Information Strategy and Warfare

A Guide to Theory and Practice

John Arquilla, Douglas A. Borer, John Arquilla, Douglas A. Borer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN:
  9780415771245
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135984144
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This volume develops information strategy as a construct equal in importance to military strategy as an influential tool of statecraft.John Arquilla and Douglas A. Borer explore three principal themes:the rise of theinformation domain and information strategy as an equal partner alongside traditional military strategythe need to consider the org

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The rhetoric of terror

“War” as misplaced metaphor

Frank J. Barrett and Theodore R. Sarbin

When President Bush referred to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks as the “first war of the twenty-first century,” he was marking off the attacks as distinctive and perhaps unprecedented. This new “war” beckoned some to reach beyond common conventions to make sense of what was happening. For some the marking was literal: The Economist referred to 11 September as “the day the world changed.” Others reach for similes or some semblance of familiarity (“It’s like Pearl Harbor,” or “It’s like the day JFK was killed”). None of these depictions are satisfying. In fact, the attacks were so unusual and unprecedented, there was no ready framework or language to convey what had happened. The temptation is strong to grasp for a more familiar set of words, to draw on some preexisting framework to make sense of these disruptive events. What’s interesting, for our purposes, is the search for metaphorical constructs, “as if” expressions, in an effort to understand what feels radically unfamiliar. Bush and his aides drew immediately on the accessible and facile language of war.

In this chapter, we explore the consequences of choosing the war metaphor. We begin by discussing the nature of metaphor and the tendency for metaphor to morph into mythology such that the discourse community that repeatedly uses a metaphor comes to interpret it literally. We then discuss the widespread use of the war metaphor as a framework for guiding action and implementing policy. Analyzing the “war on drugs,” we argue that the warfare framework for guiding policy, while useful, also creates unintended consequences. We build on this foundation to make three points about the “war on terrorism” metaphor. First, we propose that the application of the war metaphor as a framework for understanding and responding to the terrorist attacks is an inappropriate choice. Use of the warfare lexicon to construe the struggle against suicide bombers has obfuscated meaning, constrained the repertoire of possible responses to the attacks, and produced several unintended consequences, some of them self-defeating. Second, we propose it would be more appropriate to cite the framework of criminality and justice to shape and implement policy related to terrorism. Third, we argue that by choosing the warfare metaphor, US policy makers have undermined their ability to study and understand the conditions that give rise to suicide bombers, terrorist cells, and others we have labeled as the “enemy,” and as a result, US policies may exacerbate those very conditions. If policy makers were to approach the problem in the same manner that criminologists approach their tasks, their efforts are more likely to lead to useful insights for stopping terrorism. Finally, we discuss the often used phrase “winning the war of ideas” that guides intervention efforts, and we suggest that this language is self-limiting and fails to appreciate the dynamics by which people are likely to alter their beliefs.

From metaphor to myth

While metaphors aid in articulating challenging or difficult experiences, it would be mistaken to think of them only as figurative or ornamental devices. Metaphors posit a framework for selecting, naming, and framing characteristics of one domain by asserting a similarity with another, implying meanings that may not otherwise have been noticed. For example, in the metaphor “man is a wolf,” the ravaging, predatory nature of man is given focus; by contrast, the simile “my love is like a red, red rose” focuses on the more delicate, beautiful nature of one’s beloved blooming to fruition, going through seasonal changes, and so on. The domains of wolves and roses in these examples invite particular meanings. In this sense, metaphors are filters that suppress some details and emphasize others – in short, “organize our view of the world” (Barrett and Cooperrider 1990; Lackoff and Johnson 1980).

At first blush, sentences such as “my love is a rose” or “man is a wolf” violate one of the maxims of the cooperative principle, a set of rules that facilitate communication (Grice 1975). Speakers are expected to observe the maxim of quality that utterances should make sense, that speakers should utter true statements and avoid untrue statements. Since men are not literally wolves or flowers, the reader or listener experiences a momentary condition of uncertainty, of epistemic strain. Unless the context marks the utterance as metaphor, the reader or dialogue partner is in a problematic sense-making situation. The reader or dialogue partner can resolve the epistemic strain by engaging in one of three strategies. The first, the credo (“I believe”) resolution, is to regard the statement as true. The second, the figural strategy, is to regard the statement as metaphor. The third, the nonsense strategy, is to regard the statement as absurd, a condition that would terminate the cooperative discourse. If the dialogical context does not signal that a metaphor is intended, the writer can make use of linguistic conventions such as quotation marks or can qualify the anomalous utterance – “men are flowers” or “men are wolves” – with a marker phrase, such as “figuratively speaking.”

For most readers, the metaphor “man is a flower” is transparent. Hardly anyone would regard the utterance as the basis for a belief that men and flowers belong to the same taxonomic class. When we employ or hear these phrases in conversation, we recognize the “as if” quality of the descriptive terms; we would not employ the credo resolution (treating the figural expression as literal), which would support our engaging in such actions as recommending watering people so they grow like flowers.

We are concerned here with the transformation from metaphor to myth, occasions when metaphor is less transparent than these illustrative examples. Earlier studies (Chun and Sarbin 1970) support the inference that nontransparent, unmarked metaphors tend to pull for the credo resolution; they are more likely to be given a literal rather than a figurative interpretation. These submerged metaphors are candidates for reification, or what Ryle (1949) called a “category mistake,” which occurs when “idioms applicable to one category of things [are] applied to another category of events.” As we demonstrate in the next section, some metaphors, particularly those associated with warfare, are vulnerable to submersion and reification that lead to category mistakes.

The attraction of the war metaphor

The war metaphor lends itself to mythical transformation and is an attractive framework for understanding and implementing policies. Associations with the domain of combat and warfare have been insinuated into several other domains and influence daily life in ways that have become so habitual that we sometimes lose sight of the fact that these are “as if” constructs. Consider ways that we have borrowed terms from the domain of warfare and applied them to political activities and marketing: we create “think tanks,” we “mobilize resources,” “target a particular group” in order to “make an impact,” or we say that someone “missed the target” in relation to achievements as a set of indicators. The military metaphor has been used to frame the way we think about medicine and health care. Diseases “invade” the body, “advance,” and “attack the body”; antibiotics and our immune systems “fight” against infections, and so on. There are shortcomings and limitations of the “disease as warfare” metaphor. This way of thinking might lead to over-mobilization efforts when less active interventions are appropriate, an emphasis on short term goals and interventions over long term health, treating the body as if it were territory or a battlefield rather than a living person (see Board on Global Health, 2006).

Our usual referents for the term “war” are acquired early in life when we read history books that discuss the Revolutionary War, World War I, World War II, and so on. A few words about the domain of warfare: war is a conflict that occurs between nation-states; it is often associated with campaigns of accumulation and expansion or defense against invaders who wish to expand or accumulate territory or other valued property; war is a conflict between enemies who have fixed, non-negotiable positions such that going to war is a symbol that negotiations have ceased; wars have beginnings and endings, victors and vanquished; the enemy is regarded as evil, so extreme action is warranted; when one’s country is at war, one feels compelled to adopt a stance of patriotic unity and support of one’s nation.

Given the long history of warfare and writings about war, it is easy to see how warfare has come to carry a familiar set of meanings and how one might easily draw on the imagery and lexicon of warfare. Perhaps because warfare represents mobilization of activity within an extreme environment and against a defined enemy, the language lends itself to metaphorical transfer into a variety of other domains, especially as a way to rally support for some cause or endeavor. A politician who says, “We need to combat inflation” is drawing on a rhetorical device that posits inflation as an external enemy that needs to be defeated by a concerted, collective effort lest the nation be overtaken by the momentum of the inflationary forces. If inflation is construed as the enemy, elected officials become wary of supporting policies that might be inflationary, for fear of being seen as supporting the enemy. As we explore below, if we forget that these constructs are “as if” constructions and treat them literally, unintended consequences ensue.

The “war on drugs” is an example of metaphor that has achieved mythic status and influenced public policy implementation. A high priority of President George H. W. Bush, the war on drugs attracted public attention and catalyzed the implementation of strong legislation to criminalize drug trafficking. The framework through which actions were construed made it almost impossible to refer to drugs, drug traffickers, and drug users as anything but evil threats (see Edelman 1985 on symbolic acts of political leaders). References were made to scourges, criminals, cop killers, drug kingpins, and crack lords as enemies to be eliminated. Drug abuse was framed as an “assault” on American youth. Drug enforcement agents were referred to as “freedom fighters” helping to “take back our streets.” By sheer repetition the metaphor and its entailments, the war framework has attained mythical status and has been used to justify extreme action, including US military intervention in Columbia, to curtail drug production.

While the metaphor was a useful framework for mobilizing commitment, there are ways in which it does not fit the reality and detracts attention from other factors. This is not a conflict between nation-states; the traffickers are not interested in capturing territory; there is no conceivable “peace” negotiation; and a victory is inconceivable – drugs will never be eliminated, so the continued existence of drugs can be interpreted as defeat. But worse, by framing antidrug efforts as a war on drugs and on drug traffickers, drug enforcers may not be addressing other important issues.

A recent RAND study demonstrated that the “war on drugs” campaign has framed the policy in such a way that resources are devoted primarily to interdiction and criminalization. The argument for focusing on enforcement and interdiction is that by going after traffickers, drug availability will decrease, prices will increase, and demand will decrease. The study authors pointed out that the policy does not distinguish between heavy and casual or recreational users. Arguably, the heavy users warrant more attention – they keep demand high and place a greater strain on the health care system. The RAND researchers found that for this population, drug treatment would be a more appropriate intervention. A policy that emphasizes warfare tends to construe a monolithic enemy, is indiscriminate, and misses such nuances.

The RAND study concluded that the war on drugs has had mixed results. Fewer resources and efforts are devoted to understanding the social and psychological conditions that make drug use attractive. Attention is deflected away from other approaches, such as prevention, treatment, legalization, and decriminalization, even though some evidence suggests that these methods are more successful than interdiction in reducing drug abuse (Nobles 2002).

Several other factors suggest poor outcomes in the war on drugs. First, since the war on drugs was initiated, the price of cocaine has declined, indicating greater availability on the streets and increased purity, making this drug more accessible and more damaging (Sterling 1999). Second, in no small part as a result of drug enforcement policies, the courts are clogged and the prison system is overcrowded. Finally, the policy fails to notice addiction to the two most widely used (and arguably the most damaging) drugs – alcohol and tobacco.

The war metaphor may be an inappropriate way to frame and address the drug problem. The war metaphor identifies forces of evil (as it must) and thus blinds us to important nuances; it emphasizes a mindset of “quick strikes” and aggressive interventions that diverts us from addressing the social factors that lead to drug use. Some have argued that the social problem of drug use is one that requires careful and patient analysis and pragmatic strategies that address an entire spectrum of interventions, prevention measures, and treatments. In the next section we discuss how the vocabulary of the “war on terrorism” lends itself to analysis along similar lines.

Mythical status of the “war on terrorism”

The “war on terrorism” (also often called the “war on terror”) is a case of an opaque metaphor that has been uttered and repeated by government officials and media as a literal truth. The users of the warfare metaphor have forgotten the “as if” quality of the construction, and the metaphor has become myth: meaning clos...

Table of contents

• Contemporary security studies
• Contents
• Tables
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• 1 The rhetoric of terror
• 2 Al-Qaeda and its affiliates
• 3 Winning hearts and minds
• 4 Jihadi information strategy
• 5 Reorganizing for public diplomacy
• 6 The one percent solution
• 7 Strategy and psychological operations
• 8 Assessing the computer network operations threat of foreign countries
• 9 Blogs and military information strategy
• Conclusion
• Index