How Tory Governments Fall

The Tory Party in Power Since 1783

Anthony Seldon

• Publisher: Fontana Press
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780006863663
• eBook ISBN: 9780008191634
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

How Tory Governments Fall is a landmark study of the forces that shape – and ultimately destroy – political power. It assesses the factors that are common to the decline and fall of each Conservative administration in British history since the beginnings of the modern, party-based system.

CHAPTER ONE

1783–1806

Jeremy Black

Problems of Definition

Definitions are always a problem, but those set by the subtitle for this book are worse than most. Today it may be clear what is meant by Tory, party and power, but none of those terms is clear for the period 1783–1806. They were not clear to contemporaries and the terms, as used in the period, are not clear today. That they were not clear to contemporaries, that terms such as Tory were controversial and the practice of government, not least issues of party and power, were much debated, reflects the degree to which the very rationale and definitions of political action were far from rigid and the extent to which these in part constituted issues of political contention. This essay will consider the ambivalence of the term ‘Tory’ and the distinctive meaning of the ‘Pittite’ tradition in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It will also assess the combination of influences affecting the formation and end of ministries, especially the strengths and weaknesses of the Crown; and the degree to which both ‘government’ and ‘opposition’ operated within a shared political tradition.

An immediate working definition is provided by the notion that William Pitt the Younger’s first administration, 1783–1801, the Addington ministry, 1801–4, and Pitt’s second administration 1804–6, comprised a period of Tory hegemony spanning the years between the Fox–North ministry of 1783 and the ‘Ministry of All the Talents’ of 1806–7. The fact that many in these ministries were uncomfortable with the designation ‘Tory’, however, is important, for the process by which the term ceased to be one of abuse and became, instead, shorthand for a nexus of loyalties and allegiances, and a proud and self-conscious sense of political continuity, was a gradual one. Pitt called himself an independent Whig. Few MPs described themselves as Tories before 1832, the year of the First Reform Act, and a recent discussion of conservative attitudes in this period notes that ‘before 1819, few among the right-wing newspapers, journals and periodicals openly avowed themselves “Tory”’, and that the process by which the term came to be used as the principal ‘descriptive term for the party of the Right’ was slow and hesitant.¹ Another problem with the use of the term Tory to describe the government in the later 1780s is that the supporters of Lord North, First Lord of the Treasury 1770–82, who have been described as Tory, had aligned themselves in opposition to the ministry. Even the term ‘right-wing’ is problematic.

Aside from supporting the influence of the Crown, Toryism as a position had particularly pronounced religious connotations in an age when religion reflected, defined and constituted the prime instance of ideological commitments. As in the early eighteenth century when there had been a coherent Tory Party, Toryism was the party of the Church of England in so far as there was one, and Tories were identified with the defence of the Anglican position. Pitt, like his father, William Pitt the Elder, and the latter’s protégé, William, 2nd Earl of Shelburne, had been associated with the Dissenters, but became, perforce, an Anglican champion, defending the Test and Corporation Acts, which enforced Anglican privilege in public life, against Dissenter attempts to repeal them in 1787–90. While forfeiting much support from Dissenters and other reformers, Pitt won considerable Anglican backing. Toryism under Pitt’s government was identified with the Church of England and with opposition to Dissent and Catholicism. Anti-Catholic bishops were elevated.

Tory perceptions of the nature of authority drew on Anglican tradition, especially with reference to support for legally constituted authority. This tradition had been confused after 1688 by the crisis over the nature of such authority, in Church and State, that followed the so-called Glorious Revolution of 1688 when the legal monarch, the Catholic James II (1685–88), was replaced. Thereafter, as long as the Jacobite movement for the return of the male line of the Stuarts had been strong, Toryism had been divided. Originally a political tendency that arose in defence of Charles II (1660–85), order and the Church of England in the early 1680s, in response to Whig pressures for the exclusion of the future James II from the succession and for more rights for Dissenters, Toryism found it difficult to cope with the consequences of the Revolution Settlement. Some Tories were prepared to accept that the legally constituted authority was now that of William III (1689–1702), but others regarded him as a latter-day Cromwell and were prepared to conspire for his overthrow.

This tension remained strong until the collapse of the Jacobite option after the defeat of Charles Edward Stuart at Culloden in 1746. It did not, however, prevent the development of a Tory parliamentary politics opposed to the Whigs. This was the basic pattern of national politics in the first half of the century, but it collapsed in 1746–62 as Tory cohesion and identity were seriously compromised: Tory support was wooed first by Whig ministers and then by George III (1760–1820). In the early 1760s the Tories atomized, joining a variety of political groups, including the government establishment in the Commons.

The Power of the Monarch and the Formation of the Pitt Ministry 1783–84

The issue of definition is not an idle one because it relates directly to those of the ideology of the ministries already mentioned, the interests they represented most closely and the reasons for their success and failure. The government was of course the King’s government, the ministers appointed by him. Charles James Fox, a Whig stalwart of opposition, felt able to tell his nephew Lord Holland in 1804, ‘There is not a power in Europe, no not even [Napoleon] Bonaparte’s that is so unlimited’, as monarchical authority in Britain.² It is certainly possible to answer the points raised in the first sentence of this paragraph by referring to George III, to argue that he was responsible for ministerial changes, most obviously the fall of the Fox–North ministry in 1783 and its replacement by that of Pitt, and, subsequently, the fall of Pitt in 1801 over Catholic Emancipation.³ It is possible to present the crucial interest and ideology of the Pitt government in terms of the Crown, and indeed to see its rationale in terms of the rallying around Crown, Church and Country that characterized so much of conservative thought in Europe in response to the French Revolution and the subsequent rise of Napoleon.

George greatly distrusted the Fox–North ministry: he saw it as factious and was directly responsible for its replacement in December 1783 by an untried team around the 24-year-old Pitt, who lacked a majority in the House of Commons. George’s actions, which were regarded by some as unconstitutional, were countered by a collective resignation of office-holders, similar to the step that had forced George II to abandon his attempt to create a ministry under the unpopular Earl Granville (Lord Carteret) in February 1746. The unsuccessful attempt of the new ministers to reach an agreement with Fox on 21 December 1783 and the resignation the following day of Earl Temple, both Home and Foreign Secretary, in order to lessen the danger of impeachment for his crucial role in the fall of the previous government – destabilizing it by conveying the King’s opposition – were evidence of weakness, though it has also been argued that the resignation was brought about by Pitt’s desire to distance his new administration from the dubious methods by which it came into existence. On the morning of 23 December George saw himself as ‘on the edge of a precipice’.⁴

Though a Cabinet had been formed by that evening, the government was still weak after the Christmas recess. Having lost two Commons divisions on 12 January 1784, Pitt thought of resigning. Distressed to find the Commons ‘much more willing to enter into any intemperate resolutions of desperate men than I could have imagined’, George III characteristically reiterated his hostility to ‘this faction’, his readiness to struggle against them until the end of his life and his willingness to abdicate if they gained office. On 23 January Pitt’s bill for the government of British India, a crucial and contentious piece of legislation, was also defeated. Four days later the ministry was referred to by Lord George Germain as ‘this no government’. There is evidence that Pitt did intend to dissolve Parliament and call a general election immediately after his appointment in December 1783, but it was discovered that the necessary parliamentary timetable did not allow time for a new Parliament to meet and pass the Supplies and Mutiny Bill before the end of the financial year in March 1784. Therefore Pitt had to hang on and fight it out despite his weak position in the Commons.⁵

Despite the King’s determination, it was unclear whether Pitt’s tenure of office would be much longer than Temple’s. There was an element of exaggeration in Fox’s comment on the ‘unlimited’ nature of royal authority. Though George III could be important in supporting and ending ministries, not even the support of the Crown could save the Bute (1762–63), North (1770–82), Shelburne (1782–85) and Addington (1801–4) governments. In 1784 it was unclear that the same would not also be true for Pitt’s ministry. An unsuccessful attempt by independent MPs to create a broad-based government of national union, a frequently expressed aspiration during the century, gave Pitt breathing space in early February, and his position was further improved by a swelling tide of favourable public opinion, indicated by a large number of addresses from counties and boroughs, with over 50,000 signatures in total, in favour of George III and the free exercise of the royal prerogative in choosing ministers. They also reflected hostility to what was seen as the opportunism of the Fox–North coalition. George’s confidence in public support and his view that a Commons majority was not crucial were reflected when he wrote of

the present strange phenomenon, a majority not exceeding 30 in the House of Commons thinking that justifies the stopping the necessary supplies when the House of Lords by a majority of near two to one and at least that of the People at large approve of my conduct and see as I do that not less is meant than to render the Crown and the Lords perfect cyphers; but it will be seen that I will never submit.

The formation of the Pitt government had not therefore ended the crisis created by the poor relations between George III and the Fox–North political groups, but it had changed its nature, made it more public and united monarch and government. The more public nature of the transformed crisis led to an upsurge in popular interest and this focused on support for George and thus his new ministers. That so many of the latter were little known was very advantageous: they lacked the experience of office that could lead to political charges of opportunism and inconsistency, both of which harmed North. The historian and former MP Edward Gibbon referred to the country as being ‘governed by a set of most respectable boys, who were at school half a dozen years ago’.⁶

Pitt was further aided by the active support of many peers, not least their influence with dependants in the Commons; and by the uncertainty of his opponents as to whether they should use Parliament’s power to refuse supplies in order to force a change of government. The House of Lords still played a major role in the political system, albeit a lesser one than a century earlier. It posed fewer problems of management than the Commons. The ‘Party of the Crown’, composed of archbishops, bishops, royal household officers, Scottish representative peers and newly created or promoted peers, provided a consistent basis for the ministerial majority. Thus, a chamber that had posed considerable problems of management during the reign of Anne became the most quiescent of the two Houses of Parliament. Governments took care to ensure that they had effective spokesmen in the Lords, and patronage was applied in a consistent fashion to unite the ‘Party of the Crown’.⁷

The backing of the Lords lessened the severity of the political crisis in 1784 and obliged Fox to concentrate his efforts on the Commons. There, Fox’s bluff was called over the voting of supplies and he also suffered from a leakage of Northites both before and during the 1784 election. The unstable nature of the Fox–North alignment was revealed in 1784. Not only were there important tensions within it, but it was also weakened by failure and the loss of office and patronage, the last especially serious for the Northites. Pitt’s success in gaining the initiative in Parliament helped lead to the turnaround of public opinion in his favour by the time of the election.

By 5 March 1784 Fox’s majority in the Commons wa...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of Tables
• Introduction: The Tory Party in Power 1783–1996: Anthony Seldon
• 1. 1783–1806: Jeremy Black
• 2. 1812–1830: Norman Gash
• 3. 1841–1846: Bruce Coleman
• 4. 1874–1880: John Vincent
• 5. 1886–1905: Martin Pugh
• 6. 1916–1929: Stuart Ball
• 7. 1931–1945: Michael Bentley
• 8. 1951–1964: John Turner
• 9. 1970–1974: Dennis Kavanagh
• 10. 1979–1996: Ivor Crewe
• Conclusion: Why Tory Governments Fail: Anthony Seldon
• Keep Reading
• Contributors
• Notes
• Index
• About the Author
• About the Publisher