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Part I
Introduction
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1 Introduction
Nizam Ahmed
Governance, writes Rose (1973), is a relational activity; it is a process influenced by a variety of actors and institutions. While the omnipresence of some institutions/actors, particularly bureaucracy, is noticeable in any type of governing activity, there is no omnipotent actor that can determine governance outcomes. Good governance requires good policies. Malgovernance often results from bad policies. The way policies are made and implemented has implications for governance. Like governance, many actors are involved in the policy process. With the resurgence of democracy in recent decades, the scope of policymaking has widened in breadth if not depth. Those who traditionally did not play any major role in the policy process, particularly politicians, have emerged victorious. Politicians now have a greater involvement in policymaking and governance than ever before.
In fact, it has become conventional wisdom that politicians and bureaucrats are both policy actors, with each involved in the determination of ends, the choice of means and the task of balancing social forces (Aberbach et al. 1981; Campbell 1988; Peters 1978). The classical view that the politician and the bureaucrat are two different kinds of people engaged in different kinds of work – the former in policymaking and the latter in policy implementation (Wilson 1887) – has been attacked, rejected and seemingly destroyed (Svara 1985: 221). This conventional/classical view was first expounded by Wilson and subsequently popularized by Goodnow in the early twentieth century, and by White and Willoughby in the 1920s. In the 1930s Luther Gulick claimed Wilson and argued for orthodoxy when he said, “we are faced with two heterogeneous functions – politics and administration – the combination of which cannot be undertaken within the structure of administration without impairing efficiency.” The initial challenge to the model came as early as 1940 when one scholar argued:
The concrete patterns of public policy formulation and execution reveal that politics and administration are not two mutually exclusive boxes or distinctions but they are two closely linked aspects of the same process. Public policy, to put it flatly, is a continuing process, the formation of which is inseparable from its execution. Public policy is being formed as it is being executed, and it is likewise being executed as it is being formed. Politics and administration play a continuous role in both formulation and execution.
(Friedrich 1940: 6)
The first systematic attack on the orthodox view, however, came after World War II. Paul Appleby, who initiated the attack, bluntly observed: “public administration is policymaking” (1949). This view was in stark contrast to Wilson, who enunciated and argued in favor of the dichotomy model. Appleby not only found the conventional model inherently weak but also argued that the participation of administration1 in policymaking was normatively valid. To quote Appleby: “In the field of government every kind and conception of value weighs on the political scale, and only political processes produce a reading. Public administration must contribute to the weighing, and to do that means to function politically” (1949: 14). He, however, maintained that it was not an autonomous, isolated or exclusive policymaking but subjected to still other and various policymakers.
Appleby was soon followed by a new web of thinkers and practitioners including Herbert Simon, who also maintained that the separation of politics and bureaucracy in the classical sense was no longer tenable. They observed that the making and execution of public policy were inseparably intertwined. At the core of the ‘neo-conventional’ view lies the argument that bureaucracy is not simply a rational and apolitical instrument concerned with carrying out policies originating outside of its control; it is an important part of the policymaking process. It is thus argued that a clear-cut differentiation of political and bureaucratic roles is very difficult, for several reasons. Dogan classifies them into two broad categories: the expanding scope of the modern state and the decline of Parliament (1975: 3–24).
In recent years, many countries have adopted measures aimed at rolling back the state and thereby reducing the policy influence of the bureaucracy. In particular, the resurgence of ideological concerns in government has produced a demand for a reduced bureaucratic prominence in government (Peters 1978). Some of the specific measures taken in this respect include: tighter political control of senior appointments and more use of political advisors or external consultants instead of internal specialists; less security of tenure and more external recruitment to key positions; separation of policymaking from operational functions, and competition with the private sector (Pollitt 1990; Ridley 1996). Self, however, argues that the application of a market model to public administration is seriously flawed (1997: 17). Moreover, the move towards “de-privileging the civil service,” to borrow Ridley’s terminology (1996: 17), remains confined mostly to the English-speaking countries of the West. This has not appealed much to different European countries where the state, by implication the bureaucracy, can still exercise major influence. An important factor accounting for this difference relates to the constitutionally embedded status and prestige that the public servants in Europe enjoy. The constitution places restraints on what is possible in these countries (Ridley 1996: 23–26).
In general, policymaking power has flowed from the legislature to the executive and, from it, to the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy has become a system of governance and the locus of power has shifted to bureaucrats (Nachmias and Rosenbloom 1980: 25; Christoph 1975; Rourke 1976: 184, 1987; Sanera 1985: 542–543). Kaufman (1981), however, cautions that the idea that the bureaucracy is out of control is an emotional charge that lacks substantive proof. Different empirical studies of bureaucrats’ perception of policymaking show that they do not generally perceive it (policymaking) in a zero-sum fashion (Kaufman 1981; Yates 1982). However, although one can notice some kind of congruence of political and bureaucratic influences in the policy process in the modern state, the two do not approach policymaking in similar ways; nor do they have the same political skills. They may be of the same genus, but they are not of the same species (Aberbach et al. 1981: 12).
Bureaucrats are the more stable and conservative elite; they tend to maintain equilibrium in the policy environment. Politicians, on the other hand, are more ‘risk-taking’; they tend to inject energy and initiative in the policy process.
(Aberbach et al. 1981: 203)
Notwithstanding these differences, the two do not perceive policymaking in mutually exclusive terms. Bureaucrats (in the West) both acknowledge and prefer some increased degree of influence in major policy decisions by other actors (Miller 1987: 239–245).
Putnam has argued that there has emerged (in the West) a new brand of bureaucrat called political bureaucrats. In general, they are more programmatic in their orientation to policymaking, less legalist, and more activist in their interpretation of their own role. In the majority of cases, they have replaced the classical bureaucrats who, in the Weberian sense, are above politics, and believe that public issues can be resolved in terms of some objective standard of justice or legality, or technical practicability (Putnam 1975: 90). “Political bureaucrats accept the inseparability of politics and administration … notwithstanding their increasing political role, they still accept the basic values and premises of pluralistic democracy” (Putnam 1975: 89–91). Similarly, politicians also acknowledge the policy role of the bureaucracy as legitimate and an accepted norm (Aberbach et al. 1981: 241).
The situation in developing countries is somewhat different. The bureaucracy traditionally enjoyed an edge over politicians in the making and implementation of public policies. But following the resurgence of democracy worldwide, politicians have emerged as one of the key actors in the process of policymaking and governance. The role of different new groups, in particular Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), has also been recognized as legitimate, although in some cases, including Bangladesh, politicians and bureaucrats both have some kind of suspicion about the activities of these groups. Such change in the context of policymaking has implications for governance. Unlike in the past when policies were imposed mostly from the top without any public input in their making, and those responsible for their implementation could mostly carry out their responsibilities without accounting for their activities, the introduction of democracy has changed the balance of power, at least formally, in favor of the politicians. Elected politicians, formally in charge of governing, claim responsibilities for policymaking. Because of the development in information technology and the emergence of different policy advocacy groups and CSOs, they can now diversify, should they so wish, their sources of policy advice and reduce dependence upon the bureaucracy. Different institutions of governance now enjoy greater legitimacy than before, which is intended to make them effective.
This is, however, not to argue that there has been a sea-change in politico–bureaucratic relations in the policy process or the governing process. Continuity with the past is still evident in most of the areas of public concern. In Bangladesh, for example, for substantive public policymaking, ministers are dependent more upon the higher bureaucracy which possesses skills and expertise and, more importantly, controls important sources of information. Although ministers are allowed to have private secretaries at public expense, the latter are essentially more political than policy advisors, reinforcing the political dimension of the minister’s decisions and strategy. They share the minister’s party background and political language, and act as a buffer between the minister and his party and not the other way around, i.e., as a buffer between the minister and his or her permanent secretary, as in different Westminster-style systems such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand (Laffin 1987; Jones 1973; Forward 1977; Kingdom 1966; Deutsch 1973; Eichbaum and Shaw 2007). The role of Parliament in the policymaking process remains largely limited more because of the tendency of government to dominate it than for lack of any formal parliamentary power.
Formally, Parliament still enjoys supremacy over lawmaking, subject to review by the highest court if necessary. Following the resurgence of democracy in many parts of the world, legislatures have also become more active, at least compared with the past. Thus, although legislation still remains a monopoly of the government in most Westminster-style democracies including the old ones, it is subjected to influence from various sources. The passage of legislation in its original form is no longer guaranteed as in the past and because of the introduction of several procedural innovations, particularly department-related committees, which were previously considered to be a characteristic of the Congressional system – an alien device inappropriate to parliamentary government (Rush 1982: 141) – many governments now have to negotiate with law-makers for the passage of legislation. The scope for pre-legislative scrutiny by committees as well as by CSOs also exists in some countries.
As stated earlier, sound policies are an important prerequisite of good governance. The two are, however, interrelated. The emergence of new groups along with the willingness of policymakers/legislators to become more proactive has widened the scope of the policy process, at least to a certain extent. Demands from donors have also contributed in some ways to the process. Implementation of policies is also now subject to greater, if not better, scrutiny than before. One of the important functions of department-related parliamentary committees is to monitor and review the implementation of government policies and in most of the new democracies these committees have the power to enforce the attendance of witnesses and the production of papers and documents. The press has apparently used its new-found freedom in a very responsible manner, probing into government policies in a much more rigorous – if not always effective – manner than before.
Overall, some kind of redefinition of roles and responsibilities of different actors in the policy/governing process may be noticed in emerging democracies. Those who did not have much scope to become proactive in the past can now hope to contribute to the process, at least to a certain extent. The monopoly of the bureaucracy has been challenged and changed. Yet that has not left the bureaucracy moribund. It still remains resilient in most of the countries of the world. As Khair has observed:
Bureaucracy has a very crucial role in the governance itself [as well as in policy] because the State cannot be delinked from the governance process. The core of the whole governance reform agenda is based on the State where other actors collaborate with the State, thereby making it a governance collaborative model. The State in this case is a very important actor. If we remove the State, other actors do not have the legitimacy or the power or the resources to carry democracy further. Here civil society agents like NGOs are not very influential. This is where the role of bureaucracy becomes very crucial, because this is the only group that can reform the governance from within.2
In 40 years, Bangladesh has had a mixed policy performance. Notwithstanding its slow economic development, the country has nevertheless achieved impressive gains in social sectors. In some cases (health, education), it has even overtaken neighboring India and Pakistan. With the restoration of democracy, the country has seen changes in public policymaking which have affected policy performance. As a post-colonial developing country, the discourse of policymaking and policy research in Bangladesh has been about ‘development’ and ‘planning.’ For over a decade following independence, most of the public sector was governed by long-term five-year plans. A clear sense of demarcation between policy and plan has also been non-existent. In recent times almost every Ministry has a plan and policy of its own. Sub-sectoral policies are also quite common.
The chapters in this edited volume seek to identify and analyze issues related to the making and implementation of public policies in Bangladesh from 1972 to 2012. Most were earlier presented to an International Workshop on Public Administration and Governance held in Chittagong in January 2013. The exceptions are Chapters 2, 4, 6, 11 and 14, which have been prepared exclusively for this volume. The volume is divided into a number of parts, each of which deals with a particular dimension.
The four chapters in Part II deal with important issues related to governance and public policy. Chapter 2 reviews the definitions and descriptions of governance, identifies the drivers, and examines the challenges of measuring governance. The chapter demonstrates that a shift in conceptualization, interpretation and measurement is necessary to improve governance. Chapter 3 b...
