to contain the troubles and bring about a return to 'normal'. In pursuing this argument, Miller examines the strategies and tactics used by the British government, the nationalists, the unionists and others to influence perceptions and ideas about the conflict through press statements and other information management activities. This is a unique and timely work, based on over 100 interviews with journalists, government officials, political activists and politicians, which lays bare the lies of the propagandists and paints a disturbing picture of the success of the media managers in manipulating our perception of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

1

Policing the Media: Secrecy, Intimidation and Censorship

On paper, the Government of the day has the power to veto any BBC broadcast. The BBC – and this is the important point – has the right to broadcast that this veto has been exercised. In the whole history of the BBC no Government – not even in war time – has made use of this power in connection with any particular programme or item and it is now pretty well politically unthinkable that it ever could be made use of.

(Sir Hugh Greene, The Third Floor Front, 1969, p. 69)

The power to require the BBC to refrain from broadcasting particular material is the famous ‘unused’ veto. This arouses immense suspicion in the minds of those visitors to Britain, who are not accustomed to the force of convention in British society. The fact that the power exists leads them to suspect that it must be used, or that its use must, at times, be threatened in order to secure desired objectives. This is simply not the case.

(Sir Charles Curran, A Seamless Robe, 1979, p. 64)

In fact, the threat of the veto to secure desired objectives has been threatened by governments on several occasions. However, the use of the veto is not the only indicator of the degree to which broadcasting is independent of the state. In Britain, there is an identifiable ‘tradition’ in the relationships between broadcasters and the state. The veto has rarely been used both because it has not been necessary to use it and because successive governments have recognised the immense value of an apparently independent broadcasting system. Broadcasting in Britain is centrally legitimated by its claim to be independent of the state. Maintaining the appearance of independence is crucial to the broadcasters and it is this that can allow the government to exert pressure for informal and ‘voluntary’ agreements with the media. The history of the relationship is one of government pressure and ‘voluntary self-restraint’ or ‘responsibility’ by the broadcasters. This has been tempered by the occasional willingness of BBC and independent television management to display their ‘independence’ by refusing to accede to government ‘requests’ or threats.

This chapter explores the ‘policing’ of the media by examining four main limits on media coverage. These are, first, the economic context of media production, second, indirect censorship via pressure, intimidation and the use of the law, third, direct censorship imposed under the Broadcasting Ban in 1988, and fourth, the limits imposed by the broadcasters on themselves – that is, self-censorship.

A key argument is that none of these limits, including the law, is hard and fast, rather, the way in which the powerful use the techniques at hand (indeed the techniques which are available) and the way in which the broadcasters react are related to an ongoing process of contest and to changing political and economic circumstances.

‘Responsibility’ versus ‘Independence’

An early example of the ‘responsible’ approach was the General Strike, during which there was pressure for the government to take over the BBC. In the event it decided not to. But as Lord Reith, the first Director-General of the BBC, recorded in his diary, ‘The Cabinet decision is really a negative one. They want to be able to say that they did not commandeer us, but they know that they can trust us not to be really impartial’ (Stuart 1975: 96).

In the 1939-45 war, the BBC saw itself as having a central role in fighting the enemy. It was subject to strict control of all news bulletins by the Ministry of Information, although it was not simply the mouthpiece of the government. During the Suez crisis in 1956 the BBC came under very heavy government pressure. Prime Minister Eden regarded Suez as a war situation and expected internal criticisms of the government to be suppressed. When the BBC gave the opposition the right to reply to ministerial broadcasts and refused to excise critical comments from its overseas bulletins the government made threats of financial cuts and planted a Foreign Office liaison officer in Bush House to vet the external services.¹ The BBC was able to resist government pressure partly because Suez was not a national emergency, but also because there was a deep division in the press and in politics, stretching to the cabinet itself.²

The credibility of British broadcasting was a key reason for the reluctance of the government to take over the BBC. This thinking was shared by the broadcasters. In the aftermath of Suez, Postmaster-General Charles Hill argued this point with the Cabinet:

In my view, the gain to Britain from the BBC’s high reputation is immense, far outweighing any confusion which may occur through failure to understand its relationship to government. The independence which the corporation has should always be kept inviolate. Once this issue was decided little more was heard of the agitation to destroy or to reduce the BBC’s independence. (Hill 1964: 188)

In 1958, the crisis in Cyprus and the possibility of Archbishop Makarios being interviewed on a visit to London prompted the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, to write to the BBC expressing his concern. Charles Hill, who by then was the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, went to visit Harman Grisewood, Chief Assistant to the Director-General, for what he called ‘one of our informal chats’ (Irish Times, 2/3 January 1989). Grisewood resisted the attempt to keep Makarios off the air, but nevertheless Hill ‘was left with the impression that … if they did put Makarios on, they would make it the occasion for severe hostile questioning of the gentleman’ (PREM 11/2226, 16 June 1958).

In August 1956, over two months before the Suez crisis came to a head, the BBC had already come under pressure from Eden, who objected to an Egyptian major being interviewed. The BBC rejected his complaints. Eden’s press adviser, William Clark, then wrote to the Prime Minister advising on the powers that could be used against the BBC. Clark noted that every dispute with the BBC had been ‘settled by persuasion so far’ (Guardian, 2 January 1987). Charles Hill also advised Eden that ‘while the powers of formal intervention remain so limited, it is only by informal contact and discussion that programme content can be influenced’ (HO 256/360, 20 August 1956).

During the Falklands episode the broadcasters again found it difficult to admit critical or oppositional views to news programmes, and they were attacked for being ‘traitorous’ when they did. In 1956, the BBC had managed to resist government pressure, but it is clear that during the Falklands crisis much news was shaped to support government policy (Glasgow University Media Group 1985). During the Gulf conflict of 1991 the broadcasters’ obsession with ‘surgical strikes’ and ‘precision killing’ meant that civilian casualties were ignored and there was little criticism which questioned the rationale for the war (Kellner 1992; Mowlana et al. 1992; Philo and McLaughlin 1992; Pilger 1992).

Threatening the Veto

Contrary to the official view, the threat of the veto arose as early as 1935 in the case of The Citizen and His Government, a series of talks that was to have included contributions from Oswald Moseley of the Fascists and Harry Pollitt of the Communist Party as well as representatives from the other parties. The Foreign Office wanted to stop the programmes because of the embarrassment they would cause. After some argument the BBC agreed to cancel the series only ‘if they were authorised to state that “they had been given to understand that the broadcasting of these talks would be an embarrassment to the Government” or something similar’. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden tried to get the BBC to say instead that the government felt that the talks ‘were not in the national interest’. In the event, after further pressure from the government, the BBC cancelled the talks without mentioning the government intervention. The force of the government pressure was underlined by the Cabinet’s decision to authorise the Postmaster-General ‘if necessary, to make quite clear that the Government would not permit these broadcasts’ (Briggs 1979: 198–201; Scannell and Cardiff 1991: 72–8).

For government ministers and information managers, the quiet chat is a less overt and more effective way of managing coverage. In the post-war period ‘informal consultation’ seems to have produced some remarkably effective results – so effective that they don’t even feature in the history books. It is notable that Briggs’ many volumes on the history of the BBC (Briggs 1965, 1970, 1979; cf Cockerell 1989) contain no mention of an informal arrangement between the BBC and the government on one of the most controversial issues of the time – nuclear weapons.

The BBC and the Bomb

The introduction of nuclear weapons in Britain and the build-up of the British ‘independent deterrent’ have been shrouded in secrecy from the very beginning:

The War Cabinet never discussed the atomic bomb in the period leading up to 1945; the (Labour) Deputy Prime Minister was told nothing about it; and the Labour Cabinet as a whole, after the 1945 election, never discussed Britain’s own bomb. From then until now every effort has been made to discountenance public debate on the subject. (Downing 1986: 167)³

By late 1954 BBC producer Nesta Pain was researching a possible programme on nuclear weapons. Her preliminary explorations with scientists and others came to the attention of the government, prompting a pre-emptive letter from the Postmaster-General (PMG) to the Chair of the BBC, Sir Alexander Cadogan. Earl De La Warr’s letter was a crude attempt to vet all programmes on nuclear weapons by threatening the veto:

The wide dissemination in a broadcast programme of information about thermo-nuclear weapons might well raise important issues of public policy. Indeed this is a subject on which the public interest might in certain circumstances require the issue of guidance or directions to the Corporation in pursuance of Section 15(4) of the Corporations Licence. I am therefore writing to ask you to let me see in advance the script of any programme, whether for broadcasting or for television, which contains information about atomic or thermo-nuclear weapons. (BBC WAC R34/997, 18 December 1954)

Since Cadogan was out of the country at the time, the Director-General, Ian Jacob, raised the letter at the board of management meeting on 20 December, where it was felt that ‘it was not in accordance with precedent to submit scripts to the PMG’ and that ‘it would be more appropriate if the government would give the BBC general guidance in the matter’.⁴ Around the same time Sir Ben Barnett of the Post Office had phoned the Director-General to threaten the use of Clause 15(4) against a planned programme called ‘The Spirit in Jeopardy’.

Cadogan raised both these issues in a stinging four-page reply to the PMG in January 1955. He queried ‘whether the government is interested from the point of view of security or from the point of view of wider questions such as the effect on public morale’. The letter from the PMG, together with the phone call from Ben Barnett, ‘seem to indicate’ wrote Cadogan ‘that the Government desires to exercise a measure of control over BBC output which would be unprecedented in peacetime’. He rejected the threat in the PMG’s letter and more or less challenged him to introduce a notice or back down:

Experience over a good many years seems to show … that the corporation cannot agree to accept and follow Government guidance over particular fields of output except where security is concerned. To do so would be to abdicate from responsibilities given to the Governors by the Charter. (BBC WAC R34/997, Cadogan to De La Warr 24 January 1955)

Cadogan concluded by asking for ‘enlightenment on the thinking that has inspired these communications … with sufficient precision to enable the Governors to decide what their attitude should be’. However, at the board of management meeting later that day the Director-General ruled that until they got more information from the government that ‘no programmes should be broadcast about atomic weapons’ (Minute 49, Board of Management meeting 24 January 1955).

Enlightenment came in the shape of an informal meeting at the Ministry of Defence between Cadogan and Jacob of the BBC and the PMG, the Minister of Defence and two officials. By all accounts the mood was much calmer than it had been in the earlier exchange of letters. According to the BBC account of the meeting the Minister of Defence explained that government anxiety had been sparked by the ‘mistaken impression that the BBC was proposing to do a programme about Thermonuclear weapons and their effects before the publication of the Government’s white paper on Defence Policy’. According to this account, the government’s concern here was not one of national security, but rather a simple desire to manipulate public opinion:

The government had been giving anxious consideration to the extent of the information that should be made public about the hydrogen bomb and its effects, and to the way in which this information should be presented. On the one hand they did not desire to keep the public in entire ignorance; on the other hand they did not want to stimulate the feeling so easily accepted by the British people because it agreed with their natural laziness in these matters, that because of the terrible nature of the hydrogen bomb there was no need for them to take part in home defence measures (Ian Jacob, ‘Note of meeting held at the Ministry of Defence’ 15 February 1955).

Having tried to assure the BBC that the target of the governments action was the lazy British people rather than the independence of the BBC, the Minister of Defence went on to suggest that the PMG’s rather intemperate letter and Cadogan’s reply be quietly forgotten about and that they start afresh:

The Minister of Defence felt that these two communications should now be put away in the files and that the matter should be handled on a more informal basis. He assumed that there would be no difficulty in close touch being maintained between the Ministry of Defence and the Corporation on this matter, and this would enable both parties to exchange information and views without hampering documents. (Ian Jacob, ‘Note of meeting held at the Ministry of Defence’ 15 February 1955)

The BBC response was one of relief and it quickly agreed that quiet chats were a better way of proceeding: ‘The Chairman entirely agreed with the Minister’s proposal and confirmed that the Corporation had no desire to embarrass the Government in this very delicate matter’ (Ian Jacob, ‘Note of meeting held at the Ministry of Defence’ 15 February 1955). Ian Jacob then explained that discussions of the white paper on defence would simply take their agenda from the government’s concerns set out in the paper itself:

I explained to the Minister that we should be under the necessity of having programmes expounding and discussing the White Paper on Defence but that naturally these would be founded on the information contained in that paper. I did not foresee any immediate desire on the part of the corporation to mount programmes about the effects of the hydrogen bomb. There did not seem to be any immediate point in doing so. (Ian Jacob, ‘Note of meeting held at the Ministry of Defence’ 15 February 1955)

A public interest in such programmes was perhaps not considered reason enough.

Following this the Director-General prepared a paper on nuclear weapons and broadcasting, which was discussed inside the corporation on 4 March. In it he emphasised that certain types of discussion of nuclear weapons which furthered the ‘national interest’ should be made ‘with no hesitation’:

To further the national interest in this case will be to give full exposition to the facts given in the White Paper, and to the theories expounded in it by the Government. But there are many conclusions founded on these facts and theories which call for full discussion. For example, should Britain make hydrogen bombs? Could there be a greater partition of the defence effort between us and our allies? What role should the TA play? and so on. (‘Thermo-Nuclear Weapons and Broadcasting’, A note by the Director-General 28 February 1955)

On the other hand there were other topics which were a ‘more difficult problem’, such as ‘the symptoms induced by the “fallout”, the degree of radioactivity in the atmosphere which may prove harmful, and so on’. Such topics had to satisfy much stricter criteria, such as whether there was ‘a worth-while object to be achieved by the programme, which would outweigh the horrific impact’. As we have seen, Jacob had already told the Minister of Defence that there seemed to be ‘no immediate point’ in such programmes.

In a draft letter to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, following the meeting with Jacob and Cadogan, the PMG was flushed with success:

We finally agreed that the Corporation should keep in close touch with the Ministry of Defence on all matters relating to the presentation of the hydrogen bomb to the public. We all thought that this was a more satisfactory and practical solution than that the Government should try to lay down precise rules in writing. I hope you agree that this arran...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Policing the Media: Secrecy, Intimidation and Censorship
• 2 The Development of Propaganda Strategies
• 3 Public Relations as a Propaganda Tactic
• 4 From ‘Terrorists’ to ‘Freedom Fighters’: International Coverage of Northern Ireland
• 5 Misinformation and Public Belief: The Case of Gibraltar
• 6 Conclusion: Winning the Information Battle
• Appendix A: Unattributable briefing documents issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1980–93
• Appendix B: Cost of press, public relations, advertising and marketing by official bodies in Northern Ireland
• Appendix C: PR staffing levels in official bodies in Northern Ireland
• Appendix D: Groups taking part in the general audience study
• Appendix E: Groups taking part in the Gibraltar study
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index