America, the EU and Strategic Culture

Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain

Asle Toje

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2008
• Print ISBN:
  9780415448727
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134060580
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This book provides a provocative analysis of relations between Europe and America during the tempestuous years 1998-2004. Analysing EU foreign policy, it concludes that the lessons learnt in interacting with America have been crucial in shaping the emerging EU strategic culture.The book challenges established orthodoxy regarding the sui generis nat

1
Understanding transatlantic relations

Some definitions

In order to embark in an orderly fashion this chapter will lay out some of the core concepts and assumptions that underpin this study. This work argues that the United States exerted significant influence on the European Union security policies during the formative years, 1998–2004. Hardly a revolutionary assertion – yet, one that is surprisingly often overlooked by EU security policy scholars. Attempts to put forward a coherent EU foreign policy have been hampered and shaped by ambiguity and inconsistency, but also by policies made in Washington, DC. This thesis is arrived at through three empirical case studies. The approach is to refine empirical findings into a more general framework in order to explain the exercise of influence in the US–EU security relationship. American theorist Jack Nagel points out three preconditions for the study of power and influence, namely to specify precisely, the time-period (i.e. from when to when?), the domain (i.e. power over whom?) and the scope (i.e. power with regard to what?).¹ This work focuses on the impact of the United States on the dependent variable, namely the EU strategic culture, by focusing on key security policies during the formative years from 1998 to 2004. Less attention will be paid to the capabilities and institutions of the European Security and Defence Policy and the future of the transatlantic link, although the work is clearly also relevant to these debates.² The criteria for the selection of the time-period and cases, that is, why certain events were chosen over others, are relatively straightforward. The 1999 Kosovo war, the 1998–2004 EU–NATO enlargements and the 2003 Iraq crisis have been chosen because they represent three momentous events in the transatlantic security partnership of the period. The disparity of these cases also helps shed light on the topic from different angles.

The Franco-British Saint Malo declaration of December 1998 marked the first beginning of the European Security and Defence Policy. The year 2004 is chosen as the second milestone not only because five years is a sufficient time span to allow for an assessment of EU security policies, but also because that year saw the completion of the dual project of enlarging the EU and NATO. As a European Commission study on Euro-American relations concedes: “Any assessment of EU–US cooperation immediately runs into the problem of scope”, noting that “most issues are more than exclusively EU–US issues”.³ This book will not concern itself with the formal frameworks for EU–US interaction in any detail – that ground has already been covered. Nor will much attention be given to bureaucratic interplay.⁴ Instead the study will focus on Euro-American interaction over real-world security policies. An alternate approach would perhaps have been to have singled out other events such as the EU’s missions in the Balkans in the early 2000s. But this would have complicated analysis in the sense that these operations attracted little attention in Europe and the United States. Influence is, as we shall see, best observed in issues where each actor has a stake – defined preferences with regard to outcomes, as is the case in the three chosen case studies. The three cases being spread out in time allows for monitoring diachronic change as well as the American techniques of influencing and the circumstances under which the EU proved more, and less, susceptible to influence.

American foreign policy

Before discussing the boundaries of this study in greater detail, it may be helpful to clarify what is meant by “significant American influence on EU security policies”. How to analyse the relationship between the EU and the US? The connection is characterised by a lack of institutional bindings and formal channels of communications. This is by mutual preference. The US prefers to see NATO as the primary arena for its security interaction with the Europeans, while EU institutions have, given the overpowering nature of the US, preferred to keep the world’s most powerful state at arm’s length. Strategic interaction has traditionally played a marginal role in overall EU–US relations, where most issues have been on a practical level. Primary contact points include the EU Commission and relevant US government agencies, on issues that fall within their

competencies such as the exchange of data and biannual summits.⁵ Therefore, the first question pertains to who the primary actors are. The making of US foreign policy is a complicated and, in many ways, impenetrable process.⁶ Needless to say, the President and his Administration are key players in determining American attitudes towards the European Union. Presidential Administrations tend to place great emphasis on maintaining a unity of purpose. Adopted policies are usually defended by all members of the Administration regardless of personal leanings. The Washington process of policy formation traditionally involves the State Department, the Department of Defense, the National Security Council and an inner circle of White House advisers.

The second key player is the Congress. The Houses of Congress have real influence in foreign policy matters due to their fiscal powers over the federal budgets. By controlling the government’s “purse”, Congress can regulate the President’s level of ambition abroad. Once Congress is asked for specific or additional funding for a foreign policy issue, the question is introduced into US domestic politics. Congressional votes tend to fall along party, electoral and moral lines. Given the crucial constitutional roles of the Senate in the ratification of treaties and the House of Representatives in legislating funding for government programmes, the Houses of Congress have a tradition of overseeing and shaping transatlantic security policies. The role of the Congress is strengthened by the tendency of Presidents to use foreign policies for domestic, political gain which, in turn, leads to the “domestication of foreign policy”. In addition, foreign policy lobbies and advocacy groups play a highly visible role in US foreign policy debate.

The making of EU security policies

This is not the place for any detailed account of the intricacies of EU security policy-making – that has been done in great detail elsewhere.⁷ I will instead limit myself to a few general observations. The first question one needs to ask oneself is: What are “security policies” in an EU context? It would have been considerably easier to pinpoint only two decades ago, when most readers would have had an instinctive understanding of this term.⁸ Security policies were then limited to what was called “high politics” – the diplomatic and military defence against a single and existential threat represented by the Soviet Union – or (for the member states in Eastern and Central Europe) the United States. The end of the Cold War saw a fundamental rethinking on the nature of security, with less emphasis being placed on military security, and more on non-military aspects.

As we shall examine more closely in the next chapter, the ESDP is a true-born child of the post-Cold War era. Potentially it covers a wide range of policy areas – from long-term development assistance to crisis management and military intervention with a correspondingly wide range of policy instruments. Security policy is therefore, for our purpose, defined in terms of scope – issues that are a matter of strategy. Paul Kennedy defines strategy as the endeavour to reconcile the ends and means by powers with extensive interests and obligations.⁹ This concerns the exercise of the “hard power” that stems from military and economic means. Hard power is a means of direct influence and describes an actor’s ability to coerce, induce or resist attempts at such. These were the areas the CFSP/ESDP nexus was meant to improve. The term “EU security policies” refers to policy guidelines and positions agreed upon within the EU framework which will be examined more closely in the three case studies.

With regard to decision-making, it is important to keep in mind that the EU is not a strong, centralised federation like the US, but is rather a weak federation with a fragmented centre. Examining influence in the context of EU foreign policy is more difficult than analysing the foreign policies of any single member state. For better or for worse the EU is a sui generis organisation. For reasons we shall examine in greater detail in the next chapter, the CFSP is frequently not a common policy in the sense indicated in the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (TEU). It is a coordination mechanism in which input from the EU institutions feed in alongside those of the member states. The member states pursue their parallel national foreign policies and maintain control over the fiscal, military and diplomatic resources that are to be mobilised in the context of the EU. The EU is therefore not in a position to interact wholly and deliberately with other international actors such as the United States.

The institutional structures governing EU foreign and security policy are dissimilar from their nation-state counterparts. In pluralistic democracies, power and legitimacy is transmitted bottom-up through the democratic process. The EU foreign policy institutions cannot claim a similar democratic legitimacy. This limits the mandate of the EU policymakers but it also insulates them from public opinion and electoral poli-tics. The EU Commission is dependent on the member states with whom it shares the right of initiative. The member states figure more prominently in the forward-looking, or strategic, elements of the EU foreign policy-making process that is characterised by intergovernmental bargaining. For this purpose, the Union from 1998 to 2004, pooled power resources and devised processes to mobilise and deploy these resources. Foreign and security policies are not integral parts of the EU – in the sense that the CFSP/ESDP nexus has been singled out in a separate “pillar” uneasily tacked on to the European Communities.¹⁰ The European Council defines the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP, of which the ESDP is considered a major element, as well as common strategies to be implemented by the EU. In Pillar II, the EU has embraced unanimity, that is, in principle, each of the 27 members have an absolute veto over any policy.¹¹ Of course, as Simon Nuttall has observed, “the system does not operate under a perpetual threat of veto”.¹² CFSP decisions are therefore generally made by consensus, which normally is arrived at through carefully crafted ambiguities, consensus building and horse trading.¹³

Karen Smith rightly notes that it is usual for analysts to see EU foreign policies as being dominated by élites in national foreign ministries.¹⁴ Yet Michael Smith is also correct in pointing out:

it is evident that there is an intimate linkage between the internal development of the EU and its institutions and the broader European order, which is not solely attributable to the interests, power or policies of major European states. Whilst some analysts have emphasised this connection, it is doubtful whether it can be accounted for simply within an inter-state or inter-governmental framework.¹⁵

Although the member states are important, it is important not to underestimate two other structures, notably the “Troika” (which comprises the holder of the rotating EU Presidency alongside the Commissioner for External Relations and the High Representative for the CFSP)¹⁶ and informal directorates, notably the “EU-3”, which comprises Germany, France and Britain, whose importance cannot be overestimated. In the EU process, the importance of individual actors clearly varies, albeit perhaps not in the ways one might expect, as we shall see in the case studies.

Although decision-making by consensus certainly limits policy output, the EU states have generated a cumulative body of common foreign and security policies characterised by common positions and joint actions. For all its shortcomings, the CFSP has brought about a sea-change in the practice and ambiance of foreign policy-making. This is due not least to the fact that the modus operandi of voluntary security, combined with the ineffective decision-making mechanism, have proven fertile ground for “bureaucratic politics”, where the HR-CFSP, and Council and Commission staff play essential roles in formulating EU foreign and security policies. In an interview, a Council Official stated: “We are charged with identifying the issue areas where there is an overlap in terms of means and ends among the member states.” She later went on to say, “Alongside the rotating presidency it is our job to play the role of the honest broker.” Through a blend of incrementalism and pragmatism, the CFSP staff has played an important, if not widely acknowledged, role in setting the EU security agenda. This is the primary reason why EU foreign policies do not represent the lowest common denominator, but rather a median of the range of national views.¹⁷

A question of actorness

The EU wears confidence and insecurity in equal measure. After the Cold War, the Union was widely expected to play a leading role in the new European political and security order. The EU foreign policy élites increasingly took to referring to the EU – in that familiar jargon that conceals and at the same time highlights shortcomings – as a “global actor”.¹⁸ The High Representative of the CFSP summarised the rationale:

Indeed we are a global actor. With 25 member states, with over 450 million inhabitants, a quarter of the world’s GNP, and around 40 per cent of the world merchandise exports; and with the comprehensive array of instruments – economic, legal, diplomatic, military – at our disposal, that claim is not an aspiration but a statement of fact.¹⁹

The question of actorness is of importance because it alludes to the EU’s aspiration to become what in international relations jargon is called a power. David Allen and Michael Smith note that such a presence refers to the ability to exert influence, to shape the perceptions and expectations of others.²⁰ Wolfgang Wessels makes this point clearer still, when he points out that the term “global actor” is usually taken to refer “to a state...

Table of contents

• Contemporary security studies
• Contents
• Tables
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Understanding transatlantic relations
• 2 The transatlantic bargain
• 3 The Kosovo war
• 4 EU and NATO enlargements
• 5 The Iraq crisis
• 6 Towards a bipolar West
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index