Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS

Nicole J. Jackson

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• Print ISBN:
  9780415305778
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134403585
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book investigates the options, the debates and the ensuing policies of the fledgling Russian government. It examines the evolution of policy from the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until the Presidential elections in June 1996. Analysing Russia's actions in the context of contemporary foreign policy theory, Nicole J. Jackson discusses and compares three key conflicts: the separatist war between Moldova and Transdniestria; the separatist war between Georgia and Abkhazia and the civil war in Tajikistan. It will be of interest to students and researchers of international relations, security, foreign policy analysis and Russian studies.

1 Introduction

Russia’s political debates about foreign policy

In 1991, the Soviet Union disbanded into fifteen new states. As the former dominant republic in the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation was the largest and most powerful of these states. As well as accruing advantages stemming from this position, Russia inherited many difficulties, responsibilities and challenges.¹

In terms of foreign affairs, Russia was suddenly faced with having to develop, almost from scratch, policies towards the fourteen newly independent states. A whole range of political, economic and military relations had to be forged and old Soviet ties either dismantled or rebuilt. Although Russia inherited many Soviet foreign policy institutions, the new government’s information and expertise about how to create foreign policy concerning the fourteen states were limited. The creation of policies was further complicated by the fact that Russia was undergoing its own economic catastrophe and domestic identity crisis following the sudden collapse of both communism and empire.

The most serious foreign policy challenge that Russian faced from 1991 to 1996 was how to respond to outbreaks of conflict within its new neighbouring states. Soon after the Soviet Union broke up, many hostilities erupted, ranging from minor border skirmishes to outright war. The Russian government was confronted with urgent decisions about whether or not it should react to these conflicts, and if so, by what means. After 1991, unlike under the Soviet Union, there was an open, diverse, complex political debate about these questions. It is this foreign policy debate and the ensuing policies which form the subject of this book. The time-frame of the study is from the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until the Presidential elections in June 1996, a period encompassed by President Boris Yeltsin’s first term in office.

Of course, the political elite and their debates did not operate in a vacuum. The participants in the foreign policy debates acted within institutional and political settings which at times constrained or enhanced their ability to influence policy. Foreign policy ideas must be understood in terms of the political process by which they are selected. This book therefore focuses on the interplay of debate, the adoption of a consensus view and its reflection in policy. The changing nature of the conflicts created both opportunities and constraints for new policy direction and promotion.

Context: the search for a new Russian foreign policy in a period of uncertainty

After the collapse of the Soviet Union there was considerable uncertainty over Russia’s identity, its new role in the post-Soviet space and, specifically, the course of action that would best further Russian interests in the ‘near abroad’ states.² Russian leaders and the Russian public were faced with an almost paralysing degree of confusion about which policies would produce greater national security and which would best protect Russian interests. This uncertainty, combined with political and institutional instability, enhanced the importance of ideas and debate in the development of Russian foreign policy. Russian leaders could not just work on autopilot or on conventional policy lines. This was a time when politicians and policy-makers had to rethink their positions fundamentally and develop new ones from scratch.

The confusion over how to develop Russian foreign policy was not unexpected. Russia, itself a new state, had to develop relations with the rest of the world and with the fourteen other new states which emerged from the Soviet Union – all of which had appeared suddenly and at approximately the same time. Russia faced a new geopolitical situation. It had inherited 80 per cent of the former Soviet territory and 60 per cent of the Soviet population. Its economy and resources were comparatively limited, as was its military power. The Russian political elite and public faced great anxieties due to many internal problems, including a severe economic crisis and the rise of crime. From 1991 to 1996, many dramatic events occurred: the 1993 coup attempt, the first Chechen war, Russia’s first experiments with democratization and elections. Moreover, Russia had lost its former position as a superpower on the international stage. The threat of the Cold War was gone, but the perception of insecurity was great.

Within these radically new and uncertain internal and external contexts, and without the previous guidance of a Marxist–Leninist philosophy, Russian politicians needed and wanted to find new ways to think about foreign and security policies. There was no obvious or clear direction, especially with regard to the near abroad. The uncertainty goes a long way towards explaining why many politicians’ foreign policy ideas shifted throughout this period – and why some even held contradictory and confused views. It also helps to explain why fundamental ideas were so important in helping politicians choose among the various foreign policy options available to the new Russian state. There was little time for the political elite to develop highly nuanced and knowledgeable views, and there were also pressing issues to be tackled in the domestic arena. Even by 1996 – the end of the time frame encompassed by this study – Russia’s foreign policy was still at a very early stage in its evolution.

Many types of relations could hypothetically have been used to protect Russian interests in the near abroad. In fact, Russia’s political elite advocated various designs which all claimed to advance Russian national interests. Because the participants in the foreign policy debate had divergent preferences over potential ways to act, there was no natural or single policy choice available. Of course, foreign policy ideas were also advocated for pragmatic reasons, especially in order for politicians to preserve power. Foreign policy strategies are generally designed not only in relation to the external environment but also with domestic political consumption in mind. However, in the case of Russia, it was not always obvious which foreign policy choice would strengthen a politician’s political bargaining power. Choices had to be made. Ideas mattered in making those choices, and they helped to shape the foreign policy agenda.

Approach/methodology and sources

In this context, the study asks what the dominant ideas expressed in these debates about foreign policy were in 1992–6 and whether they were reflected in Russia’s policies towards specific military conflicts within the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). To answer this twofold question, the book first identifies the broad ideas about foreign policy that helped to structure the foreign policy thinking of the Russian political elite and their narrower policy orientations towards the near abroad. Second, it sets out the major stages in the evolution of the debate and policy, outlining three broad periods of historical importance – each of which had differing results in terms of foreign policy. Third, the book examines and compares the conflicts in the CIS states in which Russia was militarily involved: the separatist war between Moldova and Transdniestria, the separatist war between Georgia and Abkhazia, and the civil war in Tajikistan.

In each of these three case studies, Russia’s key interests in the conflict are examined to discover how constraining the environment was and how much uncertainty or room for debate over foreign policy choices really existed. The first part of each case study examines Russia’s key interests in the particular conflict – its security, diaspora and economic interest – and, briefly, how they were conditioned by Soviet and Tsarist history. The second part examines the debates over Russia’s foreign policy options towards each particular conflict, the government’s official policy position and Russia’s military action on the ground.

These three steps allow us to examine the relations among the evolution of ideas in the Russian political debate, Russia’s foreign policy output and Russia’s military involvement in each particular conflict. The procedure allows for comparison across the three cases and reveals whether, and to what extent, the dominant ideas expressed in the political debate about foreign policy in general were reflected in Russia’s policies towards some military conflicts and not others. Of course, as in all historical studies it is difficult to demonstrate a definitive relationship between ideas and action.

Although some scholars have commented on the general political debates about Russian foreign policy, this study is original in that it examines in detail Russia’s political debates and official rhetoric as well as its policies and military involvement in three specific conflicts on its territorial periphery. It seeks to discover whether either the debate and/or the policies concerning the specific conflicts reflected the dominant foreign policy ideas within the general foreign policy debate or whether they were irrelevant.

The principal sources systematically consulted for information concerning the political debates are Russian newspapers and journals from 1991–6. Also examined are political party platforms, party pamphlets, political memoirs and books written by members of the Russian political elite during that period. Parliamentary debates are examined only as reported in Russian media sources, since the most important of them – namely detailed committee discussions – are generally not available to the public. Particular attention is paid to the participants in the foreign policy debate who most prominently discussed the particular conflicts and those who represented the different foreign policy ideas and perceptions across the political spectrum. The analysis is supplemented by many direct participant foreign policy views and insights derived from interviews conducted by the author.

The examination of Russia’s official foreign policy position and its military actions is developed primarily from official statements and documents found in the Russian media and Russian government reports. This is supplemented by documents from international organizations such as the United Nations, as well as Russian and Western academic studies about the conflicts.³ This ensemble of materials provides a comprehensive account of the key political elite foreign policy views and the major details concerning Russia’s foreign policy towards the conflicts.

Parameters of the study

Although foreign policy was debated among journalists, academics, diplomats, the military and the wider public, this study focuses almost exclusively on the Russian political elite. Here the political elite involved in the foreign policy debate is defined to include the officials involved in the presidential and governmental administration (particularly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence), Members of Parliament (particularly those in foreign policy committees) and leaders of the key political parties. Of course, many of these foreign policy participants were either previously or simultaneously academics or diplomats. Some also switched their occupational and foreign policy positions during the period under consideration. The transfer from academic to political jobs and back again was relatively common. Significantly, many of those participating in the debate were actively involved in the creation of Russian foreign policy. For example, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev both outlined his foreign policy ideas (which evolved from 1991 to 1996) and made key decisions about how Russia’s foreign policy would be pursued. This study attempts to present a representative sample of the key participants in the debates from across the political spectrum – while concentrating on those most active in the debates and those involved in policy-making.

Case studies

After the Soviet Union broke up, Russia no longer had a specific enemy nor did it face any immediate threat from abroad. Apart from internal threats, its greatest vulnerabilities were seen as coming from its near abroad. These newly independent former Soviet republics were the major focus of Russia’s foreign policy from 1993–6, and relations with these states were among the most important external problems addressed by Russia’s political elite.

This study is limited to an examination of Russia’s debate and policies towards conflicts in the CIS states because these conflicts offered the greatest potential external danger to the stability of the former Soviet Union. While debating how to react to these specific conflicts, Russian politicians were forced to confront a whole range of key issues at the heart of the new state’s foreign policy: the future of the Russian diaspora, the role of Russia’s military and Russia’s economic relations with the former Soviet republics. As we shall see, in each case there were many different reasons for Russia’s involvement in any specific CIS state. The issue of Russia’s military involvement in the CIS conflicts also has significance because it has often been described as the single most important example of Russian ‘quasi-imperialism’. Whether or not this is an accurate description of Russia’s debates and policies will be explored.

The Moldova–Transdniestria, Georgia–Abkhazia and Tajikistan conflicts were chosen for this study because they were the only cases in which Russia became active militarily in CIS conflicts. The Russian military was only indirectly involved in the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Russia’s military was directly involved in South Ossetia, and this is briefly considered in the Abkhazia chapter, but because the conflict was over by early 1992, there was very little debate about this issue. The three selected case studies are also helpfully representative of the three main regions of the former Soviet Union – Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and the ‘European’ states – and thus highlight the similarities and differences in Russia’s debates and policies towards each region.

During the time-frame of this study, Russia’s military was involved in the Chechen War of 1994–6. However, this case is not explicitly examined here because Chechnya was technically part of the Russian Federation, while this book is concerned with the development of Russian foreign policy. However, the debates over foreign policy did occur within the context of the war in Chechnya and were strongly influenced by it. The first Chechen War highlighted the poor state of the Russian army. This highly unpopular war was deeply humiliating for Russians and was expensive in both financial and human costs. The army was demoralized and opinions about what the army could accomplish were highly divergent. Chechnya exposed Russia’s weaknesses and increased the desire of many in the political and military elite to have the Russian army withdraw from conflicts outside the Russian Federation. In this study, the repercussions of this first Chechen War on the general foreign policy debates are discussed in Chapter 4 and its repercussions on Russian foreign policymaking towards the Transcaucasus are considered in Chapter 6.

Foreign policy ideas and orientations

Although Russia’s political elite was in general agreement that the near abroad conflicts threatened Russian security, three main foreign policy orientations developed, each of which represented distinct views about how Russia should react to the military conflicts in the CIS states. From 1991–6, these general sets of ideas – ‘liberal westernist’, ‘pragmatic nationalist’ and ‘fundamentalist nationalist’ – competed for political dominance in Russia. The study uses this threefold classification developed by Neil Malcolm and his co-authors to examine the debates and to determine which foreign policy ideas influenced or dominated the debates and policies in each of the three case studies.⁴

Very briefly, liberal westernists in Russia widely interpreted the definition of security to include economic and political problems as well as military issues. They interpreted the settlement of CIS conflicts as being only one of Russia’s major security interests and wanted...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Ideas and Political Debates In Theoretical Approaches to Foreign Policy Development
• 3. Foreign Policy Ideas and Their Manifestation In Key Foreign Policy Orientations
• 4. Russian Domestic Politics and the Evolution In Debates About Foreign and Military Policy Towards the CIS States, 1991–6
• 5. Russia’s Political Debates and Military Involvement In the Moldova–Transdniestria Conflict
• 6. Russia’s Political Debates and Military Involvement In the Georgia–Abkhazia Conflict
• 7. Russia’s Political Debates and Military Involvement In the Tajik Conflict
• 8. Conclusions
• Notes
• Selected Bibliography