Europe and Northern Ireland's Future

Negotiating Brexit's Unique Case

Mary C. Murphy

• Publisher: Agenda Publishing
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781788210300
• eBook ISBN: 9781788211123
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Échanges et tarifs douaniers

The implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland are profound, given its history and geographical position as a land border with the European Union. Four decades of sectarian violence have been replaced by a period of sustained peace, economic growth and development, yet the trenchant political divide remains. The ongoing fractious relations within the Northern Irish Assembly threaten to derail any hope the region might have on influencing the discussion and direction of the Brexit negotiations.

Mary C. Murphy offers a detailed and in-depth analysis of Northern Ireland's relationship with the EU, the role the EU has played in rebuilding the region after the Troubles, and the challenges and opportunities that Brexit might offer Northern Ireland in terms of its fragile politics and economy.

Northern Ireland has long occupied a greater political space than might seem warranted, given its size and relatively underdeveloped economy. This space may yet again become the most hotly contested and divisive topic in future Brexit negotiations, if it doesn't in fact prove to be the key to the successful UK withdrawal and future relations with our European neighbours.

1

The political economy of a pressured relationship

After a prolonged period of conflict spanning four decades, political violence in Northern Ireland has dissipated. Agreement on the cre-ation of power-sharing institutions was achieved in 1998 and has been followed by a lowering of tensions between the nationalist and unionist communities. Relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and between the UK and Ireland have simultaneously been transformed.1 Economic growth and prosperity has materialized on both sides of the border. All of these positive developments have happened against the backdrop of joint Irish and UK membership of the European Union (EU).

The June 2016 referendum decision to exit the EU represents a critical moment for the UK, and for its constituent parts. The outcome and aftermath of the vote revealed the existence of marked political, ideological, socio-economic, demographic and geographic divisions across the UK. The Northern Ireland electorate voted for the UK to remain in the EU. Of those who voted in Northern Ireland, 55.8 per cent supported the UK’s continued membership. This result is at odds with the overall UK referendum result, which narrowly supported the Leave position. Like Scotland, London and Gibraltar, the Northern Ireland preference for Remain was subsumed by the UK-wide preference for Leave. The suspension of Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions in early 2017 followed in May by elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and then shortly after that a UK general election added an intriguingly unexpected dimension to the question of how to deal with Northern Ireland interests during and after UK withdrawal. A loose political pact between the Conservative Party and Northern Ireland’s Eurosceptic Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) prompted very real concerns about the impact of such a move on the shape of the UK’s Brexit deal and on what the new UK government arithmetic might mean for political stability in Northern Ireland.

Given Northern Ireland’s geographic situation, its close economic and institutional ties with the Republic of Ireland, its political history of conflict, and the existence of a communal divide on the question of EU membership, the implications of the overall Leave vote were more profound for Northern Ireland than for any other part of the UK. The referendum result effectively meant that Northern Ireland was politically and economically vulnerable, and more concerning was that the region had no champion in terms of defending and advancing its specific interests. Neither the Northern Ireland Executive nor the local political parties were able to forge a common position on Brexit and the UK government paid only limited attention to the implications of EU withdrawal for the region. In contrast, the Irish government was much more vocal and proactive in highlighting issues for both sides of the border. The EU also afforded consideration to specific Irish and Northern Ireland interests. Overall however, the Northern Ireland situation was largely a footnote in the broader national Brexit referendum debate. This was not just regrettable, but reckless. The political and economic forces to which Northern Ireland is subject were profoundly challenged by Brexit, and produced some economic and political turbulence. Long-term this may involve severe political implications for the region itself, and also entail serious consequences for the UK and the Republic of Ireland. The fracturing of relationships in Northern Ireland, on the island of Ireland and between the Republic of Ireland and the UK, potentially threatens political and constitutional stability. The EU referendum vote added an additional layer of (tense) complexity to the troubled Northern Ireland polity, which risks igniting broader economic and political turmoil for the neighbouring states. The Republic of Ireland’s continued membership of the EU means that the Union is implicated here too.

Northern Ireland has been a region in transition since the 1990s. The calling of paramilitary ceasefires in 1994 and the signing of the Belfast Agreement less than four years later jumpstarted a period of regional economic revival and political stability. The region also weathered the global economic crisis and managed to maintain peace and stability despite sporadic political crises. The 2016 Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report (Wilson 2016) depicted a region in transition – one that faces continuing economic, political, security and social challenges, but that has nevertheless experienced some success in the bedding down of devolved institutions and in advancing community relations. The process of reconciliation and community integration is slow however, and the challenges that persist are complex and multifaceted. What Galtung (1990) labels a “negative peace” prevails in Northern Ireland. This environment is characterized by lingering disagreements and tensions that contribute to the ongoing polarization of the two communities. Even after the ceasefires and the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland occupied a volatile political context. The Irish language, legacy issues, flags and symbols continue to be a thorn in the side of an incomplete peace process, the final stages of which are always the most vexing. Northern Ireland also retains an “essential ‘inbetweenness’ of a political space that has moved from a ‘long war’ through a ‘long peace’ and into a profoundly undecided future” (Shirlow & Coulter 2014: 713). The process of conflict management and resolution is long-term and imperfect. Given the tenuous nature of the local settlement, future peace, prosperity and stability may be derailed by unexpected and unanticipated forces. Brexit has the potential to be one such force.

On the cusp of remarkable changes – not of its own making or choice – Northern Ireland may simultaneously be collateral damage, and the cause of further collateral damage. Brexit has challenged the current status quo in Northern Ireland and disrupted the region’s economic and political trajectory. This book delivers a strong cautionary message about the imprudence of overlooking the needs, interests, preferences and aspirations of the UK’s most troubled region at a moment of extraordinary constitutional change. It provides a detailed and in-depth overview and analysis of key economic and political factors for Northern Ireland. It analyses the potential impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland, and details how what happens in Northern Ireland may have substantial and far-reaching political, economic and constitutional effects for the UK and the Republic of Ireland.

Devolution and the UK

Northern Ireland’s EU relationship can only be understood within the broader UK national context. Since joining the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, the UK’s political system changed through the devolution process. The devolution of powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland was initiated and implemented by former Prime Minister Tony Blair in the late 1990s. This process of regionalization was in line with a broader trend towards the embrace of various forms of decentralization in many European states. A range of factors including globalization, nationalism, and EU developments influenced “a general renaissance of the regional level” (Bullman 1997: 4) and the UK was not removed from this trend. Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions grew out of this environment, although importantly their consociational, power-sharing arrangement was primarily rooted in attempts at conflict resolution.

Northern Ireland and devolution: The 1998 Belfast Agreement

The Belfast Agreement is a historic compromise agreed by the majority of Northern Ireland’s political parties on Good Friday, 10 April 1998. At the heart of the Agreement lies the principle of consent, which affirms that there will be no change to Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as a part of the UK unless a majority of the people of Ireland, north and south, vote for change. This central provision of the Agreement effectively legitimized the nationalist aspiration for a united Ireland, and simultaneously provided guarantees for unionists by confirming that there was currently no majority support for a united Ireland. The Agreement also put in place an institutional framework that aimed to manage relationships within Northern Ireland, between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and between the two islands. The framework comprises three separate but interlocking institutional strands: the Northern Ireland Assembly, the North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC) and the British–Irish Council (BIC) (see Table 1.1). The Agreement also addresses other facets of the conflict and contains provisions in relation to human rights, equality, the decommissioning of weapons, the early release of paramilitary prisoners, security and policing.

Table 1.1 The Belfast Agreement (1998): key strands

Strand	Characteristic	Institutions
Strand 1	Internal	A directly elected 108-member Northern Ireland Assembly operating on a cross-community basis with full legislative and executive control over “transferred matters” (and some reserved matters).*
Strand 2	North–South	The North/South Ministerial Council (NSMC) comprises representatives from the Irish government and the devolved Northern Ireland administration. It meets in sectoral and plenary format “to develop consultation, co-operation and action within the island of Ireland – including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the Administrations, North and South” (Strand 2, Paragraph 1).**
Strand 3	East–West	The British–Irish Council comprises representatives from the UK and Irish governments; representatives of the devolved administrations in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales; and representatives from the Isle of Man and Channel Islands. The Council was established “to promote the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands” (Strand 3, Paragraph 1). It aims to reach agreement on cooperation on matters of mutual interest and does so through discussion, consultation and the exchange of information.***

* The size of the Northern Ireland Assembly has since been reduced to 90 members.

** The Belfast Agreement stipulates a range of areas for North–South cooperation and implementation: agriculture; education; transport; environment; waterways; social security/social welfare; relevant EU programmes; inland fisheries; aquaculture and marine matters; health; and urban and rural development. The work of the NSMC is supported by a series of all-island implementation bodies: one such body is the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), which oversees cross-border EU funding programmes.

*** The Belfast Agreement is less prescriptive in relation to areas of BIC cooperation, when compared to the NSMC. However, the Agreement does suggest that suitable areas for early discussion may include transport links, agricultural issues, environmental issues, cultural issues, health issues, education issues and approaches to EU issues. The work of the BIC has since expanded to 12 work-streams.

The Northern Ireland Assembly, which is overseen by the Executive, facilitates power-sharing. The single transferable vote (PR-STV) electoral system used to elect Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) allocates seats in relative proportion to votes won. The Assembly also conducts its business using specific legislative voting mechanisms designed to achieve cross-community support,2 and the ministerial appointment procedure is based on the d’Hondt system,3 which also effectively guarantees representation for both communities.

The Northern Ireland Assembly enjoys full executive and legislative control over “transferred” matters. These are primarily in the economic and social field.4 The Assembly may also legislate in respect of “reserved” matters subject to various consents, but has not yet done so to any significant degree.5 “Excepted” matters remain the responsibility of Westminster and the UK central government. The Northern Ireland Assembly does not have competence to legislate in these areas.6

The Belfast Agreement and the institutions it creates have been an important means of preserving relative peace in Northern Ireland. Despite sporadic suspensions of the power-sharing institutions, the Agreement has facilitated the peaceful expression of difference within an institutional setting acceptable to both communities. The ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword by Erik Jones
• Abbreviations
• 1. Th e political economy of a pressured relationship
• 2. Th e politicization of Brexit in Northern Ireland
• 3. When introverted politics and political economy collide
• 4. Who speaks for Northern Ireland?
• 5. Europe and Northern Ireland’s future
• References
• Index